“Security Guarantees” for Ukraine: Breathing Life into a Buzzword

“Security Guarantees” for Ukraine: Breathing Life into a Buzzword

By: Paula C. Kates, Sindija Beta & Dr. Paul R. Williams

The purpose of this blog is to explain what is meant by the now frequently used term “security guarantees” in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

Following President Donald Trump’s meeting with Vladimir Putin in Alaska on August 15, 2025, and his subsequent meeting with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and several European leaders in Washington, D.C., on August 18, 2025, a renewed focus has emerged on the question of “security guarantees” for Ukraine.  

The phrase “security guarantees” is an often used buzzword, which few diplomats, commentators and even experts seem to understand.   

This blog explores the multiple dimensions of the term “security guarantees,” including:  What does the term “security guarantees” traditionally mean? What constitutes an Article 5-like guarantee? Which states or organizations might implement such guarantees? Does an Article 5-like guarantee require the deployment of combat troops on the ground in Ukraine? What options exist for configuring combat forces—or other types of security forces—on Ukrainian territory? How might these forces operate in the absence of an Article 5-like commitment? And finally, what binding obligations or discretionary measures might apply to—or be available to—the United States?” 

What does the term “security guarantees” traditionally mean?

There is no universally accepted definition of the term “security guarantees.” Some argue that a true “guarantee” of security is impossible and prefer the term “security commitment” to reflect the reality that no state can fully ensure the security of another. Nonetheless, in common discourse, security guarantees are generally understood as commitments to safeguard and maintain the status and territorial integrity of a specific state or entity against external aggression. These guarantees may be extended by individual states, groups of states, or international organizations.

For instance, the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea of 1953, commits the United States to come to South Korea’s defense in the event of external aggression. Since its signing, the United States has provided extensive defense support and has maintained a military presence in South Korea as a deterrent. Notably, the Treaty also extended the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” to the Republic of Korea, meaning that the deterrent effect of U.S. nuclear weapons applies not only to threats against the United States itself but also to those targeting South Korea.

An example of a multilateral security guarantee is the European Union member states’ commitment enshrined in Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union. Under the Article, member states are obliged to provide “aid and assistance by all the means in their power” to any other member state that is the victim of armed aggression on its territory. What distinguishes this clause from that of the United States and Korea Agreement is that, as the European Union is not a military institution, “all the means in their power” does not necessarily mean using armed force and may instead refer to non-military measures such as sanctions, economic assistance, diplomatic pressure, cyber defense support, or logistical coordination.

What constitutes an Article 5-like guarantee? 

The notion of an Article 5-like guarantee has its origins in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.  Article 5 provides that “an armed attack against one or more [member states] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense … will assist the Party or Parties so attacked.”  Put simply, Article 5 legally binds all NATO members to come to the aid of any single NATO member state that is attacked.  

Article-5 like guarantees for Ukraine were proposed during the Istanbul talks of March 2022 where it was suggested that, in lieu of full NATO membership, a coalition of willing states could provide a collective security guarantee akin to that provided by Article 5.  Russia counterproposed with the insistence that it be one of the guarantor states with a veto power over any support that may be provided should Ukraine again become a victim of armed aggression. 

In March of 2025, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni floated a similar proposal for Article 5-like guarantees. Contemporaneous commentary indicated that the Prime Minister intended for NATO and its member states to provide the collective security guarantee; but since Ukraine would not be a member state it could not be termed an Article 5 guarantee, and thus must be called an Article 5-like guarantee. At the time, Prime Minister Meloni reportedly envisioned that no NATO member state would necessarily need to station combat troops in Ukraine, as such an approach would be more acceptable to Russia. 

Following the recent summit between European leaders and President Trump in Washington, new details emerged regarding Italy’s evolving proposal on security guarantees. According to reports, the Italian government circulated a more formal draft to summit participants, outlining a collective assistance mechanism as an alternative to NATO membership. The plan would commit nations with bilateral agreements with Ukraine to swiftly coordinate a response in the event of an attack, potentially within 24 hours, though some countries have suggested timelines ranging from 12 to 72 hours. 

Proposed measures include rapid and sustained defensive support for Kyiv, economic aid, military reinforcement, and sanctions against Russia. While it remains unclear whether European troops would be deployed on Ukrainian soil, sources indicate that the framework could mirror the 2024 Rome-Kyiv bilateral pact. The reaction force might involve all NATO members, a subset, or even interested non-members like Japan and Australia. Crucially, any immediate response would rely on NATO’s existing infrastructure. Should Moscow launch an attack against Ukraine, a consultative process among guarantors would determine a proportionate—military or economic—reaction. 

While Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has notably distanced herself from the Coalition of the Willing initiative, particularly regarding proposals that involve deploying European troops to Ukraine, recently Italian Minister of Defense, Crosetto, clarified that this proposal is not mutually exclusive with the “Coalition of the Willing” concept, and both approaches could coexist.

What kinetic or other action could be taken under an Article 5-like guarantee?

At its core, an Article 5-like guarantee implies the potential for a military response to defend Ukraine in the event of renewed aggression. This could involve direct deployment of combat forces or the use of military capabilities to repel an attack. However, recent discussions—particularly among European states—have signaled growing interest in a broader spectrum of responses that fall short of direct military engagement.

One such alternative involves robust and sustained financial and arms commitments that enable Ukraine to maintain a level of military capability sufficient to deter future aggression on its own. This approach would avoid the need to deploy guarantor states’ militaries, but would require a significant and ongoing flow of weapons, ammunition, and funding. As war fatigue sets in across Europe and political support in the United States continues to erode, the prospects for maintaining such high levels of assistance are increasingly uncertain.

Moreover, a security guarantee structured solely around arms and financing—without the credible threat of direct military response—would only marginally exceed the support already provided to Ukraine by its allies to date. As a result, the credibility and deterrent power of such a guarantee may be limited unless paired with explicit political commitments or the credible presence of forward-deployed forces.

Which states or organizations might implement such guarantees? 

More recently the Article 5-like guarantee has evolved from a guarantee by NATO to a guarantee by a so-called "Coalition of the Willing"willing to participate in an ad hoc security arrangement. France and the United Kingdom have indicated a willingness to participate in such a coalition and to possibly deploy combat troops to Ukraine, though to limited geographic areas.  Germany and Poland have also indicated a willingness to provide these Article 5-like guarantees as part of a coalition, but would not station combat troops in Ukraine. Other states, including several European states, Japan, New Zealand, and Australia, have expressed interest in the Coalition of the Willing but have not provided a definite position on what could be their involvement. 

Notably, after the European meeting with President Trump on August 18, 2025 NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte seemed to resurrect the idea that the Article 5-like guarantees would be provided by NATO.

President Trump has indicated that he, and even President Putin, are open to Article 5-like guarantees, though it does not appear that either one of them envision the United States itself providing such a guarantee.  

Importantly, without a commitment from the United States for significant American involvement, any attempt at “Article-5 like” security guarantees may fall far short of what is guaranteed by Article 5 given the limited military infrastructure of the other NATO member states.

While there has been some discussion that nonaligned states could play a role in providing security guarantees or act as a peacekeeping force either under a United Nations mandate or another mechanism, to date, there has been little development and interest in turning the discussion into practical measures. When it comes to mandating such a force by the United Nations, Russia’s role as a permanent member state of the UN Security Council makes the debate unfeasible due to well-founded concerns over Russia’s interests in manipulating the mandate of a UN peacekeeping force and the power to subsequently withdraw the force prematurely to suit its political interests. 

Does an Article 5-like guarantee require the deployment of combat troops on the ground in Ukraine? 

Under the Italian proposal, it would not be necessary to deploy troops in order to guarantee Ukraine’s security. The concept relies instead on the deterrent effect of a credible threat—the potential use of force by NATO or a coalition of the willing—as sufficient to prevent future Russian aggression.

More recent proposals, however, envision a stronger form of deterrence that combines an Article 5-like guarantee with the deployment of some kind of military force away from the frontlines as additional support to the Ukrainian military, and possibly U.S. air support. The specific configuration of such forces is discussed in greater detail below.

What options exist for configuring combat forces—or other types of security forces—on Ukrainian territory? 

British officials have indicated readiness to place British troops in Ukraine, as have Belgium, Lithuania, and Estonia. On the other end of the spectrum are Poland, Germany, and Hungary, all of which have firmly declined the option of placing their troops in Ukraine. The United States has also dismissed the deployment of American troops inside Ukraine.

Troops that would be deployed could be done so in multiple configurations. 

