Elections in Ukraine: Between Peace Demands and Democratic Integrity

Elections in Ukraine: Between Peace Demands and Democratic Integrity

By: Dr. Paul R. Williams* and Sindija Beta**

As Ukraine navigates the most consequential peace negotiations in its modern history, the question of elections has again resurfaced during the most recent peace agreement drafts. The recently publicized 28-point plan, allegedly drafted by US and Russian officials, places elections soon after the cessation of hostilities as a requirement of any settlement. More recently, US President Trump accused Zelenskyy of prolonging the war to avoid holding elections, in response to which President Zelenskyy announced his readiness to hold elections even during martial law should security be ensured. 

Nonetheless, the unavoidable questions and issues that arise when elections in Ukraine are discussed are numerous. Martial law remains in place, during which elections are prohibited, millions of citizens are displaced internally or abroad, and large parts of the country remain under occupation. In this context, elections require more thinking than an arbitrary timeline in a poorly thought-through plan or baseless accusations of President Zelenskyy clinging to power. The challenge is to design an electoral process that is credible, inclusive, and secure, while resisting external pressure to rush toward a vote that could fracture Ukraine's hard-fought legitimacy.

Public debate reflects this tension. Civil society organizations such as Opora have outlined detailed roadmaps for postwar elections, emphasizing legal reform, diaspora inclusion, and international monitoring. Other institutions have likewise highlighted the risks of conducting elections during active armed conflict, noting that fairness and legitimacy are often compromised when security and freedoms are restricted. 

Challenges Facing Postwar Elections

There are a number of challenges that hinder Ukraine’s ability to hold elections. Beyond the initial hurdle of finding a legal solution to the prohibition on holding elections under martial law, which is currently in force but could arguably be lifted should a peace agreement be signed, there are other practical challenges to holding free and fair elections in Ukraine. This regards (1) the high numbers of displaced people in Ukraine and abroad, which makes registering voters difficult; and (2) meaningful political participation is restricted to those portions of the population that live under occupation and near the frontlines, as well as for those who have been conscripted to the military. The inability of active-duty soldiers to participate in elections raises serious questions about representation, particularly given the scale of mobilization during the war. 

More than six million Ukrainians remain abroad, with millions more internally displaced. Their participation is essential for legitimacy, but the legal framework and infrastructure in place would create significant obstacles for large portions of displaced people to participate in elections. Without secure absentee and diaspora voting, elections risk excluding vast segments of the electorate, creating a democracy that speaks only for those who remained.

Occupied territories present another obstacle. Conducting elections in regions under Russian control would risk legitimizing occupation. Comparative practice from places, such as Afghanistan or Iraq, shows that elections held under coercion or foreign control rarely produce durable legitimacy or peace. 

Security of polling stations is another critical concern. In areas close to the frontlines or even in Kyiv, polling places could become targets for Russian intimidation, sabotage, or direct attacks. Protecting voters and election workers will require professional civilian policing, security, international monitoring, and clear protocols to prevent interference by Russia. 

This is especially pertinent given Russia’s decades-long practice of interference in elections in other states. Such actions have ranged from disinformation campaigns to direct support for proxy actors, consistently undermining democratic processes. 

Indeed, elections held shortly after a ceasefire, let alone during active armed conflict, can be vulnerable to manipulation if the conditions for sovereignty and security are not firmly established. If elections are rushed before Ukraine has secured its institutions and electoral infrastructure, they could become another arena for Russian influence rather than a milestone of democratic renewal.

El Salvador’s Chapultepec Accords illustrate how sequencing matters. Electoral reform was treated as the foundation of peace, with institutional reform and international monitoring as the cornerstone of election preparation. Ukraine faces similar imperatives. Without safeguards and comprehensive security measures in place, which would include support from Ukraine’s allies, elections could legitimize Russian occupation and allow it to further manipulate and interfere with Ukraine’s internal matters or exclude displaced populations, undermining Ukraine’s democracy. 

Opora’s roadmap for postwar elections outlines practical steps for holding free and fair elections in Ukraine. These steps include legal and electoral reform for ensuring that all of the population, including displaced persons and those on military duty, can vote, conducting comprehensive security assessments, strengthening the information space to minimize Russian interference, and increasing campaigning transparency, among others. These are not steps that can or should be rushed. 

Moreover, narrative control will be central. Russia frames elections as proof of normalization, but Ukraine must counter by insisting on sovereignty-first sequencing. If elections are portrayed as concessions, they risk undermining Ukraine’s democratic identity. If they are framed as sovereign acts of resilience, they can become a powerful symbol of renewal.

Conclusion

Elections in Ukraine will inevitably be a defining feature of the country’s postwar settlement, but they cannot be reduced to a checkbox in a peace plan. Holding elections immediately after a ceasefire, without adequate preparation, risks exposing the process to Russian interference through disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, and manipulation of voter registries. It also risks disenfranchising millions of displaced Ukrainians who cannot easily access polling stations or register under the current frameworks.

A credible process depends on concrete steps: lifting martial law only once legal safeguards are in place, rebuilding voter registries to include displaced and diaspora populations, and creating security protocols for ensuring the security and integrity of polling stations. When it comes to occupied territories, the situation is even more difficult because voters in these areas, including Crimea and Donbas, should be able to participate in voting, but safeguards are required to ensure they are able to vote freely and that the election does not entrench an illegal occupation. 

These are issues that do not currently have solutions, and it would be irresponsible to overlook them due to external pressures. 

