Defining the Practice of International Criminal Defense - An Interview with Peter Haynes KC

Defining the Practice of International Criminal Defense

An Interview with Peter Haynes KC

Edited by Emma Bakkum & Paul Williams

A Note on Defending Justice

This blog is part of the Defending Justice series, an initiative of the Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG) to promote an eclectic array of voices within the field of international criminal law. 

As part of our broader efforts to strengthen institutions of justice, this series seeks to create space for dialogue around the varied perspectives and concerns that shape these institutions. With that aim in mind, we interviewed a series of defense practitioners working in international criminal law and distilled their experiences and insights into a series of first-person monographs, preserving the spirit and voice of those interviews.

Editor’s Note

This blog introduces the topic of defense of the accused before international criminal courts and tribunals. By drawing upon Peter Haynes KC’s extensive experience at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), and the International Criminal Court (ICC), it introduces several key themes to defense, including the structure of international defense teams, how to effectively defend the accused before international criminal tribunals, differences between domestic and international defense practices, and the future outlook for international criminal defense lawyers. Through the striking first-hand achievements of Peter Haynes in defending accused and managing defense teams at international criminal courts, this blog realistically positions international defense work within the international criminal law project and articulates standards that need to be met in order to effectively defend accused before international criminal courts and tribunals. 

Introduction

A strong defense is not just a procedural safeguard. It is the foundation of a fair trial and a vital part of the international justice process. Over the years, I have come to see the defense as the quiet force that holds the system accountable. It is the defense that ensures the rights of the accused are not only recognized but actively upheld.

I have spent most of the last 17 years appearing before various courts and tribunals in The Hague, The Netherlands, including the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). The first time I worked in defense in The Hague was at the turn of the century. I was ready for a change from my domestic career in the United Kingdom, so I took the step to move to The Hague and work at the ICTY. My primary motivations to work in the difficult field of defense back then were the disenchantment I felt with domestic criminal practice, especially the inability to concentrate on my own cases because of the volume of work and the “returns” system (I was known for my ability to be able to pick things up at short notice),* as well as the desire to do something new and cutting-edge. 

I returned to the Hague and the ICTY in 2006, where I appeared for the defense of General Vinko Pandurević in relation to the Srebrenica massacre.** From then on, I worked continuously as an international defense lawyer, appearing in cases involving charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and international terrorism. At the STL, from 2012 to 2023, I represented the victims of the terrorist bombing in Beirut which resulted in the assassination of then Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri. At the ICC, I appeared for Jean-Pierre Bemba, the former Minister of Defense and Senator of the Democratic Republic of Congo, starting in 2013 and securing his acquittal of all charges on appeal in 2018. In June 2024, I was assigned to represent the interests of Lord Resistance Army’s leader Joseph Kony before the ICC. Between 2019 and 2021, I furthermore held the office of President of the International Criminal Court Bar Association, becoming the first and only person to be re-elected to the post.

Domestically in the United Kingdom, I have appeared for both the prosecution and the defense inter alia in cases of murder, serious fraud, sexual offenses, human trafficking, and complex conspiracies. Away from crime, I have acted as lead counsel in a class action against the British government concerning the torture of prisoners in Cyprus; initiated proceedings against the ICC seeking $75 million in damages for the losses arising from the freezing of Bemba’s assets; and represented the Tamil community in an appeal to the UK Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission relating to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eeelam.

These experiences, across different courts and contexts, have shaped how I understand the role of the defense within international criminal justice. What began as a professional challenge evolved into a deeper understanding of what it means to defend accused in a system built to prosecute those responsible for the gravest crimes. 

Defense as the Measure of International Justice

At the ICC, the Rome Statute provides a detailed framework for the rights of the accused. Article 67 guarantees the right of the accused, including to be informed of the charges, to have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense, to be tried without undue delay, and to choose legal counsel freely. It also affirms the right to examine witnesses, present evidence, remain silent, and receive any material from the Prosecutor that may suggest innocence or mitigate guilt. 

But rights on paper are not enough. In practice, defending someone before an international tribunal requires a well-resourced and experienced team. I have worked with investigators, case managers, and legal assistants who bring deep expertise and commitment to the work. The volume of disclosure, the complexity of legal issues, and the cross-border nature of our investigations demand a level of coordination and strategic planning that goes far beyond what is typically required in domestic criminal practice. My experience at the ICC, and earlier at the ICTY and STL, has taught me that institutional knowledge and adaptability are just as important as legal skill.

International defense work is fundamentally different from domestic criminal litigation. We operate in multilingual courtrooms, across diverse legal traditions, and often in politically sensitive environments. The crimes under scrutiny are not only serious but also deeply embedded in historical and social contexts. As defense counsel, I have had to navigate bureaucratic obstacles, limited access to witnesses, and political resistance that can make even the most basic investigative steps a challenge. Unlike domestic systems, where lawyers may benefit from established norms and local familiarity, international defense requires flexibility, cultural sensitivity, and a willingness to challenge dominant narratives.

In this blog, I reflect on what it takes to effectively defend an accused before international criminal tribunals. I focus primarily on the law and practice of the ICC, but I also draw on my experience at the ICTY and STL to highlight broader institutional dynamics. I explore how international defense teams are structured, what they require, how international defense differs from domestic criminal practice, and how I see the future of international defense. Ultimately, I argue that the strength of the defense is a litmus test for the legitimacy of international criminal justice.


International Criminal Defense Lawyers and Teams

Defense at international criminal courts and tribunals differs in many ways from defense at the domestic level, as described in further detail later in this blog. Years of experience as an international criminal defense lawyer and leading defense teams have led me to identify several key requirements for lawyers seeking to defend accused before international courts, as well as best practices for the structure and management of a defense team. 

Defense Qualifications for International Criminal Courts

Defense counsel appearing before international criminal courts, including the ICC, are independent legal professionals. Unlike prosecutors, who are employed by the Court, defense counsel are not staff members. However, to appear before the ICC, counsel and their assistants must meet specific eligibility criteria and be admitted to the Court’s official lists.

To qualify as defense counsel, applicants must satisfy the baseline requirements set out in Rule 22 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and Regulation 67 of the Regulations of the Court. These include demonstrating established competence in international or criminal law and procedure, and having at least ten years of relevant experience in criminal proceedings. Candidates must also be fluent in one of the Court’s working languages, English or French, and have no convictions for serious criminal or disciplinary offenses. Associate counsel and assistants to counsel must meet similar standards, though with a minimum of eight years’ and five years’ experience respectively. All applicants must submit documentation verifying their qualifications, including proof of legal training, professional references, and evidence of language proficiency. Once admitted, those on the List of Counsel may practice before the Court as defense counsel, legal representatives for victims, duty counsel, or ad hoc counsel. 

Professional investigators are another critical component of defense teams. The ICC maintains a separate List of Professional Investigators, governed by Regulation 137 of the Regulations of the Registry. Investigators must have at least ten years of experience in criminal investigations, either at the national or international level. They must demonstrate competence in international or criminal law and procedure, and be fluent in one of the Court’s working languages. In most cases, investigators are also expected to speak at least one language relevant to the country or region under investigation. Defense and prosecution teams propose their own case-specific investigators for inclusion on the list, subject to approval by the Registry. 

Beyond counsel and investigators, defense teams typically include assistants, case managers, and administrative staff. Legal assistants are expected to hold advanced degrees in law, with specialization in international criminal law, human rights law, or related fields. They assist with legal research, drafting, and analysis, and often play a key role in preparing filings and coordinating with the Court. Case managers oversee logistical aspects of the case, including disclosure, scheduling, and document management. Administrative staff support the day-to-day functioning of the team, ensuring that records are maintained, deadlines are met, and internal communication is efficient. Hiring practices for support staff vary depending on the complexity of the case and available resources. However, professionalism, adaptability, and familiarity with international criminal procedure are essential across all roles. 

Structure of Defense Teams

The composition of a defense team at the ICC depends on whether the accused is indigent, receiving legal aid, or is paying for his own representation. The latter of which means far more flexibility in choosing a defense team. Where the accused is indigent, the structure and funding of the team are governed by the ICC’s Legal Aid Policy. This policy outlines the permissible size and composition of defense teams, calibrated to the phase and complexity of the case. In general, a defense team includes two counsel, two assistants to counsel or legal officers, two case managers, and, where necessary, a language assistant. The Policy also provides an investigative budget, which may be used to assign either a professional investigator or a resource person to the team.

Each role within the defense team carries distinct responsibilities. Lead counsel, supported by co-counsel, sets the strategic direction of the case, represents the accused in court, and oversees all legal decisions. Assistants to counsel support this work through legal research, drafting, and analysis, often taking the lead on specific motions or evidentiary issues. Case managers handle procedural logistics, including disclosure, filings, and coordination with the Court. Investigators are responsible for identifying and interviewing witnesses, gathering evidence, and verifying factual claims. If required, language assistants facilitate communication between the accused and the team and ensure that all materials are accurately translated. Resource persons may provide contextual expertise, such as knowledge of local customs, political dynamics, or historical events relevant to the case.

Defense teams also often rely on interns and visiting professionals. They contribute to research, drafting, and administrative tasks, and their involvement can be key to the success of the team when properly integrated. 

Forming a Successful Defense Team

In practice, defense teams are often assembled through professional networks and prior working relationships. However, there is increasing recognition of the need to ensure diversity and representation, particularly of individuals from the situation country. This enhances cultural competence and facilitates engagement with local witnesses and communities.

Essential to the effectiveness of a defense team are the structure, synergy, and internal dynamics. A team that is divided, dysfunctional, or unclear in its strategic direction will struggle to prepare a credible defense. It is critical that all members share the Lead Counsel’s strategic vision and understand their roles within that framework. Clear communication, mutual respect, and a shared commitment to the case are indispensable. It is important to give all team members, including interns, ownership over their work and opportunities for professional development. This fosters a collaborative environment and strengthens the overall quality of the defense.

Challenges within defense teams are not uncommon. In the Bemba case, for instance, two Congolese defense lawyers were later investigated themselves, and found guilty of various offenses against the administration of justice related to the false testimonies of defense witnesses. This situation brought to light key issues regarding team cohesion, professional conduct, and the pressures faced by defense teams operating in politically sensitive contexts.

Ultimately, the defense team is not simply a collection of professionals. It is a strategic unit tasked with upholding the rights of the accused and the fairness of international proceedings. Its composition, management, and internal cohesion can shape not only the outcome of a case but also the broader perception of justice at the international level.

Essential Skills and Attributes

Effective international defense requires more than legal expertise. It demands a distinct set of personal and professional qualities that are often not fostered in domestic practice. The transition from national to international defense work involves adapting to different legal cultures, institutional expectations, and team dynamics. Over time, I have found that several attributes have proven essential to navigating this shift successfully.

