Forget the Debate on Peace Versus Justice. Ukraine Has Set the Stage for Peace With Justice!

Forget the Debate on Peace Versus Justice. Ukraine Has Set the Stage for Peace With Justice!

By: Dr. Paul R. Williams,* Dr. Beth Van Schaack,** Professor David Crane,*** and Sindija Beta.****

Recent efforts to reach a ceasefire and potential peace arrangement to end Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine have again brought to the fore the tension between achieving peace and delivering justice in the wake of atrocities. For much of the twentieth century, those negotiating peace deals were either silent about the imperative of justice or negotiated it away. Indeed, many peace agreements and arrangements routinely incorporated blanket amnesties, trading accountability for the promise of stability and calm. The Évian Accords in Algeria, the National Reconciliation Law in Guatemala, the Lomé Peace Accord in Sierra Leone, and the “Due Obedience” and “Full Stop” laws in Argentina all exemplified this approach. These amnesties may have encouraged combatants to lay down their arms and helped end the fighting, but they left societies fractured, victims silenced, and perpetrators free to return to positions of power. 

Ultimately, many of these amnesties did not hold as national and international courts declared them unconstitutional and/or inconsistent with the nation’s human rights obligations. Argentina, for example, has prosecuted hundreds of individuals who stood accused of committing grave crimes during the country’s “dirty war.” The experience of Sierra Leone and Cambodia demonstrates that even negotiated amnesties do not shield perpetrators from subsequent international justice mechanisms; nor do they override the treaty-based legal obligations of states to prosecute atrocity crimes.

Russia has committed aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other atrocity crimes, not only in Ukraine but also in Georgia, Syria, Chechnya, and elsewhere; to date, perpetrators have largely suffered no tangible consequences for their crimes. No surprise that Russia supported the inclusion of a blanket amnesty provision in the Istanbul 2022 Communiqué, which was proposed in the early stages of the full-scale invasion, and again, almost as an afterthought, at the very end of the 28-point peace plan that the United States and Russia crafted in the second half of 2025. Russia no doubt assumed that Ukraine, and the international community, are so exhausted by war that no one would object to once again trading away justice for peace. What Russia, and those urging a broadscale amnesty as the only option for ending Russia’s war of aggression, ignore is that a decentralized accountability infrastructure is already in place and has already been activated. As such, it is beyond the power of Russia, and even Ukraine, to forsake justice and entrench impunity entirely. 

Indeed, justice efforts have been underway since before Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. Some cases—involving the downing of MH17, proceeding in Ukraine’s domestic courts, and asserting state responsibility before the European Court of Human Rights—are already the subject of final and binding judgments. More than a dozen states—in the region and beyond—have initiated investigations into Russian atrocities, sharing information and strategies through a joint investigative team and the Eurojust network (the known cases are compiled here). Non-governmental organizations are collecting information and creating perpetrator dossiers to support additional proceedings. The International Criminal Court, despite all its recent faults and challenges, has asserted its jurisdiction and has already issued six arrest warrants, which will not be withdrawn even if an amnesty is included within any peace deal. And the Council of Europe, in collaboration with Ukraine, is marching forward with its establishment of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine and a Register of Damage. These justice efforts cannot be derailed or blocked by those sitting around the negotiating table.

As argued by this article’s authors here and here, Ukraine has embraced lawfare, the strategic use of legal tools to achieve political, military, and diplomatic objectives. Lawfare is not limited to courtrooms. It operates in the realm of public opinion, delegitimizing Russian aggression; in the halls of multilateral organizations, mobilizing new mechanisms of justice; and on the battlefield, signaling that Russian crimes will be documented, prosecuted, redressed, and remembered. This strategy has allowed Ukraine to shift the global conversation from geopolitical bargaining to legal responsibility. It has framed the war not as a defensive maneuver by Russia or even a territorial dispute but as a grave breach of the international order, one that demands accountability rather than accommodation.

The irreversibility of Ukraine’s accountability trajectory is reinforced by decades of developments in international law, which have steadily shifted from permissive attitudes toward amnesty to a clear expectation of accountability for atrocity crimes. Key treaties establish this foundation. All four of the universally-ratified Geneva Conventions—which govern Russia’s war of aggression—obligate states to search for and prosecute those responsible for grave breaches during international armed conflicts. Customary international humanitarian law is in accord. Article 2(3) of the ICCPR and Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights likewise require states to ensure effective remedies for serious human rights violations, even when those violations are committed by state actors operating in an official capacity.

International courts and human rights bodies have converged around the principle that amnesties are unlawful and need not be respected if enacted in response to serious international crimes. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia articulated this consensus, noting that emerging international practice prohibits amnesty for crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The European Court of Human Rights has similarly held (see here and here) that amnesties for acts like torture or ill-treatment undermine deterrence and violate states’ obligations to preserve the rule of law. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has been even more explicit. In Gelman v. Uruguay, for example, it held that amnesty laws preventing investigation and prosecution of grave human rights violations are incompatible with international law, even when adopted through democratic processes. Cases involving Libya, Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia, among others, all confirm that international courts routinely reject domestic amnesty laws when they conflict with obligations to prosecute atrocities.

Taken together, these instruments and decisions reflect a settled reality: international law rejects amnesty for atrocity crimes. For the parties to today’s negotiations around Russia’s war of aggression, this means that justice is not merely a bargaining position. It is an irreversible reality. Even if the Ukrainian government, under immense pressure, agreed to grant amnesty to Russian officials before its own courts, such a provision would have no binding effect on the ICC, the Special Tribunal, or the courts of states exercising universal or other forms of extra-territorial jurisdiction. And such a decision would be subject to challenge before the European Court of Human Rights. 

For decades, some policymakers treated peace and justice as mutually exclusive outcomes. Ukraine has demonstrated that this is a false dichotomy. Through its strategic use of law, its mobilization of international institutions, and its insistence that atrocity crimes cannot be ignored, Ukraine has created a system in which the Russian ability to strong-arm Ukrainian officials or the international community into appeasement and amnesty is significantly constrained.

The accountability architecture now in place—including ICC warrants, domestic prosecutions, universal jurisdiction investigations, and a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression—cannot simply be dismantled with the stroke of a pen. The current negotiations between Ukraine, Russia, the United States, and Europe, therefore, are taking place in a world where justice mechanisms are already active and non-negotiable, regardless of what any peace plan provisions may suggest. Justice, once activated, has a momentum of its own.

