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Defending before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda - An Interview with Philippe Larochelle

Defending before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

An Interview with Philippe Larochelle

Edited by Cailan Cumming, Kate Gibson & Paul R. Williams

A Note on Defending Justice

This blog is part of the Defending Justice series, an initiative of the Public International Law and Policy Group (PILPG) to promote an eclectic array of  voices within the field of international criminal law. 

As part of our broader efforts to strengthen institutions of justice, this series seeks to create space for dialogue around the varied perspectives and concerns that shape these institutions. With that aim in mind, we interviewed a series of defense practitioners working in international criminal law and distilled their experiences and insights into a series of first-person blogs, preserving the spirit and voice of those interviews.

Editor’s Note

Philippe Larochelle, widely regarded as one of the leading lawyers in international criminal defense, has built his career representing clients in some of the most complex and high-profile international cases. The ability to navigate political and procedural challenges of international law quickly positioned him as a key figure in the international defense field. His commitment to due process, fairness, and the protection of fundamental legal rights, even in cases where public sentiment strongly favored conviction, has built his reputation across multiple international tribunals, including the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), International Criminal Court (ICC), and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. This blog explores the challenges and lessons that emerged from his particular set of cases before the ICTR. Through Larochelle’s setbacks and triumphs within the world’s second international tribunal, readers get a glimpse into the case preparation and trial process for these complex cases, and better understand the way in which these tribunals shape the legacies of conflict. Through Larochelle’s stories one thing becomes clear: uncovering the truth can only be accomplished through objective institutions, counsel, and judges; strong standards of evidence and procedure; expeditious trials; and stronger mechanisms to assess victims and witnesses. 

Introduction

I became involved with the ICTR at a time when international criminal defense required both common law training and fluency in French. As a native of Quebec, I found that this combination of abilities positioned several Canadian lawyers to take on key roles as defense counsel at the Tribunal. It was in this environment that I began working alongside a group of lawyers who would go on to shape the practice of international criminal defense.

One of my most formative cases was that of my first client, Jérôme Bicamumpaka, a Rwandan government official accused of genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, and crimes against humanity. The case was particularly challenging due to the difficulties in proving individual criminal responsibility within the broader context of mass atrocities. Prosecutors alleged that Bicamumpaka, as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the interim government during the 1994 genocide, played a role in facilitating the violence. However, after years of legal battles, he was acquitted in 2011 due to insufficient evidence, a verdict that showed a failure to establish individual culpability from broader systemic crimes.  This case profoundly influenced my understanding of international criminal defense and became a defining moment in my career, shaping my approach to defending individuals accused of mass atrocities for years to come.

I then defended Callixte Nzabonimana, a former Rwandan minister convicted of genocide in 2012. The ICTR found him personally responsible for inciting and organizing killings, particularly through public speeches encouraging violence, and his conviction was upheld on appeal in 2014, reinforcing the precedent of holding political figures accountable for speech that contributes to mass atrocities. In contrast, my work with client André Ntagerura, who was acquitted of genocide charges in 2004, focused on the significant challenge of assisting Ntagerura’s relocation, as acquitted defendants often face difficulties in resettlement after trials due to political and diplomatic blocks, or threats, to their relocation.

I also represented Jean De Dieu Ndagijimana, who was charged with contempt of court related to witness protection, following his role in facilitating the recantation of prosecution witnesses who had testified against Augustin Ngirabatware, but who years later wanted to give statements saying that their testimony had been false. More recently, I have representedf Fulgence Kayishema, a Rwandan genocide suspect who was recently detained in South Africa under an arrest warrant by the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals. His potential extradition remains uncertain and raises questions regarding jurisdiction and fair trial rights, issues the defense team is currently working through.

Other cases I have taken on underscore the continued and extensive work that defense lawyers undertake post-conviction. The case of Gérard Ntakirutimana, a Rwandan doctor convicted of genocide and crimes against humanity in 2003, remains under review and certain elements of his case are being reconsidered. I also continue to support Dominique Ntawukuriryayo’s request for a reduced sentence, who was convicted of genocide by the ICTR in 2009 and sentenced to 25 years in prison.

This blog will further explore these cases, and I hope readers will gain insight into the day-to-day realities of international criminal defense, the evolving nature of post-conflict justice, and the lasting impact these trials have on both individual defendants and the broader field of international law.

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

The Rwandan genocide of 1994 remains one of the most tragic periods in modern history, deeply affecting both Rwanda and the international community.  Over the course of approximately 100 days, an estimated one million people—primarily Tutsi, along with moderate Hutu and others who opposed the government—were killed in a wave of violence carried out by government forces, militia groups, and civilians. The genocide was the culmination of longstanding ethnic and political tensions, exacerbated by colonial history, economic disparities, and a period of civil war.

In the aftermath of the genocide, Rwanda faced the immense challenge of rebuilding its society while ensuring accountability for crimes committed. The scale of the violence, combined with the destruction of Rwanda’s judicial infrastructure, made it difficult to prosecute cases through domestic courts alone.  In response, the United Nations established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda on November 8, 1994, through Security Council Resolution 955.  Headquartered in Arusha, Tanzania, the ICTR was tasked with prosecuting individuals responsible for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, focusing on high-ranking officials, military leaders, and key organizers of the violence.

Beyond its prosecutions, the ICTR played a critical role in developing international legal precedent. In 1998, it issued the first-ever conviction for genocide in an international court with the Jean-Paul Akayesu case, which also set an important precedent by recognizing rape as an act of genocide. The tribunal also addressed the role of hate media in inciting violence, convicting individuals found to be responsible for the broadcasts of Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) and other propaganda outlets that played a role in encouraging mass killings. 

In 2015, the ICTR officially completed its work, having adjudicated dozens of cases. However, its remaining functions were transferred to the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (UN-IRMCT), which is currently concluding its work to oversee appeals, enforce sentences, and locate fugitives.  The UN-IRMCT continues to handle ongoing legal matters, including cases like that of my client Fulgence Kayishema, who was detained in South Africa and awaits potential extradition.

The ICTR’s legacy extends beyond Rwanda. It contributed to the establishment of legal principles that continue to guide international criminal law, influenced the development of the International Criminal Court, and reinforced the importance of accountability for mass atrocities in post-conflict states. At the same time, its flaws, highlighted throughout this blog, remind us that the creation and implementation of international criminal justice frameworks must continue to be reformed to fulfill the promises set out by the international justice project.

Case Preparation

I will never forget my first encounter with the case file of my first case, Jérôme Bicamumpaka. The allegations were gruesome and grave. Yet, when I met Bicamumpaka, I was presented with a polite, articulate man—well dressed and measured in speech. Reconciling this outward demeanor with the horrific accusations in the file proved difficult at first. But it was also an important first lesson regarding the nature of defense: to look beyond first impressions, confront personal preconceptions, and maintain objectivity. My role was not to react emotionally to the allegations, but to get to know the deeper truths of the client: understand his story and the conflict that led to my client’s arrest. With limited knowledge of the Rwandan genocide, I immersed myself in the complex historical, social, and legal context of the conflict, having to adapt quickly to the new context and new legal system of the ICTR.

As I began building a defense strategy, the early meetings with the client were pivotal. Working through the details of the case and walking through each charge was an important first step, and proved to be key to Bicamumpaka’s defense. Bicamumpaka claimed not to have been present at the times and places of the alleged crimes, and it became clear that he had an alibi to support these claims. In fact, Bicamumpaka maintained that he had been trying to help de-escalate the situation from abroad during key periods of the genocide. Amongst such serious allegations, I found myself drawn into the evidence, trying to understand what had really taken place. We were able to call a Belgian Minister as a witness, who testified that Bicamumpaka was in Belgium during one of the events he was accused of orchestrating and supported the fact that Bicamumpaka was actually working to garner international help for Rwanda during the genocide while he was abroad. 

Examining the extensive evidence with the client can also help to identify inconsistencies and expose weaknesses in the prosecution’s evidence. For example, during Bicamumpaka’s first interview with the prosecution, he provided an alibi for specific crimes he was accused of, which the prosecution failed to remember. During the trial, the prosecution continued to present arguments that overlooked this key information—information that was later presented by the defense—leading to obvious gaps in the credibility of the prosecution’s case. 

Throughout this process I benefited greatly from the support and camaraderie of the international legal community in Arusha, Tanzania, where the Tribunal was located. For a young lawyer, the weight of responsibility was immense, but the experience was transformative. I was deeply involved in the investigative aspects of the case and grew rapidly through direct engagement with witnesses, files of evidence, and defense strategy. It was in this demanding but collaborative environment that my commitment to defense work developed, and where I learned that effective defense begins not with certainty, but with humility, persistence, and the willingness to listen.

The Nature of Complex International Crimes Cases

The scope of the crimes dealt with in international tribunals is so vast that it can be difficult to comprehend. The crimes committed almost feel immaterial because of their magnitude. These cases are not isolated events but involve the horrors of genocides, mass atrocities, and the suffering of entire populations. Consequently, the evidence presented in such cases is often overwhelming, and it becomes increasingly difficult to apply the usual, rational standards of evidence typically seen in other legal proceedings.

A significant challenge in international criminal cases is the reliance on witness or victim testimony as a principal form of evidence. While these testimonies may be grounded in real, traumatic experiences, they often fail to meet the threshold of ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’ However, rather than the prosecution having to prove ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’, the burden often falls on defense counsel to actively prove their client’s innocence to secure an acquittal. This shift in burden of proof, in my experience, creates an inherently biased environment for the accused, with presumption of guilt often outweighing the presumption of innocence.