Confidence is particularly important. Defense counsel must be prepared to assert the rights of the accused in environments where they are often viewed with suspicion. Public opinion may be hostile, and the presumption of guilt can be strong. In such settings, counsel must advocate with clarity and conviction, maintain composure under pressure, and defend strategic decisions even when they are unpopular. Confidence also plays a role in courtroom advocacy, where counsel must challenge assumptions, cross-examine witnesses, and engage with judges who may be unfamiliar with common law techniques or adversarial reasoning.

Adaptability and flexibility are equally critical. International defense work varies not only from domestic practice but also from one tribunal to another. Differences in judicial background, procedural culture, and legal tradition can shape the tone and substance of proceedings. In the Popović case, for example, the Presiding Judge was Maltese and came from a common law background. In Bemba, the Presiding Judge was Brazilian, with a civil law orientation. This shift required an adjustment of strategy. The civil law judge was less receptive to common law practices, and the defense had to adjust its approach to align with the expectations of the bench. The ability to read the courtroom, anticipate procedural preferences, and tailor advocacy accordingly is essential.

A useful analogy comes from football. David Beckham, known for his success across multiple European teams, was able to perform consistently because he adapted to different playing styles, coaching philosophies, and team cultures. International defense lawyers must do the same. Each tribunal has its own particularities, and success depends on the ability to integrate, adjust, and perform under varying conditions.

Diplomacy and interpersonal skills also matter. Defense lawyers are rarely the most popular figures in international criminal proceedings. They represent individuals accused of serious crimes, and their role is often misunderstood. Building relationships with Registry staff, opposing counsel, and even judges requires tact, professionalism, and a willingness to engage constructively. Being friendly and respectful, even in adversarial settings, can help defuse tension and facilitate cooperation. It is important to make allies where possible, even among those who may not be inclined to support the defense.

Leadership is another key attribute, especially as Lead Counsel. Unlike domestic practice, where defense counsel may work alone or with minimal support, international defense teams are often composed of six to seven individuals from diverse backgrounds. As lead counsel, managing this team requires clarity of vision, delegation of tasks, and the ability to foster cohesion. Everyone must understand the strategic direction of the case and their role within it.

Other, additional, qualities of a lawyer that contribute to effective international defense include sound judgment, strong writing skills, and courtroom presence. Counsel must obviously be able to communicate arguments persuasively, both in writing and in the courtroom. Good IT skills are also increasingly essential, given the use of electronic case management systems, the volume of digital disclosure, and the need for secure communication.

These attributes, in my view, are foundational to the practice of international defense. The most effective lawyers in this field combine technical knowledge with strategic insight, interpersonal skills, and a commitment to fairness in the face of complexity and resistance.

Resource Constraints

Resource constraints are a defining reality in international defense practice. While the ICC provides some institutional support to defense teams, including access to the Office of Public Counsel for the Defense, logistical support to investigative activities, and basic IT infrastructure, the disparity between defense and prosecution is significant. The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) routinely operates with far greater resources. In most cases, their teams outnumber ours by a ratio of eight to one. Prosecutorial staff benefit from permanent contracts, stable working conditions, and access to advanced document management systems. At the ICTY, for example, the OTP’s internal platform was far more sophisticated than anything available to defense teams.

Defense teams, by contrast, are composed of external contractors. We do not receive sick leave, vacation days, or parental leave. Our cybersecurity and travel security are minimal compared to the protections afforded to OTP staff. The imbalance is structural and persistent. But fairness in resources is not the measure of success, you do what you can with the resources you have, and what matters is the quality of the work: what is filed and how it is argued in court. Despite the limitations my defense teams have faced, I have never felt prouder of the written submissions produced by my teams. The appeal brief in Bemba remains one of the clearest examples of what can be achieved with a focused strategy, despite limited resources. 

A successful written brief is defined by clarity, consistency, and presentation. It must be readable, well-indexed, and free of unnecessary repetition. Style matters in a brief: font choices should be coherent, text should be justified, and a logical, indexed, structure should help guide the reader through complex legal arguments. A good brief does not just require an excellent understanding of the law and persuasive arguments; it also requires clarity and a strong presentation. This takes time and careful review.  

Courtroom advocacy requires the same level of preparation. A strong appearance in court is built on calm delivery, mastery of the evidence, and proficiency with the technology used. It is important to remain composed, even when challenged by the bench or provoked by opposing counsel. If an objection is necessary, it must be strategic and grounded in fairness, particularly fairness to the witness. These moments are rare, and they must be used wisely.

Working within resource constraints demands dedication, resilience, and teamwork. The defense may not have the same institutional backing as the prosecution, but it has the capacity to produce work of equal quality, both in written briefs and courtroom appearance.

International vs. Domestic Criminal Law Practice

Key differences between international and domestic criminal trials are not limited to legal frameworks or procedural rules. They extend to the length and scale of the cases, structure, and type of work throughout the proceedings. These differences shape the role of defense counsel and the demands placed on the defense team throughout the life of a case.

Key Differences in the Trial Process

One of the most significant distinctions is the length of proceedings. International trials often span several years, if not a decade. The Bemba case at the ICC lasted ten years from pre-trial to appeal. In Popović at the ICTY, which extended over nine years, the Presiding Judge remarked early in the proceedings that counsel should prepare for the long haul, noting that many changes in our private lives would likely occur before the case concluded. This observation reflects a broader truth: international defense work requires sustained commitment over long periods, often becoming the central focus of a lawyer’s professional and personal life.

The intensity of client contact is another defining feature of international criminal cases. Unlike many domestic systems, where communication with clients may be limited to court appearances or scheduled meetings, international defense work involves regular, often daily, interaction with the accused. Visits to detention facilities are frequent, and the relationship between counsel and client becomes deeply personal. Clients and their families may become part of the lawyer’s daily life, creating a dynamic that is both humanizing and pressurized. In The Hague, where the court building(s), detention center, and legal offices are located within a small geographic area, the proximity reinforces this intensity and can blur the boundaries between professional and personal space.

The scale of international cases also sets them apart from domestic criminal cases. The crimes under investigation typically involve multiple incidents, geographic regions, and hundreds of witnesses. Defense teams must manage vast quantities of evidence and coordinate complex legal strategies. Unlike domestic practice, where a lawyer may work independently or with minimal support, international defense requires the management of a multidisciplinary team. These teams are often composed of individuals from diverse legal traditions and cultural backgrounds. Effective leadership in this context demands intercultural sensitivity and inclusive team management.

The nature of the legal work itself in international crimes cases is also distinct from domestic cases. In domestic systems, legal arguments are often raised in court. In international criminal law, however, most procedural and substantive issues must be submitted in writing through the filing of a motion. In addition, international defense teams are responsible for conducting their own investigations. This includes identifying and interviewing witnesses, collecting evidence, and verifying facts, tasks that are typically handled by police or investigative authorities in domestic systems.

Key Differences in the Defense Strategy and Procedure

These structural and procedural differences between domestic and international criminal cases require a shift in the approach to defense work. International defense counsel must be prepared for long-term engagement, sustained client interaction, and the management of legally complex cases and multilingual teams.

This also means a shift in defense strategy and procedure, as proceedings differ markedly from domestic practice, particularly in common law jurisdictions. International defense teams must be prepared to litigate complex legal issues, respond to evolving jurisprudence, and advocate effectively within a system that blends multiple legal traditions. 

First, international trials tend to be more legalistic, with a greater emphasis on the interpretation of law and precedent. In domestic proceedings, the focus is often on the presentation and review of evidence. By contrast, international trials frequently center on the scope and application of legal provisions, many of which remain open to interpretation due to the relatively limited number of cases involving international crimes. 

This legal focus is especially pronounced in relation to the concept of modes of liability. Concepts such as command responsibility, joint criminal enterprise, and indirect co-perpetration are still evolving. Defense teams must engage in detailed litigation to challenge the scope, elements, and evidentiary thresholds of these doctrines. The strategic emphasis shifts from factual rebuttal to legal interpretation, requiring sustained engagement with jurisprudence from multiple tribunals and careful framing of arguments that may influence future case law.

Second, the process of judicial decision-making at international tribunals differs. In international tribunals, judges deliberate on whether the prosecution has proven each element of the crimes charged beyond reasonable doubt. They draft the judgment based on these deliberations and determine the sentence. There is no jury. This model places significant weight on the written record, particularly the trial transcript. Judges and legal officers often rely on transcripts when drafting judgments, which means that non-verbal cues of witness examination, such as tone, hesitation, or facial expression, are excluded. Defense counsel must therefore ensure that key points are clearly articulated and captured in the transcript. This requires deliberate planning for and during witness examination and a strategy to direct your defense in a much more purposeful way into law and precedent.

Third, procedural particularities at international courts shape defense strategy. International criminal law reflects a combination of common and civil law traditions. Pre-trial litigation is extensive, with prolonged debates over the admissibility and relevance of evidence. Hearsay is more readily admitted than in many domestic systems, and the prosecution may call rebuttal witnesses after the defense case has concluded. The procedural framework is also highly codified, with detailed regulations governing filings, disclosure, and courtroom conduct. Defense teams must navigate these rules and regulations with precision and adapt their strategies to the procedural realities of each tribunal.

Another distinctive feature in international criminal proceedings is the participation of victims in proceedings. At the ICC, STL, and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), victims may be represented by counsel and may submit observations on legal and factual matters. This introduces an additional layer of complexity, as defense teams must respond not only to the prosecution but also to victim representatives. In the Bemba case at the ICC, for example, victim participation influenced the structure and content of the proceedings, requiring the defense to engage with multiple parties simultaneously.

Effectiveness of Modern International Criminal Tribunals 

Despite its foundational commitment to accountability and fairness, the ICC has faced persistent challenges in delivering on its mandate. Two structural issues in particular have in my view undermined its effectiveness and raised concerns about the integrity of its proceedings.

The first relates to enforcement. Unlike the ICTY, which operated based on a UN Security Council Resolution grounded in Chapter VII of the UN Charter and benefited from the cooperation of all UN member states, the ICC lacks a comparable enforcement mechanism. The ICTY was able to secure the arrest and surrender of suspects with relative consistency, contributing to its reputation as a successful international tribunal. In contrast, the ICC has struggled to bring high-level suspects into custody. While the Kenya cases and the Bemba case involved prominent figures, many of the individuals who have faced trial before the ICC have been relatively low-level actors. This has led to criticism that the Court is failing to pursue the most responsible perpetrators and is instead focusing on those who are politically or logistically easier to apprehend.

This dynamic has prompted me to call for a more strategic use of the complementarity principle. Under Article 17 of the Rome Statute, states bear the primary responsibility for investigating and prosecuting crimes within their jurisdiction. The ICC should consider referring cases involving lower-level perpetrators to domestic systems, where feasible, and focus its resources on those most responsible for serious international crimes. Such an approach would not only reinforce the principle of complementarity but also help the Court concentrate its efforts on cases with the greatest potential impact.

