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Defending before the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia - An Interview with Anta Guissé

Defending before the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia

An Interview with Anta Guissé

Edited by Cailan Cumming, Kate Gibson & Paul Williams

A Note on Defending Justice

This blog is part of the Defending Justice series, an initiative of the Public International Law and Policy Group (PILPG) to promote an eclectic array of  voices within the field of international criminal law. 

As part of our broader efforts to strengthen institutions of justice, this series seeks to create space for dialogue around the varied perspectives and concerns that shape these institutions. With that aim in mind, we interviewed a series of defense practitioners working in international criminal law and distilled their experiences and insights into a series of first-person blogs, preserving the spirit and voice of those interviews.

Editor’s Note

In this blog, defense lawyer Anta Guissé reflects on the unique dynamics of hybrid tribunals, drawing from her extensive experience at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). As a defense lawyer for Khieu Samphan, a former high-ranking leader of the Khmer Rouge regime, Guissé discusses the historical narratives and local context that influenced her case, as well as the advantages of conducting tribunals in situ. Her first-hand experiences highlight how the symbolic nature of the ECCC trials, the immense pressure to secure convictions, and inconsistencies in applying modes of liability can undermine the foundational principles of law and justice. Guissé is a strong advocate for the integrity of the legal process and judicial discussion, and for uncovering the judicial truth and recognizing victims regardless of the trial’s outcome. Rather than building international criminal law around the desire to convict, Guissé challenges us to let the fundamentals of the rule of law work, regardless of public opinion, moral pressure, or political interference.

Introduction

My journey into international criminal defense was somewhat serendipitous. At the time I began my career, international criminal law had not yet developed into the specialized field it is today. In those early years, many of us working in international law came into the field through our experience in human rights or domestic criminal law. My own domestic career involved intervening on behalf of both the accused and victims, an experience I now draw upon when defending the accused before international tribunals.

It was through my former employer, Raphaël Constant, who had served as defense counsel for the former Rwandan military leader Théoneste Bagosora, that I first learned about international tribunals. After leaving his office, I was hired as a legal consultant for a defense team at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and after working as a consultant in another case, I became a co-counsel in a third case. I subsequently joined the ECCC when my former co-counsel in my last case before ICTR (Kalimanzira v. The Prosecutor), Arthur Vercken, invited me to join the Khieu Samphan case—one of the most defining cases of my career, and the focal point of this blog. 

Defending clients in the context of mass atrocities is a challenge many are not willing to take on, but is one that I have found to be worth confronting since the beginning of my career. Ultimately, presenting the position of the client is the same in any practice of law, but when dealing with crimes of mass atrocities a defense lawyer is forced to examine events from multiple perspectives and keep an open mind amongst the immense pressure to follow the commonly accepted view of history and the prevailing narratives surrounding those events.  International criminal defense has not solely been a professional pursuit to me, but also a service to judicial truth focused on the responsibility of my client—a truth that can only emerge when both the defense and prosecution are fully empowered to understand and present the facts of a case in court. 

What follows are some of my reflections on the complex intersections of law, politics, and justice in the work of the ECCC, and the indispensable role of the defense in upholding the integrity of the international criminal justice system. It begins with a brief overview of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC)—its origins, structure, and the historical context that shaped it. It then turns to the distinctive challenges of defending in a hybrid, in situ tribunal including the procedural dynamics of a court with mixed legal traditions, the significance of working across legal cultures and languages, the limitations on defense, and the tensions between symbolic justice and legal fairness. 

Through the lens of Khieu Samphan’s case, this blog examines how political pressures, funding constraints, time, and evolving modes of liability—particularly the use of joint criminal enterprise—shaped the trial process and strained legal integrity. Finally, it considers what, if anything, hybrid tribunals like the ECCC have contributed to the evolution of international criminal law, and what lessons that can be drawn to strengthen the international criminal justice system and the future work of international tribunals. 

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC)

Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge regime, led by Pol Pot, seized power in 1975 and established the country as Democratic Kampuchea, a classless ‘agrarian utopia’ created by forcibly evacuating cities, abolishing currency, subjecting the population to intense labor under brutal conditions, and targeting perceived enemies, including intellectuals, minorities, and dissenters. This vision, influenced by both Marxist-Leninist and nationalist ideals, contributed to the policies that caused mass suffering and death. The result was catastrophic: an estimated 2 million Cambodians—or one in four people—perished due to executions, starvation, and forced labor in what became known as the Cambodian genocide. The regime collapsed in 1979 following Vietnam’s invasion.

The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia was established in 2004 to provide long awaited justice. This hybrid tribunal, combining international and Cambodian legal frameworks, aimed to prosecute senior and non-senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge that were considered to be the most responsible for the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, destruction of cultural property, and select Cambodian Penal Code offenses. Operating in Phnom Penh, the ECCC sought to deliver justice in situ, embedding the process within the local context.

The ECCC tried a handful of high-profile cases. Case 001 convicted Kaing Guek Eav, head of the S-21 prison, for crimes against humanity. Case 002, the tribunal’s centerpiece, targeted senior Khmer Rouge leaders Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, who died during proceedings, and Ieng Thirith, who was found unfit to stand trial due to progressive dementia. Split into sub-trials, Case 002/01 addressed forced evacuations and executions of soldiers, while Case 002/02 tackled forced marriage, genocide, and other atrocities. Cases 003 and 004, which involved investigations of other Khmer Rouge officials, were mired in political controversy and never reached trial. Despite challenges such as political interference, funding shortages, and slow progress, the ECCC delivered significant verdicts, though its legacy remains debated.

Hybrid Court In Situ

Location

The ECCC’s physical and political location was deliberate. The court was technically situated in Phnom Penh, but in reality it sat on the outskirts of the city, in a military compound that had been artificially included within the capital’s boundaries as part of the negotiated arrangement between the Cambodian government and the United Nations. This physical separation was not insignificant, it contributed to a sense of insulation from the political heart of the city, and from the more acute political pressures that in situ tribunals often face. It also, perhaps intentionally, placed the proceedings more out of view from the public.

The fact that proceedings were held in the country where the crimes occurred shaped every aspect of our work. Being on Cambodian soil brought the defense team closer to the history, culture, and people most affected by the Khmer Rouge regime. Being in Cambodia allowed us to walk the ground—visiting key sites, meeting survivors, and seeing with our own eyes the places the alleged events occurred. 

Public pressure and safety concerns often accompany in-country tribunals, but I felt less at-risk than my counterparts in other cases at the ECCC. The events I was litigating had occurred forty years earlier, and my client Khieu Samphan held little significance to the public, especially to younger generations who were not as familiar with him. Our team was able to speak and act with a measure of independence that, in many international legal contexts, can be hard to come by. ​​But not all of the accused at the ECCC were seen the same way. In Cases 003 and 004, which involved individuals who remained closer to the contemporary political elite, the tribunal came under far greater political interference from the Cambodian government and these cases ultimately collapsed. 

Perceptions of Local Communities 

Despite being physically located in Cambodia, the ECCC often felt distant from the lives of everyday Cambodians. In theory, the tribunal’s presence on national soil was meant to bring justice closer to the people, foster awareness, and offer a sense of collective reckoning with the past. But in practice, many Cambodians were unaware that the tribunal was even operating. Among those who did know, opinions varied widely.

For one, a significant portion of the population had little personal memory of the Khmer Rouge regime. The crimes prosecuted had occurred more than 40 years earlier. Many people simply hadn’t been born yet, or were too young to remember. The crimes during the Khmer Rouge era, for many, was not a matter of lived experience but of distant history—something they had learned about, but not something they felt intimately connected to.

From where I sat, it felt like people were watching from afar. It is not a popular perspective, especially from the standpoint of the official ECCC outreach and communications efforts. They worked hard to engage the public. Buses were organized to bring villagers to court and sometimes people would wake up as early as 3 a.m. to travel long distances just to be present in the courtroom for a few hours. That level of commitment speaks volumes. But at the same time, it does not necessarily reflect widespread engagement or understanding. Whether or not the trials resonated with the general population depended heavily on the community. Some communities were better informed, often because of the targeted outreach or the presence of civil society organizations, while others remained detached.

The reality is that the legal proceedings were complex and often inaccessible. The hearings were dense with legal argument, procedural back-and-forth, and references to international jurisprudence. For many in attendance, especially those without legal training or prior exposure to international criminal law, it was difficult to follow. Some tuned in during major moments, like when a judgment was handed down, or when the trial was featured in a television program. Victims, too, came to court and followed the process closely, particularly those who had participated directly as civil parties. But beyond those moments, it is hard to say that the general public was actively following the trial day to day.

Cambodia’s political climate at the time was also tense. Democracy was increasingly hollowed out. Human rights abuses were ongoing, and political opposition was curtailed. In such a context, it is understandable that many Cambodians had more immediate concerns than a decades-old accountability process. Daily survival, political uncertainty, and social struggles were far more pressing for most people than the inner workings of the courtroom. In the end, while the ECCC aimed to bring international justice home, the connection between court and community was often limited—shaped as much by politics and daily realities as by legal process or historical memory.

Political Context

Understanding the crimes committed under the Khmer Rouge regime requires situating them within the broader geopolitical landscape of the time. Any analysis of what happened in Cambodia between 1975 and 1979 that overlooks the Vietnam War, the Cold War, and the resulting climate of nationalism and suspicion toward foreign influence misses crucial context. The crimes did not occur in a vacuum. The Khmer Rouge’s ideology and actions were shaped, in part, by Cambodia’s fraught relationships with its neighbors and the broader international order. Cambodia became a battleground, both literally and ideologically, between communist and anti-communist forces. The Khmer Rouge regime was intensely nationalistic and paranoid about foreign influence, which shaped an ideology that sought to purge Cambodia of capitalist systems and fueled internal purges, border attacks, and the targeting of ethnic minorities like the Vietnamese and Cham people. Understanding this climate of suspicion helps explain why the regime viewed large segments of its own population as traitors or enemies.

