The Global South and the Russian War on Ukraine: Structural Constraints on Diplomatic Alignment

The Global South and the Russian War on Ukraine: Structural Constraints on Diplomatic Alignment

An assessment of the political, economic, and institutional factors shaping multilateral engagement with Russia's war against Ukraine

By Dr. Paul R. Williams*

Three years into Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a striking diplomatic gap persists between the breadth of international condemnation and the depth of practical alignment.  While 141 states voted in the UN General Assembly to demand Russia's immediate withdrawal in March 2022, the countries that have joined Western-led sanctions regimes, restricted Russian access to their financial systems, or curtailed bilateral trade with Moscow represent a narrower group.  That gap is not incidental and it reflects durable structural realities across the Global South that are rooted in economic dependencies, regional security pressures, institutional history, and the architecture of development finance.  Understanding those realities is a prerequisite for any realistic assessment of how the conflict's diplomatic landscape might evolve.

A related question follows from this analysis: given the structural depth of these constraints, whether Ukraine's diplomatic strategy would be better served by consolidating and sustaining existing Western commitments rather than investing heavily in outreach to states whose non-alignment is unlikely to shift within any operationally relevant timeframe.

Voting Patterns and the Geometry of Non-Alignment

United Nations General Assembly resolution ES-11/1, adopted on March 2, 2022 with 141 votes in favor, demanded Russia's immediate, unconditional withdrawal from Ukrainian territory.  The 35 abstentions told their own story: India, China, South Africa, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the majority of Central Asian states declined to vote in favor.  A subsequent resolution in November 2022 demanding reparations from Russia received only 94 affirmative votes, with 73 abstentions, a result that illustrated both the limits of early momentum and the increasing discomfort of non-aligned states with being asked to take progressively stronger positions.

The geography of abstention maps closely onto economic and geopolitical relationships rather than regional or ideological blocs.  Several abstaining states have simultaneously affirmed Ukraine's sovereignty as a principle in bilateral diplomatic communications while declining to translate that position into a formal UN vote or participation in Western sanctions architecture.  This distinction matters legally and diplomatically.  Abstention is not acquiescence in Russia's conduct under international law, and most abstaining governments have been careful to preserve legal and normative space by avoiding explicit endorsement of Russia's legal arguments.  What abstention does reflect is a deliberate judgment that public alignment with the Western-led coalition carries costs that outweigh the benefits, given each government's particular economic situation, security relationships, and domestic political constraints.

Ukraine's diplomatic outreach since 2022 has been genuinely extensive.  President Zelensky addressed the Arab League summit in Jeddah in May 2023, his first appearance before that body, and made direct appeals on sovereignty and international law to an audience of governments that had largely abstained or remained neutral on the conflict.  He engaged directly with African heads of state throughout 2023 and 2024, including a June 2023 peace summit in which several African leaders proposed a ten-point peace framework of their own.  

The Peace Summit hosted in Switzerland in June 2024, which Ukraine convened as a broader multilateral gathering, attracted approximately 90 delegations, though several major Global South states either declined to attend or sent lower-level representation, and the final communiqué was not signed by a number of key developing country participants.  These outcomes do not indicate diplomatic failure in any simple sense, but they do indicate that outreach and dialogue have not yet produced the depth of alignment that Ukraine and its Western partners had hoped to generate.

Embedded Economic Dependencies

The most consequential constraint on broader Global South alignment is economic rather than ideological, and it operates across energy, food, and defense procurement in ways that are deeply embedded in national development strategies.  

Energy and Commodities

India's expansion of Russian crude oil imports following Western sanctions in 2022 is the most analytically significant case.  By mid-2023, Russia had displaced Saudi Arabia and Iraq to become India's single largest oil supplier, accounting for approximately 40% of total crude imports.  The discounts available on Russian crude, which reached $20 to $30 per barrel below Brent benchmark prices at peak in early 2022 and again in late 2025, represented a material economic benefit for an economy managing significant energy import costs and a current account sensitive to oil price movements.  The Indian government has publicly defended this policy on development and energy security grounds, framing it as a sovereign economic decision rather than a geopolitical statement.  India imports approximately 85% of its crude oil requirements and price sensitivity at this scale has direct effects on domestic fuel costs, inflation, and the government's fiscal position.

The broader significance of the India case is what it demonstrates about the limits of Western pressure on large emerging economies with independent development trajectories.  India is simultaneously a member of the Quad security dialogue, a deepening defense partner of the United States, and a major purchaser of Russian energy.  These positions are held concurrently, without apparent contradiction from New Delhi's perspective, because Indian foreign policy operates on a doctrine of strategic autonomy that predates the current conflict and reflects the foreign policy legacy of the Non-Aligned Movement.  The conflict has not changed that fundamental orientation.

Food Supply Chains

The food security dimension of Global South non-alignment is particularly significant for African governments, where the dependency on Russian and Ukrainian agricultural exports created acute vulnerabilities following the February 2022 invasion.  Prior to the conflict, Russia and Ukraine together accounted for approximately 28% of global wheat exports and a comparable share of sunflower oil and fertilizer supply chains.  For example, the two countries supplied approximately 85% of Egyptian wheat imports before the war.  The disruption of Ukrainian Black Sea grain exports following the invasion and Russia's suspension and eventual termination of the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023, contributed to food price inflation exceeding 60% in Egypt by 2023, against a backdrop of a severe foreign exchange crisis and negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) over a $3 billion support program.  Cairo has been navigating these pressures while simultaneously managing its bilateral relationship with Washington, its arms supply relationship with Moscow, and domestic political dynamics that limit the government's tolerance for economic disruption.

The situation in Egypt is illustrative of a broader pattern across North Africa and parts of the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, where governments are managing food price inflation, foreign exchange shortfalls, and IMF conditionality simultaneously, while being asked to absorb additional economic costs through alignment with Western sanctions.  The structural redirection of grain supply chains of this scale is a multi-year undertaking even under favourable conditions, and alternative suppliers at comparable price points and volume have not been readily available.

Defense Procurement

Several of Russia's most significant arms export relationships involve countries that have abstained or declined to support Ukraine in formal multilateral settings.  India maintains one of the world's largest accumulated inventories of Russian-origin military equipment, including Sukhoi Su-30MKI fighters, T-90 main battle tanks, S-400 air defense systems, and a fleet of Russian-built submarines and frigates.  The S-400 procurement in particular generated significant friction with Washington, which threatened CAATSA (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) sanctions before ultimately granting a waiver in 2022, partly in recognition of the strategic complexity of sanctioning a country simultaneously regarded as a key Indo-Pacific partner.

Algeria sources the overwhelming majority of its military hardware from Russia, including Su-30 and MiG-29 aircraft, T-90 tanks, and S-400 systems.  Ethiopia, Vietnam, and several Southeast Asian states have similarly deep Russian equipment dependencies.  The procurement relationships in question were built over decades, involve training pipelines and maintenance ecosystems that cannot be transferred overnight, and require capital outlays that Western governments have not offered to subsidise.  A country seeking to transition its air force from Russian to Western platforms faces not only the capital cost of new aircraft but the cost of training new pilots and ground crews, rebuilding maintenance infrastructure, renegotiating basing and logistics arrangements, and managing a capability gap during the transition period. 

Regional Priorities and the Gulf Security Environment

The Gulf Cooperation Council states, comprising Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman, represent a diplomatically and economically significant bloc whose engagement with the Ukraine conflict has been shaped primarily by a regional threat environment that has deteriorated sharply since October 2023.  While Gulf states have not endorsed Russia's invasion, they have maintained independent diplomatic postures, declined to join Western sanctions regimes, and continued to participate in OPEC+, the alliance formed in 2016 between the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and ten major non-OPEC oil-producing nations, in which Russia holds a co-decision-making role on global oil production.

The broader pattern across the Global South reflects a similar dynamic.  Governments that are managing active or escalating security crises in their own regions have limited political bandwidth to direct toward a conflict in Europe, however significant its implications for the international legal order.  The Ethiopian civil war in Tigray and Amhara, the ongoing conflict in Sudan, and persistent instability across the Sahel have consumed the crisis management capacity of African governments and regional institutions.  In South and Southeast Asia, persistent territorial tensions in the South China Sea, the unresolved conflict in Myanmar, and the structural fragility of several South Asian states represent competing priorities that crowd out sustained engagement with the Ukraine file.

For Gulf states specifically, the regional threat environment has undergone a major shift since October 2023.  Israel's use of force in Gaza and Lebanon, and the subsequent twelve-day war between Israel and Iran in June 2025, initiated a cascading escalation that Gulf capitals had actively sought to prevent, precisely because it placed them in the middle.  By early 2026, Israeli and US strikes against Iranian territory, and Iranian retaliatory strikes targeting US military facilities across the Gulf, had transformed what was a serious but manageable regional tension into a direct security emergency on Gulf soil.  For governments managing the consequences of missile strikes, disrupted energy exports, and acute vulnerability along the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately a third of global seaborne crude oil transits, the diplomatic bandwidth available for sustained engagement with a European land war has narrowed considerably.

The cumulative effect is that the ask being made of Global South governments to prioritize alignment on Ukraine is arriving at a moment when most of them are already absorbing the costs of conflicts and crises closer to home.  That is not indifference to international law.  It is the predictable consequence of asking governments operating under acute regional pressure to extend finite diplomatic capital toward a conflict whose resolution lies, in any near-term scenario, primarily in the hands of Western states and their partners.