* Dr. Paul R. Williams is the Co-Founder and Director of the Public International Law & Policy Group and Rebecca Grazier Professor of Law and International Relations at American University

** Sindija Beta is the Legal Officer and Program Manager at the Public International Law & Policy Group

Roundtable Blog: Peace Without Possession—Preserving Ukraine’s Territorial Integrity in Negotiations

Roundtable Blog: Peace Without Possession—Preserving Ukraine’s Territorial Integrity in Negotiations

Editor’s Note:
This post is part of the PILPG Lawyering Justice blog’s roundtable series. Rather than a traditional co-authored piece, it presents a curated set of expert reflections from members of PILPG’s Ukraine Peace Negotiations Working Group. Drawing on the diverse expertise of our Peace Fellows, this roundtable-style blog explores the discussion surrounding Ukraine’s territorial integrity.  Published under the Lawyering Justice banner, this post reflects our commitment not only to chronicling the legal and diplomatic dimensions of active conflicts, but also to fostering strategic foresight and connecting lawyering to policy planning. We hope this format will serve as a model for future collaborative work on peace and justice.

***

In the context of ongoing hostilities, Ukraine faces a critical dilemma: how to enter into peace negotiations while lacking control over parts of its territory and with the understanding that negotiating the return of the territory is unlikely. The stakes are high. Any misstep could weaken Ukraine’s sovereignty claims, embolden future aggression, or fracture international consensus. With these risks in mind, the Public International Law & Policy Group’s Ukraine Peace Negotiations Working Group convened a roundtable to examine the legal, political, and strategic dimensions of preserving territorial integrity in the absence of de facto control.

Participants were asked to consider six interrelated questions: what is the legal basis for assessing territorial questions in Ukraine; how Ukraine can best negotiate without possession; what legal instruments preserve territorial claims over time; how EU and NATO pathways intersect with unresolved occupation; how to navigate dueling constitutional claims; and whether strategic ambiguity risks weakening Ukraine’s legal position. The discussion drew on comparative precedents, international law, and realpolitik assessments of the current diplomatic landscape.

The purpose of this public-facing Roundtable Blog is threefold: to inform Ukrainian policymakers and Peace Formula stakeholders of the legal and strategic variables shaping territorial negotiations; to connect Ukraine-focused expertise with broader international practice; and to provide analytically grounded perspectives that can guide the development of durable, sovereignty-preserving peace frameworks.

—

1. Territorial Integrity

What is the legal framework in which territorial questions should be assessed during peace negotiations?

Dr. Paul R. Williams

Any peace negotiations in Ukraine must be conducted within the framework of international law that categorically prohibits the acquisition of territory through aggression and affirms the principle of territorial integrity as enshrined in the UN Charter. The law of occupation makes clear that effective control does not alter sovereignty, meaning Ukraine’s legal title to its territory remains intact regardless of Russia’s presence on the ground. Negotiations must therefore assess territorial questions through the lens of continuity of non-recognition of unlawful annexation, ensuring that temporary arrangements or ceasefire lines are not mistaken for permanent borders. This framework preserves Ukraine’s sovereign rights while preventing the normalization of territorial conquest in international practice.

Sindija Beta

Any peace negotiations in Ukraine must recognize that territorial integrity is not simply a legal principle but a political safeguard against legitimizing aggression. International law prohibits territorial acquisition by force, and past precedents show that concessions made under pressure often become permanent fractures in rule of law. Ukraine’s legal title to its territory remains intact despite Russia’s military control, but negotiations must be structured to prevent Moscow from altering legal norms based on military force. Territorial questions should therefore be addressed as matters of international law, ensuring that the process reinforces international norms rather than erodes them.

Kateryna Kyrychenko

Territorial questions in peace negotiations must also account for the cultural rights at stake in the territories under temporary occupation. International human rights law guarantees the right of all communities to maintain their language, education, and cultural identity - rights that have been systematically violated in the occupied regions through forced Russification, the suppression of Ukrainian education, and efforts to erase local cultural heritage. These rights can only be meaningfully protected within Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders and under its legitimate authority.

Russia’s attempts to justify annexation through claims of “self-determination” or cultural protection have no legal basis: cultural rights are safeguarded through respect for territorial integrity, not through coerced referenda or occupation. Any peace negotiations must therefore reinforce non-recognition of Russia’s unlawful annexations and affirm that restoring Ukraine’s sovereignty is essential to protecting the cultural rights of affected communities.

Ambassador Ylber Hysa

Ukraine’s territorial integrity must remain the unambiguous end state of any negotiation process. It should not be reduced to declarative legal rhetoric. To reach this end state, the Ukrainian side may consider tactical and temporary transitional arrangements that facilitate the conditions for eventual full territorial reintegration.

These transitional steps would not replace or weaken Ukraine’s sovereignty claims. Rather, they provide operational pathways to realize them.

A feasible component of such a transitional framework is the establishment of a Peacekeeping Transitional Period (PTP) within the currently Russian-occupied territories. This PTP would operate under a UN-mandated or internationally mandated peacekeeping mission for a defined period (e.g., five years).

—

2. Peace Without Possession

How can Ukraine enter into a peace agreement while lacking control over parts of its territory without undermining its long-term legal claim to those regions?

Professor Michael Kelly

Overlaying a current military control map with Ukraine’s geological survey reveals that the western parts of Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia, which are still under Ukrainian control, contain significant rare earth mineral deposits. These resources are likely to become bargaining chips in any transactional negotiation, particularly given that the Trump administration has already signed a rare earths deal with Ukraine. This dynamic is expected to shape trilateral discussions between Trump, Zelenskyy, and Putin. A recent Just Security article co-authored with Craig Martin outlines this scenario in greater detail.

Ambassador Ylber Hysa

The western parts of Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia, currently Ukrainian-controlled areas, contain significant rare earth mineral deposits, which may become a factor in negotiations, particularly within a transactional framework associated with a potential future U.S. administration.

However, comparable geological resources exist in the Russian-occupied territories as well. These resources should therefore be integrated into negotiation strategies as potential assets. A useful historical precedent is the post–World War II Saar–Ruhr arrangements, where resource governance played a stabilizing and cooperative role without undermining national sovereignty.