In several of my cases the defense was faced with testimonies where the victim’s suffering was undoubtedly real, but the evidence connecting the accused to the crimes was non-existent. The Bicamumpaka case, for example, relied heavily on witness testimonies that lacked the necessary corroboration or, at its worst, was manufactured in order to fit a false narrative of the accused. The judges, in some cases, did not adhere to rules of evidence, but rather assessed evidence as the trial progressed, making it hard for the defense to anticipate how evidence would be treated and making it more difficult to build a case.

The reliability of witnesses is another major challenge that defense counsel contend with. I recall the story of one witness who, after being informed he could not seek asylum after testifying in a case in Canada, recanted his previous testimony—revealing that he had lied to further his interest in gaining asylum. This example highlights the serious issue of witness manipulation, especially when victims and witnesses are offered benefits such as reduced sentences in their home countries or asylum in exchange for testifying. Some witnesses have admitted to fabricating stories to make themselves more credible to gain access to compensation and other benefits.

What is more, many of the witnesses are anonymous, which presents difficulties in verifying their testimonies, their credibility as a witness, and tracking their testimonies across multiple cases. There have been instances where witnesses recanted their statements, yet those recantations could not be used to reopen or reassess a case unless the other testimonies also changed. This dynamic can lead to wrongful convictions, especially when false testimony goes unchecked or is shielded by anonymity.

Beyond evidentiary challenges, there is also the issue of bias towards the prosecution. Many of the judges of international tribunals are not seasoned jurists but diplomats who may not have the requisite experience to assess evidence impartially. This lack of qualification, combined with a tendency to favor the prosecution, can result in judgements that do not reflect the reality of the evidence presented. I believe there are some cases in which judges have appeared to let their personal feelings about the victims’ suffering cloud their judgment, making it harder for them to maintain the required objectivity. Faced with a flood of testimony detailing unimaginable atrocities, it is understandably difficult to remain impartial, but impartiality is precisely what justice demands.

Additionally, the long duration of these trials, with some lasting over a decade, severely impacts the integrity of the cases. Memories fade, evidence becomes stale, and the accused are subjected to years of legal uncertainty. In my experience, protracted legal proceedings often infringe on the rights of the accused. In one such example, one of my clients spent several months in prison, only to have his charges dismissed after an argument that only lasted three hours, meaning that he had been unjustly detained without sufficient grounds.

To address these issues, an independent review of evidence before indictment should be conducted, as seen in the case of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, where ICC Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan convened a panel of external legal experts to review the evidence he ultimately used to support his application for arrest. This would ensure that charges are based on credible and verified evidence, reducing the likelihood of wrongful prosecutions. Additionally, there should be stronger standards for assessing victims and witnesses to avoid manipulation, ensure that testimonies are accurate, and verify that the testimony is linked to the client. Moreover, victim reparations should not be tied directly to the outcome of criminal trials, as this creates an inherent conflict of interest that may lead to fabricated testimonies. Lastly, I argue for the establishment of clear and fair rules of evidence, which should be consistently followed by all judges. Only by adhering to these principles can the integrity of the tribunal and the pursuit of justice be preserved. 

Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was established with the mandate to prosecute those most responsible for the 1994 genocide, to end impunity, and to help establish a historical record of the events. However, the legacy it leaves behind is one mired in contradiction—where the pursuit of justice became inseparable from the pursuit of political objectives.

Rwanda, under the leadership of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), quickly understood how to wield the ICTR as a tool of lawfare. It used the tribunal to legitimize its own narrative of the genocide while shielding its crimes from scrutiny. When international investigators attempted to look into acts like the downing of President Habyarimana’s plane—a critical trigger for the genocide—Rwanda impeded efforts to investigate. The Rwandan Patriotic Front continually refused to provide witnesses or evidence and instead turned over only political opponents. The tribunal, lacking enforcement power and dependent on Rwanda for access, effectively became complicit in this selective justice.

International tribunals have the capacity to shape domestic and global political landscapes for decades. Once an individual is indicted, regardless of guilt, their political and social life is effectively over. The Rwandan government has long exploited this reality, feeding narratives to the media, fueling continued arrests, and portraying all members of the pre-genocide Hutu political elite—ministers, préfets, military leaders—as inherently culpable, regardless of their actual role in the genocide. While some may indeed have played a role in the genocide, the concern lies in how the Rwandan Patriotic Front, led by Paul Kagame, has fabricated or distorted evidence against those not involved to attribute a blanket collective responsibility on the Hutu political elite from before the genocide. Ultimately implicating them based not on actions but on influence and perceived political threat, hence using the tribunal to eliminate the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s main threats to power.

This manipulation hollowed out the ICTR’s intended impartiality. Rather than establishing a comprehensive factual record of the genocide, the tribunal was instrumentalized to reinforce a singular, simplistic version: one in which Hutu extremists were the sole perpetrators, and the Rwandan Patriotic Front were the liberators. The reality, however, was far more complex and the genocide was perpetrated by a diverse group of people. Atrocities were committed by a range of actors, including the Rwandan Patriotic Front, yet none of its members were ever indicted. The tribunal’s promise to hold “those most responsible” to account was not fully realized. Instead, it has been seen by some as granting a degree of impunity to the Rwandan Patriotic Front and President Kagame’s regime,  effectively legitimizing their control, justifying their actions, and limiting the voices of its critics.

Rwanda has also leveraged foreign domestic jurisdictions to target its opponents. In Canada, for instance, the government prosecuted Jacques Mungwarere, an alleged Rwandan genocide suspect, under universal jurisdiction, which was Canada’s last criminal trial of this kind. Since then, Canada has largely moved away from complex criminal prosecutions, favoring administrative laws instead. By relying on lower-threshold immigration standards such as a “reasonable belief” of involvement in atrocities, authorities have deported alleged perpetrators, a shift Rwanda has capitalized on by using these mechanisms to pursue political dissidents living abroad.

These failures have lasting consequences. The selective justice, and selective narrative, perpetrated by the ICTR undermines confidence in the legitimacy of both convictions and acquittals. The ICTR’s findings are now cited to justify Rwanda’s current foreign policy, including its support for the M23 rebel group and its military presence and crimes committed in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Western states, still constrained by guilt over their inaction during the genocide, continue to give Rwanda a wide berth. The power of the narrative produced by the tribunal has outlived the tribunal itself, shaping international politics decades later.

Justice Richard Goldstone, the first Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY and ICTR, articulated five goals of the tribunals, often referred to as the ‘Goldstone Five’: deterrence, establishing a historical record, victim catharsis and justice, ending impunity, and contributing to peace and reconciliation. Overall, the ICTR has fallen short of the goals laid out by the Chief Prosecutor; however, there is hope that future tribunals can deliver on these goals if key questions are addressed and substantial reforms are implemented.

The Future of International Criminal Tribunals

Looking forward, the international justice system must confront these uncomfortable realities. The manipulation of evidence, reliance on questionable witnesses, and failure to prosecute powerful actors are not problems unique to the ICTR—they are recurring flaws that continue to plague tribunals, including the ICC. The Timor-Leste tribunal provides a compelling precedent. A special expert committee was established to assess the justice delivered, eventually reopening some cases in which they believed that justice had not been served. A similar approach should be applied to the ICTR and future international tribunals. Allowing for independent review of the work of the tribunal would be a meaningful step toward restoring legitimacy and true justice to the victims. However, international tribunals are unwilling to admit fault in order to protect their legacy, and residual mechanisms are interested in closing the work and the history books. 

Today, the UN-IRMCT, the successor to the ICTR, is winding down. But the same ethical and legal questions remain unresolved. Take the case of Fulgence Kayishema. Although the UN-IRMCT has pushed for his extradition from South Africa, it has no intention of trying him itself. Instead, it seeks to send him to Rwanda, despite well-documented risks that he may not receive a fair trial. South Africa is hesitant knowing that he may be sent to Rwanda given the country’s history of assassinating political opponents on South African soil and refusing to turn those responsible over.

These dilemmas raise urgent questions about the long-term design of international justice mechanisms. I find it legally and ethically incompatible with the UN-IRMCT’s mandate and jurisdiction to arrest individuals only to transfer them over to the referral state, especially when due process cannot be guaranteed in the state. I am also concerned with the prospect of handing over the court’s archives, an essential repository of history and evidence, to a government that has shown a willingness to manipulate history and suppress dissent. As the UN-IRMCT prepares to close its doors, these unprecedented challenges have exposed the overall lack of foresight and long-term planning when first establishing the ICTR.

Looking at the long-term future of international criminal justice, I hold the same opinion as many defense lawyers, that at the ICC arrest warrants should be issued and publicized with great care, not symbolically or for political effect. Issuing warrants without realistic prospects for enforcement, such as the ICC’s warrant for Vladimir Putin, weakens the legitimacy of the entire system. Worse, the legacy of selective justice in many situation countries has eroded public trust in international tribunals, prompting some to view such warrants as politicized instruments rather than impartial legal measures, thereby reframing individuals like Putin as targets of geopolitical bias rather than perpetrators of international crimes.

Finally, and critically, we must continually reassess the very model of international criminal justice. Is a traditional courtroom—where a single suspect stands trial for atrocities affecting thousands of victims—the best structure for addressing such massive and complex crimes? So far, efforts to centralize victim suffering into one symbolic trial have not achieved the goals of victim catharsis and justice. These shortcomings should be a central consideration in the design of future international tribunals. 

Justice must not operate in isolation from the societies it seeks to serve; it must work in tandem with domestic efforts and remain rooted in the lived experiences of affected communities. The international justice project is far from perfect, but its deep flaws are precisely why it must be preserved and reformed—not abandoned. Moving forward requires the humility to learn, the courage to evolve, and the resolve to repair what is broken.