Institutional Scepticism and the Consistency Question

Governments across Africa, Asia, and Latin America have raised, in both public statements and diplomatic communications, whether the principles most vocally championed in the Ukraine context, primarily sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the prohibition on the use of force, are being applied consistently by the Western states invoking them.  The cases cited include the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Ethiopian civil war in Tigray and Amhara, the civil war in Sudan, and Israel's use of force in Gaza and Lebanon.  In none of these conflicts did the Western governments now leading the sanctions coalition against Russia impose comparable measures against the parties responsible for the conduct in question, and in several cases those same governments provided arms, financing, or diplomatic cover to them.

For many Global South governments, that asymmetry is not a peripheral observation.  It is the central lens through which the broader diplomatic ask is evaluated. When the same capitols that organized the fastest and most comprehensive sanctions regime in modern history declined to impose comparable measures in a conflict involving a Western ally, the conclusion drawn across much of Africa, Asia, and Latin America was not that the two situations are legally distinct, which they are, but that the architecture of international accountability is applied according to strategic interest rather than principle.  

None of this amounts to a legal defense of Russia's conduct in Ukraine, which violates foundational norms of international law that exist independently of who enforces them and how selectively.  The distinction, however, is precisely the point.  International law derives its authority not only from its text but from the perceived legitimacy of its application.  When the states most invested in enforcing a norm are also the states most visibly exempted from its consequences, the norm does not disappear, but its claim to universal obligation is weakened in the eyes of those being asked to bear the cost of upholding it.  What Global South governments are contesting is not the illegality of Russia's invasion but the moral standing of the states demanding a response to it, and those are different questions. 

A legal prohibition can be simultaneously valid and selectively enforced, and it is precisely that selectivity, accumulated across decades and conflicts, that has eroded the political authority the rules-based order needs to function as something other than a coalition of the willing operating under a universal banner. The ask being made of the Global South is ultimately an ask to treat that banner as genuine.  For many of the governments receiving it, the evidentiary record makes that difficult to do.

The China Variable

China's economic footprint across the Global South is the largest single structural factor shaping the background conditions within which Global South governments evaluate their Ukraine-related diplomatic positioning.  The relationship is not primarily about ideological affinity or coordinated diplomatic strategy, though both exist to some degree.  It is primarily about the material dependencies that Chinese financing has created across a wide range of countries and the economic costs that would flow from positions that openly antagonise Beijing.

Chinese state-backed lending through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and bilateral financing arrangements has been extensive and geographically broad. Sub-Saharan Africa has received an estimated $170 billion in Chinese financing since 2000, a figure that encompasses infrastructure loans, concessional credit, and commercial bank lending.  The distribution is uneven, with countries including Zambia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of Congo carrying particularly significant Chinese debt exposure relative to GDP.  Zambia's 2020 external debt default, the first by a sub-Saharan African country in the post-pandemic period, involved Chinese creditors holding a substantial share of the debt, and its restructuring process illustrated the degree to which Chinese bilateral creditors have become central actors in sovereign debt negotiations across the continent.  In Southeast Asia, Laos has a particularly deep infrastructure dependency on Chinese financing, having committed a majority stake in its national electricity grid to Chinese creditors as part of a debt restructuring arrangement.  Pakistan, which straddles the South and Central Asian categories, has received approximately $26.5 billion in Chinese financing under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor component of the BRI, with total repayment obligations, including debt service and dividends, projected to reach nearly $40 billion over twenty years.

China's formal position on the Ukraine conflict, as set out in its twelve-point position paper released in February 2023 and elaborated in subsequent joint statements with Russia, declines to characterize Russia's operations as an invasion, attributes the conflict in part to NATO expansion and Western security policies, and proposes a ceasefire framework premised on conditions that Ukraine and its Western partners have not found acceptable.  China has maintained and in some categories expanded its trade and economic relationships with Russia throughout the conflict.  Whether trade represents deliberate state policy or the actions of Chinese commercial actors exploiting regulatory gaps has been a matter of ongoing debate, but their operational significance for Russian defense industrial production is not seriously disputed.

For governments that depend on Chinese financing for debt rollovers, infrastructure project completion, or sustained trade access, public alignment with positions that China actively opposes carries measurable costs.  The relevant constraint is not that these governments will do whatever Beijing instructs.  Most have demonstrated independent judgment on a range of diplomatic questions.  The constraint is that the diplomatic calculus for a government managing Chinese debt obligations and seeking continued infrastructure financing includes, as a background factor, the cost of damaging a relationship with one of its most consequential creditors.  

The Material Offer Gap

The diplomatic effort to build Global South alignment has been framed predominantly around normative and legal arguments, with insufficient attention to the material interests of the countries being courted.  That imbalance has been noted, and has generated a persistent perception among Global South governments that the ask is being made on Western terms, without genuine reciprocity.

The concrete material incentives that could plausibly shift the cost-benefit calculation for non-aligned states, including meaningful debt relief for heavily indebted African and South Asian countries, preferential or restructured trade access to European and American markets, accelerated and genuinely concessional technology transfer arrangements, or credible security architecture for non-aligned states, have not been systematically advanced by Western governments or by the international financial institutions they influence.

The IMF and World Bank have continued to operate under standard program conditionality frameworks during this period.  For governments negotiating painful fiscal adjustment programs with the Fund, including Egypt, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Ethiopia, all of which have had active IMF programmes during the conflict period, the experience of conditionality is an immediate and often politically costly reality, not an abstraction.  The request to absorb additional economic costs through Ukraine alignment, in an environment where the same institutional architecture is imposing austerity-adjacent conditions, generates a credibility problem that is difficult to surmount through diplomatic engagement alone.

The trade dimension compounds this problem.  Several Western governments have simultaneously sought diplomatic alignment from developing nations while maintaining agricultural subsidies that depress global commodity prices for the agricultural products on which many Global South economies depend, and trade barriers including tariff structures and phytosanitary requirements that restrict market access for developing country exports.  The EU's Common Agricultural Policy, the United States' domestic farm support programmes, and the various non-tariff barriers maintained by wealthy countries against developing country agricultural, textile, and manufacturing exports are well-documented features of the global trade architecture that Global South governments have sought to reform through the WTO and bilateral negotiations for decades, with limited success.  The asymmetry between the standards being invoked in the diplomatic context and the economic policies being maintained simultaneously is not invisible to the governments being asked to align.

A foreign policy ask that requires a government to absorb near-term economic costs, in exchange for normative commitments from partners who are not offering near-term economic concessions, is a structurally weak diplomatic offer regardless of the merit of the underlying cause. Addressing that weakness would require a level of material reciprocity that Western governments have not yet demonstrated a willingness to extend.

Conclusion

The degree of Global South alignment with Ukraine's diplomatic position is shaped by structural constraints that operate largely independently of the legal merits of Ukraine's case or the quality of its diplomatic outreach.  Economic dependencies on Russian energy, food, and defense supply chains create genuine costs for governments considering alignment.  Regional security pressures, particularly across the Middle East, consume political bandwidth that might otherwise be directed toward a European conflict.  Institutional scepticism about the consistent application of international legal principles by Western states creates a reception environment in which normative arguments carry less weight than their legal foundations warrant.  China's economic footprint across the developing world creates background constraints on how far governments can move against Beijing's stated preferences.  And the absence of systematic material reciprocity from Western governments means the diplomatic ask has been presented without the economic accompaniment that might meaningfully shift the calculus.

A more durable international coalition would require Western governments to reckon seriously with each of these dimensions, not as communication problems to be managed, but as substantive constraints that reflect the actual interests and experiences of the countries being courted.  The normative case for Ukraine's position is legally sound.  Whether the political authority exists to translate that case into sustained multilateral action depends on whether the states leading that effort are willing to extend the kind of reciprocity they are asking others to demonstrate.

In light of these structural constraints, there is a reasonable argument that Ukraine's diplomatic resources are more efficiently deployed in deepening and sustaining the commitments of existing allies than in pursuing incremental shifts among states whose non-alignment reflects durable material and institutional realities unlikely to change within the timeframe of the conflict.  Managing alliance cohesion, particularly as domestic political pressures in key Western states create uncertainty about long-term military and financial support, may represent a higher-return diplomatic investment than continued outreach to governments whose cost-benefit calculus is structurally resistant to realignment.

* Dr. Paul R. Williams is the Co-Founder and Director of the Public International Law & Policy Group and Rebecca Grazier Professor of Law and International Relations at American University

Roundtable Blog: Four Years Since Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion Into Ukraine: What Have We Learned?

 Roundtable Blog:  Four Years Since Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion Into Ukraine:  What Have We Learned? 

Editor’s Note:

This blogpost is part of the PILPG Lawyering Peace roundtable series.  Rather than a traditional co-authored article, it presents a curated set of expert reflections from members of PILPG’s Peace Fellows and Ambassador Circle networks.  Marking four years since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, this roundtable examines how the war has reshaped international law, global security architecture, accountability mechanisms, and our understanding of modern aggression.

Anniversaries invite commemoration.  This roundtable instead invites assessment.  Four years on, the international community possesses insights that were unavailable in the early days of the invasion.  The war has tested the resilience of collective defense systems, exposed the limitations and adaptability of international institutions, accelerated transformations in military technology and information warfare, and catalyzed new approaches to sanctions, energy security, and legal accountability.  It has also revealed both the extraordinary durability of Ukrainian statehood and the profound human costs of prolonged high-intensity conflict.