* Dr. Paul R. Williams is the Co-Founder and Director of the Public International Law & Policy Group and Rebecca Grazier Professor of Law and International Relations at American University

** Dr. Beth Van Schaack is a Senior and Peace Fellow and former Ambassador-at-large for Global Criminal Justice (2022 -2025)

*** Professor David Crane  is the Founding Chief Prosecutor of the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone and Distinguished Scholar in Residence at Syracuse University College of Law

**** Sindija Beta is the Legal Officer and Program Manager at the Public International Law & Policy Group

Stolen Childhoods: Russia’s Abduction of Ukrainian Children and the Case for Genocide

Stolen Childhoods: Russia’s Abduction of Ukrainian Children and the Case for Genocide

By: Dr. Gregory P. Noone and Kateryna Kyrychenko, PILPG, and Henry T. Scott, Dr. Andrea Eggenstein, Connor W. Reese, and Rafael Mozo Sierra, Milbank LLP

Imagine being a child torn from your home, your family, your language, and your identity — sent hundreds of miles away to a foreign country determined to erase who you are.

Since launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian state has forcibly taken thousands of Ukrainian children — orphans, those separated from parents during war, and children under state care — and relocated them to Russia. These children are not simply being “evacuated” for their safety. They are in fact being subjected to a systematic campaign of identity erasure, Russian adoption, and indoctrination.

This is obviously a war crime, and in all likelihood also meets the legal definition of genocide.

This blog explores the legal, moral, and human dimensions of Russia’s program of abducting Ukrainian children. Drawing on international law, tribunal precedent, and a growing body of evidence, we examine why the forced transfer and “Russification” of these children constitutes not only a violation of the Geneva Conventions — but potentially the gravest crime under international law: genocide.

Summary of Situation & Facts

Forcible transfer of Ukrainian children by Russia 

Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Russian government has transferred or abducted thousands of Ukrainian children to Russia by force and coercive measures, as reported by the US Government, the EU Parliament, and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. These forced transfers can be classified into three distinct categories: (i) transfer of children who have lost their parents either temporarily or permanently; (ii) transfer of children separated from their families at “filtration camps”; and (iii) transfer of children under institutional care.

What started in 2022 as a Russian program that was initially claimed to be aimed at fostering Ukrainian children with Russian families – at least, on the surface – rapidly evolved into an organized scheme for the permanent adoption or guardianship with Russian families. 

The Russification of children

Following detention at “filtration camps” where Russian officials screen ethnic background and political affiliation, certain children are transferred to Russian foster families or institutions, where they undergo an ideological re-education process. The Russian government has reportedly conducted this forced-transfers campaign with the aim of implementing a policy of Russification of the abducted children. 

Reports from international organizations and intelligence agencies have produced evidence that abducted children have been actively and systematically exposed, either at their Russian foster homes or at educational institutions, to Russian propaganda aimed at dissolving their Ukrainian identity. Russian officials have also mandated that the children attend pro-Russian festivities and Russian military schools. Russian foster families and officials have oftentimes disguised this re-education as psychological therapy. 

Several factors indicate that there is an active intent by the Russian government to erase the Ukrainian identity of the abducted children and to transform it into the Russian identity. In January 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree approving a fast-tracked procedure for the granting of Russian citizenship to recently deported Ukrainian children. As a further example, Russian high-ranking official Maria Lvova-Belova made public statements mentioning that, once the children were moved to Russia, they “drastically changed their anti-Russian ideas, as soon as they learned the Russian language and culture.”

The use of psychological manipulation and Russian propaganda by the foster families and the schooling system demonstrates that the intent is to not temporarily host Ukrainian children as war refugees, but to implement a state-led program to fully assimilate them into Russian culture and erase their original Ukrainian identity. 

Organized, systematic state-directed campaign

Evidence shows that this forced-transfers campaign is a fully organized, intentional, and systematic operation carried out by the Russian Federation with the aim of substantially altering local demographics in Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine and erasing Ukrainian identity. Russia’s system of coerced adoption and fostering has been ordered and facilitated by President Vladimir Putin and Russian officials, and it has involved the active collaboration of the State Duma, the Russian judiciary, and local officials in Russian-occupied territories.

The Legal Significance of the Child Transfers: From War Crimes to Genocide

Before addressing the legal classification of genocide, it is important to situate the forcible transfer of Ukrainian children within the broader framework of international criminal law. The Russian Federation’s actions during its ongoing aggression against Ukraine have resulted in a wide range of documented violations, including widespread physical and sexual attacks on civilians, torture, and the destruction of civilian infrastructure — many of which constitute war crimes and most likely crimes against humanity (see for instance the European Parliamentary Research Service’s February 2025 report or the March 2023 report from the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine established by the UN Human Rights Council).  Consequently, in March of 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, Russian Presidential Commissioner for Children's Rights, who stand accused of the war crime of unlawful deportation of population (children) and that of unlawful transfer of population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation. These developments underscore the international recognition of the illegality of Russia’s conduct with regard to Ukrainian children. Yet, the question remains whether the scale, coordination, and ideological nature of these actions — particularly the systemic erasure of Ukrainian identity through adoption, indoctrination, and identity obfuscation — may satisfy the criteria for a separate and more severe crime under international law: genocide.

What constitutes genocide?

The term “genocide” is often associated with the coordinated mass murder of ethnic, national, racial, or religious groups.  In fact, the literal meaning of the term [prefix from Greek “genos” (race or tribe) and suffix from Latin “cide” (from caedere, which means killing)], as coined by Polish lawyer Raphäel Lemkin in 1944, indeed evokes such connotation.  When the term “genocide” is referenced, one may immediately think of atrocities such as the campaign of ethnic extermination and collective punishment waged in Nazi Germany against, millions of Jews, Sinti, and Roma, the 1994 atrocities committed in Rwanda against the Tutsi population, or the mass murder of thousands Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica in 1995.  

However, the term “genocide” carries a much broader meaning. The term was first codified and defined as an independent crime in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the “Genocide Convention”), which has been ratified by 153 states as of May 2025, including the Russian Federation and Ukraine.  According to the International Court of Justice (the “ICJ”, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, concerned primarily with state responsibility rather than individual culpability), the Genocide Convention embodies principles that are part of general customary international law to which states are bound as a matter of law regardless of whether or not they have ratified the Genocide Convention and the prohibition of genocide is a peremptory norm of international law from which no derogation is allowed (see for instance the 2006 decision regarding Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo). 