Enforcement force: An initial, but now seldom discussed, option involves deploying a fully militarized peacekeeping force along the line of control between Russia and Ukraine. This force would be tasked with monitoring compliance, maintaining separation, and potentially responding to violations, much like traditional enforcement missions.  

Reassurance force:  A more frequently discussed configuration envisions forces providing air cover over western Ukraine, conducting demining operations in the Black Sea, and protecting key ports and airfields. These efforts would be paired with ongoing training and advisory support to the Ukrainian military, enhancing both operational readiness and public confidence in Ukraine’s defense posture.

Deterrent or “Tripwire” force: Under this model, a smaller number of international troops would be positioned in strategically significant areas to serve as a deterrent “tripwire.” The logic is that any attack resulting in non-Ukrainian casualties could trigger a military or other forceful response from coalition member states—thereby raising the political and operational cost of aggression.

U.S. Role and Requirements: European states have made clear that both the reassurance and tripwire models would require two key forms of U.S. support: (1) logistical, lift, intelligence, and munitions assistance; and (2) “over-the-horizon” combat support. Notably, President Trump has yet to clearly articulate the role he envisions for the United States in any such arrangements, although he has hinted at a potential willingness to provide air support.  

Other lighter footprint options occasionally discussed include a monitoring force and/or a training force. A monitoring force would consist of a small number of on-the-ground personnel tasked with observing and reporting potential violations of a peace agreement. In theory, such a force could play a critical role in verifying substantial breaches of the agreement and, in doing so, could trigger a military or other form of response from coalition of the willing member states. 

The lightest form of on-the-ground involvement would consist of a limited number of personnel tasked with providing ongoing training to the Ukrainian military and assisting in the strengthening of Ukraine’s defense systems. This model could share features with a tripwire force by effectively embedding non-Ukrainian military staff within Ukrainian units—creating a scenario in which any attack on Ukrainian forces could endanger foreign personnel. Such a configuration, while limited in scope, could still serve as a meaningful deterrent by raising the stakes of Russian aggression.

How might these forces operate in the absence of an Article 5-like commitment? 

Importantly, it is not necessary to establish an explicit Article 5-like security guarantee in order to deploy troops to Ukraine from member states of a coalition of the willing. In particular, forces deployed in roles such as tripwire, monitoring, or training missions could still serve a significant deterrent function. If these personnel were to be targeted by Russia, the political and strategic consequences would likely be severe, potentially triggering a strong collective response—even absent a formal mutual defense commitment. The mere presence of such troops, especially from NATO or EU member states, may thus serve as a powerful signal of resolve and solidarity with Ukraine.

What binding obligations or discretionary measures might apply to—or be available to—the United States?

Some commentators have suggested that a coalition of the willing—composed in part of NATO member states—could serve as a backdoor mechanism for securing U.S. security guarantees. The logic behind this view is that if a NATO member state, acting within such a coalition, undertakes military action in defense of Ukraine and is subsequently attacked by Russia, this could trigger Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, obligating the United States and other NATO members to respond. However, it remains unclear whether the United States views such a scenario in the same light, or whether it would interpret an attack on a coalition-based deployment as meeting the threshold for collective defense under NATO’s legal framework.

Security Guarantees - the Russian perspective

While Western states may be debating how to make sure the security guarantees truly prevent the resumption of a renewed aggression some years after signing the peace agreement, the Russian perspective on the conversation is noticeably different. After the August 2025 meetings, reports celebrated the fact that Putin had allegedly agreed to security guarantees for Russia. What was missing from the celebration was that, for Russia, security guarantees mean no NATO or European troops in Ukraine and a veto for Russia on any assistance that could be provided to Ukraine in the event of a new war. This, as noted above, is what already created an impasse at Istanbul in 2022. 

Why are security guarantees so important?

Security guarantees are crucial to any peace deal because of Russia’s history of violating ceasefires and peace agreements. To take one example, during the 2008 Russo-Georgia War Russia invaded the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. A ceasefire was brokered, but immediately broken by Russia when it refused to withdraw its troops from the Georgian regions. Ukraine has itself faced numerous broken agreements with Russia. In 1994, Ukraine entered into the Budapest Memorandum in which, among other things, Russia committed to recognizing Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and borders—and to guard against any foreign intervention.  This guarantee failed. Similarly, in the wake of Russia’s 2014 aggression against Ukraine it entered into the Minsk Protocols, which Russia also violated. Based on this history, Ukraine is adamant that serious security guarantees are necessary in order for there to be any substance to a peace agreement with Russia.

Conclusion

The evolving discourse around “security guarantees” for Ukraine reflects both the urgency of Ukraine’s need for credible protection and the complexity of delivering such protection in the current geopolitical environment. As the concept moves from rhetorical aspiration to operational planning, the range of proposed guarantees—from formal Article 5-like commitments to more flexible coalitions of the willing, and from fully deployed combat forces to lighter tripwire and training missions—demonstrates the varied levels of risk, resolve, and resources that different states are willing to assume.

Ultimately, the credibility of any security guarantee for Ukraine will depend less on the terminology used and more on the political will behind it, the clarity of its implementation mechanisms, and the strategic signals it sends to both allies and adversaries. Whether through direct deployment, sustained arms support, or embedded international personnel, the international community must now translate the concept of “security guarantees” into practical and enduring measures that both deter further aggression and support Ukraine’s long-term sovereignty and stability.

Roundtable Blog: Global Developments since January 2025 and Their Implications for Peace in Ukraine

Roundtable Blog

“Global Developments since January 2025 and Their Implications for Peace in Ukraine” 

Editor’s Note:
 

This post marks a new kind of contribution to the Lawyering Justice blog. Rather than a traditional co-authored piece, it presents a curated set of expert reflections from members of PILPG’s Ukraine Peace Negotiations Working Group. Drawing on the diverse expertise of our Peace Fellows, this roundtable-style blog explores the most consequential global developments since January 2025 and assesses how these changes may shape Ukraine’s prospects for a just and durable peace.

Published under the Lawyering Justice banner, this post reflects our commitment not only to chronicling the legal and diplomatic dimensions of active conflicts, but also to fostering strategic foresight and connecting lawyering to policy planning. We hope this format will serve as a model for future collaborative work on peace and justice.

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As Ukraine continues its struggle against Russia’s war of aggression, the strategic landscape surrounding the conflict is shifting at an accelerating pace. Since January 2025, a series of global developments—ranging from advances in military technology to evolving political alignments—have created new opportunities and risks for Ukraine’s pursuit of a just and durable peace. Recognizing the need to reassess Ukraine’s negotiation posture and peace architecture in light of these emerging dynamics, the Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG) has launched a new initiative under its Ukraine Peace Negotiations Working Group.

This Roundtable Blog is the product of that initiative. Drawing on the expertise of PILPG Peace Fellows, the document presents a set of short, focused analyses that highlight the most consequential global developments of the past six months and their implications for Ukraine’s prospects for peace. Contributors were asked “What is the most significant global development since January 2025 (in your field or area of expertise) that will shape the prospects for peace in Ukraine - and why?”  The result is a mosaic of insights that connect Ukraine’s peace strategy with broader global trends—whether technological, legal, geopolitical, or economic.

The purpose of this public-facing Roundtable Blog is threefold: to inform Ukrainian policymakers and Peace Formula stakeholders of key international variables; to connect Ukraine-focused expertise with broader global strategic thinking; and to provide forward-looking, analytically grounded perspectives that can shape Ukraine’s evolving negotiation strategy.

Darrell Guthrie, Major General (Ret.) U.S. Army Reserve

The most consequential development is the recently demonstrated effectiveness of first-person video drones and special operations.  Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb and Israel’s Operation Rising Lion utilized first-person video drones and special operations forces to destroy critical assets and eliminate key leadership. The psychological impact of a simultaneous attack on multiple targets at great distances against previously invulnerable targets was significant and could positively shape the prospects for peace in the second half of 2025.

Prior to these strikes, first-person video drone footage of armored vehicles or trench line attacks was ubiquitous and commonplace on social media.  But those types of attacks were distant and those targeted were expendable – i.e., they reflected the tactical cost of war. Operation Spiderweb, however, created a sense of strategic vulnerability, as 20% of Russia’s nuclear-capable bomber fleet was damaged or destroyed by attacking four bases simultaneously across Russia, to include Balaya Air Base deep in Siberia and Olenya Air Base in far northern Russia near Finland. But for the Russian elite supporters of the war, alone, Operation Spiderweb just created another financial burden, but not a personal risk.

That changed less than two weeks later. In Operation Rising Lion, Israel, using its air force, drones, and special operations forces, simultaneously attacked multiple targets at great distance and precisely eliminated the top tiers of Iran’s military and civilian nuclear program leadership. One can imagine that, for the first time, a sense of personal vulnerability occurred in the minds of the Russian financiers and military leadership prosecuting the war in Ukraine.  