The second issue concerns the process by which suspects are brought into custody at the ICC. I have witnessed a tendency to issue arrest warrants based on preliminary suspicion, with limited scrutiny of the strength of the underlying case. This practice places the accused at a disadvantage and undermines the fairness of the proceedings. Although the Rome Statute provides for a confirmation of charges hearing within a reasonable time, this timetable is frequently extended. There is no provision for custody limits, and the evidentiary threshold for confirmation is not consistently applied. The result is prolonged pre-trial detention and uncertainty for the accused. I believe there should be a more structural and thorough review of arrest warrants before they are issued, as well as a structural review of whether people in custody should remain in custody or should be released. 

These two systemic shortcomings have implications for the overall fairness of trials at the ICC. While the Court has demonstrated its commitment to due process, evidenced by the acquittal of several defendants, the pre-trial phase remains a point of concern. A more rigorous review of arrest warrants, clearer standards for confirmation, and greater respect for procedural timelines would strengthen the Court’s credibility.

The Future Outlook for Defense Counsel 

The role of defense counsel in international criminal law remains underappreciated, despite its centrality to fair trial guarantees and the legitimacy of international justice. A functioning criminal system requires not only effective prosecution but also robust and independent defense. Acquittals, when they occur, should not be viewed as institutional failures, instead they are indicators that the system is capable of applying legal standards impartially. The rhetoric surrounding acquittals must shift to reflect this reality.

There is a persistent failure within the broader international community to recognize the value of the defense function. Legal aid decisions are often framed in terms of cost rather than necessity. Defense budgets are scrutinized more heavily than prosecutorial ones, and support for defense teams is frequently treated as discretionary. This approach undermines the principle of equality of arms and risks reducing the defense to a procedural formality rather than a substantive counterweight to the prosecution.

Looking ahead, I believe defense counsel face a number of challenges that extend beyond legal argumentation. Physical safety is a growing concern for me and my colleagues. In high-profile cases, such as the Bemba case, defense lawyers have encountered perilous situations due to public visibility and political sensitivities. The association with controversial figures or contested narratives can expose counsel to threats, surveillance, and personal security risks. These risks are compounded by the increasing vulnerability of legal professionals to cybercrime. Online exposure, data breaches, and targeted digital harassment pose serious threats to the confidentiality and integrity of defense work.

Resource constraints are also likely to intensify. The ICC and other international tribunals face mounting financial pressures, and defense teams are often the first to experience reductions in support. Cuts to legal aid, investigative budgets, and staffing levels compromise the ability of counsel to prepare and present a full defense. Without adequate resources to the defense, the fairness of proceedings is placed at risk.

To address these challenges, a cultural shift is needed. States, institutions, and civil society actors must recognize that defense is not an auxiliary component of justice but a foundational one. Adequate resources for defense, protection for legal professionals, and respect for the role of counsel are essential to the future of international criminal law.

Conclusion 

The practice of international criminal defense is shaped by a unique set of legal, procedural, and institutional frameworks. A successful defense case requires counsel with a specific set of core qualifications and attributes, including confidence, adaptability, diplomacy, leadership, sound judgment, courtroom presence, strong writing skills, and technological proficiency. Together, these attributes enable defense counsel to navigate the complexities of international proceedings and uphold the rights of the accused in some of the most challenging legal environments. Additionally, essential to the effectiveness of a defense team is a shared strategic vision and a clear division of roles within that framework. 

International trials are generally longer, more procedurally complex, and more heavily reliant on written litigation. Furthermore, the relationship between counsel and client is more intensive, and the scale of the cases requires the management of diverse, multidisciplinary teams. Defense teams must be able to operate within a hybrid legal system that blends common and civil law traditions. The defense team’s legal strategy is shaped by the evolving nature of international jurisprudence, with a strong emphasis on precedent and legal interpretation. The participation of victims adds another layer of complexity, requiring defense teams to engage with multiple parties throughout the proceedings.

Looking ahead, I think that several areas require attention. Much has changed since the early days of international criminal tribunals. The ICC has established the Office of Public Counsel for the Defense and developed legal aid frameworks that support our work. But the defense function remains under-resourced and under-recognized. Investigative support remains uneven and cooperation from states is still frequently limited. These structural imbalances undermine the principle of equality of arms and thus threaten the credibility of the proceedings.

The wider international community must acknowledge that an effective defense is not a procedural formality but a cornerstone of a fair and credible justice system. Acquittals should be understood as evidence that the system is functioning as it should, not as institutional failure. The rhetoric around defense outcomes must change accordingly.

The ICC faces its own set of challenges, including the need for stronger state cooperation, a more coherent and equitable legal aid policy, and improved security protocols for defense teams. The Court must also take seriously its obligation under the complementarity principle to focus on prosecuting those most responsible for international crimes, while encouraging domestic systems to address lower-level perpetrators. Finally, arrest warrants should be issued only after careful review, and the rights of the accused must be protected through timely confirmation proceedings and meaningful custody safeguards.

The future of international defense counsel will depend on the system’s ability to address these structural issues. Acquittals demonstrate that fair trials are possible, but the path to that outcome is often fraught with procedural delays, resource constraints, and personal risk. The security and protection of defense counsel must be prioritized, alongside sustained investment in the institutional capacity of the defense function with a view to strengthening the role of the defense in international criminal justice and ensuring that the principles of fairness, equality, and due process remain at the heart of the international criminal justice system.


* In the UK criminal bar, the “returns system” refers to the practice of reassigning cases at short notice to another barrister when the original advocate is unavailable, often due to scheduling conflicts. The barrister taking the “return” must prepare and appear in court with minimal time to review the case.

** The Srebrenica massacre refers to the July 1995 killing of more than 7,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys by Bosnian Serb forces in and around the town of Srebrenica during the Bosnian War. It has been recognized by international courts, including the ICTY and the ICJ, as an act of genocide.

Elections in Ukraine: Between Peace Demands and Democratic Integrity

Elections in Ukraine: Between Peace Demands and Democratic Integrity

By: Dr. Paul R. Williams* and Sindija Beta**

As Ukraine navigates the most consequential peace negotiations in its modern history, the question of elections has again resurfaced during the most recent peace agreement drafts. The recently publicized 28-point plan, allegedly drafted by US and Russian officials, places elections soon after the cessation of hostilities as a requirement of any settlement. More recently, US President Trump accused Zelenskyy of prolonging the war to avoid holding elections, in response to which President Zelenskyy announced his readiness to hold elections even during martial law should security be ensured. 

Nonetheless, the unavoidable questions and issues that arise when elections in Ukraine are discussed are numerous. Martial law remains in place, during which elections are prohibited, millions of citizens are displaced internally or abroad, and large parts of the country remain under occupation. In this context, elections require more thinking than an arbitrary timeline in a poorly thought-through plan or baseless accusations of President Zelenskyy clinging to power. The challenge is to design an electoral process that is credible, inclusive, and secure, while resisting external pressure to rush toward a vote that could fracture Ukraine's hard-fought legitimacy.

Public debate reflects this tension. Civil society organizations such as Opora have outlined detailed roadmaps for postwar elections, emphasizing legal reform, diaspora inclusion, and international monitoring. Other institutions have likewise highlighted the risks of conducting elections during active armed conflict, noting that fairness and legitimacy are often compromised when security and freedoms are restricted. 

Challenges Facing Postwar Elections

There are a number of challenges that hinder Ukraine’s ability to hold elections. Beyond the initial hurdle of finding a legal solution to the prohibition on holding elections under martial law, which is currently in force but could arguably be lifted should a peace agreement be signed, there are other practical challenges to holding free and fair elections in Ukraine. This regards (1) the high numbers of displaced people in Ukraine and abroad, which makes registering voters difficult; and (2) meaningful political participation is restricted to those portions of the population that live under occupation and near the frontlines, as well as for those who have been conscripted to the military. The inability of active-duty soldiers to participate in elections raises serious questions about representation, particularly given the scale of mobilization during the war. 

More than six million Ukrainians remain abroad, with millions more internally displaced. Their participation is essential for legitimacy, but the legal framework and infrastructure in place would create significant obstacles for large portions of displaced people to participate in elections. Without secure absentee and diaspora voting, elections risk excluding vast segments of the electorate, creating a democracy that speaks only for those who remained.

Occupied territories present another obstacle. Conducting elections in regions under Russian control would risk legitimizing occupation. Comparative practice from places, such as Afghanistan or Iraq, shows that elections held under coercion or foreign control rarely produce durable legitimacy or peace. 

Security of polling stations is another critical concern. In areas close to the frontlines or even in Kyiv, polling places could become targets for Russian intimidation, sabotage, or direct attacks. Protecting voters and election workers will require professional civilian policing, security, international monitoring, and clear protocols to prevent interference by Russia. 

This is especially pertinent given Russia’s decades-long practice of interference in elections in other states. Such actions have ranged from disinformation campaigns to direct support for proxy actors, consistently undermining democratic processes. 

Indeed, elections held shortly after a ceasefire, let alone during active armed conflict, can be vulnerable to manipulation if the conditions for sovereignty and security are not firmly established. If elections are rushed before Ukraine has secured its institutions and electoral infrastructure, they could become another arena for Russian influence rather than a milestone of democratic renewal.

El Salvador’s Chapultepec Accords illustrate how sequencing matters. Electoral reform was treated as the foundation of peace, with institutional reform and international monitoring as the cornerstone of election preparation. Ukraine faces similar imperatives. Without safeguards and comprehensive security measures in place, which would include support from Ukraine’s allies, elections could legitimize Russian occupation and allow it to further manipulate and interfere with Ukraine’s internal matters or exclude displaced populations, undermining Ukraine’s democracy. 

Opora’s roadmap for postwar elections outlines practical steps for holding free and fair elections in Ukraine. These steps include legal and electoral reform for ensuring that all of the population, including displaced persons and those on military duty, can vote, conducting comprehensive security assessments, strengthening the information space to minimize Russian interference, and increasing campaigning transparency, among others. These are not steps that can or should be rushed. 

Moreover, narrative control will be central. Russia frames elections as proof of normalization, but Ukraine must counter by insisting on sovereignty-first sequencing. If elections are portrayed as concessions, they risk undermining Ukraine’s democratic identity. If they are framed as sovereign acts of resilience, they can become a powerful symbol of renewal.

Conclusion

Elections in Ukraine will inevitably be a defining feature of the country’s postwar settlement, but they cannot be reduced to a checkbox in a peace plan. Holding elections immediately after a ceasefire, without adequate preparation, risks exposing the process to Russian interference through disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, and manipulation of voter registries. It also risks disenfranchising millions of displaced Ukrainians who cannot easily access polling stations or register under the current frameworks.

A credible process depends on concrete steps: lifting martial law only once legal safeguards are in place, rebuilding voter registries to include displaced and diaspora populations, and creating security protocols for ensuring the security and integrity of polling stations. When it comes to occupied territories, the situation is even more difficult because voters in these areas, including Crimea and Donbas, should be able to participate in voting, but safeguards are required to ensure they are able to vote freely and that the election does not entrench an illegal occupation. 

These are issues that do not currently have solutions, and it would be irresponsible to overlook them due to external pressures. 