Conclusion

International criminal tribunals are among the most complex and challenging legal environments in the world. The crimes they address are extraordinary in scale and scope, requiring legal practitioners to operate in equally extraordinary ways. Defense counsel, in particular, must navigate a system where traditional legal frameworks are stretched, where the political context shapes the courtroom, and where the weight of history looms over every decision.

This chapter has traced the unique legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, highlighting how international tribunals do not merely adjudicate facts—they also shape historical memory, political narratives, and international relations. In doing so, they carry immense responsibility. Yet, as we have seen, this responsibility can be compromised when justice is politicized, when the rights of the accused are overshadowed by prosecutorial bias, or when credibility in evidence and witness testimony is sacrificed for expediency.

These challenges demand not only legal expertise, but also resilience, creativity, and ethical fortitude. They demand defense teams that can operate with extreme adaptability—developing unique strategies, cultivating deep knowledge of both law and the local context, and holding their ground in a professional landscape that is often politically charged and emotionally fraught.

Tribunals can play a vital role in building peace, establishing historical truth, and promoting reconciliation. But as the ICTR has demonstrated, they can also be weaponized for political gain, producing partial narratives and reinforcing impunity when justice is selectively applied. The cost of these failures is not merely legal—it is human. It is borne by victims denied the full truth, by accused persons denied a fair trial, and by entire societies burdened with unresolved histories.

Looking ahead, the international legal community must critically reflect on the shortcomings of the ICTR and implement reforms to improve the international justice system. Specific reforms include:

  • Establishing independent expert committees to assess evidence and review problematic cases.

  • Applying stronger and clearer standards for evaluating the credibility and testimonies of witnesses and victims.

  • Selecting judges with proven qualifications, legal rigor, objectivity, and sensitivity to the broader social and political dynamics at play.

  • Strengthening due process protections and upholding the fundamental rights of the accused.

  • Reducing excessive delays in trials and delivering timely judgments.

  • Carefully reviewing evidence before issuing indictments, rather than relying on quantity or political pressure.

  • Ensuring that, after release, acquitted or freed individuals can access safe relocation options, including family reunification, work, and residency rights in safe third countries.

Defense counsel will remain at the heart of this effort, not only as advocates but as guardians of justice in a system that too often struggles to balance law with politics and truth with power.

Forget the Debate on Peace Versus Justice. Ukraine Has Set the Stage for Peace With Justice!

Forget the Debate on Peace Versus Justice. Ukraine Has Set the Stage for Peace With Justice!

By: Dr. Paul R. Williams,* Dr. Beth Van Schaack,** Professor David Crane,*** and Sindija Beta.****

Recent efforts to reach a ceasefire and potential peace arrangement to end Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine have again brought to the fore the tension between achieving peace and delivering justice in the wake of atrocities. For much of the twentieth century, those negotiating peace deals were either silent about the imperative of justice or negotiated it away. Indeed, many peace agreements and arrangements routinely incorporated blanket amnesties, trading accountability for the promise of stability and calm. The Évian Accords in Algeria, the National Reconciliation Law in Guatemala, the Lomé Peace Accord in Sierra Leone, and the “Due Obedience” and “Full Stop” laws in Argentina all exemplified this approach. These amnesties may have encouraged combatants to lay down their arms and helped end the fighting, but they left societies fractured, victims silenced, and perpetrators free to return to positions of power. 

Ultimately, many of these amnesties did not hold as national and international courts declared them unconstitutional and/or inconsistent with the nation’s human rights obligations. Argentina, for example, has prosecuted hundreds of individuals who stood accused of committing grave crimes during the country’s “dirty war.” The experience of Sierra Leone and Cambodia demonstrates that even negotiated amnesties do not shield perpetrators from subsequent international justice mechanisms; nor do they override the treaty-based legal obligations of states to prosecute atrocity crimes.

Russia has committed aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other atrocity crimes, not only in Ukraine but also in Georgia, Syria, Chechnya, and elsewhere; to date, perpetrators have largely suffered no tangible consequences for their crimes. No surprise that Russia supported the inclusion of a blanket amnesty provision in the Istanbul 2022 Communiqué, which was proposed in the early stages of the full-scale invasion, and again, almost as an afterthought, at the very end of the 28-point peace plan that the United States and Russia crafted in the second half of 2025. Russia no doubt assumed that Ukraine, and the international community, are so exhausted by war that no one would object to once again trading away justice for peace. What Russia, and those urging a broadscale amnesty as the only option for ending Russia’s war of aggression, ignore is that a decentralized accountability infrastructure is already in place and has already been activated. As such, it is beyond the power of Russia, and even Ukraine, to forsake justice and entrench impunity entirely. 

Indeed, justice efforts have been underway since before Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. Some cases—involving the downing of MH17, proceeding in Ukraine’s domestic courts, and asserting state responsibility before the European Court of Human Rights—are already the subject of final and binding judgments. More than a dozen states—in the region and beyond—have initiated investigations into Russian atrocities, sharing information and strategies through a joint investigative team and the Eurojust network (the known cases are compiled here). Non-governmental organizations are collecting information and creating perpetrator dossiers to support additional proceedings. The International Criminal Court, despite all its recent faults and challenges, has asserted its jurisdiction and has already issued six arrest warrants, which will not be withdrawn even if an amnesty is included within any peace deal. And the Council of Europe, in collaboration with Ukraine, is marching forward with its establishment of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine and a Register of Damage. These justice efforts cannot be derailed or blocked by those sitting around the negotiating table.

As argued by this article’s authors here and here, Ukraine has embraced lawfare, the strategic use of legal tools to achieve political, military, and diplomatic objectives. Lawfare is not limited to courtrooms. It operates in the realm of public opinion, delegitimizing Russian aggression; in the halls of multilateral organizations, mobilizing new mechanisms of justice; and on the battlefield, signaling that Russian crimes will be documented, prosecuted, redressed, and remembered. This strategy has allowed Ukraine to shift the global conversation from geopolitical bargaining to legal responsibility. It has framed the war not as a defensive maneuver by Russia or even a territorial dispute but as a grave breach of the international order, one that demands accountability rather than accommodation.

The irreversibility of Ukraine’s accountability trajectory is reinforced by decades of developments in international law, which have steadily shifted from permissive attitudes toward amnesty to a clear expectation of accountability for atrocity crimes. Key treaties establish this foundation. All four of the universally-ratified Geneva Conventions—which govern Russia’s war of aggression—obligate states to search for and prosecute those responsible for grave breaches during international armed conflicts. Customary international humanitarian law is in accord. Article 2(3) of the ICCPR and Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights likewise require states to ensure effective remedies for serious human rights violations, even when those violations are committed by state actors operating in an official capacity.

International courts and human rights bodies have converged around the principle that amnesties are unlawful and need not be respected if enacted in response to serious international crimes. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia articulated this consensus, noting that emerging international practice prohibits amnesty for crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The European Court of Human Rights has similarly held (see here and here) that amnesties for acts like torture or ill-treatment undermine deterrence and violate states’ obligations to preserve the rule of law. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has been even more explicit. In Gelman v. Uruguay, for example, it held that amnesty laws preventing investigation and prosecution of grave human rights violations are incompatible with international law, even when adopted through democratic processes. Cases involving Libya, Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia, among others, all confirm that international courts routinely reject domestic amnesty laws when they conflict with obligations to prosecute atrocities.

Taken together, these instruments and decisions reflect a settled reality: international law rejects amnesty for atrocity crimes. For the parties to today’s negotiations around Russia’s war of aggression, this means that justice is not merely a bargaining position. It is an irreversible reality. Even if the Ukrainian government, under immense pressure, agreed to grant amnesty to Russian officials before its own courts, such a provision would have no binding effect on the ICC, the Special Tribunal, or the courts of states exercising universal or other forms of extra-territorial jurisdiction. And such a decision would be subject to challenge before the European Court of Human Rights. 

For decades, some policymakers treated peace and justice as mutually exclusive outcomes. Ukraine has demonstrated that this is a false dichotomy. Through its strategic use of law, its mobilization of international institutions, and its insistence that atrocity crimes cannot be ignored, Ukraine has created a system in which the Russian ability to strong-arm Ukrainian officials or the international community into appeasement and amnesty is significantly constrained.

The accountability architecture now in place—including ICC warrants, domestic prosecutions, universal jurisdiction investigations, and a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression—cannot simply be dismantled with the stroke of a pen. The current negotiations between Ukraine, Russia, the United States, and Europe, therefore, are taking place in a world where justice mechanisms are already active and non-negotiable, regardless of what any peace plan provisions may suggest. Justice, once activated, has a momentum of its own.



* Dr. Paul R. Williams is the Co-Founder and Director of the Public International Law & Policy Group and Rebecca Grazier Professor of Law and International Relations at American University

** Dr. Beth Van Schaack is a Senior and Peace Fellow and former Ambassador-at-large for Global Criminal Justice (2022 -2025)

*** Professor David Crane  is the Founding Chief Prosecutor of the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone and Distinguished Scholar in Residence at Syracuse University College of Law

**** Sindija Beta is the Legal Officer and Program Manager at the Public International Law & Policy Group

Stolen Childhoods: Russia’s Abduction of Ukrainian Children and the Case for Genocide

Stolen Childhoods: Russia’s Abduction of Ukrainian Children and the Case for Genocide

By: Dr. Gregory P. Noone and Kateryna Kyrychenko, PILPG, and Henry T. Scott, Dr. Andrea Eggenstein, Connor W. Reese, and Rafael Mozo Sierra, Milbank LLP

Imagine being a child torn from your home, your family, your language, and your identity — sent hundreds of miles away to a foreign country determined to erase who you are.