The Genocide Convention defines certain “punishable acts” committed by individuals as genocide and establishes a duty for state parties to prevent genocide and to enact legislation to criminalize its commission, regardless of whether they are public officials or private individuals (see Articles I and IV).  Pursuant to Article III of the Genocide Convention, the following are “punishable acts” as referenced above: (i) genocide; (ii) conspiracy to commit genocide; (iii) direct and public incitement to commit genocide; (iv) attempt to commit genocide; and (v) complicity in genocide.  

Article II of the Genocide Convention defines “genocide” as follows: 

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

1. Killing members of the group;

2. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

3. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

4. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

5. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Can the forcible displacement and “Russification” of Ukrainian children by Russia be classified as genocide?

In 2023, the US House of Representatives passed a resolution “condemning the illegal abduction and forcible transfer of children from Ukraine to the Russian Federation”, declaring that “the Russian Federation is attempting to wipe out a generation of Ukrainian children” and that Russia’s abduction, transfer, and forcible adoption of Ukrainian children is “contrary to Russia’s obligations under the Genocide Convention and amounts to genocide.”

Resolution 2482 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (the “PACE”) demanded an immediate halt of forcible deportations of Ukrainian civilians, including children, explaining that the forcible transfer of children for “Russification purposes” could be punishable under Article II of the Genocide Convention, and “that the official Russian rhetoric used to justify the full-scale invasion and aggression against Ukraine, the so-called “de-Ukrainianisation” process, carries characteristics of public incitement to genocide or reveals a genocidal intent to destroy the Ukrainian national group as such or at least part of it.” 

A team of legal and genocide experts and open-source intelligence investigators concluded in 2022 that there were “reasonable grounds to believe” that Russia is responsible for violating Article II (genocide) and Article III(c) (direct and public incitement to commit genocide) of the Genocide Convention. While these grounds are a lesser standard of proof than required in applicable legal proceedings, this report is one of many giving credibility to the allegations of Russian crimes. This report is further supported by the 2024 Humanitarian Research Lab Report, which concluded that a broader case pursuing genocide convictions was plausible considering Russian atrocities in the region. 

Despite these physical indications, there are legal challenges in proving the crime of genocide; these challenges primarily manifest from the requirement of proving both genocide’s “physical” elements (murder etc.) and “mental” elements, with the mental specific intent elements creating the greatest evidentiary difficulty. In recent history, several courts or commissions were unable to confirm the existence of genocidal intent and hence were unable to conclude that genocide had been committed (e.g., the ICJ and commissions of inquiry regarding Former Yugoslavia, Sudan (Darfur), and the Central African Republic). 

The physical elements of genocide

The Ukrainian national group is protected under the Genocide Convention. As outlined above, there is ample and well-researched evidence of organized and forcible abductions of Ukrainian children to Russia, coupled with their “Russification”, including adoption by Russian nationals and obfuscation of their true identities.  The same applies in respect of other atrocities that may, in principle, form the basis of the “physical” element of genocide as set out above. The number of well-documented cases of atrocities (including known facilitators/perpetrators) and proven involvement of officials of the Russian Federation render it reasonably promising that at least the “physical elements” of the crime of genocide would be provable in a trial setting.  

The transfers appear to be organized at the highest level, are seemingly (mostly) permanent or structured so as to be permanent, brought about under coercion, and accompanied by identity obfuscation, “Russification”, and adoption by Russian citizens and outside the Ukrainian territory.  These actions go beyond objective humanitarian explanations to protect children from the impact of war as set out in the 1949 Geneva Conventions (specifically the Fourth Convention, concerning the protection of civilian persons in time of war) and the 1977 Additional Protocols (Protocol I).  As detailed by the 2024 Humanitarian Research Lab Report, there are convincing arguments to conclude that the afore-described systematic and widespread actions against Ukrainian children are not justifiable humanitarian actions on the basis of the following:

• Russia’s own unlawful actions have brought about the humanitarian crisis that now allegedly necessitates the children’s forced removal;

• the non-justifiably permanent character of the actions taken by Russia in respect of these children (including adoption, nationalization, and “Russification”);

• Russia’s systematic and organized violations of obligations even in a war to ensure/preserve family unity, transfer to neutral countries, and cultural/national identity of these children; 

• the systematic and widespread use of coercion, deception, obfuscation, and indoctrination (“Russification”) far beyond what could be reasonably argued to be driven by an objective or desire to simply protect children from the immediate effects of war; and 

• all of the foregoing happening under control and with the approval and knowledge of high-level Russian officials.

The mental elements of genocide

While the physical elements appear provable, the critical element of that definition of genocide and of most jurisprudence regarding genocide, is the requirement of the specific intent to commit the physical acts in Article II (a)-(e) whilst specifically targeting a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, which intent must be present (and proven beyond reasonable doubt) in addition to the intent attaching to the physical elements of the underlying acts (see for instance the Krstić appeal judgment, para 134 (“unequivocally established”)).  

Proving the specific intent (such as the intent to destroy) that goes beyond the intent associated with the physical elements of a crime is by nature challenging in the absence of a confession or written plan of the perpetrators. Nevertheless, when considered against the backdrop of Russian officials’ dehumanizing and aggressive rhetoric (see above and see the 2024 Humanitarian Research Lab Report and the 2022 report of legal and genocide experts) regarding the destruction of the Ukrainian people, the possibility of genocide becomes more likely.  

Martial rhetoric alone, however, does not prove targeted intent to destroy in the sense of the Genocide Convention.  However, it would be an important element in proving such intent since it is well established, including under jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (the “ICTY”) (e.g., Popović appeal judgement, para. 468), that the required intent may be inferred contextually in case of a lack of more direct evidence of a perpetrator’s volition from his words or deeds.  Such an approach need not and may not be “compartmentalized” in the sense of inferring such intent separately for each potential genocidal act, but may be based on all evidence taken together (as for instance confirmed in the ICTY’s Stakić appeal judgement, para. 55).  