* Dr. Paul R. Williams is the Co-Founder and Director of the Public International Law & Policy Group and Rebecca Grazier Professor of Law and International Relations at American University

** Sindija Beta is the Legal Officer and Program Manager at the Public International Law & Policy Group

Roundtable Blog: Peace Without Possession—Preserving Ukraine’s Territorial Integrity in Negotiations

Roundtable Blog: Peace Without Possession—Preserving Ukraine’s Territorial Integrity in Negotiations

Editor’s Note:
This post is part of the PILPG Lawyering Justice blog’s roundtable series. Rather than a traditional co-authored piece, it presents a curated set of expert reflections from members of PILPG’s Ukraine Peace Negotiations Working Group. Drawing on the diverse expertise of our Peace Fellows, this roundtable-style blog explores the discussion surrounding Ukraine’s territorial integrity.  Published under the Lawyering Justice banner, this post reflects our commitment not only to chronicling the legal and diplomatic dimensions of active conflicts, but also to fostering strategic foresight and connecting lawyering to policy planning. We hope this format will serve as a model for future collaborative work on peace and justice.

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In the context of ongoing hostilities, Ukraine faces a critical dilemma: how to enter into peace negotiations while lacking control over parts of its territory and with the understanding that negotiating the return of the territory is unlikely. The stakes are high. Any misstep could weaken Ukraine’s sovereignty claims, embolden future aggression, or fracture international consensus. With these risks in mind, the Public International Law & Policy Group’s Ukraine Peace Negotiations Working Group convened a roundtable to examine the legal, political, and strategic dimensions of preserving territorial integrity in the absence of de facto control.

Participants were asked to consider six interrelated questions: what is the legal basis for assessing territorial questions in Ukraine; how Ukraine can best negotiate without possession; what legal instruments preserve territorial claims over time; how EU and NATO pathways intersect with unresolved occupation; how to navigate dueling constitutional claims; and whether strategic ambiguity risks weakening Ukraine’s legal position. The discussion drew on comparative precedents, international law, and realpolitik assessments of the current diplomatic landscape.

The purpose of this public-facing Roundtable Blog is threefold: to inform Ukrainian policymakers and Peace Formula stakeholders of the legal and strategic variables shaping territorial negotiations; to connect Ukraine-focused expertise with broader international practice; and to provide analytically grounded perspectives that can guide the development of durable, sovereignty-preserving peace frameworks.

1. Territorial Integrity

What is the legal framework in which territorial questions should be assessed during peace negotiations?

Dr. Paul R. Williams

Any peace negotiations in Ukraine must be conducted within the framework of international law that categorically prohibits the acquisition of territory through aggression and affirms the principle of territorial integrity as enshrined in the UN Charter. The law of occupation makes clear that effective control does not alter sovereignty, meaning Ukraine’s legal title to its territory remains intact regardless of Russia’s presence on the ground. Negotiations must therefore assess territorial questions through the lens of continuity of non-recognition of unlawful annexation, ensuring that temporary arrangements or ceasefire lines are not mistaken for permanent borders. This framework preserves Ukraine’s sovereign rights while preventing the normalization of territorial conquest in international practice.

Sindija Beta

Any peace negotiations in Ukraine must recognize that territorial integrity is not simply a legal principle but a political safeguard against legitimizing aggression. International law prohibits territorial acquisition by force, and past precedents show that concessions made under pressure often become permanent fractures in rule of law. Ukraine’s legal title to its territory remains intact despite Russia’s military control, but negotiations must be structured to prevent Moscow from altering legal norms based on military force. Territorial questions should therefore be addressed as matters of international law, ensuring that the process reinforces international norms rather than erodes them.

Kateryna Kyrychenko

Territorial questions in peace negotiations must also account for the cultural rights at stake in the territories under temporary occupation. International human rights law guarantees the right of all communities to maintain their language, education, and cultural identity - rights that have been systematically violated in the occupied regions through forced Russification, the suppression of Ukrainian education, and efforts to erase local cultural heritage. These rights can only be meaningfully protected within Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders and under its legitimate authority.

Russia’s attempts to justify annexation through claims of “self-determination” or cultural protection have no legal basis: cultural rights are safeguarded through respect for territorial integrity, not through coerced referenda or occupation. Any peace negotiations must therefore reinforce non-recognition of Russia’s unlawful annexations and affirm that restoring Ukraine’s sovereignty is essential to protecting the cultural rights of affected communities.

Ambassador Ylber Hysa

Ukraine’s territorial integrity must remain the unambiguous end state of any negotiation process. It should not be reduced to declarative legal rhetoric. To reach this end state, the Ukrainian side may consider tactical and temporary transitional arrangements that facilitate the conditions for eventual full territorial reintegration.

These transitional steps would not replace or weaken Ukraine’s sovereignty claims. Rather, they provide operational pathways to realize them.

A feasible component of such a transitional framework is the establishment of a Peacekeeping Transitional Period (PTP) within the currently Russian-occupied territories. This PTP would operate under a UN-mandated or internationally mandated peacekeeping mission for a defined period (e.g., five years).

2. Peace Without Possession

How can Ukraine enter into a peace agreement while lacking control over parts of its territory without undermining its long-term legal claim to those regions?

Professor Michael Kelly

Overlaying a current military control map with Ukraine’s geological survey reveals that the western parts of Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia, which are still under Ukrainian control, contain significant rare earth mineral deposits. These resources are likely to become bargaining chips in any transactional negotiation, particularly given that the Trump administration has already signed a rare earths deal with Ukraine. This dynamic is expected to shape trilateral discussions between Trump, Zelenskyy, and Putin. A recent Just Security article co-authored with Craig Martin outlines this scenario in greater detail.

Ambassador Ylber Hysa

The western parts of Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia, currently Ukrainian-controlled areas, contain significant rare earth mineral deposits, which may become a factor in negotiations, particularly within a transactional framework associated with a potential future U.S. administration.

However, comparable geological resources exist in the Russian-occupied territories as well. These resources should therefore be integrated into negotiation strategies as potential assets. A useful historical precedent is the post–World War II Saar–Ruhr arrangements, where resource governance played a stabilizing and cooperative role without undermining national sovereignty.

Professor David Crane

Neither Putin nor Zelenskyy is politically positioned to concede territory. Putin has suffered too many casualties to retreat without consequence, and Zelenskyy would face political collapse if he conceded land after such sacrifice. This impasse suggests that the war is unlikely to end soon. One possible approach is to establish local self-governance in the occupied provinces under a ceasefire, supported by neutral third-party peacekeepers modeled on the Sinai mission. However, any such arrangement must rest on the international community’s continued recognition of these regions as Ukrainian territory.

Professor Milena Sterio

Under the law of occupation, control does not equate to sovereignty. Ukraine retains its de jure claim to all territories currently under Russian control. This legal distinction must be preserved in any peace framework, as it forms the foundation for future reintegration and international support.

Ambassador Elayne Whyte Gomez

The current situation represents a new paradigm. While the international community has consistently recognized Ukraine’s borders, which have been affirmed in seven UNGA resolutions, this year's events at UNGA and UN Security Council changed some configurations and alliances at the UN regarding some Ukraine-sponsored texts. Any peace process must remain anchored in international recognition to avoid legitimizing aggression through ambiguity.

Ambassador Zorica Marić-Djordjević

Ukraine can enter into peace negotiations without conceding sovereignty by managing occupation rather than ratifying it. International law prohibits the acquisition of territory by force. Peace agreements must include “without prejudice” clauses, avoid sovereignty language, and refer to occupied areas as “territories temporarily outside the effective control of the Government of Ukraine.” These legal choices are essential to shaping a post-war order that upholds international norms.

3. Legal Instruments for Continuity

What international legal instruments or precedents can Ukraine invoke to preserve its territorial claims over the long term?

Professor Milena Sterio

The law of occupation and the principle of non-recognition of territorial acquisition by force are Ukraine’s strongest legal tools. These doctrines have been upheld in numerous conflicts and must be embedded in any peace agreement. The agreement should avoid any implication of territorial transfer and instead reinforce Ukraine’s continuing legal title.

Ambassador Zorica Marić-Djordjević

Operationalizing legal continuity requires the use of administrative and security language rather than sovereignty terms. Ceasefire lines must not be mistaken for borders, and demilitarized zones must not imply territorial concessions. The legal framing must reflect temporary control, not permanent change, to ensure that Ukraine’s territorial claims remain intact.

Professor David Crane

Putin is relying on time and distraction to wear down Ukraine and its allies. In contrast, consistent international recognition serves as Ukraine’s legal and diplomatic shield. The tools exist; the challenge lies in using them visibly and persistently. Sustained and coordinated use of these instruments will ensure that Ukraine’s sovereignty remains protected even in the absence of immediate territorial control.

Ambassador Elayne Whyte Gomez

Ukraine’s principled legal position is gaining traction, particularly in the non-aligned countries. Many smaller states now see their own struggles reflected in Ukraine’s experience. This emerging solidarity could become a powerful force in sustaining legal continuity and resisting the normalization of occupation.

Ambassador Ylber Hysa

Ukraine can engage in peace negotiations without recognizing or legitimizing the occupation by adopting a framework that focuses on managing the temporary situation rather than accepting any permanent change.

To ensure this, ceasefire lines must not be interpreted as borders, demilitarized zones must not imply territorial concessions, and all legal and diplomatic language should explicitly describe any control arrangements as temporary and linked to a defined peacekeeping mandate. This approach preserves Ukraine’s sovereignty claims and prevents any de facto normalization of the occupation. It maintains the legal and political foundation for full territorial restoration once the international environment becomes more favorable.

4. EU and NATO Pathways

How should Ukraine’s territorial integrity be addressed in the context of EU accession or NATO integration, particularly if parts of its territory remain under foreign control?

Professor David Crane

EU accession remains one of the most powerful strategic signals the international community can send to Russia. It demonstrates that Europe is not prepared to walk away from Ukraine’s future. The credibility of this pathway lies not only in its symbolic value but in its potential to unlock long-term political and economic integration that reinforces Ukraine’s sovereignty.

Ambassador Elizabeth Richard

NATO membership is politically untenable in the current climate. It remains a red line for Russia and would likely trigger disproportionate demands in any negotiation. In contrast, EU membership is both strategically viable and politically palatable. It offers Ukraine a credible path forward without escalating tensions, and it should be prioritized accordingly.

H. E. Dr. Igor Luksic

The EU path is not only a matter of legal alignment but also of strategic necessity. Ukraine’s integration into the EU could unlock vital resources for reconstruction, economic stabilization, and institutional reform. The precedent of Finland’s post-war transformation is instructive. While not directly analogous, it illustrates how strategic alignment with Europe can serve as a stabilizing force. Ukraine should insist on this track with greater urgency.