Professor David Crane

Neither Putin nor Zelenskyy is politically positioned to concede territory. Putin has suffered too many casualties to retreat without consequence, and Zelenskyy would face political collapse if he conceded land after such sacrifice. This impasse suggests that the war is unlikely to end soon. One possible approach is to establish local self-governance in the occupied provinces under a ceasefire, supported by neutral third-party peacekeepers modeled on the Sinai mission. However, any such arrangement must rest on the international community’s continued recognition of these regions as Ukrainian territory.

Professor Milena Sterio

Under the law of occupation, control does not equate to sovereignty. Ukraine retains its de jure claim to all territories currently under Russian control. This legal distinction must be preserved in any peace framework, as it forms the foundation for future reintegration and international support.

Ambassador Elayne Whyte Gomez

The current situation represents a new paradigm. While the international community has consistently recognized Ukraine’s borders, which have been affirmed in seven UNGA resolutions, this year's events at UNGA and UN Security Council changed some configurations and alliances at the UN regarding some Ukraine-sponsored texts. Any peace process must remain anchored in international recognition to avoid legitimizing aggression through ambiguity.

Ambassador Zorica Marić-Djordjević

Ukraine can enter into peace negotiations without conceding sovereignty by managing occupation rather than ratifying it. International law prohibits the acquisition of territory by force. Peace agreements must include “without prejudice” clauses, avoid sovereignty language, and refer to occupied areas as “territories temporarily outside the effective control of the Government of Ukraine.” These legal choices are essential to shaping a post-war order that upholds international norms.

—

3. Legal Instruments for Continuity

What international legal instruments or precedents can Ukraine invoke to preserve its territorial claims over the long term?

Professor Milena Sterio

The law of occupation and the principle of non-recognition of territorial acquisition by force are Ukraine’s strongest legal tools. These doctrines have been upheld in numerous conflicts and must be embedded in any peace agreement. The agreement should avoid any implication of territorial transfer and instead reinforce Ukraine’s continuing legal title.

Ambassador Zorica Marić-Djordjević

Operationalizing legal continuity requires the use of administrative and security language rather than sovereignty terms. Ceasefire lines must not be mistaken for borders, and demilitarized zones must not imply territorial concessions. The legal framing must reflect temporary control, not permanent change, to ensure that Ukraine’s territorial claims remain intact.

Professor David Crane

Putin is relying on time and distraction to wear down Ukraine and its allies. In contrast, consistent international recognition serves as Ukraine’s legal and diplomatic shield. The tools exist; the challenge lies in using them visibly and persistently. Sustained and coordinated use of these instruments will ensure that Ukraine’s sovereignty remains protected even in the absence of immediate territorial control.

Ambassador Elayne Whyte Gomez

Ukraine’s principled legal position is gaining traction, particularly in the non-aligned countries. Many smaller states now see their own struggles reflected in Ukraine’s experience. This emerging solidarity could become a powerful force in sustaining legal continuity and resisting the normalization of occupation.

Ambassador Ylber Hysa

Ukraine can engage in peace negotiations without recognizing or legitimizing the occupation by adopting a framework that focuses on managing the temporary situation rather than accepting any permanent change.

To ensure this, ceasefire lines must not be interpreted as borders, demilitarized zones must not imply territorial concessions, and all legal and diplomatic language should explicitly describe any control arrangements as temporary and linked to a defined peacekeeping mandate. This approach preserves Ukraine’s sovereignty claims and prevents any de facto normalization of the occupation. It maintains the legal and political foundation for full territorial restoration once the international environment becomes more favorable.

—

4. EU and NATO Pathways

How should Ukraine’s territorial integrity be addressed in the context of EU accession or NATO integration, particularly if parts of its territory remain under foreign control?

Professor David Crane

EU accession remains one of the most powerful strategic signals the international community can send to Russia. It demonstrates that Europe is not prepared to walk away from Ukraine’s future. The credibility of this pathway lies not only in its symbolic value but in its potential to unlock long-term political and economic integration that reinforces Ukraine’s sovereignty.

Ambassador Elizabeth Richard

NATO membership is politically untenable in the current climate. It remains a red line for Russia and would likely trigger disproportionate demands in any negotiation. In contrast, EU membership is both strategically viable and politically palatable. It offers Ukraine a credible path forward without escalating tensions, and it should be prioritized accordingly.

H. E. Dr. Igor Luksic

The EU path is not only a matter of legal alignment but also of strategic necessity. Ukraine’s integration into the EU could unlock vital resources for reconstruction, economic stabilization, and institutional reform. The precedent of Finland’s post-war transformation is instructive. While not directly analogous, it illustrates how strategic alignment with Europe can serve as a stabilizing force. Ukraine should insist on this track with greater urgency.

Professor Michael Kelly

Cyprus provides a compelling precedent. Despite being territorially divided following Turkey’s 1974 invasion and the continued occupation of the northern part of the island, Cyprus acceded to the European Union in 2004 with the strong advocacy of Greece acting as its sponsor state. The EU’s legal framework accommodated this division by suspending the application of EU law in the occupied areas while affirming the Republic of Cyprus’s sovereignty over the entire island, thereby preserving the principle of non-recognition of occupation. For Ukraine, the precedent demonstrates that full and effective territorial control is not an absolute prerequisite for EU membership, provided there is a committed sponsor or coalition of states willing to champion its accession. The decisive factor will be whether EU leaders summon the political will to treat Ukraine’s membership as a strategic move that signals Europe’s refusal to compromise on sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Ambassador Zorica Marić-Djordjević

The legal and political layers of EU accession must be addressed in tandem. While full and effective control is typically required, the Cyprus model demonstrates that suspended application of EU law in occupied territories is feasible. What matters is that the EU explicitly affirms Ukraine’s territorial integrity and commits to reintegration and reconstruction. The EU should treat Ukraine’s accession as a strategic imperative, not a procedural formality.

