Can the EU Afford to Wait? Why Ukraine’s Membership Is a Strategic Imperative
By: Ambassador (Ret.) Zorica Maric Djordjevic and Kateryna Kyrychenko
The European Union stands at a historic crossroads. As Ukraine defends its sovereignty against full-scale aggression, it is also fighting for the very ideals that the EU claims as its foundation: democracy, human dignity, rule of law, economic progress, and peace. In this context, Ukraine’s bid for EU membership is no longer just a diplomatic question—it is a test of Europe’s political courage and historical vision.
This post explores whether Ukraine’s EU accession can be accelerated and, more importantly, why it should be. We examine the legal mechanisms, political logic, historical precedents, and strategic rationale that together make the case not just for eventual membership—but for urgent, decisive action.
Can the EU Accelerate Ukraine’s Membership?
Legal Basis for Accession “Shortcuts”
The EU accession process is governed by Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which outlines the formal steps for a European state to apply for membership. This includes respect for EU values, adoption of EU law (the acquis communautaire), and the unanimous agreement of all 27 member states.
On paper, there is no fast-track or shortcut procedure. However, crucially, the treaties do not forbid flexibility within the process. That distinction matters. While the formality of the steps cannot be bypassed, the tempo and interpretation of progress remain politically malleable. Negotiations can be accelerated, chapters can be opened in parallel or bundled together, and transitional arrangements can be made to allow phased implementation after accession. The European Council, as the political engine of the Union, has the authority to redefine what constitutes "sufficient progress" to move forward.
In other words, the door is open—not for rule-breaking, but for rule-shaping.
Historical Comparisons: Lessons from Southern Europe
History shows us that political urgency often precedes technical perfection. When Greece joined the European Economic Community in 1981, followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986, their democracies were still fragile.
But the Community made a bold choice. The priority was not perfect compliance, but strategic anchoring. Democracy needed to be secured through integration—not postponed until all reforms were complete. Political stability and regional alignment outweighed bureaucratic orthodoxy.
Like Southern Europe in the 1980s, Ukraine is a frontline democracy emerging from conflict and repression. But Ukraine is not only defending its own future—it is defending the European Union project itself. Its people have mobilized around the vision of a democratic, free, and united Europe—often more passionately than some current member states.
Ukraine’s accession is therefore not only a legal process, but a moral imperative and geopolitical strategy. It would affirm the EU’s founding values at a moment when they are under siege.
The Cyprus Exception: Political Flexibility in Action
Cyprus joined the EU in 2004 despite its unresolved territorial division. A special protocol allowed the Republic of Cyprus to enter while effectively suspending EU law in the northern part of the island. This example proves that the EU can—and has—made exceptions for the sake of political and strategic objectives.
The case of Cyprus shows that geopolitical imperatives can outweigh procedural rigidity. If a divided island could be accommodated, why not a united, fighting democracy that has already implemented more reforms under wartime conditions than many peace-time candidates?
What Would a “Fast-Track” for Ukraine Actually Look Like?
To accelerate Ukraine’s accession, several political conditions must align. First, a geostrategic consensus must emerge among major EU capitals—Paris, Berlin, Rome, and Warsaw—that Ukraine’s future lies firmly in Europe. Second, there must be a clear institutional roadmap that respects the legal process but adapts to Ukraine’s wartime constraints. Finally, any fast-track move must be embedded within a broader reform of the EU itself, particularly around decision-making to avoid institutional paralysis once Ukraine joins.
Accelerating Ukraine’s membership is politically possible. It depends not on legal innovation, but on political will.
The Agriculture Question: A Test of Policy and Priorities
One of the most frequently cited challenges in Ukraine’s accession process is its agricultural sector. Ukraine is one of the world’s agricultural giants—often called the “breadbasket of Europe.” It boasts some of the planet’s most fertile land, and even during wartime disruption, it remains a major global exporter of wheat, sunflower oil, corn, and barley.
