“Recognizing 2014: The Legal and Moral Imperative for Full Reparations for Russian Aggression”
By: Kateryna Kyrychenko, Dr. Paul R. Williams, and Sindija Beta
Why are the earliest victims of Russia’s war in Ukraine — those targeted since 2014 — still excluded from reparations, when it was exactly the failure to respond to that initial aggression that directly enabled the full-scale invasion in 2022?
In February 2014, the Russian Federation launched its aggression against Ukraine through the illegal occupation and annexation of Crimea, followed shortly by direct military involvement in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. This marked the beginning of a protracted and unlawful use of force that escalated dramatically in 2022 as a full-scale invasion. Today, however, Ukraine’s flagship reparations mechanism — the Register of Damage for Ukraine — recognizes only the latter phase.
While the Register represents a groundbreaking achievement in war-related reparations, its current framework excludes thousands of victims of Russia’s initial aggression. As it stands, the Register only accepts claims for losses incurred from February 24, 2022, onward. This gap in coverage creates a dangerous precedent: it implies that the initial eight years of aggression, occupation, and systematic rights violations somehow fall outside the scope of justice.
The main explanation for this cutoff, as Executive Director of the Register of Damage for Ukraine, Markiyan Kliuchkovskyi has noted, is that the 2022 invasion marked the point at which the global community coalesced in recognizing Russia’s conduct as a full act of aggression. This view reflects the political reality of 2022 — when support for Ukraine surged and international mechanisms mobilized. But from a legal standpoint, Russia’s aggression, along with related damages and human rights violations, began in 2014.
In fact, both international legal institutions and political bodies have consistently recognized that Russia’s aggression began in 2014 — not in 2022. Failing to incorporate that reality into the reparations process risks distorting both legal precedent and the lived experience of victims. This omission is not merely a technical oversight. It risks undermining both the credibility of the reparations process and the legal coherence of Ukraine’s broader accountability architecture.
Beyond its legal and moral implications, this exclusion also carries serious consequences for international security. The failure to hold Russia accountable in 2014 sent a clear signal: limited territorial conquest and hybrid warfare could go unpunished. The result was predictable — a full-scale invasion eight years later. Impunity breeds escalation.
What Constitutes the Crime of Aggression?
The crime of aggression, as set out in the Rome Statute, covers grave violations such as invasion, military occupation, and annexation by the use of force. For an act to qualify, it must constitute a “manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations,” particularly a violation of the prohibition set out in Article 2(4) against the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state. Russia’s actions in Ukraine since 2014 meet this standard. To understand why, it is necessary to analyze the four key elements of the crime of aggression as defined in Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute and elaborated in the Elements of Crimes adopted by the Assembly of States Parties.
First, the crime of aggression requires an act of aggression — defined as the use of armed force by one state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of another. In February 2014, forces without insignia (“little green men”), now known to have been deployed by Russia, entered Crimea, took control of key infrastructure and government buildings, blockaded Ukrainian military bases, and facilitated a staged referendum under the presence of occupying troops. These acts were conducted without Ukraine’s consent and in direct violation of its sovereignty. Shortly thereafter, Russia provided military, logistical, and financial support to armed separatist groups in Donetsk and Luhansk and later deployed its own regular troops, leading to open armed hostilities. These actions constitute instances of unlawful use of force by one state against another.
Second, the leadership element requires that the act of aggression be committed by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or direct the political or military action of a state. This element was also met in 2014. The occupation of Crimea and involvement in Donbas were not spontaneous or decentralized operations; they were executed with the full knowledge, authorization, and strategic direction of the highest echelons of the Russian state. President Vladimir Putin publicly admitted Russian involvement in Crimea shortly after the purported annexation. Russian government documents, parliamentary approvals, military command structures, and the coordinated role of Russian state security services all point to centrally planned and authorized aggression. The operation was not rogue or peripheral — it was a deliberate act of the Russian state.
Third, for the crime of aggression to be prosecutable under the Rome Statute, the act must constitute a manifest violation of the United Nations Charter, considering its character, gravity, and scale. Russia’s annexation of Crimea was not a minor border skirmish or isolated incursion; it was the first forcible seizure of territory on the European continent since World War II. Russia’s actions involved the occupation and absorption of nearly 27,000 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory, a referendum held under military duress, and subsequent violations of the rights of the Crimean population. In Donbas, the use of proxy warfare, heavy weaponry, and regular Russian troops escalated the conflict and caused thousands of civilian and military deaths. The sheer scope and consequences of these acts render them grave breaches of international peace — and manifestly illegal.