Tyler Thompson

Russia’s preferred model for Ukraine is Austrian-style neutrality—a Cold War-era posture that avoids NATO alignment while preserving nominal sovereignty. EU membership, however, is a tolerable outcome for Moscow and should be leveraged accordingly. The United States should press Brussels to make a political decision, as it did with Portugal and Spain after their transitions from dictatorship. Strategic ambiguity on this front only benefits Russia.

—

5. Constitutional Claims

How can Ukraine navigate the fact that both it and Russia enshrine Donbas and Crimea in their constitutions?

Dr. Paul R. Williams

The challenge of dueling constitutional claims is not new, but it is particularly acute in this context.  The international community must avoid falling into the trap of false equivalence. Its legal position is grounded in international law, while Russia’s rests on unilateral assertions and coercive annexation. The distinction must be made explicit in every negotiation and public communication.

Tyler Thompson

Russia has long used constitutional amendments and legal rhetoric to accumulate bargaining chips. This is part of a broader lawfare strategy, refined through its experiences in Georgia and Kosovo. The goal is not legal clarity but leverage. Ukraine and its allies must anticipate this and ensure that international legal standards, rather than domestic proclamations, frame the discussion.

Professor Milena Sterio

International law provides clear criteria for the legitimacy of referenda and declarations of independence. Any referendum must be free, fair, and conducted without coercion. Unilateral declarations obtained through force are invalid. Ukraine’s legal position is strong if it continues to emphasize these principles and avoids mirroring Russia’s constitutional framing.

Ambassador Zorica Marić-Djordjević

Russia’s invocation of Kosovo is legally flawed. Moscow repeatedly cites Kosovo as precedent in order to justify its annexation of Crimea and its claims over occupied Ukrainian territories, arguing that the West recognized unilateral secession in Kosovo and therefore cannot deny Russia the same right. This comparison, however, ignores critical distinctions. Kosovo was not annexed; Crimea was. Kosovo operated under a UN mandate and international oversight; Russia acted unilaterally and by force. Moreover, Serbia’s constitution still claims Kosovo, but that has not altered Kosovo’s international status. Ukraine must highlight these differences and reject any narrative that equates its legal position with Russia’s, underscoring that Russia’s reliance on Kosovo is a political tactic rather than a valid legal precedent.

Professor David Crane

Domestic constitutional claims are a distraction. They do not override international law and should not be treated as legitimate bargaining tools. Ukraine’s legal team must remain focused on international norms and avoid being drawn into debates over internal legal texts.

Ambassador Elayne Whyte Gomez

There is growing awareness among the non-aligned states of the power dynamics at play in Ukraine’s case. This creates an opportunity for Ukraine to build broader coalitions and reinforce its legal position through shared experience and solidarity. The moment is ripe for strategic engagement beyond traditional allies. Many of these states have themselves faced pressures from larger powers and are increasingly sensitive to questions of sovereignty and territorial integrity. By framing its struggle as part of a wider global narrative against coercion and annexation, Ukraine can strengthen its legitimacy and broaden the base of international support.

—

6. Strategic Ambiguity vs. Legal Clarity

Can Ukraine afford to use strategic ambiguity in peace negotiations, or does this risk weakening its long-term legal claim?

Professor Milena Sterio

Strategic ambiguity may offer tactical flexibility, but it carries long-term risks. Any ambiguity in the legal framing of a peace agreement could be exploited to undermine Ukraine’s territorial claims. The agreement must clearly distinguish between temporary arrangements and permanent sovereignty. Legal clarity is essential to preserving Ukraine’s rights under international law.

Tyler Thompson

Russia thrives in legal grey zones. Its lawfare strategy depends on exploiting ambiguity and reframing facts on the ground as legal precedent. Ukraine cannot afford to leave gaps in its legal position. Every omission becomes an opportunity for reinterpretation. The peace framework must be airtight.

Ambassador Elizabeth Richard

While the U.S. administration may appear distracted, the Department of Defense remains deeply engaged. There is still significant political and financial investment in Ukraine’s success, even if it operates below the radar. That institutional commitment should be leveraged to support a peace framework grounded in legal clarity and strategic foresight.

Ambassador Ylber Hysa

Peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia should be understood not as a single event, but as a complex, evolving process. Within this framework, Ukraine’s territorial integrity must be treated as an active strategic objective, guiding the negotiation dynamics rather than existing solely as a formal legal principle.

In this context, strategic ambiguity does not contradict legal clarity. Instead, it can serve as a pragmatic tool for securing Ukraine’s long-term strategic red lines while preserving diplomatic flexibility during negotiations.

*

Professor Michael Kelly: Professor at Creighton University School of Law and The Senator Allen A. Sekt Endowed Chair in Law

Professor David Crane: Founding Chief Prosecutor of the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone and Distinguished Scholar in Residence at Syracuse University College of Law

Professor Milena Sterio, the James A. Thomas Distinguished Professor of Law at Cleveland State University's Cleveland-Marshall College of Law and Managing Director at PILPG

Ambassador Elayne Whyte Gomez: Senior Fellow of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research, Professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and former Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the United Nations

Ambassador Zorica Marić-Djordjević: Former Head of the Permanent Mission of Montenegro to the WTO and Special Representative to the UN Human Rights Council

Ambassador Elizabeth Richard: Former U.S. Ambassador and Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and Stabilization Operations

H. E. Dr. Igor Luksic: the former Prime Minister of Montenegro

Tyler Thompson: Chief Negotiation Officer & Co-Founder, Expeditionary

Ambassador Ylber Hysa: Former Ambassador of the Republic of Kosovo to Montenegro and North Macedonia

Dr. Paul R. Williams: Rebecca Grazier Professor of Law and International Relations at American University

Sindija Beta: Legal Officer at Public International Law & Policy Group

Kateryna Kyrychenko: Head of Ukraine Legal Affairs and Program Management at Public International Law & Policy Group

Nuclear Testing: An Inflection Point or Another Step Toward Confrontation?