Personal vulnerability brings fear, stress, hyper-vigilance, and many other emotions, as well as direct financial costs associated with increased personal security. If exploited by Ukraine and its allies, this can create internal pressure and erode public support for Putin’s war. In sum, the psychological impact of Operation Spiderweb and Operation Rising Lion occurring in such close temporal proximity creates an opportunity to bring Russia to the negotiating table. 

David Crane, Founding Chief Prosecutor of the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone and Founder of the Global Accountability Project

The most consequential development is the establishment of the Special Tribunal on the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine.

And this is why: it is truly an important moment for justice. The establishment of the Special Tribunal on the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine (the Special Tribunal) marks a remarkable moment in legal history, signaling a commitment to accountability in a world often overshadowed by conflict and aggression. On June 25, 2025, Ukraine and the Council of Europe signed an accord to create this crucial international tribunal, supported by a core group of United Nations member states (the Core Group of Nations). This historic development emerges as a beacon of hope in an age where strongmen often act without fear of repercussion, underscoring a collective determination that aggressors will face justice for their actions.

The impetus for establishing the tribunal stems from ongoing conflicts that have destabilized nations and displaced millions. Ukraine's experience, particularly under the aggression displayed by its neighbor, the Russian Federation, reflects the broader issue of sovereignty and the urgent need for mechanisms that protect it. The tribunal is designed to hold individuals accountable for acts of aggression—actions that threaten the stability of nations and the well-being of their citizens. It emphasizes that those in power cannot act with impunity, signaling to potential aggressors worldwide that there are legal frameworks ready to address and punish acts of international violence.

This tribunal stands as a significant advancement within the European legal framework. By aligning with international law, it situates itself as a complement to existing entities such as the International Criminal Court. However, the Special Tribunal uniquely focuses on the crime of aggression, which has historically been challenging to prosecute due to geopolitical complexities and state sovereignty issues. In doing so, it aims to fill a critical gap in international law, ensuring that acts that are the breeding grounds for wider conflict are recognized and prosecuted.

Moreover, the creation of this tribunal underscores a pivotal message regarding the rule of law. In a global landscape where authoritarianism and hegemonic ambitions often prevail, the Special Tribunal represents a commitment to uphold justice rather than succumb to the whims of might. As the phrase goes, “the rule of law is more powerful than the rule of the gun.” By asserting that legal structures can prevail over brute force, Europe positions itself as a guardian of civilizational values, promoting peace and justice over chaos and oppression.

The tribunal's significance extends beyond its legal implications; it serves as a moral compass for the international community. Its establishment sends a powerful message about the importance of collective action in response to aggression. It invigorates efforts to garner worldwide support for a more peaceful international order rooted in respect for sovereignty and human rights. Nations around the globe are reminded that they share a responsibility to uphold these principles, challenging the allure of power driven by aggression.

The Special Tribunal on the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine represents a watershed moment in the pursuit of justice, emphasizing the need for accountability in international relations. Its formation is not only a commitment to the people of Ukraine but also a declaration that the international community will stand firm against the tyranny of aggression. As such, it enhances the potential for a more just and secure world, reinforcing the belief that through collaboration and dedication to the rule of law, humanity can triumph over the forces of violence.

Joachim Rücker, former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and Head of the UN Mission in Kosovo

When it comes to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, the most consequential development is that it seems that both Russia and, since 2025, the US, are sidelining the United Nations by working on bilateral or multilateral “deals” with no direct link to parallel or at least subsequent talks, let alone negotiations, on new UN Security Council or UN General Assembly resolutions. It seems that, at least so far, Ukraine, a UN founding member, and its European and other allies have withstood this tendency, as evidenced by the central role of point 5 in President Zelensky’s Peace Plan and by coordinated initiatives in New York.

It could be argued that the events from February 2025, when the US switched sides and voted with Russia first in the UN General Assembly and then in the UN Security Council, would be something like a deterrent for continuing to embed developments in the UN system. This, however, could lead to dynamics which would explicitly or implicitly undermine the UN’s role, confirmed time and again including at last year’s Summit for the Future. It would also undermine the central role of point 5 in the Peace Plan, which resonates well with countries beyond the Euro-Atlantic alliance, which have been helpful with various proposals and with attending various peace conference formats, including Bürgenstock, and are expected to make more contributions. In other words: while Russia, and mutatis mutandis the US, might or might not have reasons to sideline the UN, Ukraine and its allies should by all means stay the course, say so very publicly, and multiply their efforts in New York.

When doing so, it might also be helpful to refer to some of the “hidden treasures” in the UN Charter: to Article 27 (3), which would require Russia to abstain from voting in the UN Security Council as it is in fact a “party to the dispute”, and maybe also to Article 109, which foresees a procedure for changes in the Charter. References to the UN General Assembly’s “Uniting for Peace” resolution and to a larger role for the UN General Assembly in cases of UN Security Council blockage, as evidenced in more recent UN General Assembly resolutions and actions (e.g. Emergency Sessions), are also helpful.

In a nutshell, embedding peace initiatives and possible outcomes in the UN system must remain on top of the agenda of Ukraine and its allies, because it is the lifeline to the rule-based international order. New ways of communicating this publicly should be considered.

Ylber Hysa, former diplomat of the Republic of Kosovo 

The most consequential development is Ukraine’s recent drone strikes deep inside Russian territory, which have had a significant impact not only on the battlefield but also on the broader peace process. These strikes came at a crucial moment, following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s rejection of an armistice proposal by former U.S. President Donald Trump. This rejection appears to have paved the way for a potential American “green light” for Ukraine’s special operations within Russian borders. The well-planned and carefully executed Ukrainian missions had multiple effects.

Firstly, they showcased Ukraine’s advanced operational capabilities and reaffirmed Kyiv’s commitment to continue resisting Russian aggression. Secondly, these strikes boosted Ukrainian morale and provided a psychological edge over Russian society, while simultaneously reinforcing respect among Kyiv’s international allies. Thirdly, the operations gave the U.S. administration added leverage to maintain pressure on Putin, encouraging a reassessment of his strategy for prolonging the conflict. Importantly, the diplomatic fallout from Trump’s failed armistice offer did not fall on Ukraine, allowing Kyiv to avoid blame or responsibility for that breakdown in talks.

These developments have sparked commentary from foreign affairs analysts, who offer a cautiously optimistic view of the changing dynamics between the Kremlin and Trump. They argue that while Trump is known for his brash and theatrical approach, his influence should not be overestimated. Encouragingly, some signs suggest the emergence of a “special diplomatic operation,” which may help restore communication channels between Putin and Trump and foster sustained contact at other diplomatic levels. This renewed dialogue, however, appears to be extending beyond the conflict in Ukraine, touching on broader U.S.-Russia relations.

Despite these nuanced shifts in diplomacy, the war in Ukraine shows no immediate signs of ending. The situation remains tense, with ongoing hostilities overshadowing the potential for near-term resolution.

Elayne Whyte Gomez, Senior Fellow of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research, Professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and former Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the United Nations

The most consequential development is the growing fragmentation of the once-strong international response to the invasion of Ukraine, marked by a weakening of Global South cohesion in UN votes—shaped in part by the impact of the war in Gaza. 

This is particularly relevant as Ukraine now faces added challenges in an area where it initially held a strong position: broad international support and clear legal standing as a victim of aggression under international law. Since the annexation of Crimea, the UN General Assembly has adopted eight resolutions reaffirming Ukraine’s territorial integrity and condemning acts of aggression. These resolutions assert that no territorial acquisition by force shall be recognized as legal and demand Russia’s full and unconditional withdrawal from Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders.

While the Security Council failed to act in 2022 when the invasion began, this gap allowed the General Assembly to take a firm stance, explicitly labeling the invasion as an act of aggression and expressing broad political and legal support for Ukraine. This momentum was further reinforced by the International Court of Justice, which, under the Genocide Convention, ordered Russia to immediately suspend its military operations. The ICJ’s provisional measures underscored the condemnation of the invasion within the international legal system and added judicial weight to Ukraine’s case.

However, that initial political strength has been undermined by broader geopolitical dynamics—particularly the impact of the war in Gaza, military actions in Syria, and the perceived double standards of Western nations. These factors have fueled discontent in the Global South over the selective application of international law, complicating diplomatic efforts around Ukraine.