Historically, the “intent to destroy” is widely interpreted, including by relevant international tribunals (e.g., Krstić appeal judgment on margin note 25), as “intent to physically or biologically destroy the protected group” (i.e., attacking mere cultural or sociological characteristics to annihilate them is not sufficient).  With this in mind it may appear difficult to prove the required specific intent in connection with only the forcible abduction of children of a group (unless as an accessory to other genocidal acts that involve acts of physical or biological destruction).  However, the fact that the forcible abduction and transfer of children of a group is defined in the Convention as a genocidal act if coupled with the requisite intent, implies that this conclusion is too narrow.  The Global Justice Center’s 2018 article on the spectrum of possible non-lethal genocidal violence and related intent is in our view instructive in this respect (including non-lethal acts of genocide, which are typically directed against females).  The Global Justice Center’s article advocates for a broader view that would “more easily encompass conduct that targets the social bond that bind individuals into a group” (see p. 33 et seqq., in particular p. 37) and focuses on genocide that may be perpetrated without killing (quoting, for instance, the broader views expressed in the 2006 Krajišnik ICTY trial judgement (see e.g., para. 854, footnote 1701)). 

Protecting Children and Obtaining Judgments

When it comes to obtaining actual judgements against individuals or against the Russian Federation, the existence of a genocidal intent may be a reasonable conclusion in light of the available evidence and applicable precedent (as expressed in several trial judgements, such as the ICJ 2015 genocide judgement, paras. 143 – 148).  Given the existing judicial focus on lethal acts of genocide and the fact that Russian acts concerning the forcible abduction of children are limited to the above-referenced group of children in Russian occupied territories with limited evidence of systematic lethal actions, proving that the forcible abduction in itself amounts to genocide may, however, be challenging in a trial setting.  But however challenging it may appear to be, it is certainly not impossible in the light of facts as known today. 

Today’s world is interconnected to an unprecedented extent. Russian actions and state-sanctioned violence against Ukrainians and Ukrainian children is well-documented, systematic, and widespread.  As referenced in the Global Justice Center’s 2018 article, a broader understanding of genocidal intent should apply. As the Global Justice Center’s article states, genocide is a crime of intent, and not of scale: “Where this special intent is present, the killing of a thousand people is no less a genocide than the killing of a million people”.  If the landscape of international law cannot presently accommodate the ever-changing nature of warfare and state action, international law must evolve. 

Russian officials may feel “safe” at present.  But the likes of Ratko Mladić and others show that Russian leadership cannot rejoice too early.  It is by no means certain that the perpetrators will indeed escape justice.  And even if that were the case: in the light of the outrageous nature of the reckless actions committed against (inter alia) vulnerable Ukrainian children we consider it legally sufficiently promising and morally imperative to accept the challenge of pursuing those responsible for possible genocidal acts committed against Ukrainians, and notably including against Ukrainian children.  

Considering all facts, a potential genocidal pattern and the vastness of the Russian state’s involvement are inescapable (see, for instance, the 2022 report of a team of legal and genocide experts and open-source intelligence investigators).  This pattern of state-directed child transfers, viewed in light of international law, warrants close and sustained legal examination under the Genocide Convention.

Elections in Ukraine: Between Peace Demands and Democratic Integrity

Elections in Ukraine: Between Peace Demands and Democratic Integrity

By: Dr. Paul R. Williams* and Sindija Beta**

As Ukraine navigates the most consequential peace negotiations in its modern history, the question of elections has again resurfaced during the most recent peace agreement drafts. The recently publicized 28-point plan, allegedly drafted by US and Russian officials, places elections soon after the cessation of hostilities as a requirement of any settlement. More recently, US President Trump accused Zelenskyy of prolonging the war to avoid holding elections, in response to which President Zelenskyy announced his readiness to hold elections even during martial law should security be ensured. 

Nonetheless, the unavoidable questions and issues that arise when elections in Ukraine are discussed are numerous. Martial law remains in place, during which elections are prohibited, millions of citizens are displaced internally or abroad, and large parts of the country remain under occupation. In this context, elections require more thinking than an arbitrary timeline in a poorly thought-through plan or baseless accusations of President Zelenskyy clinging to power. The challenge is to design an electoral process that is credible, inclusive, and secure, while resisting external pressure to rush toward a vote that could fracture Ukraine's hard-fought legitimacy.

Public debate reflects this tension. Civil society organizations such as Opora have outlined detailed roadmaps for postwar elections, emphasizing legal reform, diaspora inclusion, and international monitoring. Other institutions have likewise highlighted the risks of conducting elections during active armed conflict, noting that fairness and legitimacy are often compromised when security and freedoms are restricted. 

Challenges Facing Postwar Elections

There are a number of challenges that hinder Ukraine’s ability to hold elections. Beyond the initial hurdle of finding a legal solution to the prohibition on holding elections under martial law, which is currently in force but could arguably be lifted should a peace agreement be signed, there are other practical challenges to holding free and fair elections in Ukraine. This regards (1) the high numbers of displaced people in Ukraine and abroad, which makes registering voters difficult; and (2) meaningful political participation is restricted to those portions of the population that live under occupation and near the frontlines, as well as for those who have been conscripted to the military. The inability of active-duty soldiers to participate in elections raises serious questions about representation, particularly given the scale of mobilization during the war. 

More than six million Ukrainians remain abroad, with millions more internally displaced. Their participation is essential for legitimacy, but the legal framework and infrastructure in place would create significant obstacles for large portions of displaced people to participate in elections. Without secure absentee and diaspora voting, elections risk excluding vast segments of the electorate, creating a democracy that speaks only for those who remained.

Occupied territories present another obstacle. Conducting elections in regions under Russian control would risk legitimizing occupation. Comparative practice from places, such as Afghanistan or Iraq, shows that elections held under coercion or foreign control rarely produce durable legitimacy or peace. 

Security of polling stations is another critical concern. In areas close to the frontlines or even in Kyiv, polling places could become targets for Russian intimidation, sabotage, or direct attacks. Protecting voters and election workers will require professional civilian policing, security, international monitoring, and clear protocols to prevent interference by Russia. 

This is especially pertinent given Russia’s decades-long practice of interference in elections in other states. Such actions have ranged from disinformation campaigns to direct support for proxy actors, consistently undermining democratic processes. 

Indeed, elections held shortly after a ceasefire, let alone during active armed conflict, can be vulnerable to manipulation if the conditions for sovereignty and security are not firmly established. If elections are rushed before Ukraine has secured its institutions and electoral infrastructure, they could become another arena for Russian influence rather than a milestone of democratic renewal.

El Salvador’s Chapultepec Accords illustrate how sequencing matters. Electoral reform was treated as the foundation of peace, with institutional reform and international monitoring as the cornerstone of election preparation. Ukraine faces similar imperatives. Without safeguards and comprehensive security measures in place, which would include support from Ukraine’s allies, elections could legitimize Russian occupation and allow it to further manipulate and interfere with Ukraine’s internal matters or exclude displaced populations, undermining Ukraine’s democracy. 