Nuclear Testing: An Inflection Point or Another Step Toward Confrontation?

By Ambassador (Ret.) Zorica Maric Djordjevic, Senior Peace Fellow, Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG)

A New Round Begins in Moscow

By late October 2025, two troubling signals came from the world’s most powerful military nations — Russia and the United States.

The first move came from Moscow. President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia had completed tests of two nuclear-powered delivery systems. These were Burevestnik, a long-range cruise missile, and Poseidon, an underwater torpedo designed to devastate coastal regions with a radioactive surge. Both, reportedly, could evade existing missile defenses, creating a direct challenge to U.S. plans to build an expanded “Golden Dome.” Russian officials later clarified that both tests were non-nuclear, involving delivery systems rather than atomic warheads.

Within days, President Trump declared that the United States would keep pace with China and Russia and instructed the Department of War to resume nuclear-weapons testing. Officials later noted that such tests might involve system components rather than full detonations. Soon afterward, Washington unveiled its next-generation stealth nuclear cruise missile, the AGM-181 LRSO, signaling that the U.S. would match or outpace its rivals.

Putin responded by ordering the preparation of proposals for Russian nuclear testing should Washington proceed. “If the U.S. conducts such tests,” he said, “Russia must also take appropriate retaliatory steps.”

These exchanges rekindled the specter of superpower rivalry and signaled a return to competitive deterrence. For more than three decades, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has embodied a global consensus against nuclear explosions. Though the Treaty has not entered into force due to several key states not ratifying it (including the U.S., China, Iran, India, Pakistan, and North Korea), it has created a powerful informal norm. The global monitoring system of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) ensures nearly certain detection.

Since 1996, only India, Pakistan, and North Korea have violated this norm, and each test was detected. Russia’s and Washington’s recent announced decisions risk unraveling this restraint:

• Vertically, by legitimizing renewed testing and modernization among established nuclear powers.

• Horizontally, by weakening the normative barrier that deters aspirants from pursuing nuclear weapons.

Arms control rests on predictability. The long-standing assumption that no major power would resume nuclear testing preserved a baseline of trust. Once that assumption erodes, the architecture weakens. A return to testing may not ignite an immediate arms race, but it increases uncertainty and shifts future negotiations toward escalation management rather than risk reduction.

A Global Ripple Effect

Moscow’s reaction following Putin’s initial comments remains mixed. While the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought clarity on whether Washington intended to conduct full explosive tests or limited system trials, Putin warned of reciprocal actions that could inject volatility into an already fragile arms-control architecture. Nuclear parity has long anchored Russia’s conception of sovereignty and great power status. Any U.S. move toward testing, even a symbolic one, is seen through this lens. Putin’s unveiling of new nuclear systems added a deliberate symmetry: technological display as diplomacy.

Moreover, the revival of nuclear testing reverberates far beyond the U.S.–Russia dyad. China, which has not conducted explosive tests in decades but continues to modernize its arsenal rapidly, may feel compelled to respond. Even a symbolic U.S. test could accelerate strategic competition among the three major powers and undermine the CTBT’s already fragile authority.

For smaller and non-nuclear states — from Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans to the South Caucasus — renewed great-power signaling produces deep unease. Their security rests on predictable conduct by major powers and the credibility of international law. When deterrence eclipses dialogue, these foundations weaken.

In contrast, large parts of the Global South, including Latin America, Africa, Southeast Asia, and the South Pacific, remain firmly committed to Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones. Their stance underscores a widening divide between states anchored in legal restraint and those asserting power through capability.

The long-standing nuclear taboo, driven by political restraint rather than formal rules, is now less certain.

The Ukraine Factor: Negotiations Under Nuclear Shadows

The current nuclear signaling between Russia and the United States does not take place in isolation; the war in Ukraine directly shapes it. Nuclear security has become part of the negotiating environment itself, not a parallel or distant issue. As a result, any diplomatic endgame must now account for:

• Why nuclear brinkmanship has intensified,

• How it reshapes incentives and red lines of all parties, and

• Why nuclear stability is becoming an important pillar of a future peace framework.

For Ukraine, the impact is double-edged. A more assertive U.S. posture offers reassurance, but it may also encourage Moscow to prolong the conflict in hopes of generating pressure on Washington. The risk is that negotiations devolve into a test of political endurance rather than a search for compromise — a dynamic in which deterrence logic overwhelms diplomacy.

Because recent Russian and U.S. announcements - from new Russian delivery systems to Washington’s intention to resume nuclear testing - demonstrate that strategic deterrence is once again contested, the new “28-point U.S. peace proposal” places renewed emphasis on credible Ukrainian security guarantees. These proposed “reliable guarantees” may fall short of full NATO membership and reportedly include meaningful restrictions on Ukraine, but they also reflect a core reality: when the nuclear threshold is publicly challenged, Ukraine’s vulnerability increases, and normative deterrence alone becomes insufficient. If deterrence is under strain at the nuclear level, it must be reinforced at the conventional and strategic levels for Ukraine. Without that reinforcement, any peace settlement risks becoming unstable – or even unworkable.

For Europe, caught between deterrence and diplomacy, the challenge is to keep communication channels open, especially for nuclear risk-reduction and humanitarian issues, even as the broader strategic environment hardens. 

Ultimately, nuclear signaling does not close the door to negotiations, but changes their architecture. The task for Washington is to convert deterrence into diplomatic leverage, using strength not to foreclose talks, but to enable them. In the end, nuclear testing may strengthen military power, but it weakens trust, the essential currency of diplomacy. The world now stands between a harder peace or a more protracted war.