By February 2025, on the third anniversary of the invasion and amid continued war in Gaza, the once-solid majority international response was further fragmented by great power rivalry and diverging positions between Europe and the United States became evident at the UN General Assembly, where two competing resolutions were introduced: one by Ukraine with European support, reaffirming the invasion as an act of aggression and calling for accountability under international law; and another by the United States, which stressed a peaceful resolution but omitted any legal framing. The U.S.-led resolution failed to pass, and a weaker legal position was subsequently adopted at the Security Council. Under mounting pressure, many Global South countries abstained from voting on Ukraine’s resolution, underscoring a fragmentation of international consensus. As a result, Ukraine—despite its clear legal position—now faces additional challenges in sustaining broad political support for a resolution grounded in international law.

Milena Sterio, Distinguished Professor of Law at Cleveland State University

The most consequential development is the establishment of the ad hoc Tribunal for Aggression, which is currently being negotiated and created in a partnership between Ukraine and the Council of Europe.  The creation of such a tribunal will fill an important accountability gap, by allowing for the prosecution of Russian leaders responsible for the act of aggression vis-a-vis Ukraine.  

In the wake of the Russian full-scale invasion against Ukraine in February 2022, the International Criminal Court initiated an investigation into atrocity crimes committed in Ukraine.  Although Ukraine is not an ICC member state, it lodged two special declarations accepting the court’s jurisdiction over crimes committed on its territory, which include war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.  However, because the crime of aggression within the ICC’s Rome Statute is subject to a narrow jurisdictional regime, requiring both the victim state and the aggressor state to have acceded to the Rome Statute and to the Rome Statute’s aggression amendments, the ICC does not have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in Ukraine (as Russia, the aggressor state, is not a member of the ICC).  

The ICC’s inability to prosecute Russian leaders has created an important accountability gap, by disallowing international prosecutors to impose accountability on those who committed blatant acts of aggression. In fact, as many have already argued, the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine constitutes a manifest violation of the U.N. charter and amounts to a clear-cut case of aggression, in a manner we have not witnessed since the end of World War II and the establishment of our current international legal order.  In light of this state affairs, the only way that the crime of aggression can be prosecuted at a supra-national level is through the establishment of an ad hoc aggression tribunal. 

Although many in the international community agree that prosecuting aggression committed against Ukraine is important, disagreement had emerged over the modalities of such prosecutions.  The United States has supported aggression prosecutions through a hybrid model, where a special tribunal would have been established as part of the Ukrainian legal order. Others, including the most notable aggression experts, had argued in favor of an international model, whereby a tribunal would be created through an agreement between Ukraine and the international community.  Yet, despite calls for the establishment of a tribunal, political and legal roadblocks emerged, in the wake of the international community’s “tribunal fatigue.”  

Within this context, it is particularly significant that the ad hoc aggression tribunal is being negotiated in a partnership between Ukraine and the Council of Europe.  Based on expert conversations, it appears that a draft statute has already been created and that most of the legal groundwork has already been completed.  It is now up to the politicians at the Council of Europe to hammer out a political agreement with the Ukrainian leadership to get the tribunal off the ground.

The creation of the ad hoc aggression tribunal is one the most significant and consequential legal and political developments in Ukraine.  It signals that the imposition of individual criminal responsibility for Russian leaders who ordered the commission of aggression against Ukraine is on the way.  Moreover, it reflects the international community’s political commitment that aggression in the post-World War II arena will not be tolerated.  

Chris Goebel, Senior Legal Advisor at PILPG

The most consequential development is the accelerated EU accession screening for Ukraine. The European Union recently completed screening meetings for three negotiation clusters—Fundamentals, Internal Market, and External Relations—with Ukraine set to open formal accession talks by late 2025. This significant progress, confirmed by the European Parliament, follows Ukraine’s robust implementation of anti-corruption and judicial reforms, a key benchmark for Cluster 1 negotiations.

EU integration directly influences peace dynamics by offering Ukraine a non-military "endgame" that counters Russian narratives of geopolitical isolation. Membership talks provide leverage in negotiations: Ukraine can frame compromises as steps toward European standards rather than concessions to Russia. The screening progress also signals Brussels’ commitment, making Ukraine’s EU future a tangible bargaining chip in territorial or security discussions, as noted in the European Council Conclusions of June 2025.

Institutional momentum creates pressure for Russia to engage seriously. With Ukraine on track to complete all cluster screenings by year-end, delays in peace talks could leave Moscow facing a stronger, EU-aligned neighbor. Conversely, the accession process risks stalling if war persists, as reconstruction funds and reforms depend on stability—a subtle incentive for Ukraine to seek faster resolutions.

The development tangentially shifts negotiations toward governance and rule-of-law issues, moving beyond battlefield metrics. For instance, Ukraine’s anti-corruption progress (a screening requirement) could ease Western concerns about post-war accountability.

Michael Kelly, The Senator Allen A. Sekt Endowed Chair in Law at Creighton University School of Law

The most consequential development is the discovery of AI inside the new white Iranian drones (from the wreckage), coupled with better cameras and better communication back to Russian controllers. Drones have quantitatively been a game changer in this war, but now with AI tech, they are poised to be a qualitative game changer as well. 

If AI targeting and defensive maneuver adaptations are live, Russian drones become (1) more lethal, and (2) more difficult to intercept. While Russia hasn’t yet achieved scale with these improved devices, that is only a matter of time. Ukraine has not succeeded with similar tech upgrades to their drones - ground commanders consider them unreliable and prefer the older fiber optic drones. But they’d better move fast in this area, otherwise they’ll be in a worse position on the ground and, therefore, a worse position in peace negotiations. 

Technological advantage on the battlefield translates into leverage at the negotiating table, much like territorial occupation does. The U.S. proved this point with nuclear weapons in 1945. In Ukraine, the battlefield momentum has already shifted to Russia’s advantage both in terms of territory gained and in ejecting Ukraine from Russian territory - a key negotiating chip that Kyiv had briefly gained but has now lost.

In addition to munitions and financial aid, Europe’s tech heavyweights, Germany and Sweden, should be sharing their capabilities with Ukraine, even if under strict supervision. Negotiations between Berlin, Stockholm, and their corporate tech giants to release newly developed capabilities to Kyiv might be tricky, but the companies must understand that pushing back against the existential threat Russia represents is in their own self-interest. Under Trump, America remains unlikely to be of much use in the AI arms race unfolding in real time across Ukraine.

Leveraging European technical innovation into battlefield drone parity for Ukraine resets the board at least in this aspect of the war and therefore one component of eventual peace negotiations.

Ryan Westlake, Director of Peacebuilding Policy & Strategy at PILPG

The most consequential development in the war in Ukraine has been the rapid and transformative integration of artificial intelligence and advanced technologies into military operations on both sides. This is one of the first large-scale conflicts where AI is not theoretical but fully operational—shaping real-time targeting, intelligence collection, and battlefield autonomy. Both Ukraine and Russia are racing to gain a technological edge, deploying autonomous systems and digital warfare tools that are not only altering the course of the current conflict but also establishing new precedents for how wars will be fought in the future. The rise of AI on the battlefield is redefining military advantage, operational tempo, and strategic depth in ways that may prove more decisive than troop numbers or traditional hardware.

Ukraine has moved swiftly to embed AI into its defense strategy, positioning itself as a hub for military-tech innovation. Palantir Technologies has played a central role, providing AI platforms—free of charge—that now drive the majority of Ukraine’s targeting operations and support war crimes documentation. Major U.S. firms such as Microsoft, Amazon, and Google, along with companies like ClearView AI and Fortem Technologies, have contributed critical capabilities ranging from facial recognition to autonomous counter-drone systems. Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation has institutionalized this technological surge by embedding software engineers in frontline units and prioritizing AI-enhanced drone development. Even while adhering to Western norms that require human oversight, Ukraine has pushed AI integration to the limits of current policy frameworks.

Russia has also expanded its AI and autonomous weapons programs, particularly in drone warfare. Its Lancet and Shahed-136 drones are increasingly AI-enabled, improving precision and evasion capabilities. With the support of Chinese component suppliers and a new AI partnership with Iran, Russia has scaled drone production and invested in swarming technology and machine vision systems. These capabilities reduce reliance on human operators and allow for real-time target acquisition, paving the way for fully autonomous attacks. Russia’s participation in the BRICS AI Alliance reflects a broader effort to create a parallel technological ecosystem, free from Western export controls and norms.

These developments are not peripheral—they are reshaping the conflict’s trajectory. Ukraine has reclaimed half of the territory lost since 2022 and struck deep into Russian-held areas, enabled in large part by AI-driven targeting and domestically produced drones. Its military-industrial base has grown more than thirtyfold, and its ability to produce advanced systems like the Long Neptune missile underscores a decisive shift in strategic capabilities. Russia, while struggling to match this pace, continues to leverage AI to compensate for conventional limitations. In a war of attrition where traditional measures of power have proven insufficient, it is the race for technological superiority—especially in AI and autonomy—that may ultimately determine the outcome.