This collection seeks to move beyond retrospective narrative toward forward-looking analysis.  What assumptions proved mistaken?  What institutional innovations have emerged?  How has the legal framework governing aggression and atrocity crimes evolved under pressure?  What lessons should policymakers internalize to deter future wars of aggression?  By elevating diverse expert perspectives across disciplines, this roundtable aims to distill the most consequential lessons of the past four years — and to consider how they should inform the future of peacebuilding, deterrence, and the international legal order.

If February 2022 was a moment of shock, February 2026 is a moment of reckoning. What have these four years revealed about power, law, resilience, and the future of the international order?

Dr. Paul R. Williams, Rebecca Grazier Professor of Law and International Relations at American University

Four years into Russia’s full-scale invasion, the first and most striking transformation has been the acceleration of technological change in warfare.  Artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, precision-guided drones, satellite-enabled targeting, and real-time data fusion have compressed decision cycles and expanded the battlefield into cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum.  Ukraine has demonstrated how commercially available technology, agile software development, and decentralized innovation can offset traditional force disparities.  The war has made clear that future conflicts will be shaped as much by code, algorithms, and adaptive manufacturing as by tanks and artillery.

Yet even as technology has evolved exponentially, the fundamental constraints of warfare remain stubbornly constant.  Attrition still matters. Manpower, training, logistics, and industrial capacity continue to determine strategic endurance.  Economic resilience based on energy security, defense production, fiscal sustainability has proven as decisive as battlefield ingenuity.  The lesson of the past four years is therefore not that technology replaces fundamentals, but that it amplifies them.  States that combine technological agility with demographic depth, industrial mobilization, and societal cohesion will shape the future of warfare; those that rely on innovation alone will discover that the enduring logic of war has not disappeared.

Second, the resilience and limits of the Euro-Atlantic alliance have come into sharper focus over the past four years.  In February 2022, many assumed that the United States would continue to underwrite European security with little political friction.  That assumption has eroded.  Domestic pressures in Washington have sharpened scrutiny of asymmetric burden sharing, signaling that long-term U.S. support cannot be detached from questions of allied contribution and strategic reciprocity.  The alliance has endured, but its internal equilibrium has shifted.

At the same time, the war exposed that Europe was militarily weaker and less prepared for high-intensity conflict than many believed.  Stockpiles were thin, defense industrial capacity had atrophied, and rebuilding credible surge capacity is proving more difficult than many policymakers had assumed.  Yet the war also catalyzed a remarkable strategic reawakening: increased defense spending, joint procurement initiatives, expanded production of ammunition and air defense systems, and a broader political acceptance that deterrence requires sustained investment.  The lesson is not alliance fragility, but alliance recalibration — toward a more balanced distribution of risk, cost, and capability within the Euro-Atlantic community.

The next lesson learnt is that the economic sanctions policy as a tool to deter aggression remains strikingly anemic.  Despite unprecedented coordination in response to Russia’s invasion, sanctions have struggled to produce rapid behavioral change or to meaningfully constrain a determined, resource-rich state.  Financial restrictions, export controls, and asset freezes have imposed real costs, but they have not fundamentally altered strategic decision-making in Moscow. The limits are both institutional and structural.  Institutionally, sanctions regimes are fragmented, unevenly enforced, and vulnerable to political fatigue.  Structurally, decades of deep economic integration, particularly in energy, finance, and critical supply chains, created mutual dependencies that diluted deterrent credibility before the war and complicated escalation once it began.  The lesson is sobering: sanctions can signal condemnation and incrementally degrade capacity, but absent broader strategic alignment and sustained enforcement, they remain an insufficient stand-alone mechanism for deterring wars of aggression.

Finally, over the past four years, it has become increasingly clear that this is not simply Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, but a broader war of aggression against Europe itself.  The objectives extend beyond territorial control to reshaping the European security architecture, weakening transatlantic cohesion, and reasserting spheres of influence long thought obsolete.  Energy coercion, cyber operations, election interference, disinformation campaigns, and calibrated military pressure along NATO’s eastern flank reveal a strategy aimed not only at Kyiv, but at the political and strategic unity of the continent.

Seen in this light, Ukraine has been the frontline, but not the sole target.  The war has tested Europe’s energy resilience, industrial capacity, democratic institutions, and willingness to bear sustained economic and military costs.  It has forced a reckoning with assumptions about post–Cold War stability and exposed how deeply European security remains intertwined with the outcome on Ukrainian territory.  The central question is no longer whether Europe is supporting Ukraine, but whether Europe is defending its own security order through Ukraine.

Major General Darrell Guthrie, US Army (Ret.), PILPG Senior Peace Fellow

 Four years into the war, Russia has failed to translate its initial ambitions into sustained strategic success.  Since the early phases of the invasion and the subsequent Ukrainian counter-offensives, the Russian Army has been unable to generate a decisive offensive threat beyond the eastern oblasts it currently contests.  At sea, the Russian Navy has largely withdrawn from active Black Sea operations, deterred by Ukraine’s innovative use of autonomous maritime systems.  In response to battlefield constraints, Russian leadership has increasingly relied on ballistic missile and suicide drone attacks targeting civilian populations and critical energy infrastructure — a shift that reflects both strategic frustration and a continued willingness to weaponize terror. 

At the same time, Ukraine’s military has demonstrated resilience, adaptability, and operational creativity.  Ukrainian forces have integrated autonomous systems across the frontlines and conducted deep strikes against oil production and logistical facilities inside Russia.  Despite earlier fears that fluctuations in U.S. support would create crippling ammunition shortages, coordinated domestic production and expanded European defense cooperation have significantly strengthened supply chains and replenished critical stockpiles over the past year. 

Several lessons stand out.  The Russian military remains anchored in a 20th-century attritional mindset, relying on mass and firepower rather than agility.  In contrast, Ukraine’s experience underscores the importance of securing reliable supply chains, reducing operational restrictions on advanced weapons systems, and integrating autonomous capabilities at scale.  The war has already reshaped how major powers assess force structure, industrial preparedness, and the role of unmanned systems in future conflicts.  While the fighting continues, each failed Russian attempt to break Ukraine’s defensive lines or erode civilian resolve narrows Moscow’s strategic options and reinforces the long-term limits of coercive warfare.  

Dr. David M. Crane, Founding Chief Prosecutor of the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone and Founder of the Global Accountability Project

Four years into Russia’s full-scale assault on Ukraine, the world has had time to absorb what this war has revealed — about Ukraine, about Russia, and about the international system that surrounds them. The war has not followed the script many expected in February 2022, and the lessons that have emerged are sobering.

First, Ukraine’s resilience has been extraordinary.  What was supposed to be a quick decapitation strike instead became a national awakening.  Ukrainians have shown that motivation, local knowledge, and a sense of existential purpose can outweigh assumptions about military size.  Their ability to adapt — whether through drone innovation, rapid battlefield learning, or community-driven defense — has reshaped how modern resistance is understood.

Second, Russia’s strengths and weaknesses have both been laid bare.  The early failures exposed deep problems in planning, logistics, and leadership.  Yet Russia has also shown a capacity to absorb losses, reconstitute forces, and grind forward despite sanctions and diplomatic isolation.  The war has demonstrated that an authoritarian state can sustain a long, costly conflict if it is willing to sacrifice its own people and economy to do so.

Third, civilians have paid the highest price.  Millions have been displaced.  Families have been separated.  Children have grown up in basements, shelters, and foreign countries.  Russia’s strikes on energy grids, apartment blocks, and public infrastructure have made civilian life unpredictable and dangerous.  The humanitarian toll is not a side effect of the war — it is one of its defining features.

Fourth, the war has tested the cohesion of democratic alliances.  Ukraine’s survival has depended on sustained Western support, and that support has not always been guaranteed.  The war has revealed both the power of collective action and the fragility of political will.  It has forced democracies to confront a basic question: how much does the international order matter when it is challenged by force?

Fifth, the nature of warfare is changing in real time.  Drones, electronic warfare, satellite intelligence, and commercial technology have become central to the battlefield.  The war has shown that large-scale land conflict in Europe is not a relic of the past, and that future wars will blend traditional combat with rapidly evolving digital tools.

Sixth, time itself has become a strategic weapon.  Russia is betting that fatigue — political, economic, and emotional — will outlast Ukraine’s ability to fight and the West’s willingness to help.  Ukraine, in turn, is betting that determination and international solidarity can outlast Russian coercion.  The duration of the war has become part of the war. Time and distraction are Putin’s ultimate weapons.

Finally, the war in Ukraine has reshaped the landscape of international law.  The invasion has revived global attention to the crime of aggression, a charge rarely pursued since Nuremberg.  Ukraine’s partners have pushed for new accountability mechanisms, including a special tribunal focused specifically on Russia’s decision to wage an unlawful war.  At the same time, the systematic targeting of civilians, forced deportations, and attacks on critical infrastructure have forced the international community to confront gaps in how atrocity crimes are investigated and prosecuted.  The war has reminded the world that international law is only as strong as the political will behind it — and that accountability for aggression and mass harm cannot be an afterthought if the rules-based order is to survive.  The bright red thread to atrocity accountability is political not legal.