Since launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian state has forcibly taken thousands of Ukrainian children — orphans, those separated from parents during war, and children under state care — and relocated them to Russia. These children are not simply being “evacuated” for their safety. They are in fact being subjected to a systematic campaign of identity erasure, Russian adoption, and indoctrination.

This is obviously a war crime, and in all likelihood also meets the legal definition of genocide.

This blog explores the legal, moral, and human dimensions of Russia’s program of abducting Ukrainian children. Drawing on international law, tribunal precedent, and a growing body of evidence, we examine why the forced transfer and “Russification” of these children constitutes not only a violation of the Geneva Conventions — but potentially the gravest crime under international law: genocide.

Summary of Situation & Facts

Forcible transfer of Ukrainian children by Russia 

Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Russian government has transferred or abducted thousands of Ukrainian children to Russia by force and coercive measures, as reported by the US Government, the EU Parliament, and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. These forced transfers can be classified into three distinct categories: (i) transfer of children who have lost their parents either temporarily or permanently; (ii) transfer of children separated from their families at “filtration camps”; and (iii) transfer of children under institutional care.

What started in 2022 as a Russian program that was initially claimed to be aimed at fostering Ukrainian children with Russian families – at least, on the surface – rapidly evolved into an organized scheme for the permanent adoption or guardianship with Russian families. 

The Russification of children

Following detention at “filtration camps” where Russian officials screen ethnic background and political affiliation, certain children are transferred to Russian foster families or institutions, where they undergo an ideological re-education process. The Russian government has reportedly conducted this forced-transfers campaign with the aim of implementing a policy of Russification of the abducted children. 

Reports from international organizations and intelligence agencies have produced evidence that abducted children have been actively and systematically exposed, either at their Russian foster homes or at educational institutions, to Russian propaganda aimed at dissolving their Ukrainian identity. Russian officials have also mandated that the children attend pro-Russian festivities and Russian military schools. Russian foster families and officials have oftentimes disguised this re-education as psychological therapy. 

Several factors indicate that there is an active intent by the Russian government to erase the Ukrainian identity of the abducted children and to transform it into the Russian identity. In January 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree approving a fast-tracked procedure for the granting of Russian citizenship to recently deported Ukrainian children. As a further example, Russian high-ranking official Maria Lvova-Belova made public statements mentioning that, once the children were moved to Russia, they “drastically changed their anti-Russian ideas, as soon as they learned the Russian language and culture.”

The use of psychological manipulation and Russian propaganda by the foster families and the schooling system demonstrates that the intent is to not temporarily host Ukrainian children as war refugees, but to implement a state-led program to fully assimilate them into Russian culture and erase their original Ukrainian identity. 

Organized, systematic state-directed campaign

Evidence shows that this forced-transfers campaign is a fully organized, intentional, and systematic operation carried out by the Russian Federation with the aim of substantially altering local demographics in Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine and erasing Ukrainian identity. Russia’s system of coerced adoption and fostering has been ordered and facilitated by President Vladimir Putin and Russian officials, and it has involved the active collaboration of the State Duma, the Russian judiciary, and local officials in Russian-occupied territories.

The Legal Significance of the Child Transfers: From War Crimes to Genocide

Before addressing the legal classification of genocide, it is important to situate the forcible transfer of Ukrainian children within the broader framework of international criminal law. The Russian Federation’s actions during its ongoing aggression against Ukraine have resulted in a wide range of documented violations, including widespread physical and sexual attacks on civilians, torture, and the destruction of civilian infrastructure — many of which constitute war crimes and most likely crimes against humanity (see for instance the European Parliamentary Research Service’s February 2025 report or the March 2023 report from the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine established by the UN Human Rights Council).  Consequently, in March of 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, Russian Presidential Commissioner for Children's Rights, who stand accused of the war crime of unlawful deportation of population (children) and that of unlawful transfer of population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation. These developments underscore the international recognition of the illegality of Russia’s conduct with regard to Ukrainian children. Yet, the question remains whether the scale, coordination, and ideological nature of these actions — particularly the systemic erasure of Ukrainian identity through adoption, indoctrination, and identity obfuscation — may satisfy the criteria for a separate and more severe crime under international law: genocide.

What constitutes genocide?

The term “genocide” is often associated with the coordinated mass murder of ethnic, national, racial, or religious groups.  In fact, the literal meaning of the term [prefix from Greek “genos” (race or tribe) and suffix from Latin “cide” (from caedere, which means killing)], as coined by Polish lawyer Raphäel Lemkin in 1944, indeed evokes such connotation.  When the term “genocide” is referenced, one may immediately think of atrocities such as the campaign of ethnic extermination and collective punishment waged in Nazi Germany against, millions of Jews, Sinti, and Roma, the 1994 atrocities committed in Rwanda against the Tutsi population, or the mass murder of thousands Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica in 1995.  

However, the term “genocide” carries a much broader meaning. The term was first codified and defined as an independent crime in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the “Genocide Convention”), which has been ratified by 153 states as of May 2025, including the Russian Federation and Ukraine.  According to the International Court of Justice (the “ICJ”, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, concerned primarily with state responsibility rather than individual culpability), the Genocide Convention embodies principles that are part of general customary international law to which states are bound as a matter of law regardless of whether or not they have ratified the Genocide Convention and the prohibition of genocide is a peremptory norm of international law from which no derogation is allowed (see for instance the 2006 decision regarding Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo). 

The Genocide Convention defines certain “punishable acts” committed by individuals as genocide and establishes a duty for state parties to prevent genocide and to enact legislation to criminalize its commission, regardless of whether they are public officials or private individuals (see Articles I and IV).  Pursuant to Article III of the Genocide Convention, the following are “punishable acts” as referenced above: (i) genocide; (ii) conspiracy to commit genocide; (iii) direct and public incitement to commit genocide; (iv) attempt to commit genocide; and (v) complicity in genocide.  

Article II of the Genocide Convention defines “genocide” as follows: 

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

  1. Killing members of the group;

  2. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

  3. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

  4. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

  5. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Can the forcible displacement and “Russification” of Ukrainian children by Russia be classified as genocide?

In 2023, the US House of Representatives passed a resolutioncondemning the illegal abduction and forcible transfer of children from Ukraine to the Russian Federation”, declaring that “the Russian Federation is attempting to wipe out a generation of Ukrainian children” and that Russia’s abduction, transfer, and forcible adoption of Ukrainian children is “contrary to Russia’s obligations under the Genocide Convention and amounts to genocide.

Resolution 2482 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (the “PACE”) demanded an immediate halt of forcible deportations of Ukrainian civilians, including children, explaining that the forcible transfer of children for “Russification purposes” could be punishable under Article II of the Genocide Convention, and “that the official Russian rhetoric used to justify the full-scale invasion and aggression against Ukraine, the so-called “de-Ukrainianisation” process, carries characteristics of public incitement to genocide or reveals a genocidal intent to destroy the Ukrainian national group as such or at least part of it.” 

A team of legal and genocide experts and open-source intelligence investigators concluded in 2022 that there were “reasonable grounds to believe” that Russia is responsible for violating Article II (genocide) and Article III(c) (direct and public incitement to commit genocide) of the Genocide Convention. While these grounds are a lesser standard of proof than required in applicable legal proceedings, this report is one of many giving credibility to the allegations of Russian crimes. This report is further supported by the 2024 Humanitarian Research Lab Report, which concluded that a broader case pursuing genocide convictions was plausible considering Russian atrocities in the region. 

Despite these physical indications, there are legal challenges in proving the crime of genocide; these challenges primarily manifest from the requirement of proving both genocide’s “physical” elements (murder etc.) and “mental” elements, with the mental specific intent elements creating the greatest evidentiary difficulty. In recent history, several courts or commissions were unable to confirm the existence of genocidal intent and hence were unable to conclude that genocide had been committed (e.g., the ICJ and commissions of inquiry regarding Former Yugoslavia, Sudan (Darfur), and the Central African Republic). 

The physical elements of genocide

The Ukrainian national group is protected under the Genocide Convention. As outlined above, there is ample and well-researched evidence of organized and forcible abductions of Ukrainian children to Russia, coupled with their “Russification”, including adoption by Russian nationals and obfuscation of their true identities.  The same applies in respect of other atrocities that may, in principle, form the basis of the “physical” element of genocide as set out above. The number of well-documented cases of atrocities (including known facilitators/perpetrators) and proven involvement of officials of the Russian Federation render it reasonably promising that at least the “physical elements” of the crime of genocide would be provable in a trial setting.  

The transfers appear to be organized at the highest level, are seemingly (mostly) permanent or structured so as to be permanent, brought about under coercion, and accompanied by identity obfuscation, “Russification”, and adoption by Russian citizens and outside the Ukrainian territory.  These actions go beyond objective humanitarian explanations to protect children from the impact of war as set out in the 1949 Geneva Conventions (specifically the Fourth Convention, concerning the protection of civilian persons in time of war) and the 1977 Additional Protocols (Protocol I).  As detailed by the 2024 Humanitarian Research Lab Report, there are convincing arguments to conclude that the afore-described systematic and widespread actions against Ukrainian children are not justifiable humanitarian actions on the basis of the following:

  • Russia’s own unlawful actions have brought about the humanitarian crisis that now allegedly necessitates the children’s forced removal;

  • the non-justifiably permanent character of the actions taken by Russia in respect of these children (including adoption, nationalization, and “Russification”);

  • Russia’s systematic and organized violations of obligations even in a war to ensure/preserve family unity, transfer to neutral countries, and cultural/national identity of these children; 

  • the systematic and widespread use of coercion, deception, obfuscation, and indoctrination (“Russification”) far beyond what could be reasonably argued to be driven by an objective or desire to simply protect children from the immediate effects of war; and 

  • all of the foregoing happening under control and with the approval and knowledge of high-level Russian officials.