Between Deterrence and Diplomacy

If Washington and Moscow continue to define strength through demonstration rather than dialogue, the space for diplomacy — especially on Ukraine — will continue to contract. What emerges may not resemble the classical Cold War arms race, but something more unstable: a world where uncertainty itself becomes a strategic instrument.

Whether this moment becomes a turning point or merely another step toward confrontation depends on how the major powers act. Nuclear testing can stabilize deterrence or destabilize diplomacy. Managed wisely, it could remind all sides of the catastrophic costs of miscalculation and ground arms control. Mishandled, it risks opening a new cycle of escalation.

Negotiating Peace Under Fire: How Dayton Informs Ukraine’s Path to a Durable Settlement

Negotiating Peace Under Fire: How Dayton Informs Ukraine’s Path to a Durable Settlement

By: Dr. Paul R. Williams* and Sindija Beta**

The Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995 is often celebrated as a diplomatic breakthrough. It ended nearly four years of brutal conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, halting atrocities and stabilizing the Balkans. Yet Dayton’s compromises were not neutral; they reflected the urgency of stopping violence rather than building a durable state. The agreement froze wartime territorial divisions, entrenched ethnic power-sharing, and created a constitutional framework that was more a ceasefire mechanism than a blueprint for governance. Bosnia survived, but its institutions remained fragile, dependent on international oversight, and prone to paralysis. The lesson for Ukraine is sobering: compromise can end war, but if it undermines sovereignty or institutional coherence, it risks producing a peace too brittle to endure. 

Territorial Integrity: The Perils of Codifying Loss

Dayton’s territorial settlement effectively legitimized wartime gains by recognizing the Republika Srpska as one of two constituent entities within Bosnia and Herzegovina, alongside the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This arrangement embedded ethnic separation into the constitutional fabric and rewarded territorial conquest achieved through ethnic cleansing and genocide. The result was a peace that was stable on paper but contested in practice. Republika Srpska’s leadership has repeatedly threatened secession, undermining Bosnia’s sovereignty and fueling nationalist rhetoric that obstructs reform. The territorial division also entrenched displacement: hundreds of thousands of Bosniaks and Croats did not return to their pre-war homes, leaving the promise of multiethnic coexistence hollow. 

For Ukraine, the stakes are even higher. Any negotiation that concedes sovereignty over occupied territories would not only weaken Ukraine’s national survival but also erode the principle of territorial integrity that underpins international law and global stability. Just as Dayton’s recognition of Republika Srpska entrenched ethnic partition and legitimized wartime atrocities, conceding Ukrainian territory would normalize aggression and occupation. The precedent of rewarding force would reverberate beyond Ukraine, emboldening other actors to pursue annexation and undermining global norms designed to protect sovereignty. 

Political Stability: Avoiding Institutional Paralysis

Dayton’s power-sharing arrangements sought to balance ethnic representation, but they produced a system prone to deadlock. The tripartite presidency, requiring consensus among Bosniak, Croat, and Serb members, became a symbol of paralysis. Ethnic vetoes embedded in the constitution blocked reforms, while the Office of the High Representative (OHR) was repeatedly forced to impose laws and dismiss officials to keep the state functioning. Bosnia’s institutions became arenas of obstruction rather than vehicles of progress, with international actors forced to intervene repeatedly to break political stalemates.

Ukraine must avoid replicating such institutional fragility. While inclusivity and representation are vital, political arrangements should strengthen rather than weaken state capacity. Stability cannot rest on institutional fragmentation; it requires a resilient constitutional order capable of adapting to future challenges. Bosnia’s experience shows how constitutional rigidity can stall reform and obstruct integration into the European Union. For Ukraine, this means designing institutions that are inclusive but not immobilized, representative but not hostage to vetoes, and flexible enough to evolve as the country rebuilds after war.

Security Guarantees: Balancing External Support and Domestic Resilience

Dayton relied heavily on international military presence to enforce peace, beginning with NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) and later Stabilization Force (SFOR), before responsibility shifted to the EU’s mission (EUFOR Althea). This external enforcement prevented renewed conflict but also revealed Bosnia’s fragility. Its armed forces remained fragmented for years, only gradually unified under international supervision, and the state continued to depend on foreign troops. Even today, Bosnia’s stability is contingent on international actors, raising questions about the durability of a peace that never fully transitioned into self‑sufficiency.

Ukraine’s trajectory is different. The war has already compelled the country to build a strong, unified military capable of defending its territory, while also relying on external support to deter further Russian aggression. NATO’s involvement is not a substitute for Ukraine’s resilience but a necessary complement, given the scale and persistence of Russia’s attacks. The lesson from Bosnia is that peace enforced externally without internal consolidation risks dependency and stagnation. Ukraine’s security architecture is emerging as a blend of self‑reliance and credible international guarantees, where domestic defense capacity anchors sovereignty and NATO’s deterrence provides the external shield against renewed aggression.

Toward Durable Peace in Ukraine

The Dayton Peace Process demonstrates both the necessity and the peril of compromise. It ended the war but entrenched divisions, secured stability but undermined governance, and provided security but fostered dependency. In Bosnia, the compromises that brought immediate calm also embedded fragility into the state’s foundations, leaving institutions vulnerable to paralysis and sovereignty dependent on external oversight.

Ukraine’s situation carries echoes of these dilemmas but also important differences. Negotiators face immense pressure to deliver peace quickly, from domestic constituencies exhausted by war and international actors eager for stability. Yet Dayton reminds us that the quality of peace matters as much as its speed. A settlement that trades away territorial integrity, weakens institutions, or leaves security reliant on external enforcement risks becoming a temporary pause rather than a lasting resolution. Bosnia’s experience shows how compromises that appear pragmatic in the moment can generate long‑term instability.