In the end, the fourth anniversary offers no easy conclusions.  What it does offer is clarity: deterrence cannot be assumed, borders are not self-enforcing, and the defense of a rules-based order requires more than statements of principle.  Ukraine’s struggle is reshaping global security, and the lessons learned today will influence international politics for decades.

Ambassador Zorica Marić-Djordjević, former Head of the Permanent Mission of Montenegro to the World Trade Organization and Special Representative of Montenegro to the UN Human Rights Council

Four years on, any commemoration of Russia’s full-scale invasion must hold two realities together: the magnitude of devastation and the depth of Ukrainian resilience.  The war has shattered cities, displaced millions, and reintroduced to Europe a form of industrial, attritional violence many believed had been confined to history.  Yet it has also revealed a society capable of extraordinary mobilization, improvisation, and sacrifice, alongside an international coalition that, despite hesitation and internal divisions, has sustained Ukraine far longer than the aggressor and many observers initially expected. 

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has forced Europe to confront its own vulnerability, accelerating a shift from a market-driven union toward a more security-conscious, geopolitical actor.  Power dynamics within the Union have subtly shifted: the Baltic and Nordic states, Poland, and Romania now carry greater influence on Russia policy; Germany has undergone a difficult strategic reorientation; and Finland and Sweden, long associated with neutrality, have joined NATO.  As a result, the EU now speaks about its security, strength, and even its “destiny” in far starker terms than before 2022.

As the end of the war approaches, the prospect of some form of “emergency accession” or accelerated integration of Ukraine into the EU has shifted from a peripheral debate to a central test of European unity.  A credible, fast tracked EU pathway would not merely reward Ukraine’s sacrifice but also function as a security instrument in its own right, anchoring Ukraine irreversibly within Europe’s political, legal, and economic space and raising the long term costs and complexity of any renewed Russian attempt to control Ukraine. 

Ambassador Ylber Hysa, former diplomat of the Republic of Kosovo 

In the years preceding the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2022, intelligence warnings from the United States and the United Kingdom were met with skepticism across parts of Europe.  This hesitation reflected the dominant post-Cold War paradigm: the assumption that large-scale interstate war in Europe had become structurally irrational.  The skepticism felt reasonable, because leaders of Europe felt Russian invasion was not “rational”.

This paradigm rested on three core premises: economic interdependence reduces incentives for conflict; institutional frameworks provide mechanisms for dispute resolution; and state actors primarily calculate interests in material terms. Within such a framework, invasion appeared strategically self-defeating.

However, developments in 2021 indicated an alternative logic. Following the Geneva summit with the United States, Vladimir Putin increasingly articulated a historical narrative that challenged Ukrainian sovereignty.  His interpretation of medieval statehood and shared origins suggested that identity and historical grievance, rather than economic calculation, were central to the Kremlin’s strategic worldview. The emphasis on historical continuity evokes comparisons within Russian discourse to transformative rulers such as Peter the Great or Joseph Stalin — figures associated with territorial expansion and centralized authority.

The invasion exposed miscalculations on multiple sides.  European governments and Ukrainian leadership underestimated the likelihood of maximalist action.  Russian planners appear to have underestimated Ukrainian resistance and Western cohesion.  These reciprocal misjudgments highlight the limits of rationalist models when actors prioritize ideological or historical objectives.

The events of February 2022 may therefore represent the end of the post-Cold War security order in Europe.  Rather than signaling the collapse of rationality per se, the war demonstrates the inadequacy of narrow materialist assumptions about rational behavior.  States may act “rationally” according to internally defined ideological goals, even when such actions impose significant economic costs.

In this sense, the contemporary period could be conceptualized as a transition from liberal institutional optimism toward renewed geopolitical realism. Defense spending, alliance structures, and deterrence strategies have regained prominence.

At the same time, Ukraine’s resistance has challenged deterministic assessments of military capability. The conflict has also acquired normative dimensions, framed by many Western actors as a defense of sovereignty and liberal political order.

Whether this normative framing will shape the long-term structure of European security remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that February 2022 marked a structural rupture in the assumptions that governed European politics for more than three decades.

Ambassador Joachim Rücker, former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and Head of the UN Mission in Kosovo

Four years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the contrast with earlier responses to aggression within the United Nations system remains striking.  Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait triggered swift and decisive action by the UN Security Council, culminating in the authorization of force and the rapid liberation of Kuwait.  In the case of Ukraine, by contrast, the Security Council has been structurally paralyzed by the veto of a permanent member that is itself the aggressor.  The comparison underscores both the promise and the vulnerability of the collective security framework established under the UN Charter.

Yet the story does not end with the Security Council deadlock.  Faced with paralysis, the UN General Assembly has assumed a more visible and assertive role.  Through emergency special sessions and repeated resolutions invoking the “Uniting for Peace” precedent, the General Assembly has articulated clear and sustained condemnation of Russia’s aggression and reaffirmed Ukraine’s territorial integrity.  While its resolutions are not legally binding, they carry significant normative weight and demonstrate that multilateral legitimacy does not disappear when the Security Council fails to act.

This more assertive posture of the General Assembly is not accidental.  It has emerged largely as a response to Russia’s war of aggression and the institutional vacuum created by Security Council inaction.  The evolution of the Assembly’s role should not be overlooked amid competing global crises or diplomatic distractions.  It reflects an effort by the broader membership of the United Nations to preserve the principles of the Charter when the primary enforcement organ is unable to fulfill its mandate.

Stephanie Gusching⁩, Associate at White & Case, Secondee at the Public International Law and Policy Group

Four years after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the war has exposed the structural weaknesses of the UN collective security apparatus.  Under Articles 39-42 of the UN Charter, the Security Council (UNSC) is tasked with identifying threats to peace and authorizing collective, binding measures to combat them.  However, Russia’s status as a permanent member of the UNSC has enabled it to veto draft resolutions condemning its actions and instituting remedial measures.  This case illustrates a core weakness in the enforcement authority of a system dependent on the consent of the most powerful states: when a permanent member is itself the alleged aggressor, the system is functionally inoperative.

In response to UNSC paralysis, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) invoked the “Uniting for Peace” procedure to impose normative pressure on Russia.  The UNGA adopted multiple resolutions with large majorities that condemned Russia’s invasion, affirmed Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and called for the withdrawal of Russian forces.  However, the key weakness of UNGA resolutions is their non-binding nature.  This demonstrates that while international law provides strong rules against aggression, it has comparatively weak mechanisms to enforce them.

By highlighting these weaknesses, Russia’s war in Ukraine has thus ignited discussion on reform within the UNSC.  Proposals include voluntary veto restraint, mandatory abstention, and expansion of UNSC membership.  However, the path to reform is laden with its own set of challenges, as amendments to the UN Charter require ratification by the permanent members whose very power would be curtailed.

Kateryna Kyrychenko, Head of Ukraine Legal Affairs and Program Management at the Public International Law and Policy Group

Four years into Russia’s full-scale invasion, one of the most visible changes has been the shift from discussing accountability to building it.  In February 2022, many conversations about justice felt premature - almost theoretical - while the trajectory of the war remained deeply uncertain.  Today, we are living with institutions that did not exist when the invasion began.

The foundations of the International Compensation Mechanism have been laid.  The Register of Damage for Ukraine, the first chain of the Mechanism, is operational, creating a structured mechanism to document claims and prepare the groundwork for reparations.  The Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression, established last year, marked a historic step in addressing leadership responsibility for the decision to wage an unlawful war.  At the same time, international investigations have expanded across jurisdictions, and the International Criminal Court has issued six arrest warrants in the situation in Ukraine, which is a notably rapid pace by international criminal law standards.  None of this eliminates the political challenges of enforcement.  But it does show that international law is not static.  Faced with gaps and paralysis, states and practitioners have demonstrated an ability to innovate — to create complementary mechanisms rather than accept impunity as inevitable.

Yet the legal architecture tells only part of the story.  Civilian resilience has been the constant foundation beneath every institutional development.  Local authorities continue governing despite repeated attacks.  Civil society organizations document crimes while supporting displaced families.  Energy workers restore power after each strike on infrastructure.  Teachers, doctors, volunteers, and ordinary families have adapted to a reality of prolonged uncertainty without surrendering their sense of dignity or national identity.

For me, the lesson of these four years is that institutions and people sustain each other.  Accountability mechanisms derive strength from a society that refuses to normalize aggression.  And civilian endurance is reinforced by the knowledge that crimes are being recorded, named, and pursued.  International law does not defend itself, it rather advances when communities insist that it must.

Roundtable Blog: Voting Under Duress — Referenda, Aggression, and the Limits of Democratic Consent

Roundtable Blog: Voting Under Duress — Referenda, Aggression, and the Limits of Democratic Consent

Editor’s Note:

This post is part of the PILPG Lawyering Justice roundtable series.  Rather than a traditional co-authored article, it presents a curated set of expert reflections from members of PILPG’s Ukraine Peace Negotiations Working Group.  Drawing on a closed-door discussion held on 6 February 2026, this roundtable examines one of the most legally and politically fraught questions facing Ukraine: whether a national referendum can play a legitimate role in a peace process shaped by aggression, occupation, and mass displacement.