Professor Michael Kelly

Cyprus provides a compelling precedent. Despite being territorially divided following Turkey’s 1974 invasion and the continued occupation of the northern part of the island, Cyprus acceded to the European Union in 2004 with the strong advocacy of Greece acting as its sponsor state. The EU’s legal framework accommodated this division by suspending the application of EU law in the occupied areas while affirming the Republic of Cyprus’s sovereignty over the entire island, thereby preserving the principle of non-recognition of occupation. For Ukraine, the precedent demonstrates that full and effective territorial control is not an absolute prerequisite for EU membership, provided there is a committed sponsor or coalition of states willing to champion its accession. The decisive factor will be whether EU leaders summon the political will to treat Ukraine’s membership as a strategic move that signals Europe’s refusal to compromise on sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Ambassador Zorica Marić-Djordjević

The legal and political layers of EU accession must be addressed in tandem. While full and effective control is typically required, the Cyprus model demonstrates that suspended application of EU law in occupied territories is feasible. What matters is that the EU explicitly affirms Ukraine’s territorial integrity and commits to reintegration and reconstruction. The EU should treat Ukraine’s accession as a strategic imperative, not a procedural formality.

Tyler Thompson

Russia’s preferred model for Ukraine is Austrian-style neutrality—a Cold War-era posture that avoids NATO alignment while preserving nominal sovereignty. EU membership, however, is a tolerable outcome for Moscow and should be leveraged accordingly. The United States should press Brussels to make a political decision, as it did with Portugal and Spain after their transitions from dictatorship. Strategic ambiguity on this front only benefits Russia.

5. Constitutional Claims

How can Ukraine navigate the fact that both it and Russia enshrine Donbas and Crimea in their constitutions?

Dr. Paul R. Williams

The challenge of dueling constitutional claims is not new, but it is particularly acute in this context.  The international community must avoid falling into the trap of false equivalence. Its legal position is grounded in international law, while Russia’s rests on unilateral assertions and coercive annexation. The distinction must be made explicit in every negotiation and public communication.

Tyler Thompson

Russia has long used constitutional amendments and legal rhetoric to accumulate bargaining chips. This is part of a broader lawfare strategy, refined through its experiences in Georgia and Kosovo. The goal is not legal clarity but leverage. Ukraine and its allies must anticipate this and ensure that international legal standards, rather than domestic proclamations, frame the discussion.

Professor Milena Sterio

International law provides clear criteria for the legitimacy of referenda and declarations of independence. Any referendum must be free, fair, and conducted without coercion. Unilateral declarations obtained through force are invalid. Ukraine’s legal position is strong if it continues to emphasize these principles and avoids mirroring Russia’s constitutional framing.

Ambassador Zorica Marić-Djordjević

Russia’s invocation of Kosovo is legally flawed. Moscow repeatedly cites Kosovo as precedent in order to justify its annexation of Crimea and its claims over occupied Ukrainian territories, arguing that the West recognized unilateral secession in Kosovo and therefore cannot deny Russia the same right. This comparison, however, ignores critical distinctions. Kosovo was not annexed; Crimea was. Kosovo operated under a UN mandate and international oversight; Russia acted unilaterally and by force. Moreover, Serbia’s constitution still claims Kosovo, but that has not altered Kosovo’s international status. Ukraine must highlight these differences and reject any narrative that equates its legal position with Russia’s, underscoring that Russia’s reliance on Kosovo is a political tactic rather than a valid legal precedent.

Professor David Crane

Domestic constitutional claims are a distraction. They do not override international law and should not be treated as legitimate bargaining tools. Ukraine’s legal team must remain focused on international norms and avoid being drawn into debates over internal legal texts.

Ambassador Elayne Whyte Gomez

There is growing awareness among the non-aligned states of the power dynamics at play in Ukraine’s case. This creates an opportunity for Ukraine to build broader coalitions and reinforce its legal position through shared experience and solidarity. The moment is ripe for strategic engagement beyond traditional allies. Many of these states have themselves faced pressures from larger powers and are increasingly sensitive to questions of sovereignty and territorial integrity. By framing its struggle as part of a wider global narrative against coercion and annexation, Ukraine can strengthen its legitimacy and broaden the base of international support.

6. Strategic Ambiguity vs. Legal Clarity

Can Ukraine afford to use strategic ambiguity in peace negotiations, or does this risk weakening its long-term legal claim?

Professor Milena Sterio

Strategic ambiguity may offer tactical flexibility, but it carries long-term risks. Any ambiguity in the legal framing of a peace agreement could be exploited to undermine Ukraine’s territorial claims. The agreement must clearly distinguish between temporary arrangements and permanent sovereignty. Legal clarity is essential to preserving Ukraine’s rights under international law.

Tyler Thompson

Russia thrives in legal grey zones. Its lawfare strategy depends on exploiting ambiguity and reframing facts on the ground as legal precedent. Ukraine cannot afford to leave gaps in its legal position. Every omission becomes an opportunity for reinterpretation. The peace framework must be airtight.

Ambassador Elizabeth Richard

While the U.S. administration may appear distracted, the Department of Defense remains deeply engaged. There is still significant political and financial investment in Ukraine’s success, even if it operates below the radar. That institutional commitment should be leveraged to support a peace framework grounded in legal clarity and strategic foresight.

Ambassador Ylber Hysa

Peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia should be understood not as a single event, but as a complex, evolving process. Within this framework, Ukraine’s territorial integrity must be treated as an active strategic objective, guiding the negotiation dynamics rather than existing solely as a formal legal principle.

In this context, strategic ambiguity does not contradict legal clarity. Instead, it can serve as a pragmatic tool for securing Ukraine’s long-term strategic red lines while preserving diplomatic flexibility during negotiations.

 

 

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Professor Michael Kelly: Professor at Creighton University School of Law and The Senator Allen A. Sekt Endowed Chair in Law

Professor David Crane: Founding Chief Prosecutor of the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone and Distinguished Scholar in Residence at Syracuse University College of Law

Professor Milena Sterio, the James A. Thomas Distinguished Professor of Law at Cleveland State University's Cleveland-Marshall College of Law and Managing Director at PILPG

Ambassador Elayne Whyte Gomez: Senior Fellow of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research, Professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and former Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the United Nations

Ambassador Zorica Marić-Djordjević: Former Head of the Permanent Mission of Montenegro to the WTO and Special Representative to the UN Human Rights Council

Ambassador Elizabeth Richard: Former U.S. Ambassador and Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and Stabilization Operations

H. E. Dr. Igor Luksic: the former Prime Minister of Montenegro

Tyler Thompson: Chief Negotiation Officer & Co-Founder, Expeditionary

Ambassador Ylber Hysa: Former Ambassador of the Republic of Kosovo to Montenegro and North Macedonia

Dr. Paul R. Williams: Rebecca Grazier Professor of Law and International Relations at American University

Sindija Beta: Legal Officer at Public International Law & Policy Group

Kateryna Kyrychenko: Head of Ukraine Legal Affairs and Program Management at Public International Law & Policy Group

Nuclear Testing: An Inflection Point or Another Step Toward Confrontation?

Nuclear Testing: An Inflection Point or Another Step Toward Confrontation?

By Ambassador (Ret.) Zorica Maric Djordjevic, Senior Peace Fellow, Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG)

A New Round Begins in Moscow

By late October 2025, two troubling signals came from the world’s most powerful military nations — Russia and the United States.

The first move came from Moscow. President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia had completed tests of two nuclear-powered delivery systems. These were Burevestnik, a long-range cruise missile, and Poseidon, an underwater torpedo designed to devastate coastal regions with a radioactive surge. Both, reportedly, could evade existing missile defenses, creating a direct challenge to U.S. plans to build an expanded “Golden Dome.” Russian officials later clarified that both tests were non-nuclear, involving delivery systems rather than atomic warheads.

Within days, President Trump declared that the United States would keep pace with China and Russia and instructed the Department of War to resume nuclear-weapons testing. Officials later noted that such tests might involve system components rather than full detonations. Soon afterward, Washington unveiled its next-generation stealth nuclear cruise missile, the AGM-181 LRSO, signaling that the U.S. would match or outpace its rivals.

Putin responded by ordering the preparation of proposals for Russian nuclear testing should Washington proceed. “If the U.S. conducts such tests,” he said, “Russia must also take appropriate retaliatory steps.”

These exchanges rekindled the specter of superpower rivalry and signaled a return to competitive deterrence. For more than three decades, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has embodied a global consensus against nuclear explosions. Though the Treaty has not entered into force due to several key states not ratifying it (including the U.S., China, Iran, India, Pakistan, and North Korea), it has created a powerful informal norm. The global monitoring system of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) ensures nearly certain detection.

Since 1996, only India, Pakistan, and North Korea have violated this norm, and each test was detected. Russia’s and Washington’s recent announced decisions risk unraveling this restraint:

  • Vertically, by legitimizing renewed testing and modernization among established nuclear powers.

  • Horizontally, by weakening the normative barrier that deters aspirants from pursuing nuclear weapons.

Arms control rests on predictability. The long-standing assumption that no major power would resume nuclear testing preserved a baseline of trust. Once that assumption erodes, the architecture weakens. A return to testing may not ignite an immediate arms race, but it increases uncertainty and shifts future negotiations toward escalation management rather than risk reduction.

A Global Ripple Effect

Moscow’s reaction following Putin’s initial comments remains mixed. While the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought clarity on whether Washington intended to conduct full explosive tests or limited system trials, Putin warned of reciprocal actions that could inject volatility into an already fragile arms-control architecture. Nuclear parity has long anchored Russia’s conception of sovereignty and great power status. Any U.S. move toward testing, even a symbolic one, is seen through this lens. Putin’s unveiling of new nuclear systems added a deliberate symmetry: technological display as diplomacy.

Moreover, the revival of nuclear testing reverberates far beyond the U.S.–Russia dyad. China, which has not conducted explosive tests in decades but continues to modernize its arsenal rapidly, may feel compelled to respond. Even a symbolic U.S. test could accelerate strategic competition among the three major powers and undermine the CTBT’s already fragile authority.

For smaller and non-nuclear states — from Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans to the South Caucasus — renewed great-power signaling produces deep unease. Their security rests on predictable conduct by major powers and the credibility of international law. When deterrence eclipses dialogue, these foundations weaken.

In contrast, large parts of the Global South, including Latin America, Africa, Southeast Asia, and the South Pacific, remain firmly committed to Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones. Their stance underscores a widening divide between states anchored in legal restraint and those asserting power through capability.

The long-standing nuclear taboo, driven by political restraint rather than formal rules, is now less certain.

The Ukraine Factor: Negotiations Under Nuclear Shadows

The current nuclear signaling between Russia and the United States does not take place in isolation; the war in Ukraine directly shapes it. Nuclear security has become part of the negotiating environment itself, not a parallel or distant issue. As a result, any diplomatic endgame must now account for:

  • Why nuclear brinkmanship has intensified,

  • How it reshapes incentives and red lines of all parties, and

  • Why nuclear stability is becoming an important pillar of a future peace framework.

For Ukraine, the impact is double-edged. A more assertive U.S. posture offers reassurance, but it may also encourage Moscow to prolong the conflict in hopes of generating pressure on Washington. The risk is that negotiations devolve into a test of political endurance rather than a search for compromise — a dynamic in which deterrence logic overwhelms diplomacy.