Revolution and nationalism can carry different meanings to people with differing histories. For countries that gained independence through long and protracted struggles, concepts like revolution can hold a different moral and political weight. Understanding the Khmer Rouge’s ideological mission as an extreme outcome of a radicalized, nationalistic response to perceived external and internal threats provides context as to why certain policies were pursued. This context informed some of our defense positions. We did not seek to excuse crimes or minimize suffering, but we aimed to explain the conditions and motivations that shaped individual and collective actions at the time. These historic and factual layers matter, and it is our role as defense lawyers to bring them to light. Unfortunately, in international criminal trials, we are often given very little space, either in terms of time or pages, to fully articulate this context.

Hybrid Framework

In addition to the location, the court’s hybrid framework brought unique perspectives, tools, and challenges. Every chamber and organ, including investigative judges, prosecutors, and defense, had to be composed of both Cambodian and international members. Judicial decisions had to be reached jointly by national and international judges, meaning every step of the judicial process required careful communication across cultural and legal traditions.

This structure profoundly shaped how the court and teams operated and created an environment of strong collaboration. Cambodian lawyers and local translators brought essential linguistic, legal, and cultural fluency to the team. All court documents had to be filed in Khmer, French, and English so that every judge could follow proceedings in their working language. Working across three languages was demanding, but our trilingual jurist Seng Socheaya became the team linchpin who held everything together. 

A mixed national-international team was essential in shaping each lawyer’s legal and professional approaches into a unified vision that took local customs and norms into consideration. Even the seemingly straightforward task of preparing questions for a witness became challenging when approached from different legal traditions and cultural norms. What might be a perfectly acceptable question in a Western courtroom could be misunderstood—or even offensive—in a Cambodian context. Local norms shaped not only how questions were asked, but how witnesses responded, and how the evidence was interpreted. In the end, the hybrid structure of the ECCC, while complex and sometimes unwieldy, was essential to its legitimacy and effectiveness.

        Investigations

The investigative process at the Extraordinary Chambers was unique in its procedural grounding within the Cambodian legal tradition, which itself draws heavily on the French civil law system. This had a tangible effect on how evidence was gathered, presented, and evaluated throughout the trial process. The Prosecution conducted its investigation and presented it to the investigating judges, while the defense played a limited role in the investigation phase. Although defense lawyers could submit requests to the investigating judges, they could not conduct field investigations as they often do at other international tribunals. As a result, defense teams at the ECCC were confronted with an immense case file with unfamiliar evidence, which presented a greater obstacle to the trial process than in any other international or hybrid tribunal. On my part, I only arrived in the case at the trial stage.

This created significant hurdles in preparing an effective defense, particularly given the scale and complexity of the charges, which spanned more than four years and involved events across the entire country. The volume of evidence which we were required to review was staggering as the investigating judges could admit virtually anything into the record—including entire books. In my perspective, this overwhelming amount of material was the greatest challenge, and marks one of the most striking differences between domestic and international defense practice.

Witness statements were obtained in a formal way before the investigative judges, a process I was more familiar with as someone trained in civil law systems. Common law systems place more weight on the adversarial process, with cross-examination serving as the principal method of testing the reliability and truthfulness of evidence. While this method was present at the ECCC, the pre-trial investigative process laid a far more substantial foundation for the eventual trial proceedings. In addition, most of the interviews at the ECCC were recorded, allowing both the Prosecution and Defense to assess how the statements had been produced. For instance, we could determine if the statements were in response to an open, direct, or leading question. Through this our team had a clearer sense of if the translation of statements was poor or inconsistent, if the victim may not have understood the question, if the question was asked in an aggressive way, or if the victim may have been nervous in providing his or her answer. The national lawyers were especially important in verifying and analyzing the contents of the statements.

In other international tribunals, like the ICC, witnesses are only heard in the field by prosecution investigators. The defense only receives the finalized statement, and does not have insight into the investigative or interview process. Teams do not have information about the context in which the statements were made, making it difficult to evaluate the witness statements and assess the quality or reliability of the evidence. The ECCC model on that specific aspect offers important lessons for international courts like the ICC, particularly in demonstrating how greater transparency in the investigative and interview process can enhance the evaluation of evidence and the fairness of trials.

Funding and Timing

In theory, international criminal law is about fairness, due process, accountability, and closure for victims. In practice, international criminal tribunals are politically and financially driven, shaped by the interests and expectations of the states and institutions that create and fund them. Donors do not fund tribunals expecting acquittals. The money comes with expectations, often unspoken but deeply understood: justice, in the eyes of many funders, means convictions. It means holding someone responsible, visibly and symbolically. If trials result in acquittals, the tribunal is seen by many as a failure.

The ECCC was supposed to be co-funded by the Cambodian government and international donors, but the Cambodian side often failed to meet its obligations. When that happened, operations ground to a halt—interpreters would strike, proceedings would pause, and uncertainty would set in. Eventually, another donor would always step in to bridge the gap, but not without delay and disruption. A court that existed to serve impartial justice found itself constrained by the funding cycles and political priorities of distant capitals.

The tribunal was enormously expensive, but for all its ambition and symbolism, the ECCC heard only a handful of cases. The length of the trials, the complexity of the hybrid system, and the layers of translation and coordination made the process slow and costly. These tensions were compounded by time constraints. The ECCC began its work decades after the crimes and many of the accused were elderly and in poor health. From the outset, there was a race against the clock to ensure that trials concluded before defendants died or became unfit to stand trial. This urgency led to a series of procedural choices, such as severing case 002 into multiple, smaller trials. The idea was to simplify the case into specific issues and expedite the process. But in practice, it had the opposite effect.

Rather than streamlining the proceedings, severance led to duplication. Issues litigated in the first trial 002/01 resurfaced in the second 002/02. Legal determinations from one case influenced the other in ways that undermined procedural fairness. We found ourselves constantly revisiting arguments and rulings, trying to untangle their consequences for our defense strategy, and litigating issues that impacted the fairness of procedures in the second trial. The clock was always ticking, but the shortcuts meant to save time ended up costing more of it.

And as proceedings dragged on, money and motivation ran thin. Donors became less enthusiastic. Resources dwindled. The brunt of the time pressure fell to the defense team who were expected to review thousands of pages of evidence under short timeframes, perform under impossible deadlines, and respond quickly to shifting legal frameworks. Looking forward, there are lessons to be learned. Prosecutors might consider bringing fewer, better-supported charges. Narrowing the scope to focus on the strongest evidence could result in shorter, more effective trials and it would also help preserve the credibility of the institutions.

Defending the Principles of Law

At the center of international criminal trials is the determination of individual criminal liability. These courts ultimately are not truth commissions, nor are they tasked with writing history. Their mandate is legal, and their aims are rooted in principles of law. For defense counsel, this means our job is not to deny the tragic crimes that occurred or to dismiss the suffering of victims. Rather, it is to test the prosecution’s case and the alleged implication of our client within the proposed evidence.

Objectivity is the starting point. A defense lawyer must work constantly to remove preconceived notions and personal reactions in order to analyze the evidence as neutrally as possible. The defense hopes—and expects—that judges and observers do the same. In my experience, the most dedicated defense lawyers hold profound respect for the victims and for those who have suffered, but ultimately are required to question whether their client is legally and individually responsible for specific acts. That is the fundamental purpose of the defense lawyer.

Symbolic Justice

International and hybrid tribunals tend to operate under immense political and symbolic pressure. The accused often become stand-ins for entire regimes or histories of violence. When only a few individuals are tried for mass atrocities, the pressure to convict those individuals increases, especially in the early stages of a tribunal’s life. At the ECCC, moral outrage, public sentiment, and political optics sometimes threatened to override the principles of law. But defense lawyers have a duty to hold the line. We are not there to deliver moral verdicts. We are there to ensure that legal standards are upheld, even when the events in question are horrifying and the public demands punishment. If symbolism is permitted to eclipse substance, then the tribunals risk undermining the foundation of the system it seeks to uphold.

       Jurisprudence

The trials at the ECCC were designed to represent justice on a grand scale. But that symbolism could sometimes overshadow the substance of the law. The Court was supposed to judge the accused according to the legal framework that existed in Cambodia between 1975 and 1979 but in practice, the jurisprudence applied to their cases was often drawn from international rulings that came decades later—particularly from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. That meant retroactively applying legal standards that had not existed at the time of the alleged crimes and that the accused could not forsee, raising fundamental concerns about legality and fairness.

In my case at the ECCC, the central legal issue was whether it was justifiable to convict my client Khieu Samphan, who held a particular leadership position at the time of the conflict, for acts he neither committed nor ordered, in locations he had never set foot in. Could he have known, between 1975 and 1979, that he bore legal responsibility for certain crimes under a theory of liability that did not yet exist? That was the question my team posed to the Chamber. We maintained throughout that our submission was both factually and legally correct. While the verdict ultimately did not reflect our position, the full submission reveals legal and factual issues that are far more complex than the conviction suggests. 

Legal Integrity

One of the major challenges in the Samphan case involved the principle of legal integrity—the idea that the law must be applied consistently and fairly, without bending principles to achieve a desired outcome. The mode of liability that the prosecution ultimately used to secure the conviction, that of joint criminal enterprise, did not appear in the original indictment. Instead, it was introduced and built into the case over time, during the trial itself. Joint criminal enterprise, a doctrine developed by the judges of the ICTY, permits conviction for crimes that an accused did not commit or intend, if those crimes were foreseeable outcomes of a common criminal plan. It remains highly controversial, in part because of its attenuated connection between the accused and the acts in question.