The mental elements of genocide

While the physical elements appear provable, the critical element of that definition of genocide and of most jurisprudence regarding genocide, is the requirement of the specific intent to commit the physical acts in Article II (a)-(e) whilst specifically targeting a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, which intent must be present (and proven beyond reasonable doubt) in addition to the intent attaching to the physical elements of the underlying acts (see for instance the Krstić appeal judgment, para 134 (“unequivocally established”)).  

Proving the specific intent (such as the intent to destroy) that goes beyond the intent associated with the physical elements of a crime is by nature challenging in the absence of a confession or written plan of the perpetrators. Nevertheless, when considered against the backdrop of Russian officials’ dehumanizing and aggressive rhetoric (see above and see the 2024 Humanitarian Research Lab Report and the 2022 report of legal and genocide experts) regarding the destruction of the Ukrainian people, the possibility of genocide becomes more likely.  

Martial rhetoric alone, however, does not prove targeted intent to destroy in the sense of the Genocide Convention.  However, it would be an important element in proving such intent since it is well established, including under jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (the “ICTY”) (e.g., Popović appeal judgement, para. 468), that the required intent may be inferred contextually in case of a lack of more direct evidence of a perpetrator’s volition from his words or deeds.  Such an approach need not and may not be “compartmentalized” in the sense of inferring such intent separately for each potential genocidal act, but may be based on all evidence taken together (as for instance confirmed in the ICTY’s Stakić appeal judgement, para. 55).  

Historically, the “intent to destroy” is widely interpreted, including by relevant international tribunals (e.g., Krstić appeal judgment on margin note 25), as “intent to physically or biologically destroy the protected group” (i.e., attacking mere cultural or sociological characteristics to annihilate them is not sufficient).  With this in mind it may appear difficult to prove the required specific intent in connection with only the forcible abduction of children of a group (unless as an accessory to other genocidal acts that involve acts of physical or biological destruction).  However, the fact that the forcible abduction and transfer of children of a group is defined in the Convention as a genocidal act if coupled with the requisite intent, implies that this conclusion is too narrow.  The Global Justice Center’s 2018 article on the spectrum of possible non-lethal genocidal violence and related intent is in our view instructive in this respect (including non-lethal acts of genocide, which are typically directed against females).  The Global Justice Center’s article advocates for a broader view that would “more easily encompass conduct that targets the social bond that bind individuals into a group” (see p. 33 et seqq., in particular p. 37) and focuses on genocide that may be perpetrated without killing (quoting, for instance, the broader views expressed in the 2006 Krajišnik ICTY trial judgement (see e.g., para. 854, footnote 1701)). 

Protecting Children and Obtaining Judgments

When it comes to obtaining actual judgements against individuals or against the Russian Federation, the existence of a genocidal intent may be a reasonable conclusion in light of the available evidence and applicable precedent (as expressed in several trial judgements, such as the ICJ 2015 genocide judgement, paras. 143 – 148).  Given the existing judicial focus on lethal acts of genocide and the fact that Russian acts concerning the forcible abduction of children are limited to the above-referenced group of children in Russian occupied territories with limited evidence of systematic lethal actions, proving that the forcible abduction in itself amounts to genocide may, however, be challenging in a trial setting.  But however challenging it may appear to be, it is certainly not impossible in the light of facts as known today. 

Today’s world is interconnected to an unprecedented extent. Russian actions and state-sanctioned violence against Ukrainians and Ukrainian children is well-documented, systematic, and widespread.  As referenced in the Global Justice Center’s 2018 article, a broader understanding of genocidal intent should apply. As the Global Justice Center’s article states, genocide is a crime of intent, and not of scale: “Where this special intent is present, the killing of a thousand people is no less a genocide than the killing of a million people”.  If the landscape of international law cannot presently accommodate the ever-changing nature of warfare and state action, international law must evolve. 

Russian officials may feel “safe” at present.  But the likes of Ratko Mladić and others show that Russian leadership cannot rejoice too early.  It is by no means certain that the perpetrators will indeed escape justice.  And even if that were the case: in the light of the outrageous nature of the reckless actions committed against (inter alia) vulnerable Ukrainian children we consider it legally sufficiently promising and morally imperative to accept the challenge of pursuing those responsible for possible genocidal acts committed against Ukrainians, and notably including against Ukrainian children.  

Considering all facts, a potential genocidal pattern and the vastness of the Russian state’s involvement are inescapable (see, for instance, the 2022 report of a team of legal and genocide experts and open-source intelligence investigators).  This pattern of state-directed child transfers, viewed in light of international law, warrants close and sustained legal examination under the Genocide Convention.

Defining the Practice of International Criminal Defense - An Interview with Peter Haynes KC

Defining the Practice of International Criminal Defense

An Interview with Peter Haynes KC

Edited by Emma Bakkum & Paul Williams

A Note on Defending Justice

This blog is part of the Defending Justice series, an initiative of the Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG) to promote an eclectic array of voices within the field of international criminal law. 

As part of our broader efforts to strengthen institutions of justice, this series seeks to create space for dialogue around the varied perspectives and concerns that shape these institutions. With that aim in mind, we interviewed a series of defense practitioners working in international criminal law and distilled their experiences and insights into a series of first-person monographs, preserving the spirit and voice of those interviews.

Editor’s Note

This blog introduces the topic of defense of the accused before international criminal courts and tribunals. By drawing upon Peter Haynes KC’s extensive experience at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), and the International Criminal Court (ICC), it introduces several key themes to defense, including the structure of international defense teams, how to effectively defend the accused before international criminal tribunals, differences between domestic and international defense practices, and the future outlook for international criminal defense lawyers. Through the striking first-hand achievements of Peter Haynes in defending accused and managing defense teams at international criminal courts, this blog realistically positions international defense work within the international criminal law project and articulates standards that need to be met in order to effectively defend accused before international criminal courts and tribunals. 

Introduction

A strong defense is not just a procedural safeguard. It is the foundation of a fair trial and a vital part of the international justice process. Over the years, I have come to see the defense as the quiet force that holds the system accountable. It is the defense that ensures the rights of the accused are not only recognized but actively upheld.

I have spent most of the last 17 years appearing before various courts and tribunals in The Hague, The Netherlands, including the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). The first time I worked in defense in The Hague was at the turn of the century. I was ready for a change from my domestic career in the United Kingdom, so I took the step to move to The Hague and work at the ICTY. My primary motivations to work in the difficult field of defense back then were the disenchantment I felt with domestic criminal practice, especially the inability to concentrate on my own cases because of the volume of work and the “returns” system (I was known for my ability to be able to pick things up at short notice),* as well as the desire to do something new and cutting-edge. 

I returned to the Hague and the ICTY in 2006, where I appeared for the defense of General Vinko Pandurević in relation to the Srebrenica massacre.** From then on, I worked continuously as an international defense lawyer, appearing in cases involving charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and international terrorism. At the STL, from 2012 to 2023, I represented the victims of the terrorist bombing in Beirut which resulted in the assassination of then Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri. At the ICC, I appeared for Jean-Pierre Bemba, the former Minister of Defense and Senator of the Democratic Republic of Congo, starting in 2013 and securing his acquittal of all charges on appeal in 2018. In June 2024, I was assigned to represent the interests of Lord Resistance Army’s leader Joseph Kony before the ICC. Between 2019 and 2021, I furthermore held the office of President of the International Criminal Court Bar Association, becoming the first and only person to be re-elected to the post.

Domestically in the United Kingdom, I have appeared for both the prosecution and the defense inter alia in cases of murder, serious fraud, sexual offenses, human trafficking, and complex conspiracies. Away from crime, I have acted as lead counsel in a class action against the British government concerning the torture of prisoners in Cyprus; initiated proceedings against the ICC seeking $75 million in damages for the losses arising from the freezing of Bemba’s assets; and represented the Tamil community in an appeal to the UK Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission relating to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eeelam.

These experiences, across different courts and contexts, have shaped how I understand the role of the defense within international criminal justice. What began as a professional challenge evolved into a deeper understanding of what it means to defend accused in a system built to prosecute those responsible for the gravest crimes. 

Defense as the Measure of International Justice

At the ICC, the Rome Statute provides a detailed framework for the rights of the accused. Article 67 guarantees the right of the accused, including to be informed of the charges, to have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense, to be tried without undue delay, and to choose legal counsel freely. It also affirms the right to examine witnesses, present evidence, remain silent, and receive any material from the Prosecutor that may suggest innocence or mitigate guilt. 

But rights on paper are not enough. In practice, defending someone before an international tribunal requires a well-resourced and experienced team. I have worked with investigators, case managers, and legal assistants who bring deep expertise and commitment to the work. The volume of disclosure, the complexity of legal issues, and the cross-border nature of our investigations demand a level of coordination and strategic planning that goes far beyond what is typically required in domestic criminal practice. My experience at the ICC, and earlier at the ICTY and STL, has taught me that institutional knowledge and adaptability are just as important as legal skill.