Because recent Russian and U.S. announcements - from new Russian delivery systems to Washington’s intention to resume nuclear testing - demonstrate that strategic deterrence is once again contested, the new “28-point U.S. peace proposal” places renewed emphasis on credible Ukrainian security guarantees. These proposed “reliable guarantees” may fall short of full NATO membership and reportedly include meaningful restrictions on Ukraine, but they also reflect a core reality: when the nuclear threshold is publicly challenged, Ukraine’s vulnerability increases, and normative deterrence alone becomes insufficient. If deterrence is under strain at the nuclear level, it must be reinforced at the conventional and strategic levels for Ukraine. Without that reinforcement, any peace settlement risks becoming unstable – or even unworkable.

For Europe, caught between deterrence and diplomacy, the challenge is to keep communication channels open, especially for nuclear risk-reduction and humanitarian issues, even as the broader strategic environment hardens. 

Ultimately, nuclear signaling does not close the door to negotiations, but changes their architecture. The task for Washington is to convert deterrence into diplomatic leverage, using strength not to foreclose talks, but to enable them. In the end, nuclear testing may strengthen military power, but it weakens trust, the essential currency of diplomacy. The world now stands between a harder peace or a more protracted war.

Between Deterrence and Diplomacy

If Washington and Moscow continue to define strength through demonstration rather than dialogue, the space for diplomacy — especially on Ukraine — will continue to contract. What emerges may not resemble the classical Cold War arms race, but something more unstable: a world where uncertainty itself becomes a strategic instrument.

Whether this moment becomes a turning point or merely another step toward confrontation depends on how the major powers act. Nuclear testing can stabilize deterrence or destabilize diplomacy. Managed wisely, it could remind all sides of the catastrophic costs of miscalculation and ground arms control. Mishandled, it risks opening a new cycle of escalation.

The Inception of International Defense - An Interview with Dr. Mark S. Ellis

The Inception of International Defense

An Interview with Dr. Mark S. Ellis

Edited by Emma Bakkum & Paul Williams

A Note on Defending Justice

This blog is part of the Defending Justice series, an initiative of the Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG) to promote an eclectic array of voices within the field of international criminal law. 

As part of our broader efforts to strengthen institutions of justice, this series seeks to create space for dialogue around the varied perspectives and concerns that shape these institutions. With that aim in mind, we interviewed a series of defense practitioners working in international criminal law and distilled their experiences and insights into a series of first-person blogs, preserving the spirit and voice of those interviews.

Editor’s Note

This blog delves into the origins and evolution of the work of defense counsel before international criminal tribunals. It presents the reflections of Dr. Mark Ellis, based on his extensive experience providing assistance to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), his active involvement in the Saddam Hussein trial in Iraq, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), and the International Criminal Court (ICC), and his service as Executive Director of the International Bar Association (IBA). Through the examination of key defense developments, including the financial remuneration of defense counsel, assigning and selecting defense counsel, defense counsel ethics, and the role of bar associations, this blog traces the evolution of the defense counsel’s role in international criminal law, showcasing how defense contributions have shaped the fabric of international justice. Starting at the formative days of defense at the ICTY, including in the landmark Tadić case, the blog presents first-hand accounts of the key challenges and milestones faced by defense counsel appearing before the ICTY and beyond, illuminating key developments of the defense at international criminal tribunals, and laying the foundation for understanding the broader international justice system.

Introduction

While the idea of international criminal justice institutions dates back to the aftermath of the First World War, it was only after the Second World War that the first international criminal courts, the Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military Tribunals, were established, aimed to address war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity committed during the war. These tribunals laid the groundwork for future international criminal justice mechanisms. Large-scale atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda in the 1990s led to the establishment of two ad hoc international tribunals (the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; ICTR), set up by the United Nations in 1993 and 1994, respectively. Following the ad hoc international tribunals, the international community experimented with other formats: hybrid courts, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone (2000) and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (2007); and special or extraordinary chambers embedded within national systems, like the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts in Cambodia (2003) and the Special Panel for Serious Crimes in East Timor (2002).

Meanwhile, discussions of an independent international criminal tribunal emerged after both world wars, but became more realistic with the end of the Cold War, when the easing of geopolitical tensions fostered renewed multilateralism and revived the international community’s concern with impunity. Several rounds of negotiations culminated in the adoption of the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court (ICC), in July 1998. The Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002, after 60 countries ratified it. The ICC became the first treaty-based, permanent international criminal court to help fight impunity by investigating and, where warranted, prosecuting individuals charged with the gravest crimes of concern to the international community: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression.

I have been involved in the field of international criminal justice since 1995. My journey into defense work started at the ICTY and in the Tadić case. Thirty-six years ago, Justice Richard J. Goldstone, the founding Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY, set out the importance of Tadić receiving a fair trial and a proper defense. That principle has been the north star throughout my career in international law, including ensuring that fair trial rights, through adequate and effective defense, remain central in international and domestic criminal trials. 

Following the Tadić case, I have served in several positions advising on high-profile international criminal processes. I served as Legal Advisor to the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, chaired by Justice Goldstone. I was appointed by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to advise on the creation of Serbia’s War Crimes Tribunal. I was involved with the Iraqi High Tribunal and acted as legal consultant to the defense team of Nuon Chea at the ECCC. In 2000, I was appointed Chair of the Advisory Panel of the ICTY. In 2013, I was admitted to the List of Assistants to Counsel of the ICC. In 2015, I also served as Chair of the UN-created Advisory Panel on Matters Relating to Defense Counsel of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (previously the ICTY and ICTR).

I currently serve as the Executive Director of the International Bar Association (IBA), leading the foremost international organization of bar associations, law firms, and individual lawyers. My current focus is specifically on the IBA’s assistance to Ukraine, which includes legal support for war crimes accountability, technical assistance and capacity-building for judicial institutions, and support for justice reform and reconstruction efforts. In addition, I serve as an advisor to the ICC on sanctions issues. Prior to joining the IBA, I served for ten years as the Executive Director of the Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative (CEELI), a project of the American Bar Association (ABA). As part of this initiative, I provided technical legal assistance to twenty-eight countries in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, as well as to the ICTY in The Hague. To this day, CEELI remains one of the most extensive international pro bono legal assistance projects ever undertaken by the US legal community. 

Throughout these experiences, I witnessed the role of defense counsel grow in importance over time. As international criminal cases became more complex, the overall organizational structure for international defense improved significantly and financial support increased. Challenges invariably remain. Nevertheless, the evolution of international defense since the early years of the ICTY is remarkable and yields critical lessons for the way forward. 

Early Years at the ICTY: The Tadić Case

The International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

The ICTY was established in 1993 in response to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, specifically the mass atrocities taking place in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. I lived in the former Yugoslavia from 1985 to 1988, having been awarded a Fulbright Scholarship.

Reports of horrendous crimes, including the killing and wounding of thousands of civilians, torture, sexual abuse, and forced displacement, led to global outrage and prompted the UN Security Council to act. In accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council established the ICTY in May 1993. The ICTY was the first ever international criminal tribunal established by the UN, and the first international war crimes tribunal since the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. 

Based in The Hague, The Netherlands, the ICTY’s mandate was to prosecute those individuals most responsible for serious international crimes such as murder, torture, rape, enslavement, destruction of property, and other crimes listed in the Tribunal’s Statute, committed in the former Yugoslavia since 1991. By bringing perpetrators to trial, the ICTY aimed to deter future crimes and render justice to thousands of victims and their families, thus contributing to a lasting peace in the former Yugoslavia.

Throughout its operation, the ICTY indicted 161 persons; all cases were completed by the time the Tribunal closed in 2017. The ICTY indicted heads of state, prime ministers, army chiefs of staff, interior ministers, and many other high- and mid-level political, military, and police leaders from various parties to the Yugoslav conflicts. The ICTY transformed the landscape of international humanitarian and criminal law by establishing groundbreaking legal precedents, expanding the scope of international criminal accountability, and reinforcing the principle that no one is above the law.

The ICTY officially closed its offices on December 31, 2017. The International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT), created by the UN Security Council in December 2010, assumed responsibility for a number of essential functions previously carried out by the ICTY and ICTR (which had closed in 2015). In doing so, the IRMCT maintains the legacies of the pioneering ad hoc international criminal tribunals and aims to reflect best practices in international criminal justice. In 2024, the IRMCT reported on a historic turning point for the Mechanism with the conclusion of all core crimes cases and fugitive tracking.

The closing of the ICTY as a standalone institution and the recent reduced activity of the IRMCT mark the end of a period in international criminal justice shaped by the ad hoc tribunals, which also transformed the landscape of international defense work. The end of the ICTY experiment calls for a reflection on the formative days of the role of defense counsel.

The Start of Defense Counsel at the ICTY

The ICTY website highlights the crucial role of defense counsel: “a competent defense upholds equality of arms between the Prosecution and the Defense, thereby ensuring the fairness of the proceedings.” Interestingly, defense lawyers were not directly involved in the creation of the ICTY. Their role only became integral during the development of the ICTY’s Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence. From that moment, it became clear that defense attorneys would be critical to the Tribunal’s success. 
However, defense counsel faced several challenges in the early years of the ICTY. When the ICTY became operational, it had no defendants. The true catalysts for defense came from the first case at the Tribunal: the Tadić case. Duško Tadić, a Bosnian Serb and President of the Local Board of the Serb Democratic Party in Kozarac, was accused of participating in crimes committed against Bosnian Muslims and Croats in the Prijedor region of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war in the early 1990s. He was accused of crimes involving the abuse and torture of detainees in concentration camps. Tadić faced multiple charges, including crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and violations of the laws and customs of war. In 1997, after a total of 79 trial days, Tadić was convicted of wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, and murder. The Trial Chamber found, among others, that Tadić participated in the collection and forced transfer of civilians to detention camps, the killing of two Muslim policemen, and the participation in the killings of five men. He was sentenced to 20 years in prison.

The Tadić case was remarkable in numerous ways. Not since the international military tribunals established in Nuremberg and Tokyo after World War II had perpetrators been held accountable for international crimes before an international tribunal. The case set important legal precedent in international criminal law, including by providing definitions of war crimes and crimes against humanity, by expanding the scope of war crimes that could be prosecuted at the international level, and by contributing to the principle of command responsibility, which says individuals in positions of authority can be held accountable for actions of subordinates if certain elements are proven.

Once Tadić was transferred to The Hague, a crucial yet unclear question was the engagement of defense lawyers. As the first indigent defendant in a modern international criminal law trial, Tadić’s attorneys were assigned, which was the first time the Registry had to do so.