This shift in the trial process felt as though the legal system had been subtly recalibrated to ensure a conviction. This is a problem that many defense lawyers face in international criminal law. Despite the appearance of adherence to the law, the reality is that no judgment in international criminal law is ever based on law alone. Social context, political expectations, and the legal, personal, and cultural backgrounds of judges all exert an influence. A judge may feel morally opposed to acquitting someone who is seen as a symbol of a brutal regime, even if that is what the law requires. That pressure can shape how modes of liability are interpreted and applied, and what kinds of evidence are considered sufficient to establish criminal responsibility. 

The definitions of crimes are clear, but the modes of liability for the accused are not. The uncertainty in how judgements are rendered makes the defense’s work highly unpredictable and undermines the rights to a fair trial. But defense lawyers ultimately do not make the final decision, and it is someone else who bears that final responsibility. We can only present the applicable law, apply it to the facts, and argue the elements as rigorously as possible. Even in defeat, we hope that the legal reasoning we advance through our submissions will be seen and acknowledged by others. At the very least, we aim to leave behind a clear and principled record that others can examine and use in the future—one that upholds the integrity of legal reasoning, even when the conclusion is politically or morally contested.

The work of a defense lawyer does not stop at the courtroom door. In my client’s case, he was more than 80 years old and struggled with the conditions of detention. We had to continually litigate to secure better conditions for him and ensure that his basic human rights were respected. This work outside of the courtroom matters. It is part of maintaining the fundamental integrity of the law: that every person, no matter who they are or what they have been accused of, has rights. Detention during trial is not about punishment; it is about safeguarding the process while preserving the rights of prisoners. Upholding those rights, both inside and outside the courtroom, is also central to the defense lawyer’s role.

Understanding the Basis for Conviction

My client, Khieu Samphan, was an educated man who had studied in France. We got along well and he enjoyed discussing French literature and politics, and had a broad curiosity about the world. But despite this rapport, there were also significant generational gaps, especially when it came to explaining the legal theory underpinning his prosecution. The idea of joint criminal enterprise was difficult to transmit—not just to the client, but also to many lawyers and judges. How do you explain to someone that they are being held criminally responsible for crimes they neither ordered, committed, nor knew about because their presence at a meeting is interpreted as joining a common plan? It is a profoundly complex legal construct. 

Samphan read extensively about the Khmer Rouge from the outside—what others had written about the regime that he had been part of. He was not wealthy, nor did he profit from the regime in the way some others might have. He spent years living in the jungle in basic conditions, and then in prison. I imagine that for an elderly person, confronting such a radically different version of the reality that you had lived, as told by others, was difficult.

Despite his old age, Samphan was committed to understanding his trial and prosecution. He read every document in the case file. He actively participated in the defense and was capable of pointing out issues. He could become frustrated, and understandably so. After a hearing he might say, “I have never even been there, I do not know this place!”. I would have to explain the nuances of joint criminal enterprise—that by attending certain meetings, the prosecution argued he became responsible for crimes committed elsewhere. That is a tough idea to accept for a criminal lawyer, let alone the accused himself. By the end of the trial, I believe Samphan understood the implications of joint criminal enterprise and why, in the eyes of the tribunal, he was there.

This understanding does not just matter for the accused, it matters for the victims too. It is important that victims understand the legal basis for a conviction or acquittal. Otherwise, they may feel that justice has not been done if the direct perpetrator is not the one on trial, or when the legal requirements for criminal responsibility of the one accused were simply not met. 

Reflections on the Tribunal’s Legacy

Overall, many of the legal principles that emerged from the ECCC were problematic, and I hope they do not shape the future of international criminal law. I left the tribunal with deep reservations about what the ECCC contributed to developing legal doctrine, particularly in regards to its use of joint criminal enterprise and its departure from the principle of legality. Still, there is one silver lining: when you fight your case and finish your submission, the judges are required to issue a reasoned decision. The legal arguments are there, on record, for other lawyers, scholars, and future practitioners to evaluate against the decision. They can read the submissions, the judgment, and the reasoning, and come to their own conclusions. Few people are reading the thousands of pages that make up these decisions. But perhaps in the future—when the dust has settled—there will be more appetite for that kind of close reading and reflection.

Still, the ECCC was not without some value. One positive contribution was the demonstration that a hybrid model of justice could be implemented within a national legal system like Cambodia’s. It also exposed Cambodian judges and lawyers to a different model of justice. Cambodian society is deeply codified, and for many national defense lawyers there had long been a sense of hesitation or deference toward prosecutors and judges. Working alongside international defense lawyers showed what a strong, adversarial defense could look like in practice and the judges became more open to this approach. I believe that that experience was meaningful. But ultimately, it is up to Cambodian lawyers and judges to determine what they took from it and how they will build on it in the years to come.

Ways Forward

One of the enduring challenges in international criminal law is how to meaningfully acknowledge and address the suffering of victims. In any large-scale atrocity, not every crime can be prosecuted, nor every victim represented in court. A good prosecutor must build a case around the strongest evidence, which means focusing on specific incidents and locations where the credibility of witnesses and documentation is highest. This inevitably leaves many victims feeling frustrated and unseen when the violence they endured falls outside the charges or is not directly linked to the accused.

Currently, international criminal law ties victim compensation to a conviction. This is a major flaw in the system. Victims suffer harm regardless of whether a conviction is secured. In some national systems, like in France, compensation is still available even when an accused is acquitted—acknowledging that the harm itself is real and deserving of redress. International law needs to move in this direction.

In addition, justice cannot be reduced to symbolic trials of a few high-ranking individuals but rather these tribunals must be part of a broader system that supports national courts in prosecuting a wider range of perpetrators and crimes. It is an illusion to think that only elite actors or high-profile figures are responsible for atrocities. Such crimes occur within systems—enabled by institutions, policies, and social environments. Trials can illuminate these enabling structures, but they cannot dismantle or reform them. Tribunals do not mark the end or the concluding chapter of a conflict, but rather true prevention of mass atrocities require a commitment to confronting the broader social and political conditions that allow these crimes to occur in the first place.

We like to imagine that international criminal law represents the highest ideals of justice—that it is the most advanced, principled system. But the reality is more complex. Like any legal system, it is flawed. In fact, it often requires extraordinary intellectual and legal contortions to convict people who were not physically present when the crimes occurred. The system, as it stands, demands legal constructions that would be unthinkable in most national jurisdictions. Based on this, I believe it is important for international practitioners to have experience in domestic jurisdictions in order to retain a grounded sense of what criminal liability should mean. In this way, these practicioners do not lose sight of the principles that anchor criminal law—principles that can easily become abstract or distorted at the international level. 

Conclusion 

Reflecting on the experience of defending at the ECCC brings with it a mix of hard-learned lessons, professional concerns, and cautious hope. The tribunal was shaped by its exceptional nature: the scale and gravity of the crimes charged, the sheer volume of evidence, and the long passage of time between the atrocities and the judicial response. These factors made the task of delivering justice uniquely challenging.

The proximity of the court to the alleged crimes provided a rare opportunity for contextualized justice and working in-country, alongside Cambodian lawyers and judges, brought a partnership and immediacy to our work. The hybrid structure—though often politically and logistically strained—allowed for moments of genuine collaboration and mutual learning. We witnessed changes in how national actors perceived the role of the defense and saw the emergence of a more adversarial, rights-respecting understanding of justice. For Cambodian defense lawyers, this exposure may have been particularly significant, as it offered an alternative model to traditional courtroom hierarchies.

At the same time, there were serious limitations. Defense teams had little opportunity for field investigations and limited time to review an already completed case file. And while the symbolism of the trials drew some international and local attention, it often amounted to performative justice rather than meaningful redress for victims. 

The development of legal doctrine at the ECCC left troubling legacies, particularly in its interpretation of joint criminal enterprise and the principle of legality. Too often, international criminal law has relied on abstract constructs to secure convictions of those far from the physical crime scenes, distorting fundamental legal principles. That distortion is not just technical—it speaks to a deeper challenge in international criminal justice. When legal principles are bent to meet political or symbolic aims, the legitimacy of the entire system is called into question. Justice, especially in this context, must resist the urge to perform. It must remain principled, predictable, and firmly grounded in law.

Moving forward, several lessons are clear. International trials must be more realistic in scope and timing. They cannot carry the full burden of transitional justice alone. National jurisdictions must be better supported and equipped to handle a broader range of cases, and the assumption that only high-level perpetrators matter must be re-examined. Donor support is critical and it must go beyond convictions—it must also support the rights of the accused and the adequate functioning of the defense. 

In the end, the legitimacy of international criminal law depends not just on convictions or symbolism, but on the integrity of the process itself. And for that process to be truly just, it must resist the pressure to sacrifice principle for expedience, or to bend the law in service of public opinion. For defense counsel, the task remains as demanding as it is necessary. We are called not just to defend the accused, but to uphold the principles of law. Even when it is unpopular. Even when it is inconvenient. Because it is in those moments that the integrity of the system is tested and hopefully, preserved.

International Humanitarian Law in Focus: Russia’s Violations and Ukraine’s Legitimate Use of Force against Energy Targets

International Humanitarian Law in Focus: Russia’s Violations and Ukraine’s Legitimate Use of Force against Energy Targets

By: Łukasz Adamski,* Kateryna Kyrychenko,** Sindija Beta,*** and Dr. Gregory P. Noone****

Why the legality of striking energy sites depends on who, what, where, when, and why

In the war waged by the Russian state against Ukraine, energy has become both a weapon and a battlefield.  Russia continues its relentless bombardment of Ukraine’s power plants, gas facilities, and heating systems — a campaign that leaves millions facing blackouts and cold as another winter approaches.  In contrast, Ukrainian drones strike deep into Russian territory, targeting refineries and chemical facilities that sustain the Kremlin’s war machine. 

To the casual observer, these might appear as parallel actions: each side hitting the other’s energy network to weaken its capacity and morale.  Yet legally, and morally, they are quite distinct.  International humanitarian law draws clear distinctions between lawful military targets and unlawful attacks on civilian infrastructure.  Understanding those distinctions is not an exercise in legal pedantry; it is essential for accountability, humanitarian protection, and how the world understands the evolving nature of this war.