Opora’s roadmap for postwar elections outlines practical steps for holding free and fair elections in Ukraine. These steps include legal and electoral reform for ensuring that all of the population, including displaced persons and those on military duty, can vote, conducting comprehensive security assessments, strengthening the information space to minimize Russian interference, and increasing campaigning transparency, among others. These are not steps that can or should be rushed. 

Moreover, narrative control will be central. Russia frames elections as proof of normalization, but Ukraine must counter by insisting on sovereignty-first sequencing. If elections are portrayed as concessions, they risk undermining Ukraine’s democratic identity. If they are framed as sovereign acts of resilience, they can become a powerful symbol of renewal.

Conclusion

Elections in Ukraine will inevitably be a defining feature of the country’s postwar settlement, but they cannot be reduced to a checkbox in a peace plan. Holding elections immediately after a ceasefire, without adequate preparation, risks exposing the process to Russian interference through disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, and manipulation of voter registries. It also risks disenfranchising millions of displaced Ukrainians who cannot easily access polling stations or register under the current frameworks.

A credible process depends on concrete steps: lifting martial law only once legal safeguards are in place, rebuilding voter registries to include displaced and diaspora populations, and creating security protocols for ensuring the security and integrity of polling stations. When it comes to occupied territories, the situation is even more difficult because voters in these areas, including Crimea and Donbas, should be able to participate in voting, but safeguards are required to ensure they are able to vote freely and that the election does not entrench an illegal occupation. 

These are issues that do not currently have solutions, and it would be irresponsible to overlook them due to external pressures. 

* Dr. Paul R. Williams is the Co-Founder and Director of the Public International Law & Policy Group and Rebecca Grazier Professor of Law and International Relations at American University

** Sindija Beta is the Legal Officer and Program Manager at the Public International Law & Policy Group

Roundtable Blog: Peace Without Possession—Preserving Ukraine’s Territorial Integrity in Negotiations

Roundtable Blog: Peace Without Possession—Preserving Ukraine’s Territorial Integrity in Negotiations

Editor’s Note:
This post is part of the PILPG Lawyering Justice blog’s roundtable series. Rather than a traditional co-authored piece, it presents a curated set of expert reflections from members of PILPG’s Ukraine Peace Negotiations Working Group. Drawing on the diverse expertise of our Peace Fellows, this roundtable-style blog explores the discussion surrounding Ukraine’s territorial integrity.  Published under the Lawyering Justice banner, this post reflects our commitment not only to chronicling the legal and diplomatic dimensions of active conflicts, but also to fostering strategic foresight and connecting lawyering to policy planning. We hope this format will serve as a model for future collaborative work on peace and justice.

***

In the context of ongoing hostilities, Ukraine faces a critical dilemma: how to enter into peace negotiations while lacking control over parts of its territory and with the understanding that negotiating the return of the territory is unlikely. The stakes are high. Any misstep could weaken Ukraine’s sovereignty claims, embolden future aggression, or fracture international consensus. With these risks in mind, the Public International Law & Policy Group’s Ukraine Peace Negotiations Working Group convened a roundtable to examine the legal, political, and strategic dimensions of preserving territorial integrity in the absence of de facto control.

Participants were asked to consider six interrelated questions: what is the legal basis for assessing territorial questions in Ukraine; how Ukraine can best negotiate without possession; what legal instruments preserve territorial claims over time; how EU and NATO pathways intersect with unresolved occupation; how to navigate dueling constitutional claims; and whether strategic ambiguity risks weakening Ukraine’s legal position. The discussion drew on comparative precedents, international law, and realpolitik assessments of the current diplomatic landscape.

The purpose of this public-facing Roundtable Blog is threefold: to inform Ukrainian policymakers and Peace Formula stakeholders of the legal and strategic variables shaping territorial negotiations; to connect Ukraine-focused expertise with broader international practice; and to provide analytically grounded perspectives that can guide the development of durable, sovereignty-preserving peace frameworks.

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1. Territorial Integrity

What is the legal framework in which territorial questions should be assessed during peace negotiations?

Dr. Paul R. Williams

Any peace negotiations in Ukraine must be conducted within the framework of international law that categorically prohibits the acquisition of territory through aggression and affirms the principle of territorial integrity as enshrined in the UN Charter. The law of occupation makes clear that effective control does not alter sovereignty, meaning Ukraine’s legal title to its territory remains intact regardless of Russia’s presence on the ground. Negotiations must therefore assess territorial questions through the lens of continuity of non-recognition of unlawful annexation, ensuring that temporary arrangements or ceasefire lines are not mistaken for permanent borders. This framework preserves Ukraine’s sovereign rights while preventing the normalization of territorial conquest in international practice.

Sindija Beta

Any peace negotiations in Ukraine must recognize that territorial integrity is not simply a legal principle but a political safeguard against legitimizing aggression. International law prohibits territorial acquisition by force, and past precedents show that concessions made under pressure often become permanent fractures in rule of law. Ukraine’s legal title to its territory remains intact despite Russia’s military control, but negotiations must be structured to prevent Moscow from altering legal norms based on military force. Territorial questions should therefore be addressed as matters of international law, ensuring that the process reinforces international norms rather than erodes them.

Kateryna Kyrychenko

Territorial questions in peace negotiations must also account for the cultural rights at stake in the territories under temporary occupation. International human rights law guarantees the right of all communities to maintain their language, education, and cultural identity - rights that have been systematically violated in the occupied regions through forced Russification, the suppression of Ukrainian education, and efforts to erase local cultural heritage. These rights can only be meaningfully protected within Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders and under its legitimate authority.

Russia’s attempts to justify annexation through claims of “self-determination” or cultural protection have no legal basis: cultural rights are safeguarded through respect for territorial integrity, not through coerced referenda or occupation. Any peace negotiations must therefore reinforce non-recognition of Russia’s unlawful annexations and affirm that restoring Ukraine’s sovereignty is essential to protecting the cultural rights of affected communities.

Ambassador Ylber Hysa

Ukraine’s territorial integrity must remain the unambiguous end state of any negotiation process. It should not be reduced to declarative legal rhetoric. To reach this end state, the Ukrainian side may consider tactical and temporary transitional arrangements that facilitate the conditions for eventual full territorial reintegration.

These transitional steps would not replace or weaken Ukraine’s sovereignty claims. Rather, they provide operational pathways to realize them.