Referenda are commonly understood as the highest expression of democratic will.  Yet in contexts defined by coercion and force, democratic instruments themselves may be distorted into tools that legitimise unlawful outcomes.  This roundtable explores the legal limits of consent under international law, the precedent-setting risks of post-aggression referenda, and the strategic choices Ukraine faces in navigating popular participation without eroding its sovereignty or the international legal order.

1. Can Territorial Change Resulting from Aggression Ever Be Legitimated by Referendum?

Dr. Paul R. Williams, Rebecca Grazier Professor of Law and International Relations at American University

The issue involves both legal and ethical dimensions.  Even if procedurally lawful under domestic legislation, referenda in occupied territories raise profound normative concerns.  Creating a referendum-based validation mechanism would institutionalise a pathway for legitimising aggression.  The core question is not merely whether Ukraine can hold a referendum, but whether international law permits the consequences such a referendum would produce.

Dr. David Crane, Founding Chief Prosecutor of the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone and Founder of the Global Accountability Project

Any referendum conducted after aggression risks negating the crime of aggression by retroactively legitimising unlawful territorial claims.  Even a procedurally valid vote may be interpreted as acknowledgement of Russia’s claims over Crimea or Donbas.  Allowing referenda to validate conquest creates a dangerous global precedent — invade, hold territory, organise a vote, and claim legality.  Ukraine is not the only audience; other potential aggressors are closely watching how international law responds.  At the same time, a clearly framed referendum rejecting territorial concessions could place Ukraine in a strong bargaining position by demonstrating unified public resistance to ceding land.

Prof. Milena Sterio, Distinguished Professor of Law at Cleveland State University

The prohibition on the acquisition of territory by force is a jus cogens norm that cannot be derogated from through popular consent.  Even genuine democratic approval cannot cure the illegality of territorial change resulting from aggression.  Referenda held under coercive conditions undermine the non-recognition doctrine that protects Ukraine’s territorial integrity. International law draws a clear line: sovereignty cannot be voted away when force is the determining factor.

2. Does Democratic Consent Retain Legal Meaning When Given Under Duress?

Prof. Michael Kelly, The Senator Allen A. Sekt Endowed Chair in Law at Creighton University School of Law

Democratic sovereignty theory does not support territorial concessions made under military pressure.  Consent obtained under invasion and occupation constitutes duress and invalidates any agreement to surrender territory.  If territory were ever relinquished, international law would require full compensation, including land value, infrastructure, and subsurface resources, underscoring the impracticality of referendum-based territorial loss.  

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter protects political independence and territorial integrity.  Referenda combined with elections under current conditions would be nearly impossible to organise without fatally undermining legitimacy.

Ambassador Zorica Marić-Djordjević, former Head of the Permanent Mission of Montenegro to the World Trade Organization and Special Representative of Montenegro to the UN Human Rights Council

Democratic legitimacy cannot override the principle of non-recognition of unlawful acts.  A Ukrainian referendum ratifying territorial change would validate aggression through democratic means.  The optics alone would weaken Ukraine’s position and offer a model for other conflicts.  Any referendum must avoid even implicit recognition of annexation outcomes.

At the same time, a referendum conducted by Ukraine under its own constitutional framework differs fundamentally from any vote organised under foreign occupation.  In principle, Ukraine may consent, through a treaty freely negotiated between sovereign equals, to a boundary adjustment without breaching the duty of non-recognition (provided it does not validate the prior unlawful use of force).  A referendum could serve as a channel of domestic democratic endorsement for such consent.  However, such consent would not erase the illegality of the original aggression, nor extinguish state responsibility, criminal accountability, or claims to reparations.  Those legal consequences remain governed by separate bodies of international law.  The principal risk lies in perception: if territorial loss were seen as “ratified,” it could politically suggest that sustained aggression yields results and invite similar tactics elsewhere.

Greta Ramelli, Legal Officer, Program Manager at the Public International Law & Policy Group

Under current Ukrainian law, referenda cannot be held under martial law, creating a significant legal constraint.  Any referendum would therefore be contingent on a ceasefire and linked to broader peace negotiations.  Referenda should not be treated as standalone mechanisms but as part of a larger sequencing strategy.  

Short-term peace achieved through territorial concessions may prove unsustainable in the long term.

3. What Precedents Would a Post-Aggression Referendum Set Beyond Ukraine?

Dr. Paul R. Williams, Rebecca Grazier Professor of Law and International Relations at American University

International law has spent decades delegitimising conquest, and referenda risk reversing that progress.  A model of “invade, hold, vote, legitimise” would erode the prohibition on territorial acquisition by force.  Institutionalising such a mechanism would provide a blueprint for laundering aggression.  Ukraine’s democratic credentials do not exempt it from the constraints of international legal order.

Stephanie Gusching⁩, Associate at White & Case, secondee at the Public International Law and Policy Group

Referenda conducted under duress risk legitimising similar tactics in other geopolitical contexts.  Potential spillover effects include Taiwan, Greenland, and other contested territories.  Ukraine’s decision will shape how democratic processes are perceived in future conflicts involving force.

Ambassador Jorge Lomonaco, former Ambassador of Mexico to the UN Human Rights Council, and to the Organization of American States 

Historical precedents demonstrate how treaties and ratification processes can be shaped by power asymmetries.  The nineteenth-century US–Mexico war illustrates how territorial transfer and ratification can produce enduring legal ambiguities.  Formal validation through legal processes does not eliminate underlying concerns about coercion.

4. Can Referenda Be Used Strategically Without Ratifying Territorial Loss?

Ambassador Ylber Hysa, former diplomat of the Republic of Kosovo 

Referenda may serve purposes other than territorial validation, including domestic cohesion and political legitimacy.  The framing of the question is critical; it should be designed to nullify annexation claims rather than endorse territorial change.  Used carefully, referenda can strengthen Ukraine’s internal unity during negotiations without conceding sovereignty.  

Delayed or postponed referenda may preserve flexibility pending more favourable geopolitical developments.  Interim agreements could include review clauses, though this may require accepting temporary concessions.

Ambassador Jorge Lomonaco, former Ambassador of Mexico to the UN Human Rights Council, and to the Organization of American States 

Referenda can function tactically to gain time and political space rather than to resolve territorial questions.  Strategic delay may allow Ukraine to consolidate international support and military capacity.  Tactical considerations may at times prevail over strictly legal ones, but without crossing red lines on recognition.

Tyler Thompson, Co-Founder and Chief Negotiation Officer of Expeditionary, founding member of the U.S. State Department’s Negotiations Support Unit 

The purpose of the referendum must be clearly defined.  For Russia, an ideal outcome would validate annexation; for Ukraine, only an overwhelming rejection would be beneficial.  A divided or ambiguous result would be strategically dangerous.  Russia would exploit drafting ambiguities and legal grey zones in peace agreements.

5. How Should Voter Inclusion Be Addressed After Occupation and Mass Displacement?

Kateryna Kyrychenko, Head of Ukraine Legal Affairs and Program Management at the Public International Law and Policy Group

Ukrainians from occupied territories and displaced persons are arguably the most directly affected by any territorial outcome.  Excluding these populations undermines substantive justice and democratic legitimacy.  At the same time, differentiated voting schemes raise serious concerns under equal suffrage principles.  Any referendum design must confront the realities of displacement, coercion, and forced transfer, while ensuring that voter inclusion criteria are clearly defined and legally defensible.

Tyler Thompson, Co-Founder and Chief Negotiation Officer of Expeditionary, founding member of the U.S. State Department’s Negotiations Support Unit 

Population movements, forced displacement, and settlement of Russian nationals in occupied territories complicate voter eligibility.  There is no clear precedent for weighted or differentiated voting in such contexts.  Demographic manipulation risks distorting the electorate, and any ambiguous or divided outcome would be strategically harmful for Ukraine.  Russia would likely exploit grey zones in interpretation to advance lawfare narratives.

Ambassador Joachim Rücker, former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and Head of the UN Mission in Kosovo

Referenda must comply with Ukraine’s constitutional framework.  Narrow parliamentary or referendum majorities may be insufficient for decisions of existential national importance; national unity, not procedural minimalism, should guide territorial decisions.  Historical precedents suggest populations in occupied territories should participate once conditions allow genuine and free expression.  Comparative constitutional models, including post-war Germany, illustrate how decisions can be structured when parts of the population are temporarily unable to vote.

6. How Should a Referendum Question Be Designed — or Should It Be Deferred Entirely?

Ambassador Zorica Marić-Djordjević, former Head of the Permanent Mission of Montenegro to the World Trade Organization and Special Representative of Montenegro to the UN Human Rights Council

Referendum questions must be singular, clear, and legally precise.  Bundling multiple issues risks misrepresenting voter intent.  The Cyprus experience demonstrates how rushed or failed referenda can stigmatise rejection as opposition to peace and complicate future negotiation rounds.  Venice Commission involvement and adherence to international electoral standards are essential.  Explicit criteria for voter inclusion should be developed in advance.

Where a peace agreement combines territory, security guarantees, and status arrangements, simplicity and legal clarity are essential.  OSCE and Venice Commission standards require neutral phrasing, prior review, and conditions for informed choice.  Splitting a comprehensive agreement into multiple binding questions risks inconsistent outcomes and an ambiguous mandate, as illustrated by the 2004 Annan Plan referendum.  A cautious model for Ukraine would involve a single principal question approving the agreement “as ratified by the Verkhovna Rada,” prior constitutional review of the wording, and full public dissemination of the agreement under balanced campaigning conditions.  Such safeguards cannot eliminate political risk, but they would reduce legal ambiguity and strengthen procedural legitimacy.