Specifically, Russia’s systematic attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure amount to war crimes under international law.  Ukraine’s strikes, by contrast, are directed at military-relevant facilities used for generating revenue for Russia’s war machine, while seeking to limit the civilian impact.  This legal and moral asymmetry is not a matter of moral equivalency, but rather it is a matter of law, and it must shape how we understand and respond to this war.

The law that governs destruction

Under Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, parties to an armed conflict may attack only “military objectives” — objects which, by their nature, location, purpose, or use, make an effective contribution to military action and whose destruction offers a definite military advantage.  Attacks on civilian objects are prohibited, as are those that cause incidental civilian harm excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

The law also obliges attackers to take all feasible precautions to verify that targets are military in nature and to minimize harm to civilians.  In practice, these principles mean that the legality of a strike depends not only on what is hit, but why, how, and with what foreseeable consequences.

Energy infrastructure presents a uniquely difficult test.  Power grids, gas networks, and refineries often serve both civilian populations and the war effort.  This dual-use character complicates the application of international humanitarian law, but it does not erase its core logic: an object’s military use must be specific and its destruction must yield a definite military gain.  Strikes that primarily harm civilians or aim to deprive them of essential services fall outside lawful conduct — and may amount to war crimes.

Russia’s assault on Ukraine’s energy grid

From February through October 2025, Moscow has waged what can only be described as an energy-terror campaign.  In February, Russian strikes damaged nearly 40 percent of Ukraine’s gas-production capacity.  In early October, a new wave of missiles and drones destroyed power and heating infrastructure across several regions, leaving around 800,000 people without electricity.  At peak moments during Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, as many as 8 million households were left without power.  Extensive civilian infrastructure, crucial for ensuring heat and electricity during Ukraine’s often harsh winters, has been damaged or destroyed. 

These attacks are timed not to coincide with military offensives but with the onset of winter.  The foreseeable effect — and arguably the intent — is to plunge civilians into darkness and deprivation, using winter as a weapon.  The resulting humanitarian crisis, with hospitals and water systems paralyzed, has little to do with military necessity and everything to do with breaking the morale of the Ukrainian people.

Such conduct fails every major test of legality under IHL.  Power grids and district-heating plants, designed to provide warmth and light to the civilian population, are not military objectives.  The scale of civilian suffering caused by these strikes far exceeds any conceivable military advantage, violating the rule of proportionality.  And the deliberate use of cold and darkness to break morale indicates an intent to terrorize, which is explicitly prohibited under the laws of war.

The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has documented these attacks as likely violations of international humanitarian law.  As the Atlantic Council warned, Russia’s campaign has implications that extend beyond Ukraine’s borders, threatening regional stability and Europe’s energy security as well.

In fact, the International Criminal Court has already issued two arrest warrants against Russian military officials for alleged war crimes against civilian objects, primarily focusing on Russia’s attacks on civilian energy infrastructure. 

Ukraine’s campaign against Russian refineries

In contrast to Russia’s unlawful attacks on civilian energy infrastructure, Ukraine has focused its military campaign on legitimate targets under international humanitarian law.  Since early 2025, Ukraine has expanded its campaign against the Russian Federation’s oil refining and chemical industries — sectors that directly fuel the Russian military.  Over the summer and autumn of 2025, Kyiv’s precision attacks damaged multiple refineries, cutting Russian refining capacity by an estimated 10 to 17 percent.  In October, Ukrainian drones struck the Rosneft-owned Ryazan refinery, one of Russia’s largest.

Ukrainian attacks have targeted Russian export terminals in the Black and Baltic seas using air and sea-borne drones.  They have aimed to disrupt the Kremlin’s revenue streams and military logistics.  Ukraine has also targeted Russia’s oil refineries, fuel depots, and energy export infrastructure in various Russian regions.  The Tyumen refinery, nearly 2,000 km from the border, marks the deepest strike recorded.  Ukraine has also struck at least 18 pumping stations, including Unecha and Nikolskoye on the Druzhba pipeline.  Notably, Ukraine has not targeted civilian power plants, residential heating infrastructure, nuclear facilities, or gas pipelines supplying Europe, thereby underscoring a deliberate effort to avoid humanitarian fallout and broader energy destabilization.

While some evidence may point to the existence of a certain civilian impact resulting from these strikes, it is overall limited.  The effect of the Ukrainian attacks is indeed more of a military nature, raising the cost of Russia’s war of aggression by reducing Russia’s export capacity.  Ukrainian officials and experts still acknowledge that Russia’s energy industry is not under a critical threat but that it does have an impact on Russia’s ability to finance the continuation of its war. 

Against this background, the legal analysis of these attacks is fairly straightforward.  Do Ukraine’s attacks satisfy Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions’ requirement of producing a military advantage and limiting the damage to objects that create an effective military contribution?  There is a strong case for saying that they do.  Likewise, the Ukrainian strikes are targeted at facilities contributing to Russia’s war effort and, while it is difficult to verify precise numbers of possible civilian casualties, there is little to no evidence suggesting that they have caused disproportionate civilian suffering. 

Overall, Ukraine’s targeting of infrastructure with direct military relevance, coupled with its efforts to avoid indiscriminate effects, supports the conclusion that these strikes are consistent with the law of armed conflict.  Unlike Russia’s campaign of terror against civilian energy systems, Ukraine’s actions reflect a disciplined application of IHL principles in defense of its sovereignty.

Escalation without equivalence

It is undeniable that the strikes on energy infrastructure have fueled a cycle of escalation.  Russia’s renewed bombardment of Ukraine’s power grid has come largely in response to Ukraine’s successful attacks on refineries that sustain the Kremlin’s war economy.  Yet this escalation is not driven by Ukraine, but by Russia’s pattern of retaliating against civilians whenever its military and economic assets are struck.  And so, the spiral continues.

Yet understanding escalation dynamics does not mean accepting moral or legal equivalence.  Ukraine’s strikes target facilities that materially sustain an ongoing war of aggression; Russia’s strikes target infrastructure essential for civilian survival.  The difference is not semantic — it is the line between legitimate warfare and war crimes. 

Similarly, calling on Ukraine to exercise restraint so as to avoid escalation fails to recognize the background to the war and pattern of Russia’s behavior. Russia unlawfully annexed Crimea and began its aggression against Eastern Ukraine in 2014.  In 2022, it escalated its war with a full-scale invasion.  It has continued to bomb all of Ukraine for almost four years without any restraint, despite continuous calls and efforts to negotiate an end to the war throughout 2025.  Experts broadly agree on the necessity to make Russia’s war of aggression too costly for Russia to be able to continue and that only this scenario will allow there to be a meaningful peace process.  Ukraine’s military campaigns thus are doing exactly that. 

Why clarity matters

As the war enters another winter, clarity about the legality of energy strikes is essential.  Analysts, journalists, and policymakers must describe what is happening accurately: the destruction of refineries used for military purposes is not equivalent to the targeting of power plants that heat civilian homes.  Choosing the right words matters because it shapes the narrative that, in turn, influences political will and future accountability.

Ultimately, destroying a refinery that fuels an invasion may be lawful if done proportionately and with precautions.  Destroying a heating plant to freeze civilians into submission is a war crime. 

Ukraine’s precision strikes on Russian energy infrastructure fit within the legitimate exercise of self-defense.  Russia’s systematic attacks on Ukraine’s energy systems, designed to terrorize and coerce, fall far outside that framework — and into the realm of war crimes.  Recognizing and articulating that difference is not simply a legal necessity; it is a moral one.

Clarity, however, is not only a matter for lawyers and policymakers. Every paragraph of international law, if enforced, can help Ukrainian civilians survive. 

For an ordinary Ukrainian living in Kyiv—hundreds of kilometers from the front line—or for a foreigner who often visits the city, such as the co-author of this post—the war remains brutally present. In recent days, as outdoor temperatures hover between 40 and 50 degrees Fahrenheit, most residents have no heating in their homes. The city’s vast network of combined heat and power plants lies partly crippled by Russian strikes, while the destruction of gas infrastructure has forced the government to delay the start of the heating season for as long as possible to conserve dwindling supplies.  Nights bring little relief: usually several times a week, the capital is shaken by the hum of incoming drones, and sometimes by the roar of ballistic or cruise missiles. At least several days a month, there is no true night’s sleep in Kyiv anymore—only brief intervals of rest between air-raid sirens. 

That same resident has no certainty that he or she will awaken whole and healthy after going to sleep. Recently, drones have struck residential buildings, killing people directly or indirectly—like the nineteen-year-old girl and her mother who suffocated in their bathroom after hiding there during an air alert. It happened when a drone set her apartment ablaze. 

That Kyiv resident cannot be sure of keeping a job either, as economic activity slows under energy shortages and the threat of mobilization looms. Above all, there is no clarity on when the war will end, or whether justice will prevail. 

Thus, many Ukrainians grow increasingly frustrated by what they perceive as the “symmetry” in some foreign analyses—an insistence on treating aggressor and victim as if their actions were morally or legally comparable. The muted tone of some Western commentary feels like cynicism disguised as balance. Ukrainians seek instead moral clarity and honest words from the democratic world to describe reality.



* Łukasz Adamski is the Deputy Director and Head of the Research and Projects Office at the Juliusz Mieroszewski Dialogue Centre 

** Kateryna Kyrychenko is the Head of Ukraine Legal Affairs and Program Management at PILPG and a PhD candidate in International Law at the National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy” 

*** Sindija Beta is a Legal Officer and Program Manager at PILPG

**** Dr. Gregory P. Noone, CAPT, JAGC, USN (Ret.), is Executive Director at PILPG and a retired Captain in the United States Navy

Roundtable Blog: One Year Since Ukraine’s Ratification of the Rome Statute

Roundtable Blog: “One Year Since Ukraine’s Ratification of the Rome Statute” 

Editor’s Note

This blog marks the first anniversary reflection on one of Ukraine’s most consequential legal milestones — the ratification of the Rome Statute.  Presented as part of PILPG’s Ukraine Peace Negotiations Working Group, this roundtable brings together expert perspectives from leading members of the PILPG Peace Fellows network.  Each contributor examines how Ukraine’s formal accession to the International Criminal Court (ICC) has shaped its justice architecture, legal capacity, and international standing during an ongoing war of aggression.