International defense work is fundamentally different from domestic criminal litigation. We operate in multilingual courtrooms, across diverse legal traditions, and often in politically sensitive environments. The crimes under scrutiny are not only serious but also deeply embedded in historical and social contexts. As defense counsel, I have had to navigate bureaucratic obstacles, limited access to witnesses, and political resistance that can make even the most basic investigative steps a challenge. Unlike domestic systems, where lawyers may benefit from established norms and local familiarity, international defense requires flexibility, cultural sensitivity, and a willingness to challenge dominant narratives.

In this blog, I reflect on what it takes to effectively defend an accused before international criminal tribunals. I focus primarily on the law and practice of the ICC, but I also draw on my experience at the ICTY and STL to highlight broader institutional dynamics. I explore how international defense teams are structured, what they require, how international defense differs from domestic criminal practice, and how I see the future of international defense. Ultimately, I argue that the strength of the defense is a litmus test for the legitimacy of international criminal justice.


International Criminal Defense Lawyers and Teams

Defense at international criminal courts and tribunals differs in many ways from defense at the domestic level, as described in further detail later in this blog. Years of experience as an international criminal defense lawyer and leading defense teams have led me to identify several key requirements for lawyers seeking to defend accused before international courts, as well as best practices for the structure and management of a defense team. 

Defense Qualifications for International Criminal Courts

Defense counsel appearing before international criminal courts, including the ICC, are independent legal professionals. Unlike prosecutors, who are employed by the Court, defense counsel are not staff members. However, to appear before the ICC, counsel and their assistants must meet specific eligibility criteria and be admitted to the Court’s official lists.

To qualify as defense counsel, applicants must satisfy the baseline requirements set out in Rule 22 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and Regulation 67 of the Regulations of the Court. These include demonstrating established competence in international or criminal law and procedure, and having at least ten years of relevant experience in criminal proceedings. Candidates must also be fluent in one of the Court’s working languages, English or French, and have no convictions for serious criminal or disciplinary offenses. Associate counsel and assistants to counsel must meet similar standards, though with a minimum of eight years’ and five years’ experience respectively. All applicants must submit documentation verifying their qualifications, including proof of legal training, professional references, and evidence of language proficiency. Once admitted, those on the List of Counsel may practice before the Court as defense counsel, legal representatives for victims, duty counsel, or ad hoc counsel. 

Professional investigators are another critical component of defense teams. The ICC maintains a separate List of Professional Investigators, governed by Regulation 137 of the Regulations of the Registry. Investigators must have at least ten years of experience in criminal investigations, either at the national or international level. They must demonstrate competence in international or criminal law and procedure, and be fluent in one of the Court’s working languages. In most cases, investigators are also expected to speak at least one language relevant to the country or region under investigation. Defense and prosecution teams propose their own case-specific investigators for inclusion on the list, subject to approval by the Registry. 

Beyond counsel and investigators, defense teams typically include assistants, case managers, and administrative staff. Legal assistants are expected to hold advanced degrees in law, with specialization in international criminal law, human rights law, or related fields. They assist with legal research, drafting, and analysis, and often play a key role in preparing filings and coordinating with the Court. Case managers oversee logistical aspects of the case, including disclosure, scheduling, and document management. Administrative staff support the day-to-day functioning of the team, ensuring that records are maintained, deadlines are met, and internal communication is efficient. Hiring practices for support staff vary depending on the complexity of the case and available resources. However, professionalism, adaptability, and familiarity with international criminal procedure are essential across all roles. 

Structure of Defense Teams

The composition of a defense team at the ICC depends on whether the accused is indigent, receiving legal aid, or is paying for his own representation. The latter of which means far more flexibility in choosing a defense team. Where the accused is indigent, the structure and funding of the team are governed by the ICC’s Legal Aid Policy. This policy outlines the permissible size and composition of defense teams, calibrated to the phase and complexity of the case. In general, a defense team includes two counsel, two assistants to counsel or legal officers, two case managers, and, where necessary, a language assistant. The Policy also provides an investigative budget, which may be used to assign either a professional investigator or a resource person to the team.

Each role within the defense team carries distinct responsibilities. Lead counsel, supported by co-counsel, sets the strategic direction of the case, represents the accused in court, and oversees all legal decisions. Assistants to counsel support this work through legal research, drafting, and analysis, often taking the lead on specific motions or evidentiary issues. Case managers handle procedural logistics, including disclosure, filings, and coordination with the Court. Investigators are responsible for identifying and interviewing witnesses, gathering evidence, and verifying factual claims. If required, language assistants facilitate communication between the accused and the team and ensure that all materials are accurately translated. Resource persons may provide contextual expertise, such as knowledge of local customs, political dynamics, or historical events relevant to the case.

Defense teams also often rely on interns and visiting professionals. They contribute to research, drafting, and administrative tasks, and their involvement can be key to the success of the team when properly integrated. 

Forming a Successful Defense Team

In practice, defense teams are often assembled through professional networks and prior working relationships. However, there is increasing recognition of the need to ensure diversity and representation, particularly of individuals from the situation country. This enhances cultural competence and facilitates engagement with local witnesses and communities.

Essential to the effectiveness of a defense team are the structure, synergy, and internal dynamics. A team that is divided, dysfunctional, or unclear in its strategic direction will struggle to prepare a credible defense. It is critical that all members share the Lead Counsel’s strategic vision and understand their roles within that framework. Clear communication, mutual respect, and a shared commitment to the case are indispensable. It is important to give all team members, including interns, ownership over their work and opportunities for professional development. This fosters a collaborative environment and strengthens the overall quality of the defense.

Challenges within defense teams are not uncommon. In the Bemba case, for instance, two Congolese defense lawyers were later investigated themselves, and found guilty of various offenses against the administration of justice related to the false testimonies of defense witnesses. This situation brought to light key issues regarding team cohesion, professional conduct, and the pressures faced by defense teams operating in politically sensitive contexts.

Ultimately, the defense team is not simply a collection of professionals. It is a strategic unit tasked with upholding the rights of the accused and the fairness of international proceedings. Its composition, management, and internal cohesion can shape not only the outcome of a case but also the broader perception of justice at the international level.

Essential Skills and Attributes

Effective international defense requires more than legal expertise. It demands a distinct set of personal and professional qualities that are often not fostered in domestic practice. The transition from national to international defense work involves adapting to different legal cultures, institutional expectations, and team dynamics. Over time, I have found that several attributes have proven essential to navigating this shift successfully.

Confidence is particularly important. Defense counsel must be prepared to assert the rights of the accused in environments where they are often viewed with suspicion. Public opinion may be hostile, and the presumption of guilt can be strong. In such settings, counsel must advocate with clarity and conviction, maintain composure under pressure, and defend strategic decisions even when they are unpopular. Confidence also plays a role in courtroom advocacy, where counsel must challenge assumptions, cross-examine witnesses, and engage with judges who may be unfamiliar with common law techniques or adversarial reasoning.

Adaptability and flexibility are equally critical. International defense work varies not only from domestic practice but also from one tribunal to another. Differences in judicial background, procedural culture, and legal tradition can shape the tone and substance of proceedings. In the Popović case, for example, the Presiding Judge was Maltese and came from a common law background. In Bemba, the Presiding Judge was Brazilian, with a civil law orientation. This shift required an adjustment of strategy. The civil law judge was less receptive to common law practices, and the defense had to adjust its approach to align with the expectations of the bench. The ability to read the courtroom, anticipate procedural preferences, and tailor advocacy accordingly is essential.

A useful analogy comes from football. David Beckham, known for his success across multiple European teams, was able to perform consistently because he adapted to different playing styles, coaching philosophies, and team cultures. International defense lawyers must do the same. Each tribunal has its own particularities, and success depends on the ability to integrate, adjust, and perform under varying conditions.

Diplomacy and interpersonal skills also matter. Defense lawyers are rarely the most popular figures in international criminal proceedings. They represent individuals accused of serious crimes, and their role is often misunderstood. Building relationships with Registry staff, opposing counsel, and even judges requires tact, professionalism, and a willingness to engage constructively. Being friendly and respectful, even in adversarial settings, can help defuse tension and facilitate cooperation. It is important to make allies where possible, even among those who may not be inclined to support the defense.

Leadership is another key attribute, especially as Lead Counsel. Unlike domestic practice, where defense counsel may work alone or with minimal support, international defense teams are often composed of six to seven individuals from diverse backgrounds. As lead counsel, managing this team requires clarity of vision, delegation of tasks, and the ability to foster cohesion. Everyone must understand the strategic direction of the case and their role within it.

Other, additional, qualities of a lawyer that contribute to effective international defense include sound judgment, strong writing skills, and courtroom presence. Counsel must obviously be able to communicate arguments persuasively, both in writing and in the courtroom. Good IT skills are also increasingly essential, given the use of electronic case management systems, the volume of digital disclosure, and the need for secure communication.

These attributes, in my view, are foundational to the practice of international defense. The most effective lawyers in this field combine technical knowledge with strategic insight, interpersonal skills, and a commitment to fairness in the face of complexity and resistance.

Resource Constraints

Resource constraints are a defining reality in international defense practice. While the ICC provides some institutional support to defense teams, including access to the Office of Public Counsel for the Defense, logistical support to investigative activities, and basic IT infrastructure, the disparity between defense and prosecution is significant. The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) routinely operates with far greater resources. In most cases, their teams outnumber ours by a ratio of eight to one. Prosecutorial staff benefit from permanent contracts, stable working conditions, and access to advanced document management systems. At the ICTY, for example, the OTP’s internal platform was far more sophisticated than anything available to defense teams.