Ambassador Ylber Hysa, former diplomat of the Republic of Kosovo 

Interim arrangements may include review clauses without resolving sovereignty questions immediately.  Postponed referenda may offer a safer path than premature votes under pressure.  Buying time may be preferable to allowing Russia to dictate the pace.  The political costs of delay must be weighed against the irreversible consequences of recognition, and interim arrangements should not prejudice long-term sovereignty claims. International monitoring presence is critical to legitimacy.

Dr. David Crane, Founding Chief Prosecutor of the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone and Founder of the Global Accountability Project

Ceasefires and deconfliction arrangements can provide a neutral negotiation platform without resolving territorial questions.  In some circumstances, not holding a referendum is the most democratic and legally responsible choice.  Democracy should not be forced to legitimize outcomes produced by force.

Conclusion

This roundtable underscores a central lesson: democratic mechanisms cannot be used to repair the legal damage caused by aggression.  For Ukraine, restraint in deploying referenda may be as important as democratic participation itself. 

The challenge is not whether Ukrainians should shape peace, but how to ensure that democratic tools strengthen, rather than erode, Ukraine’s sovereignty and the international legal order.

Forget the Debate on Peace Versus Justice. Ukraine Has Set the Stage for Peace With Justice!

Forget the Debate on Peace Versus Justice. Ukraine Has Set the Stage for Peace With Justice!

By: Dr. Paul R. Williams,* Dr. Beth Van Schaack,** Professor David Crane,*** and Sindija Beta.****

Recent efforts to reach a ceasefire and potential peace arrangement to end Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine have again brought to the fore the tension between achieving peace and delivering justice in the wake of atrocities. For much of the twentieth century, those negotiating peace deals were either silent about the imperative of justice or negotiated it away. Indeed, many peace agreements and arrangements routinely incorporated blanket amnesties, trading accountability for the promise of stability and calm. The Évian Accords in Algeria, the National Reconciliation Law in Guatemala, the Lomé Peace Accord in Sierra Leone, and the “Due Obedience” and “Full Stop” laws in Argentina all exemplified this approach. These amnesties may have encouraged combatants to lay down their arms and helped end the fighting, but they left societies fractured, victims silenced, and perpetrators free to return to positions of power. 

Ultimately, many of these amnesties did not hold as national and international courts declared them unconstitutional and/or inconsistent with the nation’s human rights obligations. Argentina, for example, has prosecuted hundreds of individuals who stood accused of committing grave crimes during the country’s “dirty war.” The experience of Sierra Leone and Cambodia demonstrates that even negotiated amnesties do not shield perpetrators from subsequent international justice mechanisms; nor do they override the treaty-based legal obligations of states to prosecute atrocity crimes.

Russia has committed aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other atrocity crimes, not only in Ukraine but also in Georgia, Syria, Chechnya, and elsewhere; to date, perpetrators have largely suffered no tangible consequences for their crimes. No surprise that Russia supported the inclusion of a blanket amnesty provision in the Istanbul 2022 Communiqué, which was proposed in the early stages of the full-scale invasion, and again, almost as an afterthought, at the very end of the 28-point peace plan that the United States and Russia crafted in the second half of 2025. Russia no doubt assumed that Ukraine, and the international community, are so exhausted by war that no one would object to once again trading away justice for peace. What Russia, and those urging a broadscale amnesty as the only option for ending Russia’s war of aggression, ignore is that a decentralized accountability infrastructure is already in place and has already been activated. As such, it is beyond the power of Russia, and even Ukraine, to forsake justice and entrench impunity entirely. 

Indeed, justice efforts have been underway since before Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. Some cases—involving the downing of MH17, proceeding in Ukraine’s domestic courts, and asserting state responsibility before the European Court of Human Rights—are already the subject of final and binding judgments. More than a dozen states—in the region and beyond—have initiated investigations into Russian atrocities, sharing information and strategies through a joint investigative team and the Eurojust network (the known cases are compiled here). Non-governmental organizations are collecting information and creating perpetrator dossiers to support additional proceedings. The International Criminal Court, despite all its recent faults and challenges, has asserted its jurisdiction and has already issued six arrest warrants, which will not be withdrawn even if an amnesty is included within any peace deal. And the Council of Europe, in collaboration with Ukraine, is marching forward with its establishment of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine and a Register of Damage. These justice efforts cannot be derailed or blocked by those sitting around the negotiating table.

As argued by this article’s authors here and here, Ukraine has embraced lawfare, the strategic use of legal tools to achieve political, military, and diplomatic objectives. Lawfare is not limited to courtrooms. It operates in the realm of public opinion, delegitimizing Russian aggression; in the halls of multilateral organizations, mobilizing new mechanisms of justice; and on the battlefield, signaling that Russian crimes will be documented, prosecuted, redressed, and remembered. This strategy has allowed Ukraine to shift the global conversation from geopolitical bargaining to legal responsibility. It has framed the war not as a defensive maneuver by Russia or even a territorial dispute but as a grave breach of the international order, one that demands accountability rather than accommodation.

The irreversibility of Ukraine’s accountability trajectory is reinforced by decades of developments in international law, which have steadily shifted from permissive attitudes toward amnesty to a clear expectation of accountability for atrocity crimes. Key treaties establish this foundation. All four of the universally-ratified Geneva Conventions—which govern Russia’s war of aggression—obligate states to search for and prosecute those responsible for grave breaches during international armed conflicts. Customary international humanitarian law is in accord. Article 2(3) of the ICCPR and Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights likewise require states to ensure effective remedies for serious human rights violations, even when those violations are committed by state actors operating in an official capacity.

International courts and human rights bodies have converged around the principle that amnesties are unlawful and need not be respected if enacted in response to serious international crimes. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia articulated this consensus, noting that emerging international practice prohibits amnesty for crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The European Court of Human Rights has similarly held (see here and here) that amnesties for acts like torture or ill-treatment undermine deterrence and violate states’ obligations to preserve the rule of law. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has been even more explicit. In Gelman v. Uruguay, for example, it held that amnesty laws preventing investigation and prosecution of grave human rights violations are incompatible with international law, even when adopted through democratic processes. Cases involving Libya, Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia, among others, all confirm that international courts routinely reject domestic amnesty laws when they conflict with obligations to prosecute atrocities.

Taken together, these instruments and decisions reflect a settled reality: international law rejects amnesty for atrocity crimes. For the parties to today’s negotiations around Russia’s war of aggression, this means that justice is not merely a bargaining position. It is an irreversible reality. Even if the Ukrainian government, under immense pressure, agreed to grant amnesty to Russian officials before its own courts, such a provision would have no binding effect on the ICC, the Special Tribunal, or the courts of states exercising universal or other forms of extra-territorial jurisdiction. And such a decision would be subject to challenge before the European Court of Human Rights. 

For decades, some policymakers treated peace and justice as mutually exclusive outcomes. Ukraine has demonstrated that this is a false dichotomy. Through its strategic use of law, its mobilization of international institutions, and its insistence that atrocity crimes cannot be ignored, Ukraine has created a system in which the Russian ability to strong-arm Ukrainian officials or the international community into appeasement and amnesty is significantly constrained.

The accountability architecture now in place—including ICC warrants, domestic prosecutions, universal jurisdiction investigations, and a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression—cannot simply be dismantled with the stroke of a pen. The current negotiations between Ukraine, Russia, the United States, and Europe, therefore, are taking place in a world where justice mechanisms are already active and non-negotiable, regardless of what any peace plan provisions may suggest. Justice, once activated, has a momentum of its own.

* Dr. Paul R. Williams is the Co-Founder and Director of the Public International Law & Policy Group and Rebecca Grazier Professor of Law and International Relations at American University

** Dr. Beth Van Schaack is a Senior and Peace Fellow and former Ambassador-at-large for Global Criminal Justice (2022 -2025)

*** Professor David Crane  is the Founding Chief Prosecutor of the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone and Distinguished Scholar in Residence at Syracuse University College of Law

**** Sindija Beta is the Legal Officer and Program Manager at the Public International Law & Policy Group

Roundtable Blog: One Year Since Ukraine’s Ratification of the Rome Statute

Roundtable Blog: “One Year Since Ukraine’s Ratification of the Rome Statute” 

Editor’s Note

This blog marks the first anniversary reflection on one of Ukraine’s most consequential legal milestones — the ratification of the Rome Statute.  Presented as part of PILPG’s Ukraine Peace Negotiations Working Group, this roundtable brings together expert perspectives from leading members of the PILPG Peace Fellows network.  Each contributor examines how Ukraine’s formal accession to the International Criminal Court (ICC) has shaped its justice architecture, legal capacity, and international standing during an ongoing war of aggression.

Published under the Lawyering Justice banner, this post continues PILPG’s effort to connect legal analysis with peace strategy and to situate Ukraine’s accountability progress within a broader framework of international law and diplomacy.  The reflections below assess how ICC membership is reshaping Ukraine’s domestic legal order, transforming cooperation with international institutions, and influencing global debates about aggression, sovereignty, and justice during active conflict.