Published under the Lawyering Justice banner, this post continues PILPG’s effort to connect legal analysis with peace strategy and to situate Ukraine’s accountability progress within a broader framework of international law and diplomacy.  The reflections below assess how ICC membership is reshaping Ukraine’s domestic legal order, transforming cooperation with international institutions, and influencing global debates about aggression, sovereignty, and justice during active conflict.

This roundtable also contributes to a forward-looking policy conversation: how Ukraine and its partners can consolidate an enduring system of accountability that integrates the ICC, the newly established Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression, and national war crimes mechanisms.  Together, these insights reaffirm that accountability is not a post-war ideal but a central element of Ukraine’s pursuit of a just and sustainable peace.

***

On 25 October 2024, Ukraine deposited its instrument of ratification of the Rome Statute, and on 1 January 2025, the Statute officially entered into force for Ukraine.  This moment marked more than the conclusion of a decades-long legal journey — it represented Ukraine’s determination to enshrine accountability within its national identity even as it continues to defend itself against Russia’s war of aggression.  The decision to join the International Criminal Court (ICC) amid active conflict underscored a powerful principle: that justice is not a luxury of peace, but a condition for achieving it.

In this roundtable blog, PILPG’s Peace Fellows and experts reflect on Ukraine’s first year as a State Party to the ICC through five guiding questions — exploring the most significant impacts of ratification, its influence on Ukraine’s domestic justice system, the evolving cooperation with the ICC, the broader implications for global accountability, and the strategic priorities that lie ahead.

What has been the most significant impact of Ukraine’s ratification of the Rome Statute so far?

Dr. Paul R. Williams, Rebecca Grazier Professor of Law and International Relations at American University

Ukraine’s ratification of the Rome Statute has fundamentally anchored its accountability framework within the international rule of law.  By formally joining the ICC system, Ukraine transformed years of ad hoc cooperation into a durable legal commitment that reinforces its credibility as a state dedicated to justice for atrocity crimes.  This ratification has also elevated Ukraine’s standing among nations seeking to strengthen the global architecture for accountability.  The move has reassured victims and civil society actors that accountability for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide will remain a long-term national and international priority, not a temporary response to Russia’s invasion.

Equally important, the ratification has created a powerful signaling effect.  It distinguishes Ukraine not only as a state under attack but also as a norm entrepreneur advancing international criminal justice from within a war zone. Ukraine’s commitment to the ICC during active conflict underscores that accountability and sovereignty can coexist — and indeed, reinforce one another.  This has encouraged renewed debate within other conflict-affected states about the political value of ICC membership, potentially reshaping global expectations of how wartime democracies engage with international law.

Michael Kelly, Professor at Creighton University School of Law and The Senator Allen A. Sekt Endowed Chair in Law

The most significant impact so far of Ukraine’s ratification of the Rome Statute is not a particular prosecution; rather it is the larger legitimizing function that draws Ukraine more inextricably into the circle of rule of law nations such as those in the European Union.  Fully authoritarian nations such as Russia, China, and Iran stand in stark contrast internationally to democratic rule of nations and Ukraine has shown in its lot with the latter.  As the United States shifts more steadily away from the latter to the former, it is unclear how the balance will shift’.  Nevertheless, Ukraine is on the right side of history embracing democracy and the rule of law.

David Crane, Founding Chief Prosecutor of the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone and Distinguished Scholar in Residence at Syracuse University College of Law

A year ago, Ukraine's signing of the Rome Statute was a pivotal moment for the country, especially given the ongoing conflict with Russia.  By stepping up to this international treaty, Ukraine is taking a clear and firm stand against war crimes and human rights abuses.  This commitment not only strengthens its own legal framework for prosecuting those responsible for atrocities but also enhances its credibility in the eyes of the world.  As Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated, "Our future is in a strong Europe and the world, where human rights and justice prevail."  With the backing of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Ukraine can initiate investigations and hold individuals accountable for their actions, even when domestic resources or political will may fall short.  This creates a greater capacity for justice and offers much-needed hope to victims who have suffered during the conflict.

On a broader scale, signing the Rome Statute sends an important message to the international community about Ukraine’s dedication to justice and the rule of law.  It highlights that, amid war and turmoil, Ukraine is serious about adhering to international norms and values, which can help attract more support from allies who prioritize accountability.  This move not only counters the narrative of impunity often seen in conflict zones but also encourages other nations to take a stand against violations.  As noted by the ICC's Chief Prosecutor, Karim Khan, “Every crime against humanity affects all of us,” emphasizing the collective responsibility to seek justice.  Additionally, by aligning itself with the Rome Statute, Ukraine fosters a sense of stability both regionally and globally as it works to prevent future atrocities and build a resilient democratic identity in a challenging environment.

Chris Goebel, Senior Legal Advisor at PILPG

Further to Paul William’s comments, Ukraine's ratification establishes a new precedent for conflict-affected states seeking ICC membership during active hostilities, potentially fundamentally reshaping international practice around timing and conditions for Rome Statute accession.  Historically, states have typically joined the ICC during peacetime or post-conflict transitions when domestic political consensus is usually more achievable and institutional capacity can be methodically developed.  Ukraine's decision to ratify while simultaneously prosecuting over 90 domestic war crimes trials, defending against existential military threats, and managing over 200,000 documented potential international crimes changes this traditional sequence.  Ukraine’s “ratification under fire” model demonstrates that ICC membership and active conflict are not necessarily mutually exclusive, potentially influencing other conflict-affected countries currently outside the Rome Statute system to consider earlier engagement.

How has ICC membership influenced Ukraine’s domestic justice system and approach to atrocity accountability?

Dr. Paul R. Williams, Rebecca Grazier Professor of Law and International Relations at American University

Ukraine’s ICC membership has accelerated domestic reforms designed to align national law with international criminal standards.  In the past year, Ukraine’s parliament has begun harmonizing its criminal code with the definitions of atrocity crimes under the Rome Statute, while judicial and prosecutorial institutions have received enhanced international support to strengthen their investigative capacity.  The Office of the Prosecutor General, working with international partners, has institutionalized mechanisms for evidence preservation and case coordination with the ICC.  These steps are not only procedural but transformational, building the foundations of a hybrid accountability system that combines international legitimacy with local ownership.

At the same time, ICC membership has reshaped the strategic mindset of Ukraine’s justice sector.  Prosecutors and policymakers increasingly frame their efforts through a “complementarity lens” — seeking to demonstrate that Ukraine can credibly investigate and prosecute Rome Statute crimes itself, while relying on the ICC for cases beyond its reach.  This has prompted a broader societal conversation about due process, command responsibility, and victim-centered justice.  In essence, Ukraine’s engagement with the ICC is catalyzing a deeper maturation of its domestic rule-of-law institutions, embedding accountability as a core pillar of post-war reconstruction and peacebuilding.

Michael Scharf, Co-Founder of the Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG), former Co-Dean of the Case Western Reserve University School of Law and the Joseph C. Hostetler—BakerHostetler Professor of Law

In October 2024, Ukraine amended its criminal code to bring it in line with the ICC, including adding a new provision on command responsibility (similar to Article 28 of the ICC Statute) which had not previously existed as a mode of liability in Ukrainian law.  The concept of command responsibility holds that a superior is responsible for the war crimes committed by subordinates that the superior knew or should have known were being committed and failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures: (1) to prevent the commission of the crimes; (2) to repress the commission of the crimes; or (3) to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.  Under this type of liability, Ukraine can prosecute military commanders for war crimes committed in their geographic area of command.  This will provide Ukraine an important tool in the effective prosecution of Russian war crimes at the command level. 

Michael Kelly, Professor at Creighton University School of Law and The Senator Allen A. Sekt Endowed Chair in Law

Ukraine’s constitution federalizes treaty law; consequently, the Rome Statute and the law associated with it come into Ukrainian domestic law.  This will prove helpful as Ukraine seeks to prosecute Russian commanders for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Ukrainian criminal courts.  It may prove especially helpful as the OTP more fully incorporates environmental crimes as a species of war crime into its operations in The Hague.  The government in Kyiv wants to prosecute environmental crimes committed by Russia as such.

What opportunities and challenges have emerged in cooperation between Ukraine and the ICC?

Dr. Beth Van Schaack, Senior and Peace Fellow and former Ambassador-at-large for Global Criminal Justice (2022 -2025)

As noted by others on these pages, Ukraine’s ratification of the Rome Statute signals its commitment to pursue justice and accountability for the war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other atrocities being committed daily during Russia’s brutal war of aggression.  Ratification further cements Ukraine’s European orientation, particularly given that joining the ICC would be a prerequisite for EU accession.  This development also signals a new form of complementarity, a concept that is central to the Rome Statute system.  The principle of complementarity dictates that so long as a national court with jurisdiction is appropriately pursuing investigations and prosecutions, ICC actors should stay their hands.  It is only when the national court is unwilling or unable to proceed that the ICC should step in. In this regard, the ICC is often called “a court of last resort.”