Dr. Paul R. Williams, Rebecca Grazier Professor of Law and International Relations at American University

The most consequential development remains the continued timid and tardy application and enforcement of energy sanctions, which has allowed Russia to sustain its war of aggression against Ukraine with funding effectively provided by the global community— most notably, Europe.  

Despite a sweeping array of Western sanctions, Russia continues to fund its war against Ukraine through substantial oil and gas revenues, sustained by persistent global demand and loopholes in enforcement. While sanctions were designed to constrain Moscow’s ability to wage war, they have proven porous. Russia has shifted much of its oil trade toward Asia, with China and India now serving as its largest fossil fuel customers.  India alone has purchased over a third of Russia’s crude exports since late 2022, while China accounted for nearly 40% of Russia’s fossil fuel revenue in April 2025.  Both countries continue to engage in ship-to-ship transfers and rely on a sprawling “shadow fleet” of unregulated tankers, allowing them to bypass Western restrictions while ensuring steady cash flow to the Kremlin.

The shadow fleet—now comprising more than 500 crude tankers—enables covert oil transfers by disabling tracking systems, masking ownership, and operating in permissive jurisdictions. These vessels facilitate the transfer of Russian oil in international waters to ships that deliver it under different documentation and flags.  India further launders Russian crude by refining it into petroleum products for re-export, including to the U.S. and EU, without technically violating sanctions.  Turkey plays a parallel role, acting as a transshipment hub where Russian-origin oil is refined and rebranded before being exported to Europe.  These practices expose significant enforcement gaps in the G7’s price cap and sanctions framework.

Even Ukraine’s strongest political supporters, including the European Union, continue to purchase large volumes of Russian energy.  While the EU banned direct imports of Russian crude and refined products in late 2022, exemptions and indirect channels have undermined the impact.  Hungary and Slovakia, for instance, continue to legally import Russian crude under special allowances, while France, Belgium, and the Netherlands remain key importers of Russian LNG.  Despite the stated goal of reducing energy dependence on Moscow, EU member states spent over €209 billion on Russian fossil fuels between 2023 and mid-2025—more than the total aid they provided to Ukraine.  In fact, in 2024, EU purchases of Russian energy generated more revenue for the Kremlin than all EU financial assistance to Kyiv combined.

This ongoing energy trade reveals a central contradiction in the West’s approach to the war. While providing military and financial aid to Ukraine, several countries—through sanctioned-exempt energy imports—continue to bankroll Russia’s war effort.  Loopholes in the G7 price cap, reliance on non-G7 insurers, and shadow fleet transactions have allowed Russian oil to fetch well above the intended $60-per-barrel ceiling.  Until sanctions enforcement becomes unified, timely, and airtight, the revenue generated from fossil fuel exports will remain a critical financial lifeline for Moscow—undermining the very measures intended to constrain its aggression.

Concluding Observation by Dr. Paul R. Williams

The first half of 2025 has been marked by a series of consequential developments that are reshaping both the battlefield and the broader geopolitical environment in which Ukraine must pursue peace. These developments span military technology, legal accountability, institutional diplomacy, and energy economics. On the battlefield, the rapid integration of artificial intelligence and advanced drone capabilities by both Ukraine and Russia has elevated the strategic importance of technological superiority. From Operation Spiderweb’s strikes deep into Russian territory to the proliferation of AI-enhanced drones and first-person video targeting, battlefield innovation is increasingly determining leverage at the negotiating table. These advances—while providing Ukraine with tactical advantages—also underscore the urgency of securing sustained tech transfers and innovation partnerships, particularly with European allies, as the United States signals retrenchment under a possible Trump administration.

Simultaneously, Ukraine’s accelerated progress toward EU accession and the establishment of the Special Tribunal on the Crime of Aggression reflect powerful non-military pathways for reinforcing peace and accountability. The Tribunal, negotiated with the Council of Europe, addresses the long-standing gap in prosecuting the crime of aggression and signals a renewed commitment to the rule of law as a pillar of postwar order. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s reform-driven advancement through the EU screening process adds political and normative weight to its peace posture, presenting an alternative endgame narrative to Russia’s imperial vision. Yet, this institutional momentum is being tested by shifting global alignments, including the sidelining of the United Nations and inconsistent engagement by key actors like the United States. These trends threaten to erode the multilateral underpinnings of Ukraine’s Peace Formula, especially the centrality of UN frameworks and the broader rules-based international order.

Perhaps the most jarring contradiction of 2025 is the continued failure to enforce energy sanctions effectively. Despite rhetorical commitments to constrain Russia’s war machine, loophole-ridden sanctions regimes have enabled Moscow to finance its aggression with funds funneled through global energy markets—most notably by Europe. India, China, and Turkey further facilitate this flow through refining and transshipment, blunting the intended impact of Western economic pressure. In sum, the summer of 2025 presents a landscape of paradox: battlefield innovation and diplomatic momentum on one hand, and strategic incoherence and funding flows to Russia on the other. For Ukraine and its allies, the path to peace now depends not only on military resilience and diplomatic agility, but on the willingness of the global community to align its principles with its practices.

“Recognizing 2014: The Legal and Moral Imperative for Full Reparations for Russian Aggression”

“Recognizing 2014: The Legal and Moral Imperative for Full Reparations for Russian Aggression”

By: Kateryna Kyrychenko, Dr. Paul R. Williams, and Sindija Beta

Why are the earliest victims of Russia’s war in Ukraine — those targeted since 2014 — still excluded from reparations, when it was exactly the failure to respond to that initial aggression that directly enabled the full-scale invasion in 2022?

In February 2014, the Russian Federation launched its aggression against Ukraine through the illegal occupation and annexation of Crimea, followed shortly by direct military involvement in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. This marked the beginning of a protracted and unlawful use of force that escalated dramatically in 2022 as a full-scale invasion. Today, however, Ukraine’s flagship reparations mechanism — the Register of Damage for Ukraine — recognizes only the latter phase.

While the Register represents a groundbreaking achievement in war-related reparations, its current framework excludes thousands of victims of Russia’s initial aggression. As it stands, the Register only accepts claims for losses incurred from February 24, 2022, onward. This gap in coverage creates a dangerous precedent: it implies that the initial eight years of aggression, occupation, and systematic rights violations somehow fall outside the scope of justice.

The main explanation for this cutoff, as Executive Director of the Register of Damage for Ukraine, Markiyan Kliuchkovskyi has noted, is that the 2022 invasion marked the point at which the global community coalesced in recognizing Russia’s conduct as a full act of aggression. This view reflects the political reality of 2022 — when support for Ukraine surged and international mechanisms mobilized. But from a legal standpoint, Russia’s aggression, along with related damages and human rights violations, began in 2014.

In fact, both international legal institutions and political bodies have consistently recognized that Russia’s aggression began in 2014 — not in 2022. Failing to incorporate that reality into the reparations process risks distorting both legal precedent and the lived experience of victims. This omission is not merely a technical oversight. It risks undermining both the credibility of the reparations process and the legal coherence of Ukraine’s broader accountability architecture.

Beyond its legal and moral implications, this exclusion also carries serious consequences for international security. The failure to hold Russia accountable in 2014 sent a clear signal: limited territorial conquest and hybrid warfare could go unpunished. The result was predictable — a full-scale invasion eight years later. Impunity breeds escalation.

What Constitutes the Crime of Aggression?

The crime of aggression, as set out in the Rome Statute, covers grave violations such as invasion, military occupation, and annexation by the use of force. For an act to qualify, it must constitute a “manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations,” particularly a violation of the prohibition set out in Article 2(4) against the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state. Russia’s actions in Ukraine since 2014 meet this standard. To understand why, it is necessary to analyze the four key elements of the crime of aggression as defined in Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute and elaborated in the Elements of Crimes adopted by the Assembly of States Parties.

First, the crime of aggression requires an act of aggression — defined as the use of armed force by one state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of another. In February 2014, forces without insignia (“little green men”), now known to have been deployed by Russia, entered Crimea, took control of key infrastructure and government buildings, blockaded Ukrainian military bases, and facilitated a staged referendum under the presence of occupying troops. These acts were conducted without Ukraine’s consent and in direct violation of its sovereignty. Shortly thereafter, Russia provided military, logistical, and financial support to armed separatist groups in Donetsk and Luhansk and later deployed its own regular troops, leading to open armed hostilities. These actions constitute instances of unlawful use of force by one state against another.