Fourth, the use of force must be attributable to one state against another — demonstrating the state-to-state character of the aggression. This requirement is likewise fulfilled. Ukraine is a sovereign, internationally recognized state. The actions of the Russian military and security services, as well as the command and support provided to proxy forces in Donetsk and Luhansk, are attributable to the Russian Federation under international law. Both the “effective control” test (used by the International Court of Justice) and the “overall control” test (used by the ICTY) are satisfied by the documented coordination, equipping, financing, and strategic command provided by Russia. In fact, the European Court of Human Rights and the International Court of Justice have both confirmed Russia’s effective control over Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine from 2014 onward.
Legal Continuity from 2014 Onward
Since 2014, international institutions have consistently recognized that a legal conflict between Russia and Ukraine began well before the 2022 full-scale invasion. In March 2014, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 68/262, affirming Ukraine’s territorial integrity and calling the Russian referendum in Crimea invalid. While this resolution did not use the term “aggression,” it rejected Russia’s annexation claim and urged all states not to recognize any alteration of Crimea’s status. Later resolutions, including 71/205 (2016), 72/190 (2018), and 73/263 (2019), continued to describe Russian control over Crimea as an “occupation,” condemn ongoing violations of international law, and reiterate Ukraine’s sovereignty over Crimea.
In parallel, international legal bodies confirmed the nature of the situation as one involving direct confrontation between states. The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court assessed that an international armed conflict began “no later than 26 February 2014”, based on the deployment of Russian forces in Crimea. As noted above, the European Court of Human Rights and the International Court of Justice have also found that Russia has effective control over Ukraine’s eastern regions. Under international humanitarian law, such control — particularly in the absence of Ukraine’s consent — constitutes occupation. That status is not just descriptive; it has legal consequences and, when lacking lawful justification, may constitute an unlawful use of force. The European Parliament has regularly cited 2014 as the start of the war in its resolutions and reports.
Although the term “aggression” may not always appear in these rulings or resolutions, their legal substance aligns with the criteria for the crime of aggression under Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute as discussed above. The facts recognized — including Russia’s unprovoked military intervention, unlawful occupation, and attempted annexation — correspond to acts such as invasion and occupation, which are expressly listed in the Rome Statute as forms of aggression when committed without lawful justification. These findings, therefore, are not mere symbolic gestures. Taken together, they reflect a consistent legal view that Russia’s occupation and, by extension, aggression began in 2014 — not in 2022.
Ukraine’s domestic legal framework reinforces this conclusion. The official date marking the start of Russian aggression — 20 February 2014 — is embedded in parliamentary resolutions, criminal provisions, and Constitutional Court jurisprudence. Ukrainian statutes refer not merely to conflict or occupation, but to armed aggression and war crimes starting in 2014. In both international and national law, the legal and factual record points to a coherent position: Russia’s war against Ukraine began in 2014 and has involved continuous unlawful uses of force ever since, escalating in 2022.
Structural Injustice and Strategic Risk
By excluding claims from 2014 to 2022, the current reparations mechanism effectively denies redress to victims of occupation, torture, unlawful detention, property seizure, and forced displacement that occurred during those foundational years of the aggression. These victims — many of them from Crimea and eastern Ukraine — remain unacknowledged in one of the key mechanisms meant to deliver justice.
The implications extend beyond Ukraine. International accountability frameworks risk signaling to authoritarian regimes that so-called “slow aggression” — conducted incrementally or by proxy — will be tolerated or erased from legal memory. This undermines global deterrence and weakens the moral authority of international law.
Moreover, the current design inadvertently affirms a narrative that contradicts both law and reality on the ground — namely, that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine only became criminal in 2022. This not only denies justice to earlier victims, but also fails to recognize that the aggression of 2022 was enabled — and emboldened — by the impunity of 2014. Correcting this is not simply about retroactive justice; it is about protecting future norms and ensuring that aggression is recognized when it starts, not when it becomes geopolitically inconvenient to ignore.
Toward a More Inclusive Register
Fortunately, legal and institutional solutions are within reach. The statute establishing the Register of Damage can be amended to extend eligibility to claims dating back to 2014. The newly established special tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine does not set 2022 as the beginning of Russia’s aggression, rather it allows the judges to make a legal assessment on a case-by-case basis, which ensures that no arbitrary limitations are placed on justice and reinforces the continuity of legal responsibility.
The Register of Damages could adopt a similar approach and permit an assessment on a case-by-case basis rather than impose an outright limitation.
Conclusion: Building a Just Foundation for Peace
Recognizing 2014 as the starting point for reparations is not only legally sound — it is essential to honoring the dignity of all victims and reinforcing the international legal order. For Ukraine, it also ensures that the peace built in the future will rest on a foundation of integrity, not omission.
And for the broader international community, it sends a critical message: impunity for early acts of aggression invites escalation. A reparations mechanism that begins in 2022 cannot deter future wars if it overlooks the unpunished aggression that made full-scale invasion possible. Justice delayed is dangerous — but justice denied can be catastrophic.