A feasible component of such a transitional framework is the establishment of a Peacekeeping Transitional Period (PTP) within the currently Russian-occupied territories. This PTP would operate under a UN-mandated or internationally mandated peacekeeping mission for a defined period (e.g., five years).

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2. Peace Without Possession

How can Ukraine enter into a peace agreement while lacking control over parts of its territory without undermining its long-term legal claim to those regions?

Professor Michael Kelly

Overlaying a current military control map with Ukraine’s geological survey reveals that the western parts of Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia, which are still under Ukrainian control, contain significant rare earth mineral deposits. These resources are likely to become bargaining chips in any transactional negotiation, particularly given that the Trump administration has already signed a rare earths deal with Ukraine. This dynamic is expected to shape trilateral discussions between Trump, Zelenskyy, and Putin. A recent Just Security article co-authored with Craig Martin outlines this scenario in greater detail.

Ambassador Ylber Hysa

The western parts of Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia, currently Ukrainian-controlled areas, contain significant rare earth mineral deposits, which may become a factor in negotiations, particularly within a transactional framework associated with a potential future U.S. administration.

However, comparable geological resources exist in the Russian-occupied territories as well. These resources should therefore be integrated into negotiation strategies as potential assets. A useful historical precedent is the post–World War II Saar–Ruhr arrangements, where resource governance played a stabilizing and cooperative role without undermining national sovereignty.

Professor David Crane

Neither Putin nor Zelenskyy is politically positioned to concede territory. Putin has suffered too many casualties to retreat without consequence, and Zelenskyy would face political collapse if he conceded land after such sacrifice. This impasse suggests that the war is unlikely to end soon. One possible approach is to establish local self-governance in the occupied provinces under a ceasefire, supported by neutral third-party peacekeepers modeled on the Sinai mission. However, any such arrangement must rest on the international community’s continued recognition of these regions as Ukrainian territory.

Professor Milena Sterio

Under the law of occupation, control does not equate to sovereignty. Ukraine retains its de jure claim to all territories currently under Russian control. This legal distinction must be preserved in any peace framework, as it forms the foundation for future reintegration and international support.

Ambassador Elayne Whyte Gomez

The current situation represents a new paradigm. While the international community has consistently recognized Ukraine’s borders, which have been affirmed in seven UNGA resolutions, this year's events at UNGA and UN Security Council changed some configurations and alliances at the UN regarding some Ukraine-sponsored texts. Any peace process must remain anchored in international recognition to avoid legitimizing aggression through ambiguity.

Ambassador Zorica Marić-Djordjević

Ukraine can enter into peace negotiations without conceding sovereignty by managing occupation rather than ratifying it. International law prohibits the acquisition of territory by force. Peace agreements must include “without prejudice” clauses, avoid sovereignty language, and refer to occupied areas as “territories temporarily outside the effective control of the Government of Ukraine.” These legal choices are essential to shaping a post-war order that upholds international norms.

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3. Legal Instruments for Continuity

What international legal instruments or precedents can Ukraine invoke to preserve its territorial claims over the long term?

Professor Milena Sterio

The law of occupation and the principle of non-recognition of territorial acquisition by force are Ukraine’s strongest legal tools. These doctrines have been upheld in numerous conflicts and must be embedded in any peace agreement. The agreement should avoid any implication of territorial transfer and instead reinforce Ukraine’s continuing legal title.

Ambassador Zorica Marić-Djordjević

Operationalizing legal continuity requires the use of administrative and security language rather than sovereignty terms. Ceasefire lines must not be mistaken for borders, and demilitarized zones must not imply territorial concessions. The legal framing must reflect temporary control, not permanent change, to ensure that Ukraine’s territorial claims remain intact.

Professor David Crane

Putin is relying on time and distraction to wear down Ukraine and its allies. In contrast, consistent international recognition serves as Ukraine’s legal and diplomatic shield. The tools exist; the challenge lies in using them visibly and persistently. Sustained and coordinated use of these instruments will ensure that Ukraine’s sovereignty remains protected even in the absence of immediate territorial control.

Ambassador Elayne Whyte Gomez

Ukraine’s principled legal position is gaining traction, particularly in the non-aligned countries. Many smaller states now see their own struggles reflected in Ukraine’s experience. This emerging solidarity could become a powerful force in sustaining legal continuity and resisting the normalization of occupation.

Ambassador Ylber Hysa

Ukraine can engage in peace negotiations without recognizing or legitimizing the occupation by adopting a framework that focuses on managing the temporary situation rather than accepting any permanent change.

To ensure this, ceasefire lines must not be interpreted as borders, demilitarized zones must not imply territorial concessions, and all legal and diplomatic language should explicitly describe any control arrangements as temporary and linked to a defined peacekeeping mandate. This approach preserves Ukraine’s sovereignty claims and prevents any de facto normalization of the occupation. It maintains the legal and political foundation for full territorial restoration once the international environment becomes more favorable.

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4. EU and NATO Pathways

How should Ukraine’s territorial integrity be addressed in the context of EU accession or NATO integration, particularly if parts of its territory remain under foreign control?

Professor David Crane

EU accession remains one of the most powerful strategic signals the international community can send to Russia. It demonstrates that Europe is not prepared to walk away from Ukraine’s future. The credibility of this pathway lies not only in its symbolic value but in its potential to unlock long-term political and economic integration that reinforces Ukraine’s sovereignty.

Ambassador Elizabeth Richard

NATO membership is politically untenable in the current climate. It remains a red line for Russia and would likely trigger disproportionate demands in any negotiation. In contrast, EU membership is both strategically viable and politically palatable. It offers Ukraine a credible path forward without escalating tensions, and it should be prioritized accordingly.

H. E. Dr. Igor Luksic

The EU path is not only a matter of legal alignment but also of strategic necessity. Ukraine’s integration into the EU could unlock vital resources for reconstruction, economic stabilization, and institutional reform. The precedent of Finland’s post-war transformation is instructive. While not directly analogous, it illustrates how strategic alignment with Europe can serve as a stabilizing force. Ukraine should insist on this track with greater urgency.