Second, the leadership element requires that the act of aggression be committed by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or direct the political or military action of a state. This element was also met in 2014. The occupation of Crimea and involvement in Donbas were not spontaneous or decentralized operations; they were executed with the full knowledge, authorization, and strategic direction of the highest echelons of the Russian state. President Vladimir Putin publicly admitted Russian involvement in Crimea shortly after the purported annexation. Russian government documents, parliamentary approvals, military command structures, and the coordinated role of Russian state security services all point to centrally planned and authorized aggression. The operation was not rogue or peripheral — it was a deliberate act of the Russian state.

Third, for the crime of aggression to be prosecutable under the Rome Statute, the act must constitute a manifest violation of the United Nations Charter, considering its character, gravity, and scale. Russia’s annexation of Crimea was not a minor border skirmish or isolated incursion; it was the first forcible seizure of territory on the European continent since World War II. Russia’s actions involved the occupation and absorption of nearly 27,000 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory, a referendum held under military duress, and subsequent violations of the rights of the Crimean population. In Donbas, the use of proxy warfare, heavy weaponry, and regular Russian troops escalated the conflict and caused thousands of civilian and military deaths. The sheer scope and consequences of these acts render them grave breaches of international peace — and manifestly illegal.

Fourth, the use of force must be attributable to one state against another — demonstrating the state-to-state character of the aggression. This requirement is likewise fulfilled. Ukraine is a sovereign, internationally recognized state. The actions of the Russian military and security services, as well as the command and support provided to proxy forces in Donetsk and Luhansk, are attributable to the Russian Federation under international law. Both the “effective control” test (used by the International Court of Justice) and the “overall control” test (used by the ICTY) are satisfied by the documented coordination, equipping, financing, and strategic command provided by Russia. In fact, the European Court of Human Rights and the International Court of Justice have both confirmed Russia’s effective control over Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine from 2014 onward.

Legal Continuity from 2014 Onward

Since 2014, international institutions have consistently recognized that a legal conflict between Russia and Ukraine began well before the 2022 full-scale invasion. In March 2014, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 68/262, affirming Ukraine’s territorial integrity and calling the Russian referendum in Crimea invalid. While this resolution did not use the term “aggression,” it rejected Russia’s annexation claim and urged all states not to recognize any alteration of Crimea’s status. Later resolutions, including 71/205 (2016), 72/190 (2018), and 73/263 (2019), continued to describe Russian control over Crimea as an “occupation,” condemn ongoing violations of international law, and reiterate Ukraine’s sovereignty over Crimea.

In parallel, international legal bodies confirmed the nature of the situation as one involving direct confrontation between states. The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court assessed that an international armed conflict began “no later than 26 February 2014”, based on the deployment of Russian forces in Crimea. As noted above, the European Court of Human Rights and the International Court of Justice have also found that Russia has effective control over Ukraine’s eastern regions. Under international humanitarian law, such control — particularly in the absence of Ukraine’s consent — constitutes occupation. That status is not just descriptive; it has legal consequences and, when lacking lawful justification, may constitute an unlawful use of force. The European Parliament has regularly cited 2014 as the start of the war in its resolutions and reports.

Although the term “aggression” may not always appear in these rulings or resolutions, their legal substance aligns with the criteria for the crime of aggression under Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute as discussed above. The facts recognized — including Russia’s unprovoked military intervention, unlawful occupation, and attempted annexation — correspond to acts such as invasion and occupation, which are expressly listed in the Rome Statute as forms of aggression when committed without lawful justification. These findings, therefore, are not mere symbolic gestures. Taken together, they reflect a consistent legal view that Russia’s occupation and, by extension, aggression began in 2014 — not in 2022.

Ukraine’s domestic legal framework reinforces this conclusion. The official date marking the start of Russian aggression — 20 February 2014 — is embedded in parliamentary resolutions, criminal provisions, and Constitutional Court jurisprudence.  Ukrainian statutes refer not merely to conflict or occupation, but to armed aggression and war crimes starting in 2014. In both international and national law, the legal and factual record points to a coherent position: Russia’s war against Ukraine began in 2014 and has involved continuous unlawful uses of force ever since, escalating in 2022.

Structural Injustice and Strategic Risk

By excluding claims from 2014 to 2022, the current reparations mechanism effectively denies redress to victims of occupation, torture, unlawful detention, property seizure, and forced displacement that occurred during those foundational years of the aggression. These victims — many of them from Crimea and eastern Ukraine — remain unacknowledged in one of the key mechanisms meant to deliver justice.

The implications extend beyond Ukraine. International accountability frameworks risk signaling to authoritarian regimes that so-called “slow aggression” — conducted incrementally or by proxy — will be tolerated or erased from legal memory. This undermines global deterrence and weakens the moral authority of international law.

Moreover, the current design inadvertently affirms a narrative that contradicts both law and reality on the ground — namely, that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine only became criminal in 2022. This not only denies justice to earlier victims, but also fails to recognize that the aggression of 2022 was enabled — and emboldened — by the impunity of 2014. Correcting this is not simply about retroactive justice; it is about protecting future norms and ensuring that aggression is recognized when it starts, not when it becomes geopolitically inconvenient to ignore.

Toward a More Inclusive Register

Fortunately, legal and institutional solutions are within reach. The statute establishing the Register of Damage can be amended to extend eligibility to claims dating back to 2014. The newly established special tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine does not set 2022 as the beginning of Russia’s aggression, rather it allows the judges to make a legal assessment on a case-by-case basis, which ensures that no arbitrary limitations are placed on justice and reinforces the continuity of legal responsibility.

The Register of Damages could adopt a similar approach and permit an assessment on a case-by-case basis rather than impose an outright limitation.

Conclusion: Building a Just Foundation for Peace

Recognizing 2014 as the starting point for reparations is not only legally sound — it is essential to honoring the dignity of all victims and reinforcing the international legal order. For Ukraine, it also ensures that the peace built in the future will rest on a foundation of integrity, not omission. 

And for the broader international community, it sends a critical message: impunity for early acts of aggression invites escalation. A reparations mechanism that begins in 2022 cannot deter future wars if it overlooks the unpunished aggression that made full-scale invasion possible. Justice delayed is dangerous — but justice denied can be catastrophic.

Russian Use of Rape as a Weapon of War in Ukraine

Russian Use of Rape as a Weapon of War in Ukraine

By: Dr. Gregory P. Noone, Sindija Beta, and Ropes & Gray

Introduction

Numerous investigative reports into the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine since 2022 have documented extensive and shocking use of sexual and gender-based violence (“SGBV”) by Russian nationals against Ukrainian civilians, prisoners of war, and other detainees.  Russia has long been responsible for a largely under-discussed and distressing amount of SGBV crimes, including rape.  Russian SGBV atrocities have historically been especially brutal during World War II in Germany, as well as Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Georgia.  Focus has recently turned to the question of how Russia could be held accountable for its use of SGBV as a weapon of war in Ukraine.  Various sources of international law provide prohibitions on the use of SGBV during armed conflict, and there have been successful examples of holding individual perpetrators accountable under international criminal law in past conflicts.  

As the Russian attacks on Ukraine continue unabated, it is appropriate to appraise the scale of SGBV committed, the international laws being breached, and the possible enforcement mechanisms.  

The Geneva Conventions and international law prohibitions against SGBV

Russia is a signatory to the Geneva Conventions, the principal treaties that constitute International Humanitarian Law (also known as the Law of Armed Conflict) and provide protections to civilians, as well as combatants, who are out of the fight due to being sick, wounded, shipwrecked, or prisoners of war, from the hazards of armed conflict.  Russia withdrew its ratification of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention in October 2019, which provided expanded protection to civilians as well as military and civilian medical workers.  However, the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions as well as Additional Protocol II, each of which Russia is still obligated to comply with, forbid the use of rape and sexual violence against civilians and prisoners of war. 

Rape, and other forms of SGBV have, in the past, been understood to constitute torture, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.  “Crime against humanity” and “war crimes” are international crimes defined under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) and also form part of customary international law.  Their inclusion in customary international law is relevant, given that Russia is not a signatory to the Rome Statute, yet is still legally bound by the customary international law prohibiting SGBV.  Indeed, the United Nations Security Council – including Russia – unanimously adopted Resolution 1820, which states that “rape and other forms of sexual violence can constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity, or a constitutive act with respect to genocide.”  Similarly, the international community has repeatedly recognized rape as a form of torture, which is prohibited under several provisions of international law.  