This roundtable also contributes to a forward-looking policy conversation: how Ukraine and its partners can consolidate an enduring system of accountability that integrates the ICC, the newly established Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression, and national war crimes mechanisms.  Together, these insights reaffirm that accountability is not a post-war ideal but a central element of Ukraine’s pursuit of a just and sustainable peace.

***

On 25 October 2024, Ukraine deposited its instrument of ratification of the Rome Statute, and on 1 January 2025, the Statute officially entered into force for Ukraine.  This moment marked more than the conclusion of a decades-long legal journey — it represented Ukraine’s determination to enshrine accountability within its national identity even as it continues to defend itself against Russia’s war of aggression.  The decision to join the International Criminal Court (ICC) amid active conflict underscored a powerful principle: that justice is not a luxury of peace, but a condition for achieving it.

In this roundtable blog, PILPG’s Peace Fellows and experts reflect on Ukraine’s first year as a State Party to the ICC through five guiding questions — exploring the most significant impacts of ratification, its influence on Ukraine’s domestic justice system, the evolving cooperation with the ICC, the broader implications for global accountability, and the strategic priorities that lie ahead.

What has been the most significant impact of Ukraine’s ratification of the Rome Statute so far?

Dr. Paul R. Williams, Rebecca Grazier Professor of Law and International Relations at American University

Ukraine’s ratification of the Rome Statute has fundamentally anchored its accountability framework within the international rule of law.  By formally joining the ICC system, Ukraine transformed years of ad hoc cooperation into a durable legal commitment that reinforces its credibility as a state dedicated to justice for atrocity crimes.  This ratification has also elevated Ukraine’s standing among nations seeking to strengthen the global architecture for accountability.  The move has reassured victims and civil society actors that accountability for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide will remain a long-term national and international priority, not a temporary response to Russia’s invasion.

Equally important, the ratification has created a powerful signaling effect.  It distinguishes Ukraine not only as a state under attack but also as a norm entrepreneur advancing international criminal justice from within a war zone. Ukraine’s commitment to the ICC during active conflict underscores that accountability and sovereignty can coexist — and indeed, reinforce one another.  This has encouraged renewed debate within other conflict-affected states about the political value of ICC membership, potentially reshaping global expectations of how wartime democracies engage with international law.

Michael Kelly, Professor at Creighton University School of Law and The Senator Allen A. Sekt Endowed Chair in Law

The most significant impact so far of Ukraine’s ratification of the Rome Statute is not a particular prosecution; rather it is the larger legitimizing function that draws Ukraine more inextricably into the circle of rule of law nations such as those in the European Union.  Fully authoritarian nations such as Russia, China, and Iran stand in stark contrast internationally to democratic rule of nations and Ukraine has shown in its lot with the latter.  As the United States shifts more steadily away from the latter to the former, it is unclear how the balance will shift’.  Nevertheless, Ukraine is on the right side of history embracing democracy and the rule of law.

David Crane, Founding Chief Prosecutor of the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone and Distinguished Scholar in Residence at Syracuse University College of Law

A year ago, Ukraine's signing of the Rome Statute was a pivotal moment for the country, especially given the ongoing conflict with Russia.  By stepping up to this international treaty, Ukraine is taking a clear and firm stand against war crimes and human rights abuses.  This commitment not only strengthens its own legal framework for prosecuting those responsible for atrocities but also enhances its credibility in the eyes of the world.  As Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated, "Our future is in a strong Europe and the world, where human rights and justice prevail."  With the backing of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Ukraine can initiate investigations and hold individuals accountable for their actions, even when domestic resources or political will may fall short.  This creates a greater capacity for justice and offers much-needed hope to victims who have suffered during the conflict.

On a broader scale, signing the Rome Statute sends an important message to the international community about Ukraine’s dedication to justice and the rule of law.  It highlights that, amid war and turmoil, Ukraine is serious about adhering to international norms and values, which can help attract more support from allies who prioritize accountability.  This move not only counters the narrative of impunity often seen in conflict zones but also encourages other nations to take a stand against violations.  As noted by the ICC's Chief Prosecutor, Karim Khan, “Every crime against humanity affects all of us,” emphasizing the collective responsibility to seek justice.  Additionally, by aligning itself with the Rome Statute, Ukraine fosters a sense of stability both regionally and globally as it works to prevent future atrocities and build a resilient democratic identity in a challenging environment.

Chris Goebel, Senior Legal Advisor at PILPG

Further to Paul William’s comments, Ukraine's ratification establishes a new precedent for conflict-affected states seeking ICC membership during active hostilities, potentially fundamentally reshaping international practice around timing and conditions for Rome Statute accession.  Historically, states have typically joined the ICC during peacetime or post-conflict transitions when domestic political consensus is usually more achievable and institutional capacity can be methodically developed.  Ukraine's decision to ratify while simultaneously prosecuting over 90 domestic war crimes trials, defending against existential military threats, and managing over 200,000 documented potential international crimes changes this traditional sequence.  Ukraine’s “ratification under fire” model demonstrates that ICC membership and active conflict are not necessarily mutually exclusive, potentially influencing other conflict-affected countries currently outside the Rome Statute system to consider earlier engagement.

How has ICC membership influenced Ukraine’s domestic justice system and approach to atrocity accountability?

Dr. Paul R. Williams, Rebecca Grazier Professor of Law and International Relations at American University

Ukraine’s ICC membership has accelerated domestic reforms designed to align national law with international criminal standards.  In the past year, Ukraine’s parliament has begun harmonizing its criminal code with the definitions of atrocity crimes under the Rome Statute, while judicial and prosecutorial institutions have received enhanced international support to strengthen their investigative capacity.  The Office of the Prosecutor General, working with international partners, has institutionalized mechanisms for evidence preservation and case coordination with the ICC.  These steps are not only procedural but transformational, building the foundations of a hybrid accountability system that combines international legitimacy with local ownership.

At the same time, ICC membership has reshaped the strategic mindset of Ukraine’s justice sector.  Prosecutors and policymakers increasingly frame their efforts through a “complementarity lens” — seeking to demonstrate that Ukraine can credibly investigate and prosecute Rome Statute crimes itself, while relying on the ICC for cases beyond its reach.  This has prompted a broader societal conversation about due process, command responsibility, and victim-centered justice.  In essence, Ukraine’s engagement with the ICC is catalyzing a deeper maturation of its domestic rule-of-law institutions, embedding accountability as a core pillar of post-war reconstruction and peacebuilding.

Michael Scharf, Co-Founder of the Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG), former Co-Dean of the Case Western Reserve University School of Law and the Joseph C. Hostetler—BakerHostetler Professor of Law

In October 2024, Ukraine amended its criminal code to bring it in line with the ICC, including adding a new provision on command responsibility (similar to Article 28 of the ICC Statute) which had not previously existed as a mode of liability in Ukrainian law.  The concept of command responsibility holds that a superior is responsible for the war crimes committed by subordinates that the superior knew or should have known were being committed and failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures: (1) to prevent the commission of the crimes; (2) to repress the commission of the crimes; or (3) to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.  Under this type of liability, Ukraine can prosecute military commanders for war crimes committed in their geographic area of command.  This will provide Ukraine an important tool in the effective prosecution of Russian war crimes at the command level. 

Michael Kelly, Professor at Creighton University School of Law and The Senator Allen A. Sekt Endowed Chair in Law

Ukraine’s constitution federalizes treaty law; consequently, the Rome Statute and the law associated with it come into Ukrainian domestic law.  This will prove helpful as Ukraine seeks to prosecute Russian commanders for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Ukrainian criminal courts.  It may prove especially helpful as the OTP more fully incorporates environmental crimes as a species of war crime into its operations in The Hague.  The government in Kyiv wants to prosecute environmental crimes committed by Russia as such.

What opportunities and challenges have emerged in cooperation between Ukraine and the ICC?

Dr. Beth Van Schaack, Senior and Peace Fellow and former Ambassador-at-large for Global Criminal Justice (2022 -2025)

As noted by others on these pages, Ukraine’s ratification of the Rome Statute signals its commitment to pursue justice and accountability for the war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other atrocities being committed daily during Russia’s brutal war of aggression.  Ratification further cements Ukraine’s European orientation, particularly given that joining the ICC would be a prerequisite for EU accession.  This development also signals a new form of complementarity, a concept that is central to the Rome Statute system.  The principle of complementarity dictates that so long as a national court with jurisdiction is appropriately pursuing investigations and prosecutions, ICC actors should stay their hands.  It is only when the national court is unwilling or unable to proceed that the ICC should step in. In this regard, the ICC is often called “a court of last resort.”

In the Ukraine context, of course, we have an ICC state party that is eager to pursue justice and, in fact, adjudicating war crimes cases in its national courts in the midst of a hot conflict to a degree unprecedented in human history.  There’s no question that Ukrainian courts will continue to be the prime engines of accountability going forward.  However, the Office of the Prosecutor General (OPG) has recorded upwards of 200,000 potentially prosecutable crimes since Russia’s full-scale invasion — an impossible juridical task for even the most well-resourced and experienced prosecutorial corps.  With the ICC Prosecutor pursuing Russia’s top leadership, including its head of state, Ukraine can focus on direct perpetrators and those down the chain of command.  Indeed, the ICC Prosecutor has made clear that his applications for arrest warrants benefited greatly from information sharing and other forms of support from the OPG.  As such, we see a new form of “complementarity as cooperation” emerging, whereby the national courts and the ICC undertake a division of labor to manage an enormous crime base.