For Ukraine, the central question is how to balance the urgency of ending violence with the durability of the settlement that follows. The lessons of Dayton suggest that peace is most resilient when it reinforces sovereignty, strengthens governance, and combines domestic resilience with credible international support. Bosnia’s stalled EU accession illustrates how rigid constitutional compromises can obstruct integration, while Ukraine’s path toward EU membership offers an opportunity to embed peace within a broader European framework. If Bosnia illustrates the dangers of a peace built on dependency and division, Ukraine’s path will be judged by whether it can secure a settlement that avoids those pitfalls and lays the foundation for a stable, democratic, and sovereign future.

* Dr. Paul R. Williams is the Co-Founder and Director of the Public International Law & Policy Group and Rebecca Grazier Professor of Law and International Relations at American University

** Sindija Beta is the Legal Officer and Program Manager at the Public International Law & Policy Group

International Humanitarian Law in Focus: Russia’s Violations and Ukraine’s Legitimate Use of Force against Energy Targets

International Humanitarian Law in Focus: Russia’s Violations and Ukraine’s Legitimate Use of Force against Energy Targets

By: Łukasz Adamski,* Kateryna Kyrychenko,** Sindija Beta,*** and Dr. Gregory P. Noone****

Why the legality of striking energy sites depends on who, what, where, when, and why

In the war waged by the Russian state against Ukraine, energy has become both a weapon and a battlefield.  Russia continues its relentless bombardment of Ukraine’s power plants, gas facilities, and heating systems — a campaign that leaves millions facing blackouts and cold as another winter approaches.  In contrast, Ukrainian drones strike deep into Russian territory, targeting refineries and chemical facilities that sustain the Kremlin’s war machine. 

To the casual observer, these might appear as parallel actions: each side hitting the other’s energy network to weaken its capacity and morale.  Yet legally, and morally, they are quite distinct.  International humanitarian law draws clear distinctions between lawful military targets and unlawful attacks on civilian infrastructure.  Understanding those distinctions is not an exercise in legal pedantry; it is essential for accountability, humanitarian protection, and how the world understands the evolving nature of this war.

Specifically, Russia’s systematic attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure amount to war crimes under international law.  Ukraine’s strikes, by contrast, are directed at military-relevant facilities used for generating revenue for Russia’s war machine, while seeking to limit the civilian impact.  This legal and moral asymmetry is not a matter of moral equivalency, but rather it is a matter of law, and it must shape how we understand and respond to this war.

The law that governs destruction

Under Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, parties to an armed conflict may attack only “military objectives” — objects which, by their nature, location, purpose, or use, make an effective contribution to military action and whose destruction offers a definite military advantage.  Attacks on civilian objects are prohibited, as are those that cause incidental civilian harm excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

The law also obliges attackers to take all feasible precautions to verify that targets are military in nature and to minimize harm to civilians.  In practice, these principles mean that the legality of a strike depends not only on what is hit, but why, how, and with what foreseeable consequences.

Energy infrastructure presents a uniquely difficult test.  Power grids, gas networks, and refineries often serve both civilian populations and the war effort.  This dual-use character complicates the application of international humanitarian law, but it does not erase its core logic: an object’s military use must be specific and its destruction must yield a definite military gain.  Strikes that primarily harm civilians or aim to deprive them of essential services fall outside lawful conduct — and may amount to war crimes.

Russia’s assault on Ukraine’s energy grid

From February through October 2025, Moscow has waged what can only be described as an energy-terror campaign.  In February, Russian strikes damaged nearly 40 percent of Ukraine’s gas-production capacity.  In early October, a new wave of missiles and drones destroyed power and heating infrastructure across several regions, leaving around 800,000 people without electricity.  At peak moments during Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, as many as 8 million households were left without power.  Extensive civilian infrastructure, crucial for ensuring heat and electricity during Ukraine’s often harsh winters, has been damaged or destroyed. 

These attacks are timed not to coincide with military offensives but with the onset of winter.  The foreseeable effect — and arguably the intent — is to plunge civilians into darkness and deprivation, using winter as a weapon.  The resulting humanitarian crisis, with hospitals and water systems paralyzed, has little to do with military necessity and everything to do with breaking the morale of the Ukrainian people.

Such conduct fails every major test of legality under IHL.  Power grids and district-heating plants, designed to provide warmth and light to the civilian population, are not military objectives.  The scale of civilian suffering caused by these strikes far exceeds any conceivable military advantage, violating the rule of proportionality.  And the deliberate use of cold and darkness to break morale indicates an intent to terrorize, which is explicitly prohibited under the laws of war.

The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has documented these attacks as likely violations of international humanitarian law.  As the Atlantic Council warned, Russia’s campaign has implications that extend beyond Ukraine’s borders, threatening regional stability and Europe’s energy security as well.

In fact, the International Criminal Court has already issued two arrest warrants against Russian military officials for alleged war crimes against civilian objects, primarily focusing on Russia’s attacks on civilian energy infrastructure. 

Ukraine’s campaign against Russian refineries

In contrast to Russia’s unlawful attacks on civilian energy infrastructure, Ukraine has focused its military campaign on legitimate targets under international humanitarian law.  Since early 2025, Ukraine has expanded its campaign against the Russian Federation’s oil refining and chemical industries — sectors that directly fuel the Russian military.  Over the summer and autumn of 2025, Kyiv’s precision attacks damaged multiple refineries, cutting Russian refining capacity by an estimated 10 to 17 percent.  In October, Ukrainian drones struck the Rosneft-owned Ryazan refinery, one of Russia’s largest.

Ukrainian attacks have targeted Russian export terminals in the Black and Baltic seas using air and sea-borne drones.  They have aimed to disrupt the Kremlin’s revenue streams and military logistics.  Ukraine has also targeted Russia’s oil refineries, fuel depots, and energy export infrastructure in various Russian regions.  The Tyumen refinery, nearly 2,000 km from the border, marks the deepest strike recorded.  Ukraine has also struck at least 18 pumping stations, including Unecha and Nikolskoye on the Druzhba pipeline.  Notably, Ukraine has not targeted civilian power plants, residential heating infrastructure, nuclear facilities, or gas pipelines supplying Europe, thereby underscoring a deliberate effort to avoid humanitarian fallout and broader energy destabilization.