All parties to international conflicts must respect and ensure respect for International Humanitarian Law by their armed forces and other persons or groups acting on their instructions, or under their direction or control.  Russia has not ensured adherence to the law, but has in fact directed, encouraged, or at the very least tolerated, the use of sexual violence by its armed forces, which constitutes a grave violation of International Humanitarian Law.

Beyond the applicability of International Humanitarian Law to armed conflicts, there are International Human Rights Laws that also prohibit SGBV.  Rape is also generally recognized as a form of legally prohibited gender discrimination.  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits discrimination broadly.  The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women’s definition of discrimination is considered to include gender-based violence, which according to the UN Security Council (“UNSC”, “Security Council”), includes rape.  Importantly, Russia is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and a permanent member of the UNSC.

 SGBV and rape in the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia on 24 February 2022, there have been widespread reports of rape and other sexual and gender-based violence committed by Russian armed forces against Ukrainian prisoners of war (at the end of 2024 there was an estimated 8,000 prisoners of war), other detainees, and civilians in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.  In fact, a representative of the U.N. Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict reported that Russia has been using these rapes as a deliberate strategy of terror in Ukraine: “When you hear women testify about Russian soldiers equipped with Viagra, it’s clearly a military strategy” and “there is consensus today on the fact that rapes are used as a military tactic, a terror tactic.”  A number of international organizations have conducted investigations to document this violence, including the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (“OHCHR”), UN Human Rights Council, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (“OSCE”), and Human Rights Watch, among others.

SGBV and rape of prisoners of war / other detainees in the Russian invasion of Ukraine

The OSCE has, since July 2022, published six bi-yearly reports on violations of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Ukraine.  The OSCE noted a consistent pattern of rape committed by Russian armed forces against Ukrainian prisoners of war and civilian detainees, and the threat of rape used to terrorize Ukrainian detainees during interrogation by Russian armed forces.  Other forms of sexual violence by Russian armed forces included striking and electrocuting detainees’ genitals, coerced sexual acts, and threats of castration.  As one former male Ukrainian prisoner of war reported: “[T]here wasn’t one day I wasn’t threatened with my genitalia being cut off.”

In late 2024, the OHCHR interviewed 32 Ukrainian prisoners of war between 1 September to 30 November 2024 who reported being subjected to sexual violence, including rape.  One female prisoner of war reported that Russian law enforcement officers in a Russian-occupied area of Ukraine raped her almost daily for more than two months, purportedly to elicit information.

The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine (“the Commission of Inquiry”) similarly reported on what it described as the “systematic use of sexual violence as a form of torture by Russian authorities in detention facilities.”  The Commission of Inquiry collected evidence of sexual violence committed “in 41 detention facilities of various types in the Russian Federation and areas under Russian control in Ukraine,” including rape and attempted rape.  Furthermore, a former Russian soldier told the Commission of Inquiry that such treatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war was “encouraged, or at a minimum tolerated, by higher-ups[.]” 

Within the context of detention, many documented victims of rape and sexual violence have been male Ukrainian prisoners of war.  However, in its latest report, the Commission of Inquiry reflected on the “particular vulnerability of female detainees to forms of sexual violence,” having reviewed numerous cases in which female Ukrainian prisoners of war and detainees were subjected to gang rape and other forms of violent torture by Russian soldiers.

SGBV and rape of civilians in the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Following Russian armed forces taking control of Ukrainian territories, there have been widespread reports of the rape of Ukrainian civilian men, women, and children by Russian armed forces.  Sexual violence including rape has been especially prevalent in residential areas in the context of forced home searches and home visits.  Victims of rape were frequently women in vulnerable situations – elderly, young, or women unable to flee due to care-giving responsibilities for elderly or disabled relatives.  The OHCHR further reported that the actions of Russian soldiers suggested they did not fear accountability, visiting the same houses twice and participating in gang rapes with other Russian soldiers.

A recent New York Times article recounted a woman’s story of surviving a violent rape by a Russian solder.  She now shares her story with other survivors as part of a growing community of Ukrainian women who suffered from SGBV as a result of Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine.  In her story, she described how a Russian soldier came to her home late at night and hit her with the butt of his rifle several times, knocking out her front teeth.  He then cut her abdomen with a knife and raped her on her couch.  The Russian soldier left six hours later and said he would come back in two days and kill her.  The article further recounted the story of two Russian soldiers pinning down, beating, and raping a local store owner in her front yard after the soldiers broke into her house and shot her husband. 

The Kyiv Independent reported frequent instances of rape and gang rape in and around Bucha, a town in Kyiv province that had been occupied by Russian armed forces.  The report explained that civilians were warned by some Russian soldiers not to let women out of the house to avoid being raped by other Russian soldiers.  The Commission of Inquiry reported that, in March and April 2022, female civilians in Kyiv province, Kharkiv province, and Kherson province were raped, in some cases multiple times, at gunpoint, and/or for hours at a time.

Reports of rape have also included men and children as victims.  The Commission of Inquiry reported that, in Kherson in August 2022, Russian soldiers raped and attempted to rape two male civilians using objects.  The OHCHR documented twelve cases of sexual violence by Russian armed forces against Ukrainian children – ten girls and two boys.  This included five cases of rape or gang rape of six girls between the ages of 13 and 17, and – in one instance – a soldier attempting to rape a mother in front of her three-year-old child.

Furthermore, Russia is likely using SGBV, including rape, as a tool to ethnically cleanse Ukraine.  For example, Ukraine’s ombudsman for human rights reported a case in which “[a]bout 25 girls and women aged 14 to 24 were systematically raped during the occupation in the basement of one house in Bucha. Nine of them are pregnant[.] Russian soldiers told them they would rape them to the point where they wouldn't want sexual contact with any man, to prevent them from having Ukrainian children."  Russia has a violent history of using rape as a tool for ethnic cleansing.  In the Second Chechen War, Russian authorities knew that raping Chechen women not only terrorized survivors, but would carry a series of long-established social implications within Chechen society that meant almost certain death for Chechen women.  Further, the death of Chechen mothers – the protectors of Chechen cultural norms – meant the eradication of the Chechen language and culture.

The true scale of the rape of civilians in Ukraine in residential areas occupied by Russian forces is likely to remain obscured for some time.  However, reports documenting civilian testimonies have established a clear pattern of SGBV at the hands of Russian occupying forces.  The head of the Ukraine team at Global Rights Compliance reported that “In several villages in the south we heard witnesses and survivors say that the Russian servicemen came in, occupied the village, and then looked specifically for the wives of Ukrainian soldiers, or their mothers or sisters.”  As noted above, the behaviour of the Russian soldiers who raped Ukrainian civilians demonstrated a lack of concern that their peers or commanders would hold them accountable, and rape often occurred with the participation of numerous soldiers. 

Institutions, organizations, and communities have begun to rally around SGBV survivors in Ukraine.  The Association of Women’s Lawyers of Ukraine “JurFem” partnered with UN Women to launch the “JurFem: Support” initiative to provide free legal advice and bring cases to court on behalf of survivors.  And SEMA Ukraine – an international community and advocacy organization – has emerged as a safe space for Ukrainian women who have suffered from Russian aggression and offers psychological, medical, legal, and financial support to survivors.

Enforcement mechanisms against the systematic use of rape as a weapon of war

International law provides mechanisms for holding both individuals and states accountable for violations of international law.  The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), for instance, can hear disputes between states for violating conventions of international law that implicate rape.  Ukraine could bring a case against Russia before the ICJ, as it did in a 2017 case concerning terrorism financing and racial discrimination. 

Further, the ICC can exercise jurisdiction against a country that is not a party to the Rome Statute, such as Russia, if the alleged crimes occurred in the territory of a member state, such as Ukraine (although in Ukraine’s case, the ICC jurisdiction has been based on the two declarations it submitted accepting the Court’s jurisdiction since 2013).  For instance, the ICC prosecutor exercised ad hoc jurisdiction over Russia’s actions in Ukraine in February 2022 by opening an investigation that resulted in an ICC arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2023.  Other potential venues for justice include the European Court of Human Rights, ad hoc tribunals, like the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine, which is being widely discussed, and special courts.  Finally, such crimes can also be prosecuted in local Ukrainian courts – in 2022, the first trial of a Russian soldier for rape was held in absentia.

However, enforcement through these mechanisms has not ended the perpetration of sexual violence in armed conflicts.  The ICJ and ICC rely on the cooperation of states and the UNSC to ensure compliance with court orders.  However, Russia uses its veto power as a member of the Security Council to block any action to stop its aggression against Ukraine, and the courts’ reliance on state cooperation enables powerful states like Russia to evade accountability.  These political realities undermine efforts to enforce Russia’s compliance with international court orders. 