A year before the start of Tadić’s trial, I traveled to The Hague for a meeting with Justice Richard J. Goldstone. Justice Goldstone was a prominent South African judge and the first Chief Prosecutor for the ICTY and ICTR. At this point, he was setting up the prosecution offices for these pioneering tribunals, in which he played an instrumental role. During the meeting, I offered CEELI’s full support to the new Prosecutor in his first trial. Justice Goldstone, however, wanted me to assist with training the defense teams. Justice Goldstone recognized the importance of the fairness of the proceedings and was concerned that the defense did not have sufficient resources. He once noted during an address: “There is no question that history will judge the Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda on the fairness or unfairness of their proceedings. Whether there are convictions or whether there are acquittals will not be the yardstick. The measure is going to be the fairness of the proceedings.” 

I agreed to assist with training the defense teams. It is a credit to Justice Goldstone that, as the Prosecutor, he sought to ensure the defense had sufficient support and resources. I fully leaned into ensuring that defense had the resources to provide effective representation for suspects and the accused.

Tadić’s Defense Team and Initial Challenges

Defense Team Structure

I became convinced that the best approach to the defense was to assemble a diverse team of international and local (co-)counsel. This naturally creates the strongest team. When the Tadić trial started, the selection process for counsel at the ICTY was included in the original 1994 Directive on Assignment of Defense Counsel and was relatively straightforward. An attorney had to meet several requirements, including being admitted to a state bar or being a law professor, and having fluency in one of the Court’s working languages (French or English).

The initial counsel of Tadić were not schooled in the common law system. Partly because the ICTY was based in The Hague, some of the early defense counsel were, in fact, Dutch. Professor Michail Wladimiroff, one of the Netherlands’ most respected criminal lawyers, was assigned as lead counsel for Mr. Tadić. Mr. Wladimiroff had impeccable credentials. He selected Alphons Orie, another superb lawyer, as his co-counsel, who later became a respected judge with the ICTY. 

I spoke to John Heffernan, director of the Coalition for International Justice, and we decided to initiate a training program for both Wladimiroff and Orie. I reached out to a good friend in the US, Joe Jones, who was a well known criminal lawyer. In turn, he suggested another American criminal lawyer, Carol Bruce, and a UK barrister, Steven Kay KC, a leading English barrister, to join the training team. With the assistance of another great American lawyer, Alain Norman, we created an extensive week-long training seminar focused on adversarial techniques, recognizing that the ICTY’s procedures and practices would lean heavily on common law traditions. The training seminar took place at the Peace Palace – a stunning building in the heart of The Hague and the home of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Because Wladimiroff was recovering from a back injury, we trained Orie in the Palace and Wladimiroff at his home while he was in bed! Both of them quickly picked up cross-examination techniques. However, they also recognized their own lack of experience in an adversarial trial. Thus, it was felt that it was essential to add a common law barrister to the defense team.
At the end of the training week, I visited the ICTY’s Registrar, Dorothée de Sampayo, and asked that a common law barrister be added to the team. I had earlier sought Justice Goldstone’s approval. One of the arguments I made was that at the time, the prosecution trial team had a mix of five Australian/US counsel, and there was a need for “equality of arms” (see below on equality of arms). To her credit, the Registrar agreed, and Stephen Kay was added to the defense team. Mr. Kay even agreed to take a substantial reduction in his fee. Another talented UK barrister, Sylvia de Bertodano, had recently completed her pupillage at the English bar and joined earlier as an assistant to the Dutch lawyers. Immediately, Mr. Kay took responsibility for cross-examining witnesses, while Mr. Wladimiroff and Mr. Orie continued to direct the overall case and advance arguments. 

Additionally, since the start of the ICTY, a transformation occurred in which lawyers from conflict situations joined the defense team. This has generally been a positive development. However, for the Tadić trial, the Serbian lawyers that Tadić had added to his team on his own were not working out. Consequently, Mr. Wladimiroff and Mr. Kay worked to have all of them removed from the team, which Tadić agreed to. While the skills used in a domestic criminal case are obviously relevant, they do not necessarily include the legal background required for a complex international war crimes case. Back then, the average attorney simply was not schooled in this practice. 

Because of the ICTY’s elaborate Rules of Procedure and Evidence, as well as its numerous directives, these attorneys found themselves unfamiliar with the ICTY and its procedures. However, the team did utilize local investigators, including Tadić’s brother and another local – Dragan Petrovoc, who had worked with a documentary crew and “fixer” in the local Yugoslav region.

The overall solution in the Tadić case was to blend co-counsel familiar with common law and civil law, with both having experience in international criminal law. Each brought his or her own unique expertise and experience. Had a common law lawyer not been added to the Tadić defense team, the trial would have been viewed entirely differently. The Wladimiroff/Orie/Kay defense team approach became the paradigm for international war crime tribunals.

Equality of Arms

Ensuring the basic tenets of a fair trial remain crucial at international criminal tribunals. The principle of equality of arms between the prosecution and the accused goes to the heart of the right to a fair trial. The importance of defense rights is premised on the equality of arms principle. This was a pivotal issue during the Tadić trial, and the trial influenced the interpretation and application of the principle of equality of arms in international criminal proceedings.

Equality of arms is not just achieved through the assignment of defense counsel. The defense teams at the ICTY faced serious challenges due to insufficient resources. The resources available to defendants, both in preparation for and during a trial, are fundamental to justice through due process. 

For instance, low remuneration for defense lawyers and limited support for their travel and witness interviews are relevant examples. In fact, the defense counsel for Mr. Tadić argued that there was no equality of arms between the prosecution and the defense at trial, which seriously affected the preparation of the case and therefore frustrated the right to a fair trial. The inability to gain access to evidence and enter key villages and towns in hostile states necessary to build the defense’s case had weakened counsel’s ability to represent their client effectively. 

The ICTY Appeals Chamber referenced jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), affirming that equality of arms encompasses the right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defense, as outlined in Article 21(4)(b) of the ICTY Statute.

In my research and through interviews with defense counsel and the Registrar, I learned that defense counsel’s access to the region of the former Yugoslavia greatly diminished over the years following the first case. Yet, the Tadić case and the decisions made reinforced the importance of procedural balance.

I have said many times that the ICTY would be judged by the fairness of its proceedings and by the certainty that the accused received a fair trial and proper defense. Ultimately, no one has questioned the outcome or legitimacy of the Tadić trial, precisely because equality of arms was ensured through the assignment of defense counsel. Justice Goldstone has reiterated this view on several occasions, stating that without the support given to the Tadić defense team, the trial would not have been fair.


The Evolution of Defense Counsel before the ICTY and ICTR

Key lessons learned from defense in the Tadić case continued to guide my work with defense teams and to influence defense work at the ICTY and ICTR. As the number of cases before the ICTY grew following the Tadić case, the role of defense counsel evolved. The evolution of defense counsel can be witnessed through developments in several areas, including remuneration, assignment and selection, ethics, and the role of civil society.

The Financial Position of Defense Counsel 

Remuneration for defense counsel is one area that drastically changed over the years. Thankfully, defense counsel salaries at the ICTY and ICTR substantially improved following the first ICTY case against Duško Tadić.

The original 1994 Directive on the Assignment of Defense Counsel (amended several times since) provided for limited remuneration for defense counsel. Counsel in the Tadić case was paid a fixed rate of $800 for the entire trial ($400 for each stage of the trial) and a daily rate of only $200 per day. As I have written in “The Evolution of Defense Counsel Appearing Before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia”, the remuneration in the Tadić case was hardly commensurate with the amount of time devoted to the case. Assigned Counsel spent 12 to 14 hours a day, six days a week, completing pre-trial and trial work. Counsel prepared for more than 85 cross-examinations and over 35 direct examinations of defense witnesses. When calculated based on a seven-and-a-half-hour workday, the lead defense counsel was paid $26 per hour, which also covered general administrative costs for the counsel’s office. Tadić’s counsel, Mr. Wladimiroff, waived his usual fees to meet the ICTY’s payment schedule.

After Tadić, compensation for counsel at the ICTY and ICTR generally improved. The Directive, amended in 2000, raised the fixed rate from $400 per trial stage to $2,000. The fixed daily rate was also raised considerably. In the early 2000s, depending on years of experience, lead counsel at the ICTY were remunerated at rates between $80 and $110 per hour, up to a maximum of 175 hours per month. An experienced counsel could earn more than $230,000 per year. Expenditures such as phones, mailing, office equipment, rent, fax services, and secretarial support were included in the payment to counsel of fees and costs. 

The Legal Aid Policies for the pre-trial, trial, and appeal stages later provided a more detailed payment scheme. They outlined the fixed rates for each phase of the proceeding, grouped into three levels of complexity (difficult, very difficult, and extremely difficult). The pre-trial stage policy provided for fixed rates, while the trial and appeal stage policies provided for a fixed rate per month depending on the difficulty of the case.

The Assignment and Selection of Counsel

The assignment and selection of defense counsel were established in the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, which referred to a right of the accused to communicate with “counsel of his or her own choosing” in Article 21(4)(b) and Article 20(4)(b) respectively. However, the right to counsel of an accused’s choosing was not without limits. The ICTY and ICTR generally left the administrative task of selecting counsel to the Registrar’s discretion, particularly to ensure that the counsel chosen met the criteria for assignment. However, in reality, the accused had great latitude in selecting his own counsel. In fact, there had rarely been a refusal of a request for assignment of counsel of choice during the ICTY’s history.

The Directive on the Assignment of Defense Counsel further governed the procedures for the assignment of defense counsel. The original Directive from 1994, in Article 16(A), entitled the suspect or accused to one attorney as assigned counsel only. The word “one” was interpreted literally. However, due to the enormous amount of work involved and the complexity of the Tadić case, as mentioned earlier, I successfully petitioned the ICTY for an additional defense attorney. The then ICTY Registrar reasoned that the Directive, while limiting counsel to one counsel, nevertheless allowed discretionary use of funds to secure the services of a defense counsel consultant.

In 1996, following the Tadić trial, the Directive was amended to allow the assignment of a second counsel to the accused under exceptional circumstances. By 2000, the ICTY further relaxed its co-counsel rules, allowing co-counsel more routinely, along with support staff such as investigators, translators, and language assistants, to manage the vast documentation involved. Article 16(C) of the Directive provided that the Registrar may, in the interests of justice and at the request of the lead counsel, “assign a second counsel to assist with the defense [...].” The Directive clarified the distinction between lead counsel and co-counsel too: acting under the authority of the lead counsel, the co-counsel may deal with all stages of the proceedings and all matters arising out of the defense. Article 16(D) further allowed the Registrar to “assign a co-counsel who does not speak either of the two working languages of the Tribunal but who speaks the native language of the suspect or accused.” Finally, Article 16(E) provided for the assigning of “other persons such as legal assistants, consultants, investigators and interpreters, as required, to provide support to counsel.” The article clarified that the lead counsel and the persons assisting him shall be referred to as the defense team.

Defense Counsel Ethics

The ICTY faced serious challenges in regulating ethics and discipline among defense counsel, given the diverse legal backgrounds of defense counsel from various countries. For instance, a system of “fee-splitting” emerged, in which the defendant appointed lawyers from the former Yugoslavia, with a portion of the lawyers’ fees paid to the defendant’s family. Unlike domestic systems with bar associations, the ICTY lacked a unified regulatory body. To address this, it introduced a Code of Professional Conduct in 1997, based on Rules 44–46 of its procedural framework, and subsequently amended it a few times. 