Professor Michael Kelly

Cyprus provides a compelling precedent. Despite being territorially divided following Turkey’s 1974 invasion and the continued occupation of the northern part of the island, Cyprus acceded to the European Union in 2004 with the strong advocacy of Greece acting as its sponsor state. The EU’s legal framework accommodated this division by suspending the application of EU law in the occupied areas while affirming the Republic of Cyprus’s sovereignty over the entire island, thereby preserving the principle of non-recognition of occupation. For Ukraine, the precedent demonstrates that full and effective territorial control is not an absolute prerequisite for EU membership, provided there is a committed sponsor or coalition of states willing to champion its accession. The decisive factor will be whether EU leaders summon the political will to treat Ukraine’s membership as a strategic move that signals Europe’s refusal to compromise on sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Ambassador Zorica Marić-Djordjević

The legal and political layers of EU accession must be addressed in tandem. While full and effective control is typically required, the Cyprus model demonstrates that suspended application of EU law in occupied territories is feasible. What matters is that the EU explicitly affirms Ukraine’s territorial integrity and commits to reintegration and reconstruction. The EU should treat Ukraine’s accession as a strategic imperative, not a procedural formality.

Tyler Thompson

Russia’s preferred model for Ukraine is Austrian-style neutrality—a Cold War-era posture that avoids NATO alignment while preserving nominal sovereignty. EU membership, however, is a tolerable outcome for Moscow and should be leveraged accordingly. The United States should press Brussels to make a political decision, as it did with Portugal and Spain after their transitions from dictatorship. Strategic ambiguity on this front only benefits Russia.

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5. Constitutional Claims

How can Ukraine navigate the fact that both it and Russia enshrine Donbas and Crimea in their constitutions?

Dr. Paul R. Williams

The challenge of dueling constitutional claims is not new, but it is particularly acute in this context.  The international community must avoid falling into the trap of false equivalence. Its legal position is grounded in international law, while Russia’s rests on unilateral assertions and coercive annexation. The distinction must be made explicit in every negotiation and public communication.

Tyler Thompson

Russia has long used constitutional amendments and legal rhetoric to accumulate bargaining chips. This is part of a broader lawfare strategy, refined through its experiences in Georgia and Kosovo. The goal is not legal clarity but leverage. Ukraine and its allies must anticipate this and ensure that international legal standards, rather than domestic proclamations, frame the discussion.

Professor Milena Sterio

International law provides clear criteria for the legitimacy of referenda and declarations of independence. Any referendum must be free, fair, and conducted without coercion. Unilateral declarations obtained through force are invalid. Ukraine’s legal position is strong if it continues to emphasize these principles and avoids mirroring Russia’s constitutional framing.

Ambassador Zorica Marić-Djordjević

Russia’s invocation of Kosovo is legally flawed. Moscow repeatedly cites Kosovo as precedent in order to justify its annexation of Crimea and its claims over occupied Ukrainian territories, arguing that the West recognized unilateral secession in Kosovo and therefore cannot deny Russia the same right. This comparison, however, ignores critical distinctions. Kosovo was not annexed; Crimea was. Kosovo operated under a UN mandate and international oversight; Russia acted unilaterally and by force. Moreover, Serbia’s constitution still claims Kosovo, but that has not altered Kosovo’s international status. Ukraine must highlight these differences and reject any narrative that equates its legal position with Russia’s, underscoring that Russia’s reliance on Kosovo is a political tactic rather than a valid legal precedent.

Professor David Crane

Domestic constitutional claims are a distraction. They do not override international law and should not be treated as legitimate bargaining tools. Ukraine’s legal team must remain focused on international norms and avoid being drawn into debates over internal legal texts.

Ambassador Elayne Whyte Gomez

There is growing awareness among the non-aligned states of the power dynamics at play in Ukraine’s case. This creates an opportunity for Ukraine to build broader coalitions and reinforce its legal position through shared experience and solidarity. The moment is ripe for strategic engagement beyond traditional allies. Many of these states have themselves faced pressures from larger powers and are increasingly sensitive to questions of sovereignty and territorial integrity. By framing its struggle as part of a wider global narrative against coercion and annexation, Ukraine can strengthen its legitimacy and broaden the base of international support.

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6. Strategic Ambiguity vs. Legal Clarity

Can Ukraine afford to use strategic ambiguity in peace negotiations, or does this risk weakening its long-term legal claim?

Professor Milena Sterio

Strategic ambiguity may offer tactical flexibility, but it carries long-term risks. Any ambiguity in the legal framing of a peace agreement could be exploited to undermine Ukraine’s territorial claims. The agreement must clearly distinguish between temporary arrangements and permanent sovereignty. Legal clarity is essential to preserving Ukraine’s rights under international law.

Tyler Thompson

Russia thrives in legal grey zones. Its lawfare strategy depends on exploiting ambiguity and reframing facts on the ground as legal precedent. Ukraine cannot afford to leave gaps in its legal position. Every omission becomes an opportunity for reinterpretation. The peace framework must be airtight.

Ambassador Elizabeth Richard

While the U.S. administration may appear distracted, the Department of Defense remains deeply engaged. There is still significant political and financial investment in Ukraine’s success, even if it operates below the radar. That institutional commitment should be leveraged to support a peace framework grounded in legal clarity and strategic foresight.

Ambassador Ylber Hysa

Peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia should be understood not as a single event, but as a complex, evolving process. Within this framework, Ukraine’s territorial integrity must be treated as an active strategic objective, guiding the negotiation dynamics rather than existing solely as a formal legal principle.

In this context, strategic ambiguity does not contradict legal clarity. Instead, it can serve as a pragmatic tool for securing Ukraine’s long-term strategic red lines while preserving diplomatic flexibility during negotiations.

*

Professor Michael Kelly: Professor at Creighton University School of Law and The Senator Allen A. Sekt Endowed Chair in Law

Professor David Crane: Founding Chief Prosecutor of the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone and Distinguished Scholar in Residence at Syracuse University College of Law

Professor Milena Sterio, the James A. Thomas Distinguished Professor of Law at Cleveland State University's Cleveland-Marshall College of Law and Managing Director at PILPG

Ambassador Elayne Whyte Gomez: Senior Fellow of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research, Professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and former Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the United Nations

Ambassador Zorica Marić-Djordjević: Former Head of the Permanent Mission of Montenegro to the WTO and Special Representative to the UN Human Rights Council

Ambassador Elizabeth Richard: Former U.S. Ambassador and Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and Stabilization Operations

H. E. Dr. Igor Luksic: the former Prime Minister of Montenegro

Tyler Thompson: Chief Negotiation Officer & Co-Founder, Expeditionary

Ambassador Ylber Hysa: Former Ambassador of the Republic of Kosovo to Montenegro and North Macedonia

Dr. Paul R. Williams: Rebecca Grazier Professor of Law and International Relations at American University

Sindija Beta: Legal Officer at Public International Law & Policy Group

Kateryna Kyrychenko: Head of Ukraine Legal Affairs and Program Management at Public International Law & Policy Group

Nuclear Testing: An Inflection Point or Another Step Toward Confrontation?