While some evidence may point to the existence of a certain civilian impact resulting from these strikes, it is overall limited.  The effect of the Ukrainian attacks is indeed more of a military nature, raising the cost of Russia’s war of aggression by reducing Russia’s export capacity.  Ukrainian officials and experts still acknowledge that Russia’s energy industry is not under a critical threat but that it does have an impact on Russia’s ability to finance the continuation of its war. 

Against this background, the legal analysis of these attacks is fairly straightforward.  Do Ukraine’s attacks satisfy Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions’ requirement of producing a military advantage and limiting the damage to objects that create an effective military contribution?  There is a strong case for saying that they do.  Likewise, the Ukrainian strikes are targeted at facilities contributing to Russia’s war effort and, while it is difficult to verify precise numbers of possible civilian casualties, there is little to no evidence suggesting that they have caused disproportionate civilian suffering. 

Overall, Ukraine’s targeting of infrastructure with direct military relevance, coupled with its efforts to avoid indiscriminate effects, supports the conclusion that these strikes are consistent with the law of armed conflict.  Unlike Russia’s campaign of terror against civilian energy systems, Ukraine’s actions reflect a disciplined application of IHL principles in defense of its sovereignty.

Escalation without equivalence

It is undeniable that the strikes on energy infrastructure have fueled a cycle of escalation.  Russia’s renewed bombardment of Ukraine’s power grid has come largely in response to Ukraine’s successful attacks on refineries that sustain the Kremlin’s war economy.  Yet this escalation is not driven by Ukraine, but by Russia’s pattern of retaliating against civilians whenever its military and economic assets are struck.  And so, the spiral continues.

Yet understanding escalation dynamics does not mean accepting moral or legal equivalence.  Ukraine’s strikes target facilities that materially sustain an ongoing war of aggression; Russia’s strikes target infrastructure essential for civilian survival.  The difference is not semantic — it is the line between legitimate warfare and war crimes. 

Similarly, calling on Ukraine to exercise restraint so as to avoid escalation fails to recognize the background to the war and pattern of Russia’s behavior. Russia unlawfully annexed Crimea and began its aggression against Eastern Ukraine in 2014.  In 2022, it escalated its war with a full-scale invasion.  It has continued to bomb all of Ukraine for almost four years without any restraint, despite continuous calls and efforts to negotiate an end to the war throughout 2025.  Experts broadly agree on the necessity to make Russia’s war of aggression too costly for Russia to be able to continue and that only this scenario will allow there to be a meaningful peace process.  Ukraine’s military campaigns thus are doing exactly that. 

Why clarity matters

As the war enters another winter, clarity about the legality of energy strikes is essential.  Analysts, journalists, and policymakers must describe what is happening accurately: the destruction of refineries used for military purposes is not equivalent to the targeting of power plants that heat civilian homes.  Choosing the right words matters because it shapes the narrative that, in turn, influences political will and future accountability.

Ultimately, destroying a refinery that fuels an invasion may be lawful if done proportionately and with precautions.  Destroying a heating plant to freeze civilians into submission is a war crime. 

Ukraine’s precision strikes on Russian energy infrastructure fit within the legitimate exercise of self-defense.  Russia’s systematic attacks on Ukraine’s energy systems, designed to terrorize and coerce, fall far outside that framework — and into the realm of war crimes.  Recognizing and articulating that difference is not simply a legal necessity; it is a moral one.

Clarity, however, is not only a matter for lawyers and policymakers. Every paragraph of international law, if enforced, can help Ukrainian civilians survive. 

For an ordinary Ukrainian living in Kyiv—hundreds of kilometers from the front line—or for a foreigner who often visits the city, such as the co-author of this post—the war remains brutally present. In recent days, as outdoor temperatures hover between 40 and 50 degrees Fahrenheit, most residents have no heating in their homes. The city’s vast network of combined heat and power plants lies partly crippled by Russian strikes, while the destruction of gas infrastructure has forced the government to delay the start of the heating season for as long as possible to conserve dwindling supplies.  Nights bring little relief: usually several times a week, the capital is shaken by the hum of incoming drones, and sometimes by the roar of ballistic or cruise missiles. At least several days a month, there is no true night’s sleep in Kyiv anymore—only brief intervals of rest between air-raid sirens. 

That same resident has no certainty that he or she will awaken whole and healthy after going to sleep. Recently, drones have struck residential buildings, killing people directly or indirectly—like the nineteen-year-old girl and her mother who suffocated in their bathroom after hiding there during an air alert. It happened when a drone set her apartment ablaze. 

That Kyiv resident cannot be sure of keeping a job either, as economic activity slows under energy shortages and the threat of mobilization looms. Above all, there is no clarity on when the war will end, or whether justice will prevail. 

Thus, many Ukrainians grow increasingly frustrated by what they perceive as the “symmetry” in some foreign analyses—an insistence on treating aggressor and victim as if their actions were morally or legally comparable. The muted tone of some Western commentary feels like cynicism disguised as balance. Ukrainians seek instead moral clarity and honest words from the democratic world to describe reality.

* Łukasz Adamski is the Deputy Director and Head of the Research and Projects Office at the Juliusz Mieroszewski Dialogue Centre 

** Kateryna Kyrychenko is the Head of Ukraine Legal Affairs and Program Management at PILPG and a PhD candidate in International Law at the National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy” 

*** Sindija Beta is a Legal Officer and Program Manager at PILPG

**** Dr. Gregory P. Noone, CAPT, JAGC, USN (Ret.), is Executive Director at PILPG and a retired Captain in the United States Navy