The Code was drafted by judges (not lawyers) and heavily influenced by national models, especially the ABA’s Model Rules. The Code, substantially revised in 2002, aimed to clarify defense counsel’s rights and obligations, restrictions and responsibilities, govern aspects of counsel’s work, such as confidentiality and conflicts, and to impose a disciplinary regime, including a Disciplinary Panel. A similar Code was introduced at the ICTR, and the ICTY code influenced the development of the ICC’s Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel.

Role of Civil Society 

The Tadić case was not only a legal milestone but also a starting point for civil society engagement in international justice. During the Tadić trial, a number of platforms and networks of civil society collaboration (e.g., CEELI) were heavily involved and played a crucial role by promoting transparency, advocating for victims’ rights, and shaping public discourse.

Civil society also recognized the importance of an effective defense as a component of a fair trial, which was crucial to the development of the defense. Several NGOs provided research or offered legal expertise and training to defense teams, recognizing the need for competent defense lawyers. Some NGOs advocated for procedural fairness and equality of arms, indirectly supporting defense teams by urging the ICTY to improve resources, transparency, and access to evidence.

Regarding the ICC Code of Professional Conduct, the IBA undertook a rigorous drafting process through an international Advisory Panel of legal experts.

Association for Defense Counsel 

Finally, a milestone development for the defense counsel was the establishment of the Association of Defense Counsel for the ICTY (ADC-ICTY). With the conclusion of the first trial, during which support for the early defense team was provided through a training program developed by CEELI, it became evident that it would be helpful for defense to consolidate formally, and in a way that would allow them to advocate for their interests. The ICTY judges saw a need for an association for the defense for several reasons. First, such an association could ensure a higher quality of defense counsel. Second, it could make collective representations to the ICTY on behalf of all defense counsel involved in cases. Third, it could deal with ethical and disciplinary issues. After more than a year of work by a special ad hoc working group, the ICTY established the Association of Defense Counsel of the ICTY in September 2002.

The judges amended the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, making membership of a recognised association of counsel a necessary requirement for inclusion on the so-called Rule 45 List (list of qualified counsel). This requirement can be found in Rule 44 of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

In December 2016, the General Assembly of the ADC-ICTY voted to adopt an amended Constitution which renamed the Association as the “Association of Defense Counsel practicing before the International Courts and Tribunals” (ADC-ICT). The ADC-ICT’s objectives include supporting the functioning, efficiency, and independence of defense counsel, promoting and ensuring the proficiency and competence of defense counsel, and overseeing their performance and professional conduct. It is the only official association of defense counsel that has practiced before the IRMCT. Lawyers admitted to the ICC List of Counsel are represented by ICCBA.

The Arc of International Defense and Way Forward

Following the armistice that ended World War I, the Treaty of Versailles committed the signatories to try Kaiser Wilhelm II for his crimes. Although he was never brought to justice, it would be the first time in history that nations imagined the possibility of an international tribunal. The ICTY, ICTR, and the ICC are a testament to that early vision.

In the 30 years since the UN Security Council created the ICTY, the international community has seen the field of international criminal law and the institutions within it steadily solidify, ultimately leading to the establishment of the ICC. The role of the ICTY and the ICTR in this evolution of legal thought cannot be underestimated. The ICTY’s achievements, in both substantive and procedural law, have established legal standards, and its perceived success is undoubtedly a major reason for the creation of the ICC.

ICTY and ICTR

Reflecting on my experiences, those early years at the ICTY showed a propensity to adapt to changing circumstances and needs. Representing those accused of some of the most heinous crimes of the past century was one of the most crucial aspects of the Tribunal. Yet, at the formation of the ICTY, issues addressing the needs of the defense counsel were not a priority for the newborn tribunal. However, because of the foresight of the ICTY’s first prosecutor, Richard Goldstone, and the Registrar, Dorothy de Sampayo, issues related to the defense counsel slowly gained greater importance. 

Although the years that followed have not been a panacea for all of these issues, the overall structure of the defense counsel significantly improved at the ICTY and ICTR. For instance, as described in this blog, the financial support for defense counsel at the ICTY improved. The number of assigned counsel and support staff provided to indigent defendants also increased. And, although not required, the ICTY adopted a liberal policy permitting the accused to select any available counsel qualified to appear before it. 

The ICTY also made progress in strengthening the integrity of the defense structure: the adoption of a code of professional conduct for defense counsel represented a milestone in countering allegations of ethical misconduct by assigned counsel. Finally, one of the hallmark developments was the formation of the Association of Defense Counsel of the ICTY.

International Criminal Court

These ICTY-specific defense developments significantly influenced the ICC’s defense framework. The ICC’s framework reflects several lessons learned from the ICTY and ICTR regarding defense issues, including the selection and assignment of defense counsel, defense counsel fees, and counsel ethics.

First, the ICC implemented a similar system of selecting defense counsel. The ICC’s Registrar oversees a list of approved counsel who meet the criteria set out in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Rule 20-22). Consistent with the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC makes clear that the indigent defendant does not have the absolute right to choose counsel. The Court reserves the right to select counsel for the defendant where the interest of justice so requires.

Likely in response to equality issues faced at the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC adopted a different approach to assigning counsel, allowing for the creation of a defense team. At the initial arrest, a defendant is assigned a “duty counsel” selected by the ICC from a list of attorneys in the accused’s country. The lead counsel is then allowed to assemble a defense team that, at various stages of the trial process, includes a professional investigator, two legal advisors, and one assistant. To facilitate this and other defense issues, the ICC has created an Office of Public Counsel for the Defense, an independent office within the registry whose purpose is to represent and research the rights of the defense and of persons entitled to legal assistance. Its functions include representing and protecting the rights of the defense during the initial stages of proceedings, providing general legal support to defense teams, and acting as an amicus curiae on defense issues.

Second, when embarking on creating the ICC’s legal defense system, the Registry conducted an impressive review of international and domestic legal aid systems. To avoid the early financial problems of the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC decided to reinforce the ICTY lump-sum payment system for assigned counsel, establishing an overall payment scheme for assigned defense counsel. 

The ICC Legal Aid Policy outlines the remuneration system in section G and Annex II, including remuneration for services provided and a monthly living cost lump sum. Unfortunately, there has been criticism about the ICC’s pay for defense counsel. Compared with other international tribunals, the ICC provides relatively low remuneration.

Third, following the ICTY’s practice, the ICC likewise recognised the need for a uniform code of conduct; Rules 8 and 22(3) of the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence authorized its creation. The Rules permitted the Registrar to develop a code of professional conduct in consultation with appropriate legal associations. As mentioned earlier, the IBA led a lengthy, consultative drafting process from 2002–2003 to build consensus across jurisdictions, and the Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel was adopted by the ICC’s Assembly of States Parties in 2005.

Finally, a considerable achievement at the ICC, building on the vital work of the ADC at the ICTY, is the creation of the International Criminal Court Bar Association (ICCBA) to advocate and lobby for defense interests similarly.

The struggles the ICTY encountered in dealing with issues affecting the defense offer current and future international tribunals ample opportunities to avoid similar mistakes. The significant achievements in the field of international criminal law and issues of accountability over the last 30 years have solidified the common understanding that, to ensure fair trials, adequate support for defense and the accused is a necessity. To maintain respect in the international community and to adhere to the principles of justice and the rule of law, international tribunals cannot be created merely to convict. I have witnessed that defense is no longer merely an afterthought as it was in the early years. 

Way Forward

Despite achievements, issues affecting the defense must remain a priority. Challenges inevitably remain (as other blogs in this series outline). As the field continues to develop and adapt, new challenges will arise. Over the past few years, we have seen a growing focus on the defense as it continues to play a critical role in shaping international criminal law at both the global and domestic levels. To meet international standards of international criminal law, this development requires an active role of the international community in capacity-building support. 

For instance, it has been very encouraging to see that Ukraine is receiving additional legal training in international criminal law from the IBA. Presently in Ukraine, over 97% of all war crimes committed by Russia since its full-scale invasion against the country will be tried by national courts. It is an arduous task with currently over 190,000 incidents of war crimes registered in the non-occupied territories alone. Ukraine’s legacy for these domestic trials will largely depend on whether the trials are seen to have met international standards of fairness and impartiality. The role of defense attorneys will be critical to meeting these standards.

The growth in domestic accountability processes, as we have also seen in universal jurisdiction cases, reinforces the idea that some crimes are so heinous that the world cannot turn a blind eye and that it has a duty to hold those responsible accountable. While this is inevitably not an easy duty, more acknowledge that a duty exists to combat impunity. We should be at a point where it is assumed that, to achieve accountability and ensure justice, a robust defense is a component of both processes. 

Conclusion

Protecting the rights of the accused appearing before international war crimes courts is not an easy task. Particularly where the most egregious crimes have been committed, social pressure to convict can be overwhelming. Coupled with the budgetary constraints associated with internationally supported courts, the focus on fair trials and the rights of the defense is often lost in the mayhem.

The rights of a defendant are fundamental to fair and impartial trial proceedings. Too often, defense issues fell to the bottom of the priority list. While there was a strong focus on the role of judges and prosecutors, little attention was given to legal assistance for the defense. Defense teams tended to be underfunded and short-staffed. Even the presumption of innocence was often absent in court statutes, particularly at the domestic level.

Although there are still many challenges for the defense, the ICTY changed the landscape of international defense remarkably. Initial challenges were overcome thanks to the foresight and resolve of some of those involved in the early defense work. The Tadić defense team’s approach, combining common and civil law experience and balancing regional expertise and procedural competence, became the paradigm for international war crime tribunals. And in the years that followed the Tadić case, crucial achievements were made at the ICTY and ICTR, some in response to the realities of defense work during that first case. 

At the ICTY and ICTR, the number of assigned counsel and support staff provided to indigent defendants increased. The ICTY adopted a liberal policy, allowing the accused to select any available counsel who is qualified to appear before the ICTY. Beyond acknowledging the importance of assigning defense counsel, the Tadić case made clear that equality of arms encompassed the right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defense. Financial support for defense counsel at the ICTY and ICTR improved in comparison to the first case. 

The ICTY and ICTR also made progress in improving the defense framework with the adoption of a code of professional conduct for defense counsel. These, and other developments, greatly influenced the broader international criminal justice field, including the ICC’s framework. A landmark development is the establishment of the International Criminal Court Bar Association (ICCBA) to represent the interest of counsel and support staff at the ICC.

The Tadić trial made evident that, in ensuring fair trials, support for the defense was necessary. Today, defense is no longer an afterthought for international criminal trials. That is a tremendous achievement in itself. Nevertheless, as the focus of international accountability increasingly shifts to domestic trials, these trials require greater specialized knowledge, awareness, engagement, and support from lawyers and the public generally.