Michael Scharf, Co-Founder of the Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG), former Co-Dean of the Case Western Reserve University School of Law and the Joseph C. Hostetler—BakerHostetler Professor of Law

Ukraine’s domestic courts are becoming a laboratory for the refinement of environmental war crimes prosecutions, with the ICC and the rest of the world watching closely.  Because Ukraine’s domestic law, like many European countries, provides for trials in absentia, Ukraine is likely to end up prosecuting cases relating to Russia’s environmental war crimes before the ICC has a chance to do so.  

In addition, Ukraine’s Criminal Code recognizes the crime of “ecocide,” which may serve as a model for future amendment of the ICC Statute.  Article 441 of the Ukraine’s Criminal Code defines ecocide as “mass destruction of flora and fauna, poisoning of air or water resources, and also any other actions that may cause an environmental disaster,” and provides that it “shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of eight to fifteen years.”  In September 2024, Vanuatu, along with Fiji and Samoa, submitted a proposal to the ICC to recognize ecocide as a separate crime on par with genocide and other serious offenses.

Michael Kelly, Professor at Creighton University School of Law and The Senator Allen A. Sekt Endowed Chair in Law

There are now greater opportunities for Ukrainian attorneys to serve as prosecutors, defenders, staff, and even judges of the ICC.  Doing so will ensure the benefit of criminal legal practice in Ukraine itself as these individuals over time come home and bring with them their expertise learned in The Hague.

Ambassador (Ret.) Zorica Maric Djordjevic, PILPG Senior Peace Fellow, former Head of the Permanent Mission of Montenegro to the World Trade Organization

Assess opportunities and challenges in cooperation with the ICC and other accountability mechanisms: for Ukraine, signing the Rome Statute opens a crucial legal and moral frontier — institutionalizing accountability amid an ongoing conflict.  The ICC’s involvement in investigating war crimes and crimes against humanity in Ukraine builds on precedents from the former Yugoslavia — the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and later its national courts under the UN guidance, where international mechanisms shaped historical record, but struggled to ensure reconciliation or local ownership.  Consequently, the Rome Statute for the states of former Yugoslavia served more as a political and normative anchor than a direct vehicle of justice as  the key regional accountability processes were already managed by the ICTY.  The opportunity for Ukraine lies in coupling ICC mechanisms with domestic legal reform, hybrid courts, and truth-seeking processes that embed justice into state reconstruction, rather than outsourcing it entirely to international bodies.

The Balkan experience underscores both the promise and the limitation of Rome Statute membership.  It provides international legitimacy and deterrence, yet its effectiveness depends on political will, judicial capacity, and societal readiness to confront the past.  For Ukraine, learning from post-Yugoslav states means building a system that not only prosecutes crimes, but also transforms justice into a foundation for durable peace, institutional integrity, and reconciliation with the consequences of the war.

How has this step shaped international legal and political discourse on aggression and accountability?

Milena Sterio, Charles R. Emrick Jr. - Calfee Halter & Griswold Professor of Law at Cleveland State University’s Cleveland-Marshall College of Law

Ukraine’s ratification of the ICC Rome Statute has altered the international legal and political discourse on aggression and accountability.  Although the ICC already had jurisdiction over the situation in Ukraine in light of dozens of state referrals and the prosecutor’s willingness to open first a preliminary examination and then an investigation, Ukraine’s ratification of the Rome Statute signals the country’s willingness to support the world’s only permanent international criminal court in its pursuit of legal accountability.  Although the ICC still lacks jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in Ukraine, the fact that Ukraine, the victim state, has ratified the Rome Statute moves the “goal post” closer, as for the purposes of jurisdiction both the victim and the aggressor state need to be ICC member states; now, in light of Ukraine’s ratification, only the aggressor state (Russia) need become a member (a feat that seems impossible under the current Russian leadership, but that could one day become a reality under a different regime).  

In addition, Ukraine’s ratification of the Rome Statute is significant politically, as it places Ukraine within the “club” of member states, which are generally committed to justice and accountability.  Thus, by ratifying the Rome Statute, Ukraine has positioned itself well geo-politically and strategically, and has opened the door toward cooperation with other member states.  Finally, Ukraine’s ratification of the Rome Statute will bring in line its domestic criminal legislation with current norms and standards of international criminal law, which is a positive development and which once more signals Ukraine’s willingness to support international justice and accountability.

Chris Goebel, Senior Legal Advisor at PILPG

Ukraine’s ratification of the ICC Rome Statute coincided with the formal establishment of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine through an agreement signed in June 2025 between the Council of Europe and Ukraine.  This institutional innovation represents a watershed development in international criminal law: it is the first international criminal tribunal for aggression created outside the UN Security Council framework — thereby circumventing the veto power that has paralyzed UN-based accountability mechanisms.  The Special Tribunal’s jurisdiction complements ICC investigations by focusing solely on aggression while the ICC pursues war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.  This architectural arrangement — combining the Special Tribunal with Ukraine’s Rome Statute ratification as well as domestic prosecutions — is potentially an important step towards establishing a comprehensive accountability ecosystem in which distinct institutions target different levels of responsibility and categories of atrocity crimes committed in the war.

Looking ahead, what should be the strategic priorities for Ukraine and its partners in consolidating justice mechanisms?

Milena Sterio, Charles R. Emrick Jr. - Calfee Halter & Griswold Professor of Law at Cleveland State University’s Cleveland-Marshall College of Law

Ukraine’s strategic priorities should be to align its domestic criminal law so that there are no gaps or conflicts with respect to the Rome Statute.  Once Ukraine has done so, it will be able to fully implement the Rome Statute, and to assume all the relevant duties and responsibilities of a member state.  

Michael Kelly, Professor at Creighton University School of Law and The Senator Allen A. Sekt Endowed Chair in Law

One thing the ICC will not be able to embrace is prosecution of Russian corporations for complicity in war crimes committed in Ukraine as the Rome Statute currently only extends the court’s jurisdiction over natural persons - not legal persons.  Consequently, Ukraine should prioritize prosecuting Russian corporations for involvement in the war and then request seizure of frozen corporate assets abroad in satisfaction of those judgments.  PILPG has white papers on how to accomplish this task.

Chris Goebel, Senior Legal Advisor at PILPG

Ukraine's ratification of the Rome Statute has made Ukraine’s continued capacity-building for war crimes prosecution an important strategic priority.  For instance, in addition to aligning its laws with developing ICC standards, Ukraine ought to continue to pioneer integration of environmental harm monitoring into both its prosecutorial and its broader national security framework.  With ICC accession, Ukraine has both the opportunity and the obligation to continue to develop sophisticated national expertise in international criminal law, compatible legal procedures, and effective cross-border cooperation — since the ICC expects domestic prosecutions wherever possible. 

Dr. Gregory P. Noone, Ph.D., J.D., is the Executive Director, a Senior Peace Fellow, and Senior Legal Advisor for the Public International Law and Policy Group (PILPG)

Three strategic priorities come to mind. First, now that in June 2025 Ukraine and the Council of Europe have agreed to establish a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression, the immediate focus should be on finalizing the staffing, securing funding, and negotiating cooperation agreements.  This will close the “aggression gap” at the leadership level and complement the ICC’s jurisdiction, ensuring a coherent international justice architecture.  Second, synchronize strategic communications around each major legal milestone (new ICC warrants, tribunal updates, or reparations actions) with targeted sanctions and travel notices, so that accountability carries visible and political consequences.  This linkage reinforces deterrence, sustains allied commitment, and demonstrates that justice has tangible costs for perpetrators.  Third, prioritize cases against field-grade military officers (Majors, Lieutenant Colonels, and Colonels) who exercise direct control over daily operations and the conduct of troops.  These officers serve as the critical link between command intent and battlefield behavior, and are the most likely to travel internationally in the coming years, increasing the practical reach and enforceability of arrest warrants.

Concluding Observations

Ukraine’s first year as a State Party to the Rome Statute has redefined its role in the global justice landscape.  The ratification has anchored accountability within Ukraine’s legal and diplomatic identity, transforming ad hoc cooperation with the ICC into a durable institutional partnership.  This legal step, taken amid ongoing conflict, has demonstrated that the pursuit of justice need not wait for peace; indeed, it can strengthen both the moral and strategic foundations of peace itself.

Across the contributions gathered here, several themes emerge.  Domestically, Ukraine’s ICC membership has catalyzed long-overdue legal reforms, from the incorporation of command responsibility to the development of hybrid accountability mechanisms.  Internationally, it has elevated Ukraine’s credibility as a norm-setting state, willing to uphold international criminal law even under fire.  The first year of implementation has also revealed both the opportunities and the strains of “complementarity as cooperation,” as Ukraine’s national courts and the ICC together navigate an unprecedented caseload of war crimes.

At the same time, the ratification has reverberated far beyond Ukraine.  It has reinvigorated the global conversation on the crime of aggression, coinciding with the June 2025 establishment of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine.  Together, these institutions signal a renewed commitment to closing the impunity gap for leaders who wage unlawful wars.

As this first anniversary passes, Ukraine stands as both a test case and a torchbearer for the future of international criminal justice.  Its experience shows that even amid destruction, the deliberate construction of legal institutions can serve as an act of resistance — and a foundation for peace built on law, not force.