Defense teams, by contrast, are composed of external contractors. We do not receive sick leave, vacation days, or parental leave. Our cybersecurity and travel security are minimal compared to the protections afforded to OTP staff. The imbalance is structural and persistent. But fairness in resources is not the measure of success, you do what you can with the resources you have, and what matters is the quality of the work: what is filed and how it is argued in court. Despite the limitations my defense teams have faced, I have never felt prouder of the written submissions produced by my teams. The appeal brief in Bemba remains one of the clearest examples of what can be achieved with a focused strategy, despite limited resources. 

A successful written brief is defined by clarity, consistency, and presentation. It must be readable, well-indexed, and free of unnecessary repetition. Style matters in a brief: font choices should be coherent, text should be justified, and a logical, indexed, structure should help guide the reader through complex legal arguments. A good brief does not just require an excellent understanding of the law and persuasive arguments; it also requires clarity and a strong presentation. This takes time and careful review.  

Courtroom advocacy requires the same level of preparation. A strong appearance in court is built on calm delivery, mastery of the evidence, and proficiency with the technology used. It is important to remain composed, even when challenged by the bench or provoked by opposing counsel. If an objection is necessary, it must be strategic and grounded in fairness, particularly fairness to the witness. These moments are rare, and they must be used wisely.

Working within resource constraints demands dedication, resilience, and teamwork. The defense may not have the same institutional backing as the prosecution, but it has the capacity to produce work of equal quality, both in written briefs and courtroom appearance.

International vs. Domestic Criminal Law Practice

Key differences between international and domestic criminal trials are not limited to legal frameworks or procedural rules. They extend to the length and scale of the cases, structure, and type of work throughout the proceedings. These differences shape the role of defense counsel and the demands placed on the defense team throughout the life of a case.

Key Differences in the Trial Process

One of the most significant distinctions is the length of proceedings. International trials often span several years, if not a decade. The Bemba case at the ICC lasted ten years from pre-trial to appeal. In Popović at the ICTY, which extended over nine years, the Presiding Judge remarked early in the proceedings that counsel should prepare for the long haul, noting that many changes in our private lives would likely occur before the case concluded. This observation reflects a broader truth: international defense work requires sustained commitment over long periods, often becoming the central focus of a lawyer’s professional and personal life.

The intensity of client contact is another defining feature of international criminal cases. Unlike many domestic systems, where communication with clients may be limited to court appearances or scheduled meetings, international defense work involves regular, often daily, interaction with the accused. Visits to detention facilities are frequent, and the relationship between counsel and client becomes deeply personal. Clients and their families may become part of the lawyer’s daily life, creating a dynamic that is both humanizing and pressurized. In The Hague, where the court building(s), detention center, and legal offices are located within a small geographic area, the proximity reinforces this intensity and can blur the boundaries between professional and personal space.

The scale of international cases also sets them apart from domestic criminal cases. The crimes under investigation typically involve multiple incidents, geographic regions, and hundreds of witnesses. Defense teams must manage vast quantities of evidence and coordinate complex legal strategies. Unlike domestic practice, where a lawyer may work independently or with minimal support, international defense requires the management of a multidisciplinary team. These teams are often composed of individuals from diverse legal traditions and cultural backgrounds. Effective leadership in this context demands intercultural sensitivity and inclusive team management.

The nature of the legal work itself in international crimes cases is also distinct from domestic cases. In domestic systems, legal arguments are often raised in court. In international criminal law, however, most procedural and substantive issues must be submitted in writing through the filing of a motion. In addition, international defense teams are responsible for conducting their own investigations. This includes identifying and interviewing witnesses, collecting evidence, and verifying facts, tasks that are typically handled by police or investigative authorities in domestic systems.

Key Differences in the Defense Strategy and Procedure

These structural and procedural differences between domestic and international criminal cases require a shift in the approach to defense work. International defense counsel must be prepared for long-term engagement, sustained client interaction, and the management of legally complex cases and multilingual teams.

This also means a shift in defense strategy and procedure, as proceedings differ markedly from domestic practice, particularly in common law jurisdictions. International defense teams must be prepared to litigate complex legal issues, respond to evolving jurisprudence, and advocate effectively within a system that blends multiple legal traditions. 

First, international trials tend to be more legalistic, with a greater emphasis on the interpretation of law and precedent. In domestic proceedings, the focus is often on the presentation and review of evidence. By contrast, international trials frequently center on the scope and application of legal provisions, many of which remain open to interpretation due to the relatively limited number of cases involving international crimes. 

This legal focus is especially pronounced in relation to the concept of modes of liability. Concepts such as command responsibility, joint criminal enterprise, and indirect co-perpetration are still evolving. Defense teams must engage in detailed litigation to challenge the scope, elements, and evidentiary thresholds of these doctrines. The strategic emphasis shifts from factual rebuttal to legal interpretation, requiring sustained engagement with jurisprudence from multiple tribunals and careful framing of arguments that may influence future case law.

Second, the process of judicial decision-making at international tribunals differs. In international tribunals, judges deliberate on whether the prosecution has proven each element of the crimes charged beyond reasonable doubt. They draft the judgment based on these deliberations and determine the sentence. There is no jury. This model places significant weight on the written record, particularly the trial transcript. Judges and legal officers often rely on transcripts when drafting judgments, which means that non-verbal cues of witness examination, such as tone, hesitation, or facial expression, are excluded. Defense counsel must therefore ensure that key points are clearly articulated and captured in the transcript. This requires deliberate planning for and during witness examination and a strategy to direct your defense in a much more purposeful way into law and precedent.

Third, procedural particularities at international courts shape defense strategy. International criminal law reflects a combination of common and civil law traditions. Pre-trial litigation is extensive, with prolonged debates over the admissibility and relevance of evidence. Hearsay is more readily admitted than in many domestic systems, and the prosecution may call rebuttal witnesses after the defense case has concluded. The procedural framework is also highly codified, with detailed regulations governing filings, disclosure, and courtroom conduct. Defense teams must navigate these rules and regulations with precision and adapt their strategies to the procedural realities of each tribunal.

Another distinctive feature in international criminal proceedings is the participation of victims in proceedings. At the ICC, STL, and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), victims may be represented by counsel and may submit observations on legal and factual matters. This introduces an additional layer of complexity, as defense teams must respond not only to the prosecution but also to victim representatives. In the Bemba case at the ICC, for example, victim participation influenced the structure and content of the proceedings, requiring the defense to engage with multiple parties simultaneously.

Effectiveness of Modern International Criminal Tribunals 

Despite its foundational commitment to accountability and fairness, the ICC has faced persistent challenges in delivering on its mandate. Two structural issues in particular have in my view undermined its effectiveness and raised concerns about the integrity of its proceedings.

The first relates to enforcement. Unlike the ICTY, which operated based on a UN Security Council Resolution grounded in Chapter VII of the UN Charter and benefited from the cooperation of all UN member states, the ICC lacks a comparable enforcement mechanism. The ICTY was able to secure the arrest and surrender of suspects with relative consistency, contributing to its reputation as a successful international tribunal. In contrast, the ICC has struggled to bring high-level suspects into custody. While the Kenya cases and the Bemba case involved prominent figures, many of the individuals who have faced trial before the ICC have been relatively low-level actors. This has led to criticism that the Court is failing to pursue the most responsible perpetrators and is instead focusing on those who are politically or logistically easier to apprehend.

This dynamic has prompted me to call for a more strategic use of the complementarity principle. Under Article 17 of the Rome Statute, states bear the primary responsibility for investigating and prosecuting crimes within their jurisdiction. The ICC should consider referring cases involving lower-level perpetrators to domestic systems, where feasible, and focus its resources on those most responsible for serious international crimes. Such an approach would not only reinforce the principle of complementarity but also help the Court concentrate its efforts on cases with the greatest potential impact.

The second issue concerns the process by which suspects are brought into custody at the ICC. I have witnessed a tendency to issue arrest warrants based on preliminary suspicion, with limited scrutiny of the strength of the underlying case. This practice places the accused at a disadvantage and undermines the fairness of the proceedings. Although the Rome Statute provides for a confirmation of charges hearing within a reasonable time, this timetable is frequently extended. There is no provision for custody limits, and the evidentiary threshold for confirmation is not consistently applied. The result is prolonged pre-trial detention and uncertainty for the accused. I believe there should be a more structural and thorough review of arrest warrants before they are issued, as well as a structural review of whether people in custody should remain in custody or should be released. 

These two systemic shortcomings have implications for the overall fairness of trials at the ICC. While the Court has demonstrated its commitment to due process, evidenced by the acquittal of several defendants, the pre-trial phase remains a point of concern. A more rigorous review of arrest warrants, clearer standards for confirmation, and greater respect for procedural timelines would strengthen the Court’s credibility.

The Future Outlook for Defense Counsel 

The role of defense counsel in international criminal law remains underappreciated, despite its centrality to fair trial guarantees and the legitimacy of international justice. A functioning criminal system requires not only effective prosecution but also robust and independent defense. Acquittals, when they occur, should not be viewed as institutional failures, instead they are indicators that the system is capable of applying legal standards impartially. The rhetoric surrounding acquittals must shift to reflect this reality.

There is a persistent failure within the broader international community to recognize the value of the defense function. Legal aid decisions are often framed in terms of cost rather than necessity. Defense budgets are scrutinized more heavily than prosecutorial ones, and support for defense teams is frequently treated as discretionary. This approach undermines the principle of equality of arms and risks reducing the defense to a procedural formality rather than a substantive counterweight to the prosecution.