In the Ukraine context, of course, we have an ICC state party that is eager to pursue justice and, in fact, adjudicating war crimes cases in its national courts in the midst of a hot conflict to a degree unprecedented in human history.  There’s no question that Ukrainian courts will continue to be the prime engines of accountability going forward.  However, the Office of the Prosecutor General (OPG) has recorded upwards of 200,000 potentially prosecutable crimes since Russia’s full-scale invasion — an impossible juridical task for even the most well-resourced and experienced prosecutorial corps.  With the ICC Prosecutor pursuing Russia’s top leadership, including its head of state, Ukraine can focus on direct perpetrators and those down the chain of command.  Indeed, the ICC Prosecutor has made clear that his applications for arrest warrants benefited greatly from information sharing and other forms of support from the OPG.  As such, we see a new form of “complementarity as cooperation” emerging, whereby the national courts and the ICC undertake a division of labor to manage an enormous crime base.

Michael Scharf, Co-Founder of the Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG), former Co-Dean of the Case Western Reserve University School of Law and the Joseph C. Hostetler—BakerHostetler Professor of Law

Ukraine’s domestic courts are becoming a laboratory for the refinement of environmental war crimes prosecutions, with the ICC and the rest of the world watching closely.  Because Ukraine’s domestic law, like many European countries, provides for trials in absentia, Ukraine is likely to end up prosecuting cases relating to Russia’s environmental war crimes before the ICC has a chance to do so.  

In addition, Ukraine’s Criminal Code recognizes the crime of “ecocide,” which may serve as a model for future amendment of the ICC Statute.  Article 441 of the Ukraine’s Criminal Code defines ecocide as “mass destruction of flora and fauna, poisoning of air or water resources, and also any other actions that may cause an environmental disaster,” and provides that it “shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of eight to fifteen years.”  In September 2024, Vanuatu, along with Fiji and Samoa, submitted a proposal to the ICC to recognize ecocide as a separate crime on par with genocide and other serious offenses.

Michael Kelly, Professor at Creighton University School of Law and The Senator Allen A. Sekt Endowed Chair in Law

There are now greater opportunities for Ukrainian attorneys to serve as prosecutors, defenders, staff, and even judges of the ICC.  Doing so will ensure the benefit of criminal legal practice in Ukraine itself as these individuals over time come home and bring with them their expertise learned in The Hague.

Ambassador (Ret.) Zorica Maric Djordjevic, PILPG Senior Peace Fellow, former Head of the Permanent Mission of Montenegro to the World Trade Organization

Assess opportunities and challenges in cooperation with the ICC and other accountability mechanisms: for Ukraine, signing the Rome Statute opens a crucial legal and moral frontier — institutionalizing accountability amid an ongoing conflict.  The ICC’s involvement in investigating war crimes and crimes against humanity in Ukraine builds on precedents from the former Yugoslavia — the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and later its national courts under the UN guidance, where international mechanisms shaped historical record, but struggled to ensure reconciliation or local ownership.  Consequently, the Rome Statute for the states of former Yugoslavia served more as a political and normative anchor than a direct vehicle of justice as  the key regional accountability processes were already managed by the ICTY.  The opportunity for Ukraine lies in coupling ICC mechanisms with domestic legal reform, hybrid courts, and truth-seeking processes that embed justice into state reconstruction, rather than outsourcing it entirely to international bodies.

The Balkan experience underscores both the promise and the limitation of Rome Statute membership.  It provides international legitimacy and deterrence, yet its effectiveness depends on political will, judicial capacity, and societal readiness to confront the past.  For Ukraine, learning from post-Yugoslav states means building a system that not only prosecutes crimes, but also transforms justice into a foundation for durable peace, institutional integrity, and reconciliation with the consequences of the war.

How has this step shaped international legal and political discourse on aggression and accountability?

Milena Sterio, Charles R. Emrick Jr. - Calfee Halter & Griswold Professor of Law at Cleveland State University’s Cleveland-Marshall College of Law

Ukraine’s ratification of the ICC Rome Statute has altered the international legal and political discourse on aggression and accountability.  Although the ICC already had jurisdiction over the situation in Ukraine in light of dozens of state referrals and the prosecutor’s willingness to open first a preliminary examination and then an investigation, Ukraine’s ratification of the Rome Statute signals the country’s willingness to support the world’s only permanent international criminal court in its pursuit of legal accountability.  Although the ICC still lacks jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in Ukraine, the fact that Ukraine, the victim state, has ratified the Rome Statute moves the “goal post” closer, as for the purposes of jurisdiction both the victim and the aggressor state need to be ICC member states; now, in light of Ukraine’s ratification, only the aggressor state (Russia) need become a member (a feat that seems impossible under the current Russian leadership, but that could one day become a reality under a different regime).  

In addition, Ukraine’s ratification of the Rome Statute is significant politically, as it places Ukraine within the “club” of member states, which are generally committed to justice and accountability.  Thus, by ratifying the Rome Statute, Ukraine has positioned itself well geo-politically and strategically, and has opened the door toward cooperation with other member states.  Finally, Ukraine’s ratification of the Rome Statute will bring in line its domestic criminal legislation with current norms and standards of international criminal law, which is a positive development and which once more signals Ukraine’s willingness to support international justice and accountability.

Chris Goebel, Senior Legal Advisor at PILPG

Ukraine’s ratification of the ICC Rome Statute coincided with the formal establishment of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine through an agreement signed in June 2025 between the Council of Europe and Ukraine.  This institutional innovation represents a watershed development in international criminal law: it is the first international criminal tribunal for aggression created outside the UN Security Council framework — thereby circumventing the veto power that has paralyzed UN-based accountability mechanisms.  The Special Tribunal’s jurisdiction complements ICC investigations by focusing solely on aggression while the ICC pursues war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.  This architectural arrangement — combining the Special Tribunal with Ukraine’s Rome Statute ratification as well as domestic prosecutions — is potentially an important step towards establishing a comprehensive accountability ecosystem in which distinct institutions target different levels of responsibility and categories of atrocity crimes committed in the war.

  

Looking ahead, what should be the strategic priorities for Ukraine and its partners in consolidating justice mechanisms?

Milena Sterio, Charles R. Emrick Jr. - Calfee Halter & Griswold Professor of Law at Cleveland State University’s Cleveland-Marshall College of Law

Ukraine’s strategic priorities should be to align its domestic criminal law so that there are no gaps or conflicts with respect to the Rome Statute.  Once Ukraine has done so, it will be able to fully implement the Rome Statute, and to assume all the relevant duties and responsibilities of a member state.  

Michael Kelly, Professor at Creighton University School of Law and The Senator Allen A. Sekt Endowed Chair in Law

One thing the ICC will not be able to embrace is prosecution of Russian corporations for complicity in war crimes committed in Ukraine as the Rome Statute currently only extends the court’s jurisdiction over natural persons - not legal persons.  Consequently, Ukraine should prioritize prosecuting Russian corporations for involvement in the war and then request seizure of frozen corporate assets abroad in satisfaction of those judgments.  PILPG has white papers on how to accomplish this task.

Chris Goebel, Senior Legal Advisor at PILPG

Ukraine's ratification of the Rome Statute has made Ukraine’s continued capacity-building for war crimes prosecution an important strategic priority.  For instance, in addition to aligning its laws with developing ICC standards, Ukraine ought to continue to pioneer integration of environmental harm monitoring into both its prosecutorial and its broader national security framework.  With ICC accession, Ukraine has both the opportunity and the obligation to continue to develop sophisticated national expertise in international criminal law, compatible legal procedures, and effective cross-border cooperation — since the ICC expects domestic prosecutions wherever possible. 

Dr. Gregory P. Noone, Ph.D., J.D., is the Executive Director, a Senior Peace Fellow, and Senior Legal Advisor for the Public International Law and Policy Group (PILPG)

Three strategic priorities come to mind. First, now that in June 2025 Ukraine and the Council of Europe have agreed to establish a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression, the immediate focus should be on finalizing the staffing, securing funding, and negotiating cooperation agreements.  This will close the “aggression gap” at the leadership level and complement the ICC’s jurisdiction, ensuring a coherent international justice architecture.  Second, synchronize strategic communications around each major legal milestone (new ICC warrants, tribunal updates, or reparations actions) with targeted sanctions and travel notices, so that accountability carries visible and political consequences.  This linkage reinforces deterrence, sustains allied commitment, and demonstrates that justice has tangible costs for perpetrators.  Third, prioritize cases against field-grade military officers (Majors, Lieutenant Colonels, and Colonels) who exercise direct control over daily operations and the conduct of troops.  These officers serve as the critical link between command intent and battlefield behavior, and are the most likely to travel internationally in the coming years, increasing the practical reach and enforceability of arrest warrants.

Concluding Observations

Ukraine’s first year as a State Party to the Rome Statute has redefined its role in the global justice landscape.  The ratification has anchored accountability within Ukraine’s legal and diplomatic identity, transforming ad hoc cooperation with the ICC into a durable institutional partnership.  This legal step, taken amid ongoing conflict, has demonstrated that the pursuit of justice need not wait for peace; indeed, it can strengthen both the moral and strategic foundations of peace itself.

Across the contributions gathered here, several themes emerge.  Domestically, Ukraine’s ICC membership has catalyzed long-overdue legal reforms, from the incorporation of command responsibility to the development of hybrid accountability mechanisms.  Internationally, it has elevated Ukraine’s credibility as a norm-setting state, willing to uphold international criminal law even under fire.  The first year of implementation has also revealed both the opportunities and the strains of “complementarity as cooperation,” as Ukraine’s national courts and the ICC together navigate an unprecedented caseload of war crimes.

At the same time, the ratification has reverberated far beyond Ukraine.  It has reinvigorated the global conversation on the crime of aggression, coinciding with the June 2025 establishment of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine.  Together, these institutions signal a renewed commitment to closing the impunity gap for leaders who wage unlawful wars.

As this first anniversary passes, Ukraine stands as both a test case and a torchbearer for the future of international criminal justice.  Its experience shows that even amid destruction, the deliberate construction of legal institutions can serve as an act of resistance — and a foundation for peace built on law, not force.