Nuclear Testing: An Inflection Point or Another Step Toward Confrontation?

By Ambassador (Ret.) Zorica Maric Djordjevic, Senior Peace Fellow, Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG)

A New Round Begins in Moscow

By late October 2025, two troubling signals came from the world’s most powerful military nations — Russia and the United States.

The first move came from Moscow. President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia had completed tests of two nuclear-powered delivery systems. These were Burevestnik, a long-range cruise missile, and Poseidon, an underwater torpedo designed to devastate coastal regions with a radioactive surge. Both, reportedly, could evade existing missile defenses, creating a direct challenge to U.S. plans to build an expanded “Golden Dome.” Russian officials later clarified that both tests were non-nuclear, involving delivery systems rather than atomic warheads.

Within days, President Trump declared that the United States would keep pace with China and Russia and instructed the Department of War to resume nuclear-weapons testing. Officials later noted that such tests might involve system components rather than full detonations. Soon afterward, Washington unveiled its next-generation stealth nuclear cruise missile, the AGM-181 LRSO, signaling that the U.S. would match or outpace its rivals.

Putin responded by ordering the preparation of proposals for Russian nuclear testing should Washington proceed. “If the U.S. conducts such tests,” he said, “Russia must also take appropriate retaliatory steps.”

These exchanges rekindled the specter of superpower rivalry and signaled a return to competitive deterrence. For more than three decades, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has embodied a global consensus against nuclear explosions. Though the Treaty has not entered into force due to several key states not ratifying it (including the U.S., China, Iran, India, Pakistan, and North Korea), it has created a powerful informal norm. The global monitoring system of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) ensures nearly certain detection.

Since 1996, only India, Pakistan, and North Korea have violated this norm, and each test was detected. Russia’s and Washington’s recent announced decisions risk unraveling this restraint:

• Vertically, by legitimizing renewed testing and modernization among established nuclear powers.

• Horizontally, by weakening the normative barrier that deters aspirants from pursuing nuclear weapons.

Arms control rests on predictability. The long-standing assumption that no major power would resume nuclear testing preserved a baseline of trust. Once that assumption erodes, the architecture weakens. A return to testing may not ignite an immediate arms race, but it increases uncertainty and shifts future negotiations toward escalation management rather than risk reduction.

A Global Ripple Effect

Moscow’s reaction following Putin’s initial comments remains mixed. While the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought clarity on whether Washington intended to conduct full explosive tests or limited system trials, Putin warned of reciprocal actions that could inject volatility into an already fragile arms-control architecture. Nuclear parity has long anchored Russia’s conception of sovereignty and great power status. Any U.S. move toward testing, even a symbolic one, is seen through this lens. Putin’s unveiling of new nuclear systems added a deliberate symmetry: technological display as diplomacy.

Moreover, the revival of nuclear testing reverberates far beyond the U.S.–Russia dyad. China, which has not conducted explosive tests in decades but continues to modernize its arsenal rapidly, may feel compelled to respond. Even a symbolic U.S. test could accelerate strategic competition among the three major powers and undermine the CTBT’s already fragile authority.

For smaller and non-nuclear states — from Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans to the South Caucasus — renewed great-power signaling produces deep unease. Their security rests on predictable conduct by major powers and the credibility of international law. When deterrence eclipses dialogue, these foundations weaken.

In contrast, large parts of the Global South, including Latin America, Africa, Southeast Asia, and the South Pacific, remain firmly committed to Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones. Their stance underscores a widening divide between states anchored in legal restraint and those asserting power through capability.

The long-standing nuclear taboo, driven by political restraint rather than formal rules, is now less certain.

The Ukraine Factor: Negotiations Under Nuclear Shadows

The current nuclear signaling between Russia and the United States does not take place in isolation; the war in Ukraine directly shapes it. Nuclear security has become part of the negotiating environment itself, not a parallel or distant issue. As a result, any diplomatic endgame must now account for:

• Why nuclear brinkmanship has intensified,

• How it reshapes incentives and red lines of all parties, and

• Why nuclear stability is becoming an important pillar of a future peace framework.

For Ukraine, the impact is double-edged. A more assertive U.S. posture offers reassurance, but it may also encourage Moscow to prolong the conflict in hopes of generating pressure on Washington. The risk is that negotiations devolve into a test of political endurance rather than a search for compromise — a dynamic in which deterrence logic overwhelms diplomacy.

Because recent Russian and U.S. announcements - from new Russian delivery systems to Washington’s intention to resume nuclear testing - demonstrate that strategic deterrence is once again contested, the new “28-point U.S. peace proposal” places renewed emphasis on credible Ukrainian security guarantees. These proposed “reliable guarantees” may fall short of full NATO membership and reportedly include meaningful restrictions on Ukraine, but they also reflect a core reality: when the nuclear threshold is publicly challenged, Ukraine’s vulnerability increases, and normative deterrence alone becomes insufficient. If deterrence is under strain at the nuclear level, it must be reinforced at the conventional and strategic levels for Ukraine. Without that reinforcement, any peace settlement risks becoming unstable – or even unworkable.

For Europe, caught between deterrence and diplomacy, the challenge is to keep communication channels open, especially for nuclear risk-reduction and humanitarian issues, even as the broader strategic environment hardens. 

Ultimately, nuclear signaling does not close the door to negotiations, but changes their architecture. The task for Washington is to convert deterrence into diplomatic leverage, using strength not to foreclose talks, but to enable them. In the end, nuclear testing may strengthen military power, but it weakens trust, the essential currency of diplomacy. The world now stands between a harder peace or a more protracted war.

Between Deterrence and Diplomacy

If Washington and Moscow continue to define strength through demonstration rather than dialogue, the space for diplomacy — especially on Ukraine — will continue to contract. What emerges may not resemble the classical Cold War arms race, but something more unstable: a world where uncertainty itself becomes a strategic instrument.

Whether this moment becomes a turning point or merely another step toward confrontation depends on how the major powers act. Nuclear testing can stabilize deterrence or destabilize diplomacy. Managed wisely, it could remind all sides of the catastrophic costs of miscalculation and ground arms control. Mishandled, it risks opening a new cycle of escalation.