Looking ahead, I believe defense counsel face a number of challenges that extend beyond legal argumentation. Physical safety is a growing concern for me and my colleagues. In high-profile cases, such as the Bemba case, defense lawyers have encountered perilous situations due to public visibility and political sensitivities. The association with controversial figures or contested narratives can expose counsel to threats, surveillance, and personal security risks. These risks are compounded by the increasing vulnerability of legal professionals to cybercrime. Online exposure, data breaches, and targeted digital harassment pose serious threats to the confidentiality and integrity of defense work.

Resource constraints are also likely to intensify. The ICC and other international tribunals face mounting financial pressures, and defense teams are often the first to experience reductions in support. Cuts to legal aid, investigative budgets, and staffing levels compromise the ability of counsel to prepare and present a full defense. Without adequate resources to the defense, the fairness of proceedings is placed at risk.

To address these challenges, a cultural shift is needed. States, institutions, and civil society actors must recognize that defense is not an auxiliary component of justice but a foundational one. Adequate resources for defense, protection for legal professionals, and respect for the role of counsel are essential to the future of international criminal law.

Conclusion 

The practice of international criminal defense is shaped by a unique set of legal, procedural, and institutional frameworks. A successful defense case requires counsel with a specific set of core qualifications and attributes, including confidence, adaptability, diplomacy, leadership, sound judgment, courtroom presence, strong writing skills, and technological proficiency. Together, these attributes enable defense counsel to navigate the complexities of international proceedings and uphold the rights of the accused in some of the most challenging legal environments. Additionally, essential to the effectiveness of a defense team is a shared strategic vision and a clear division of roles within that framework. 

International trials are generally longer, more procedurally complex, and more heavily reliant on written litigation. Furthermore, the relationship between counsel and client is more intensive, and the scale of the cases requires the management of diverse, multidisciplinary teams. Defense teams must be able to operate within a hybrid legal system that blends common and civil law traditions. The defense team’s legal strategy is shaped by the evolving nature of international jurisprudence, with a strong emphasis on precedent and legal interpretation. The participation of victims adds another layer of complexity, requiring defense teams to engage with multiple parties throughout the proceedings.

Looking ahead, I think that several areas require attention. Much has changed since the early days of international criminal tribunals. The ICC has established the Office of Public Counsel for the Defense and developed legal aid frameworks that support our work. But the defense function remains under-resourced and under-recognized. Investigative support remains uneven and cooperation from states is still frequently limited. These structural imbalances undermine the principle of equality of arms and thus threaten the credibility of the proceedings.

The wider international community must acknowledge that an effective defense is not a procedural formality but a cornerstone of a fair and credible justice system. Acquittals should be understood as evidence that the system is functioning as it should, not as institutional failure. The rhetoric around defense outcomes must change accordingly.

The ICC faces its own set of challenges, including the need for stronger state cooperation, a more coherent and equitable legal aid policy, and improved security protocols for defense teams. The Court must also take seriously its obligation under the complementarity principle to focus on prosecuting those most responsible for international crimes, while encouraging domestic systems to address lower-level perpetrators. Finally, arrest warrants should be issued only after careful review, and the rights of the accused must be protected through timely confirmation proceedings and meaningful custody safeguards.

The future of international defense counsel will depend on the system’s ability to address these structural issues. Acquittals demonstrate that fair trials are possible, but the path to that outcome is often fraught with procedural delays, resource constraints, and personal risk. The security and protection of defense counsel must be prioritized, alongside sustained investment in the institutional capacity of the defense function with a view to strengthening the role of the defense in international criminal justice and ensuring that the principles of fairness, equality, and due process remain at the heart of the international criminal justice system.


* In the UK criminal bar, the “returns system” refers to the practice of reassigning cases at short notice to another barrister when the original advocate is unavailable, often due to scheduling conflicts. The barrister taking the “return” must prepare and appear in court with minimal time to review the case.

** The Srebrenica massacre refers to the July 1995 killing of more than 7,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys by Bosnian Serb forces in and around the town of Srebrenica during the Bosnian War. It has been recognized by international courts, including the ICTY and the ICJ, as an act of genocide.

Elections in Ukraine: Between Peace Demands and Democratic Integrity

Elections in Ukraine: Between Peace Demands and Democratic Integrity

By: Dr. Paul R. Williams* and Sindija Beta**

As Ukraine navigates the most consequential peace negotiations in its modern history, the question of elections has again resurfaced during the most recent peace agreement drafts. The recently publicized 28-point plan, allegedly drafted by US and Russian officials, places elections soon after the cessation of hostilities as a requirement of any settlement. More recently, US President Trump accused Zelenskyy of prolonging the war to avoid holding elections, in response to which President Zelenskyy announced his readiness to hold elections even during martial law should security be ensured. 

Nonetheless, the unavoidable questions and issues that arise when elections in Ukraine are discussed are numerous. Martial law remains in place, during which elections are prohibited, millions of citizens are displaced internally or abroad, and large parts of the country remain under occupation. In this context, elections require more thinking than an arbitrary timeline in a poorly thought-through plan or baseless accusations of President Zelenskyy clinging to power. The challenge is to design an electoral process that is credible, inclusive, and secure, while resisting external pressure to rush toward a vote that could fracture Ukraine's hard-fought legitimacy.

Public debate reflects this tension. Civil society organizations such as Opora have outlined detailed roadmaps for postwar elections, emphasizing legal reform, diaspora inclusion, and international monitoring. Other institutions have likewise highlighted the risks of conducting elections during active armed conflict, noting that fairness and legitimacy are often compromised when security and freedoms are restricted. 

Challenges Facing Postwar Elections

There are a number of challenges that hinder Ukraine’s ability to hold elections. Beyond the initial hurdle of finding a legal solution to the prohibition on holding elections under martial law, which is currently in force but could arguably be lifted should a peace agreement be signed, there are other practical challenges to holding free and fair elections in Ukraine. This regards (1) the high numbers of displaced people in Ukraine and abroad, which makes registering voters difficult; and (2) meaningful political participation is restricted to those portions of the population that live under occupation and near the frontlines, as well as for those who have been conscripted to the military. The inability of active-duty soldiers to participate in elections raises serious questions about representation, particularly given the scale of mobilization during the war. 

More than six million Ukrainians remain abroad, with millions more internally displaced. Their participation is essential for legitimacy, but the legal framework and infrastructure in place would create significant obstacles for large portions of displaced people to participate in elections. Without secure absentee and diaspora voting, elections risk excluding vast segments of the electorate, creating a democracy that speaks only for those who remained.

Occupied territories present another obstacle. Conducting elections in regions under Russian control would risk legitimizing occupation. Comparative practice from places, such as Afghanistan or Iraq, shows that elections held under coercion or foreign control rarely produce durable legitimacy or peace. 

Security of polling stations is another critical concern. In areas close to the frontlines or even in Kyiv, polling places could become targets for Russian intimidation, sabotage, or direct attacks. Protecting voters and election workers will require professional civilian policing, security, international monitoring, and clear protocols to prevent interference by Russia. 

This is especially pertinent given Russia’s decades-long practice of interference in elections in other states. Such actions have ranged from disinformation campaigns to direct support for proxy actors, consistently undermining democratic processes. 

Indeed, elections held shortly after a ceasefire, let alone during active armed conflict, can be vulnerable to manipulation if the conditions for sovereignty and security are not firmly established. If elections are rushed before Ukraine has secured its institutions and electoral infrastructure, they could become another arena for Russian influence rather than a milestone of democratic renewal.

El Salvador’s Chapultepec Accords illustrate how sequencing matters. Electoral reform was treated as the foundation of peace, with institutional reform and international monitoring as the cornerstone of election preparation. Ukraine faces similar imperatives. Without safeguards and comprehensive security measures in place, which would include support from Ukraine’s allies, elections could legitimize Russian occupation and allow it to further manipulate and interfere with Ukraine’s internal matters or exclude displaced populations, undermining Ukraine’s democracy. 

Opora’s roadmap for postwar elections outlines practical steps for holding free and fair elections in Ukraine. These steps include legal and electoral reform for ensuring that all of the population, including displaced persons and those on military duty, can vote, conducting comprehensive security assessments, strengthening the information space to minimize Russian interference, and increasing campaigning transparency, among others. These are not steps that can or should be rushed. 

Moreover, narrative control will be central. Russia frames elections as proof of normalization, but Ukraine must counter by insisting on sovereignty-first sequencing. If elections are portrayed as concessions, they risk undermining Ukraine’s democratic identity. If they are framed as sovereign acts of resilience, they can become a powerful symbol of renewal.

Conclusion

Elections in Ukraine will inevitably be a defining feature of the country’s postwar settlement, but they cannot be reduced to a checkbox in a peace plan. Holding elections immediately after a ceasefire, without adequate preparation, risks exposing the process to Russian interference through disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, and manipulation of voter registries. It also risks disenfranchising millions of displaced Ukrainians who cannot easily access polling stations or register under the current frameworks.

A credible process depends on concrete steps: lifting martial law only once legal safeguards are in place, rebuilding voter registries to include displaced and diaspora populations, and creating security protocols for ensuring the security and integrity of polling stations. When it comes to occupied territories, the situation is even more difficult because voters in these areas, including Crimea and Donbas, should be able to participate in voting, but safeguards are required to ensure they are able to vote freely and that the election does not entrench an illegal occupation. 

These are issues that do not currently have solutions, and it would be irresponsible to overlook them due to external pressures. 


* Dr. Paul R. Williams is the Co-Founder and Director of the Public International Law & Policy Group and Rebecca Grazier Professor of Law and International Relations at American University

** Sindija Beta is the Legal Officer and Program Manager at the Public International Law & Policy Group