The Slippery Slope of Using Chemical Weapons in Sudan

The Slippery Slope of Using Chemical Weapons in Sudan 

By: Prof. David M. Crane*

The use of gas in a conflict is prohibited under international law and has been for well over a century. Its use is a war crime, plain and simple. Full stop. The use of chemicals against a belligerent in an armed conflict is rare but not unheard of.  It’s been used in the Iraq/Iran war in the 1980s, and the Assad regime in Syria dabbled in its use in the early 21st century. There is also evidence of the use of chemicals by the Russian Federation in Ukraine.

The recent accusations surrounding the alleged use of chlorine gas by the Sudanese army in its conflict with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are troubling and must not be ignored. On May 22, 2025, the United States accused the Sudanese military of using chemical weapons. Although they presented no evidence to back their claims, the implications are grave. International law strictly prohibits the use of chemical weapons, and chlorine gas is considered a violation under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Sudan is a signatory.

It's very concerning that chlorine, a substance commonly used in various industries, is reportedly being weaponized. The video evidence documented by the FRANCE 24 Observers team in September 2024, showing barrels dropping from the sky, is particularly alarming. If these claims are substantiated, they mark a dangerous escalation—not just for Sudan but for the principles of international law as a whole.

This pattern—accusations followed by denials from military leaders—is reminiscent of other conflict zones where human rights are disregarded. The Sudanese military’s immediate dismissal of these allegations further obscures the truth and undermines the credibility of international monitoring. The historical context reminds us that the failure to hold violators accountable leads to a dangerous normalization of brutality in warfare. As I’ve previously remarked, “When we allow even the smallest infractions of international law to go unaddressed, we set a precedent that invites further violations.”

The consequences of using chlorine gas as a weapon extend beyond immediate physical harm. They threaten to erode the boundaries that define acceptable conduct in warfare. The very act of using chemical agents introduces a slippery slope, normalizing violence that can lead to more horrific warfare tactics. This hardening stance risks allowing other factions or regimes to follow suit, believing they can operate with impunity.

The international community has a vital role to play right now. It must take these allegations seriously and push for independent investigations into these claims. While the U.S. has made significant assertions, it is essential that any evidence is made public to galvanize an effective global response. The commitment to enforcing the CWC is crucial; violations should prompt not just condemnation but also tangible consequences, such as sanctions or international legal action.

Sudan is at a critical juncture, and what happens next could resonate far beyond its borders. The specter of chemical warfare threatens not only regional stability but also the broader tenets of international law. We can neither afford to turn a blind eye nor allow the unacceptable to become normalized. As a global community, we must remain steadfast in our opposition to the use of chemical weapons, ensuring that those who violate this sacred trust face accountability. It’s not just about Sudan; it’s about the future of warfare and humanity itself.

*Founding Chief Prosecutor, UN Special Court for Sierra Leone; Founder, Global Accountability Network.

Roundtable Blog: Toward Enforceable Security Guarantees

Roundtable Blog: Toward Enforceable Security Guarantees

Editor’s Note:
This post is part of the PILPG Lawyering Justice blog’s roundtable series. Rather than a traditional co-authored piece, it presents a curated set of expert reflections from members of PILPG’s Ukraine Peace Negotiations Working Group. Drawing on the diverse expertise of our Peace Fellows, this roundtable-style blog explores the discussion surrounding security guarantees for Ukraine.  Published under the Lawyering Justice banner, this post reflects our commitment not only to chronicling the legal and diplomatic dimensions of active conflicts, but also to fostering strategic foresight and connecting lawyering to policy planning. We hope this format will serve as a model for future collaborative work on peace and justice.

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In recent months, the question of credible and enforceable security guarantees for Ukraine has become central to its long-term defense and peace architecture. International partners have signaled new commitments—most notably through the Paris declaration of twenty-six states willing to support Ukraine’s security—but the substance and structure of these guarantees remain contested. The strategic landscape is shifting rapidly, and with NATO membership off the table for now, Ukraine and its allies must explore alternative legal and political frameworks capable of deterring further aggression and sustaining peace.

For this Roundtable Blog, we asked the Public International Law & Policy Group’s Ukraine Peace Negotiations Working Group to answer a set of four questions focused on different aspects of the security guarantee debate. Contributors were asked to assess elements of substantive and symbolic security guarantees; alternatives to NATO membership for Ukraine; legal and political frameworks for deploying multinational forces to Ukraine; and the feasibility of providing Ukraine with security guarantees absent Russia’s consent. 

The purpose of this public-facing Roundtable Blog is threefold: to inform Ukrainian policymakers and Peace Formula stakeholders of the legal and strategic variables shaping the security guarantee debate; to connect Ukraine-focused expertise with broader international practice; and to provide analytically grounded perspectives that can guide the development of credible, enforceable guarantees in the months ahead.

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1. Substantive vs. Symbolic Commitments

What concrete elements would distinguish a truly substantive security guarantee for Ukraine from symbolic or rhetorical commitments, and are any states currently moving toward such substance?

Maj. Gen. Darrell Guthrie, Major General (Ret.) U.S. Army Reserve

Security guarantees must be understood as existing along a continuum of credibility. At one end lies the deployment of a robust military presence inside Ukraine—an option that few international partners are currently willing to pursue, but which would send the clearest signal of deterrence. As the continuum shifts outward, forward deployments in neighboring states such as Poland become more politically feasible, though still operationally demanding. Intelligence sharing, while ongoing and valuable, lacks the deterrent force of visible, deployable strength. Aircraft stationed in Germany or the UK may signal intent, but their strategic value increases significantly when positioned closer to Ukraine’s borders—or ideally, within Ukraine itself. Each step away from direct presence becomes increasingly symbolic. In case of using allied planes in Ukraine, partners would need to secure pre-negotiated overflight rights and territorial access agreements. Without these, even well-intentioned guarantees risk being undermined by logistical delays and political hesitation at critical moments.

Ambassador Joachim Rücker, former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and Head of the UN Mission in Kosovo

Expectations surrounding troop deployments must remain grounded in political and operational realities. Even under favorable conditions, no more than 40,000 troops from France, the UK, and other partners appear likely to be committed—and only after a ceasefire is in place. German ground deployments remain improbable given current domestic constraints, while all established forms of support from Germany will definitely continue or increase. In any case: what is needed, particularly in the post-ceasefire phase, is an “over-the-horizon” component—an arrangement that allows for quick activation of deterrent forces without immediate escalation. Such a model could offer credible deterrence while remaining politically palatable (the challenge lies in designing mechanisms that can evolve toward substance without overstretching the allies’ capabilities and without triggering premature confrontation). Even with these elements, the guarantees will likely fall somewhere between symbolic and substantive. In this vein, it will also be important to determine first and subsequent responders.

Professor Michael Kelly, The Senator Allen A. Sekt Endowed Chair in Law at Creighton University School of Law

Symbolic deployments can acquire strategic substance through deterrent effect and political signaling. Troops stationed in Ukrainian urban centers under national flags—not NATO—may initially appear symbolic. However, if Russian forces refrain from targeting these areas, the presence gains weight and transforms into a credible deterrent. The perception of risk alters behavior. Recent triggers of NATO’s Article 4, prompted by Russian drone incursions into allied airspace, suggest that the strategic calculus is shifting. These incursions have heightened awareness and urgency across Europe. The timeline matters: by February 2026, Russia will have been fighting Ukrainian democracy longer than Nazi Germany. That historical inflection point should catalyze European leadership and accelerate the transition from rhetorical support to enforceable commitments.

Ambassador Zorica Marić-Djordjević, former Head of the Permanent Mission of Montenegro to the World Trade Organization and Special Representative of Montenegro to the UN Human Rights Council

To transform political declarations into substantive guarantees, four foundational elements are required: legislation, funding, deployments, and treaties. At present, legislative progress among the 26 committed countries remains stalled. Written guarantees with specific operational plans are essential to move beyond symbolism. Europe’s €50 billion Ukraine Facility marks a starting point, but sustained funding and U.S. support remain critical. Deployment discussions are ongoing, yet lack clarity and coordination. Treaty frameworks—whether bilateral or multilateral—must be formalized to provide legal and political weight. Without these pillars, commitments risk remaining rhetorical. The urgency expressed by Ukrainian leadership, including President Zelenskyy’s request for a ten-day window to formalize guarantees, underscores the need to accelerate negotiations and codify intent.

Dr. Paul R. Williams, Rebecca Grazier Professor of Law and International Relations at American University

The central question is whether states are genuinely transitioning from symbolic gestures to enforceable commitments. Frameworks and funding mechanisms have been proposed, and political declarations have been made. Yet the movement toward operational substance remains uneven. The concept of “first responders”—states willing to act immediately in defense of Ukraine—has not been adequately explored. Without clarity on who will act, when, and under what legal authority, the credibility of guarantees remains in question.

Kateryna Kyrychenko, Head of Ukraine Legal Affairs and Program Management Kyiv, Ukraine

Several foundational elements must be resolved before security guarantees can be deemed robust. A temporal gap persists between Ukraine’s expectations and those of its international partners. Ukraine seeks engagement and protection now—not only after a ceasefire. Many so-called guarantees, such as intelligence sharing, do not involve physical deployment. Presence on the ground adds credibility and shifts the perception of commitment. Recent Russian drone incursions have intensified the European security discourse. The strategic environment is evolving rapidly, and guarantees must evolve with it.

2. Deterrence Without Article 5

If NATO membership remains off the table, what combination of bilateral, coalition, or EU-led guarantees could approximate the deterrent effect of Article 5—or is that fundamentally unattainable?

Ambassador Ylber Hysa, former Ambassador of the Republic of Kosovo to Montenegro and North Macedonia

The concept of security guarantees must be disaggregated. NATO membership for Ukraine remains politically blocked, but the broader question is whether NATO itself can still credibly protect its members. Recent Russian provocations—including drone incursions and hybrid operations—challenge the assumption that Article 5 will be automatically triggered. The line between Article 4 (consultations) and Article 5 (collective defense) is increasingly thin, and Russian actions appear designed to test that boundary. These provocations raise doubts about NATO’s internal cohesion and response mechanisms. Security guarantees for Ukraine are not just about Ukraine—they are a strategic investment in NATO’s credibility. If provocations continue, the question becomes: where is the red line, and what would shift the alliance from Article 4 consultations to Article 5 activation?