This strength, however, raises policy dilemmas for the EU. Integrating Ukraine into the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)—which currently consumes nearly a third of the EU budget—would require either a substantial increase in the EU’s financial envelope or a deep reform of how CAP funds are distributed. Some member states fear that Ukraine’s vast and competitive agricultural sector would distort internal markets and trigger social and political backlash, especially in countries where farmers already feel economically marginalized. Concerns also extend to compliance with EU sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) regulations and the Green Deal’s environmental criteria, which could pose adaptation challenges for Ukrainian producers in the short term.
But framing Ukraine’s agriculture as a “problem” misunderstands the opportunity. The EU has long been undergoing conversations about reforming CAP to make it more sustainable, greener, and innovation-driven. Ukraine could be the catalyst for this transformation. Its accession offers a chance to modernize outdated subsidy structures, prioritize food security and climate resilience, and create a common agricultural space that leverages Ukraine’s capacity while supporting fair transition measures for existing member states. A flexible, staged approach to integration—drawing on models such as Spain’s phased accession—could ensure mutual gains without overwhelming EU systems.
Transitional arrangements—such as phased CAP entry, special safeguard clauses, and targeted investment in Ukrainian rural infrastructure—are feasible. They were used during the 2004 enlargement and can be adapted for Ukraine. Rather than derail accession, agriculture could be the sector where vision and pragmatism converge. Framing these transitional measures as part of Ukraine’s broader post-war recovery agenda could help depoliticize negotiations while attracting consensus among member states.
In the long term, integrating Ukraine’s agriculture into the EU market is not a burden—it’s a strategic asset. At a time of rising global food insecurity, climate disruption, and competition with authoritarian grain-exporting regimes, Ukraine’s agricultural strength reinforces the EU’s geopolitical autonomy and global relevance.
The EU as a Peace Project: Returning to Foundational Values
The EU was never merely a technocratic trade bloc. It was a peace project. It was created from the ruins of war to make future conflicts not only unthinkable, but impossible. The Schuman Declaration of 1950 envisioned integration not as a goal in itself, but as a means to ensure lasting peace.
Today, Ukraine represents a 21st-century peace challenge. A sovereign democracy under assault, it is precisely the kind of state the EU was built to protect and integrate. If the EU’s original purpose was to ensure peace through unity, then integrating Ukraine is not a deviation—it is a return to first principles.
The war in Ukraine has already reshaped the EU security environment. In response to the Russian aggression the EU has approved several new measures, including the Strategic Compass, the utilization of the enhanced European Peace Facility for military support to Ukraine, the launch of the EU-led Military Assistance Mission to train Ukrainian soldiers, the revitalization of the European Defense Technological and Industrial Base to promote joint procurement, and the imposition of sanctions. Between 2021 and 2024, EU member states increased defence spending by 30 per cent, reaching a record €326 billion.
Peace is not a passive condition. It requires political action and transformative effort in moments of crisis.. Just as the EU extended its hand to post-authoritarian Southern Europe, and later to post-Soviet Central Europe, and bolstered its security infrastructure in response to the Russian aggression in 2022, it must now respond to Ukraine’s call for long-term commitment—not just with promises, but with a bold political decision to shape the future of the new European order.
Final Thought: A Moment of Decision
In 2004, the EU acted boldly, welcoming ten new members because the time was right—and because Europe was willing. In 2025, Ukraine is proving daily that it is ready. What it needs is for Europe to be willing again.
Europe has made political decisions before—to bring in Greece, Spain, and Portugal to defend democracy. Ukraine does not seek vague declarations. It seeks the kind of decisive political act that brought Poland and the Baltics into the EU: one rooted in shared sacrifice, performance under pressure, and strategic necessity.
This is not about breaking the EU’s rules. It is about fulfilling its purpose.
If Ukraine’s courage under fire is not enough to merit integration, then what remains of the EU’s promise?
Now is the time for moral clarity and geopolitical foresight—to show that the EU is not just a market of convenience, but a union of values. To delay would not be neutral—it would be a failure of Robert Shuman’s vision that “world peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it.”
Ukraine’s membership would not stretch the Union. It would strengthen it.
Not someday. But now.