In addition to difficult political realities, there are other profound difficulties with securing justice for the victims of rape and other forms of SGBV in Ukraine.  Identifying perpetrators and securing physical evidence (including medical and DNA evidence) is often very challenging.  Reporting rape is particularly difficult where thorough investigations would rely on both the cooperation of occupying Russian forces, and the confidence of victims to report the crimes of Russian soldiers who may still be present in the region.  Even upon liberation, perpetrators usually fled the area or otherwise made detainment difficult.

If individual perpetrators cannot be identified, the doctrine of command responsibility may allow for superior officers who knew or should have known of the commission of rape and other offences to be held to account.  As stated in Article 86 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention, “[t]he fact that a breach [] was committed by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to conclude [], that he was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach.”  Article 86 supports the notion that evidence of negligence and/or willful blindness by superiors as to rape and SGBV can be provided in prosecution.  Further, such evidence can be provided in prosecution even where evidence as to a particular individual is insufficiently available to prosecute that individual who directly committed the act(s).

Conclusion

Several investigative and human rights mechanisms have reported detailed accounts of Russian soldiers perpetuating systematic sexual violence and rape against Ukrainian prisoners of war and civilians as part of Russia’s military “strategy” in Ukraine.  This shocking use of SGBV violates long-standing international law with which Russia has explicitly agreed to comply.  Despite obstacles to prosecution, several legal venues, including the ICJ, ICC, and ad hoc tribunals, provide Ukraine the opportunity to pursue justice on behalf of SGBV survivors, and international communities and organizations have stepped forward to provide survivors with legal and financial support. 

As the sexual torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war and civilians persists, it is imperative that the international community continue to document SGBV crimes and rapes by Russian soldiers and consider tailored solutions, such as the establishment of a special tribunal, to prosecute Russian war crimes and crimes against humanity involving SGBV and rape.

Plunder by Paperwork: Land Use and Legal Manipulation in Russian-Occupied Ukrainian Territories

Plunder by Paperwork: Land Use and Legal Manipulation in Russian-Occupied Ukrainian Territories

By: Kateryna Kyrychenko and Patricia Wiater

In war, land is more than terrain — it is power, memory, identity, and future. Nowhere is this clearer than in the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine, where the battle is being waged not only with weapons but with registries, decrees, and legal manipulation. Russia’s strategy in Ukraine has not merely been to seize land — but to rewrite the law that governs it. Through reclassification, coerced registration, and demographic engineering, the occupying power is attempting to transform occupation into ownership — to fabricate a claim to sovereignty through legal means.

Beneath a facade of administrative normalcy lies a systematic campaign of illegal appropriation — one that violates both international humanitarian law and human rights protections. This blog post outlines the legal framework governing land under occupation, examines how Russia has sought to subvert it, and explains why land law is now a frontline of resistance.

From Crimea to Kherson: Bureaucratic Expropriation in Practice

Across occupied Ukrainian territories, Russia has used administrative mechanisms to entrench control and erase legal protections.

• In Crimea, following the 2014 annexation, vast tracts of public and private land were reclassified as federal Russian property. Ukrainian state lands, municipal holdings, and Crimean Tatar-owned plots were expropriated or re-registered. Since 2021, non-Russian citizens have been banned from owning land in most of Crimea — a policy that disenfranchises those who refused to accept Russian citizenship.

• In Donbas, beginning in 2014 with Russia’s covert military intervention and support for proxy forces, Ukrainian land and property registries were dismantled and replaced by pseudo-legal systems imposed by Russian-controlled occupation regimes calling themselves the “Luhansk People’s Republic” (LPR) and “Donetsk People’s Republic” (DPR). These unrecognized structures created legal ambiguity, making property rights difficult to verify, undermining restitution and obstructing future reconstruction or justice efforts.

• In the occupied parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, landowners have been pressured to re-register under Russian law. Fertile land has been exploited for Russian agricultural exports, while resettlement programs are relocating Russian citizens — particularly military families — into seized Ukrainian property.

These policies are not ad hoc — they are deliberate attempts to engineer demographic change, dismantle Ukrainian sovereignty, and normalize conquest through legal infrastructure.

Occupation Is Not Sovereignty: The Legal Framework

International humanitarian law (IHL) draws a fundamental distinction between control and ownership. Under Article 55 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, an occupying power is not a sovereign but a usufructuary — a temporary administrator entitled to use public land only in ways that safeguard the capital of these properties, and administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct. Article 46 of the 1907 Hague Regulations prohibits confiscation of private property, and Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention further declares destruction and appropriation of property where “not justified by military necessity” as grave breaches of IHL.

In parallel, international human rights law (IHRL) continues to apply during occupation. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), in Ukraine v. Russia (Crimea), held that Russia had engaged in a systemic large-scale campaign of expropriation in violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights. Crucially, these actions lacked due process and military necessity — making them both illegal and irreversible.

When IHL Meets Human Rights and Self-Determination

Land use in occupied territory implicates more than property rights — it raises questions of self-determination, protected under Article 1 of both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Populations under occupation retain the right to control their resources. Any use of land — especially for trade, infrastructure, or extraction — must reflect local consent, not imposed authority.

The EU-Morocco trade cases before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) provide a clear illustration of the link between economic exploitation and the right to self-determination. The case at hand concerned the EU-Morocco Association Agreement that establishes a framework for political, economic, and cultural cooperation between the European Union and Morocco. On 4 October 2024, the CJEU upheld the General Court’s decision to annul a Council Decision approving an amendment to the EU-Morocco Association Agreement. The Court ruled that the European Commission and Council violated the Saharawi people's right to self-determination by failing to obtain their consent.

The Court clarified that the right to self-determination means that the consent of a people in a non-self-governing territory to an international agreement may only be presumed if certain conditions are met. First, the agreement must not impose any obligations on that people. Second, it must guarantee that the people receive clear, substantial, and verifiable benefits from the use of their natural resources, proportional to the level of exploitation. These benefits must be managed sustainably and subject to regular monitoring to ensure the people actually receive them.

Although these principles were articulated specifically in the context of Western Sahara as a non-self-governing territory under the UN Charter, their significance extends more broadly. Consent and representation are crucial: The right to self-determination requires that the people of an occupied territory have their consent recognized, whether generally or in the specific context of international trade agreements between the occupying power and third parties affecting their land and resources. Economic development imposed without the involvement of the occupied people cannot legitimize or cure the illegality of the occupation.

Legal Divergence — But Russia Meets No Standard

The crucial issue of whose benefit land exploitation must serve – and who has to be involved to determine this – is also relevant to the interpretation of Article 55 of the 1907 Hague Regulations mentioned earlier. Some judicial opinions — such as Israel’s High Court in the Yesh Din case — have taken a broader view of usufruct, allowing that a state holding occupied territories is allowed to administer the property in the occupied territory and “to enjoy the fruits of such property’ – up to the boundaries of depletion or exhaustion. However, even this extensive approach that does not center around the clear, substantial, and verifiable benefits of the population concerned still demands formal compliance and proportionality. Russia’s actions do not meet even this lower bar. In its Advisory Opinion on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the International Court of Justice unequivocally endorsed a more restrictive interpretation of Article 55: land may be used only temporarily, for the “benefit of the local population”, and with preservation of capital. 

Exporting grain, installing settlers, and dismantling registries are not mere administrative acts of this kind — they are forms of dispossession.

What’s at Stake: Beyond the Frontlines

Land law underpins restitution, reconstruction, and justice. If the international community tolerates Russia’s manipulation of legal frameworks, it risks legitimizing conquest by paperwork. This has global implications: if the law can be rewritten by force, no occupied people’s rights are safe.

Ukraine has already declared these actions null and void under its Constitution and criminal law. Articles 13 and 14 of the Constitution affirm that land and natural resources belong to the Ukrainian people. No foreign decree can change that. What is needed now is international reinforcement of that principle through legal non-recognition, strategic litigation, and sanctions against the economic beneficiaries of expropriation.

Conclusions

At the heart of Russia’s occupation lies not only military aggression but legal manipulation. Russia’s strategy aims to convert temporary control into permanent authority through legal coercion. By reshaping land law, citizenship rules, and property records, it seeks to make occupation look ordinary — even inevitable.

But the law of occupation is built on the opposite premise: that illegality cannot be normalized through administration. No decree, registry, or zoning map can erase the rights of a people or the sovereignty of a state. If this manipulation is allowed to stand, the precedent will not stop at Ukraine. It will signal that land can be stolen with paperwork, that registries can replace resistance, and that conquest can be clothed in legal formality.

Occupation is not ownership. Annexation is not administration. War is no justification for theft. If the law is to matter in peace, it must be defended in war.