Sindija Bēta, Legal Officer, PILPG

Past agreements, which focused on consultations, failed Ukraine. The Budapest Memorandum of 1994, which did not deter the events of 2014 nor 2022, demonstrates that non-binding assurances do not prevent aggression. A more viable path could lie in EU membership. The EU Treaty contains a defense and security provision under Article 42(7).  Russia has not objected to EU membership for Ukraine.  Ukraine should aim to anchor its long-term security within the EU framework, where legal obligations and political and economic integration offer a potentially stable foundation. 

Ambassador Joachim Rücker, former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and Head of the UN Mission in Kosovo

The EU Treaty offers (in its Article 42,7) a robust foundation for long- and maybe mid-term security guarantees. Nevertheless, in the short term, guarantees must be defined within a clear framework that outlines lines of response and escalation management. Even a symbolic military presence, if politically well coordinated and legally framed, can become substantive. The deterrent effect lies not only in capacity but in clarity of commitment. The EU’s mutual defense clause, while less operationalized than NATO’s Article 5, can serve as a credible basis for coalition-led guarantees in the long-term.

Ambassador Zorica Marić-Djordjević, former Head of the Permanent Mission of Montenegro to the World Trade Organization and Special Representative of Montenegro to the UN Human Rights Council

The most realistic immediate layer of guarantees for Ukraine involves air and missile defenses. These systems are essential to protect civilians, ports, energy infrastructure, and industrial assets from Russian strikes. Expansion of Patriot or similar systems, acceleration of European sky defense initiatives, and integration of early radar warning systems with NATO are critical steps. These measures do not replicate Article 5, but they approximate its deterrent effect by reducing vulnerability and signaling readiness. Ukraine must also strengthen its own military capacity in parallel to ensure sustainability and resilience. The credibility of external guarantees depends not only on what partners provide, but on Ukraine’s ability to absorb, deploy, and maintain those systems over time.

H. E. Dr. Igor Luksic, the former Prime Minister of Montenegro

Security guarantees very much depend on the context and need to be seen as part of a comprehensive approach to ending of the current war. In order to define appropriate security guarantees (related to the present and the future), it is important to understand what is the treatment of the currently invaded territories. Whenever the peace agreement is reached, the Ukrainian security in general will be inextricable from the law enforcement in that region, as well as its economic stabilization and development. To that end, it is important to closely monitor what happens and if anything happens at all with regard to the Gaza Strip and the so-called GITA idea, as it appears to have the possibility to become a kind of model to, with necessary adaptation, use it in similar cases. Additionally, it is hard to imagine any model reached without the eventual mandate of the UN Security Council. In my view, it may be of interest to also take a look at the status of the Trusteeship Council, as it still formally exists and is stipulated by the UN Charter. Contrary to its original role, in this case, it may provide a legal framework for the period between the peace agreement and, hopefully, eventual EU membership of Ukraine.

3. Legal and Political Frameworks for Deployment

What legal or political frameworks could authorize the forward deployment of multinational forces into Ukraine—whether as trainers, peacekeepers, or deterrent forces—before a ceasefire is reached?

Maj. Gen. Darrell Guthrie, Major General (Ret.) U.S. Army Reserve

Authorization frameworks must be grounded in sustainability. Forward deployment before a ceasefire remains politically sensitive, but the question of long-term viability is paramount. Ukraine receives a wide array of weapons systems, yet the sustainability model remains unclear. Battlefield damage, logistical strain, and replenishment cycles require structured planning. Air and missile defense systems are critical, but must be embedded within a broader framework that supports Ukraine’s ability to defend itself over time. Ukraine possesses a manufacturing base capable of supporting such efforts, but coordination is essential. The U.S. continues to work on artillery ammunition commitments, signaling intent but also revealing delays. Structured deployments—whether trainers, peacekeepers, or deterrent forces—must be framed as part of a multi-year commitment, not subject to shifting political winds. Legal frameworks must reflect that continuity.

Kateryna Kyrychenko, Head of Ukraine Legal Affairs and Program Management Kyiv, Ukraine

Hesitation among international partners to authorize forward deployment before a ceasefire is understandable, but alternative forms of guarantees already exist. Sanction-based guarantees, for example, offer conditional leverage. Presence on the ground, even in non-combat roles, introduces risks of escalation and political backlash. The deterrent effect of such deployments depends not only on legal authorization but on strategic signaling. For many partners, the possibility of direct confrontation with Russia remains the primary deterrent. Engagement levels vary across states and will likely evolve in phases. Legal frameworks must accommodate differentiated participation and phased escalation, allowing some states to engage earlier through training missions or monitoring roles, while others commit to deterrent deployments post-ceasefire.

Ambassador Zorica Marić-Djordjević, former Head of the Permanent Mission of Montenegro to the World Trade Organization and Special Representative of Montenegro to the UN Human Rights Council

The next step in operationalizing guarantees lies in predictable, multi-year military funding. The EU and U.S. must pass and adopt aid packages that guarantee supply chains and defense capabilities over time. Without sustained funding, deployments risk becoming episodic and politically vulnerable. To deter Russia from exploiting a ceasefire, rapid response commitments must be formalized—drawing lessons from Bosnia’s Berlin Plus post-conflict arrangements. Legal frameworks should enable pre-authorized activation of multinational forces in response to violations or provocations, rather than relying on ad hoc political consensus. Forward deployment, even in limited roles, must be embedded within a broader architecture of readiness, deterrence, and legal clarity.

Professor Michael Kelly, The Senator Allen A. Sekt Endowed Chair in Law at Creighton University School of Law

Historical precedent offers guidance. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the UN framework was used to authorize multinational action—sometimes directly, sometimes through creative interpretation. The first Iraq war relied on explicit Security Council resolutions; the second manipulated existing mandates. Today, the challenge lies in Russia’s veto power. Any Security Council initiative must navigate that obstacle. Yet precedent shows that legal creativity, coupled with political will, can produce frameworks that authorize action even in contested environments.

4. The Role of Russia

Is it possible to design security guarantees for Ukraine that are effective and enforceable without Russian consent, or does any durable arrangement inevitably require Moscow’s participation or at least acquiescence?

Ambassador Joachim Rücker, former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and Head of the UN Mission in Kosovo

This question increasingly guides strategic discussions in capitals such as Rome and Berlin. A growing chorus of foreign observers argues that without Russian consent, any forward-looking security guarantees lack realism. This view, however, risks eventually delaying the deployment of ground forces and discouraging the 26 states currently engaged (which include Italy and Germany). The absence of Russian acquiescence becomes a political constraint, not just a legal one. But the UN Security Council remains a potential avenue. Despite the risk of a Russian veto, the Council offers a framework that brings Moscow to the table—even if only procedurally. Recent remarks by President Trump, which reaffirm the UN’s relevance while criticizing its effectiveness, create a tactical opening. That momentum should be harnessed. Rather than abandoning the UN, efforts should double or triple there in order to draft, discuss and secure a resolution that legitimizes a coalition-led guarantee. The presence of Russia, even as an obstructive actor, may paradoxically strengthen the legal and diplomatic foundation of the initiative.

Dr. Paul R. Williams, Rebecca Grazier Professor of Law and International Relations at American University

Diverging opinions persist within the EU on whether Russian consent is a prerequisite. Some argue that engaging Moscow too early risks derailing the coalition’s internal consensus. Others believe that any durable arrangement must eventually confront the question of Russian acquiescence. The sequencing of engagement matters. Can the 26 build a coherent proposal before involving Russia? And what legal instruments would underpin such a coalition? A signed memorandum? A UN resolution? A treaty-based framework? These questions remain unresolved, but they are central to the credibility of any future guarantee.

Ambassador Elayne Whyte Gomez, Senior Fellow of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research, Professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and former Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the United Nations

The role of Russia must be addressed, but not prematurely. Discussing Russian involvement too early risks freezing progress among Ukraine’s partners. A phased approach may be more effective: first, build a solid proposal among the 26; then, engage Moscow with a unified front. The legal basis for a coalition of the willing must be clarified. Article 51 of the UN Charter—Ukraine’s right to self-defense—offers a foundational framework. Beyond that, the UN General Assembly, while not legally binding, provides a strategic theater to challenge prevailing narratives and build diplomatic momentum. The distinction between UNGA and UNSC pathways must be understood not only in legal terms but in political signaling.

Ambassador Ylber Hysa, former Ambassador of the Republic of Kosovo to Montenegro and North Macedonia

The essential debate is not whether the UN is good or bad—it is whether the UN is viable under current conditions. As it stands, Russian consent appears unlikely. The UN Security Council is not a realistic avenue in the near term. Alternatives must be explored. What can be done without Russian participation? What legal instruments exist outside the UN framework? Three tracks should be pursued in parallel: one through the UN, one without Russian consent, and one with Russian consent if conditions change. Each track must be developed with contingency planning and legal rigor.

Ambassador Zorica Marić-Djordjević, former Head of the Permanent Mission of Montenegro to the World Trade Organization and Special Representative of Montenegro to the UN Human Rights Council

Russia’s position is clear and vocal. Foreign troops and NATO-style guarantees on Ukrainian territory are red lines. Any coalition of the willing must be framed carefully. Several legal bases exist. First, Article 51 of the UN Charter allows Ukraine to invite other states to assist in its defense—this is already the foundation for current Western training and aid missions. Second, treaty or political commitments can formalize bilateral or multilateral guarantees. Third, EU and NATO instruments—such as Berlin Plus—offer operational models, as seen in post-Bosnia deployments. These frameworks do not require Russian consent but must be designed to withstand political and legal scrutiny.