International Humanitarian Law in Focus: Russia’s Violations and Ukraine’s Legitimate Use of Force against Energy Targets
By: Łukasz Adamski,* Kateryna Kyrychenko,** Sindija Beta,*** and Dr. Gregory P. Noone****
Why the legality of striking energy sites depends on who, what, where, when, and why
In the war waged by the Russian state against Ukraine, energy has become both a weapon and a battlefield. Russia continues its relentless bombardment of Ukraine’s power plants, gas facilities, and heating systems — a campaign that leaves millions facing blackouts and cold as another winter approaches. In contrast, Ukrainian drones strike deep into Russian territory, targeting refineries and chemical facilities that sustain the Kremlin’s war machine.
To the casual observer, these might appear as parallel actions: each side hitting the other’s energy network to weaken its capacity and morale. Yet legally, and morally, they are quite distinct. International humanitarian law draws clear distinctions between lawful military targets and unlawful attacks on civilian infrastructure. Understanding those distinctions is not an exercise in legal pedantry; it is essential for accountability, humanitarian protection, and how the world understands the evolving nature of this war.
Specifically, Russia’s systematic attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure amount to war crimes under international law. Ukraine’s strikes, by contrast, are directed at military-relevant facilities used for generating revenue for Russia’s war machine, while seeking to limit the civilian impact. This legal and moral asymmetry is not a matter of moral equivalency, but rather it is a matter of law, and it must shape how we understand and respond to this war.
The law that governs destruction
Under Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, parties to an armed conflict may attack only “military objectives” — objects which, by their nature, location, purpose, or use, make an effective contribution to military action and whose destruction offers a definite military advantage. Attacks on civilian objects are prohibited, as are those that cause incidental civilian harm excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
The law also obliges attackers to take all feasible precautions to verify that targets are military in nature and to minimize harm to civilians. In practice, these principles mean that the legality of a strike depends not only on what is hit, but why, how, and with what foreseeable consequences.
Energy infrastructure presents a uniquely difficult test. Power grids, gas networks, and refineries often serve both civilian populations and the war effort. This dual-use character complicates the application of international humanitarian law, but it does not erase its core logic: an object’s military use must be specific and its destruction must yield a definite military gain. Strikes that primarily harm civilians or aim to deprive them of essential services fall outside lawful conduct — and may amount to war crimes.
Russia’s assault on Ukraine’s energy grid
From February through October 2025, Moscow has waged what can only be described as an energy-terror campaign. In February, Russian strikes damaged nearly 40 percent of Ukraine’s gas-production capacity. In early October, a new wave of missiles and drones destroyed power and heating infrastructure across several regions, leaving around 800,000 people without electricity. At peak moments during Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, as many as 8 million households were left without power. Extensive civilian infrastructure, crucial for ensuring heat and electricity during Ukraine’s often harsh winters, has been damaged or destroyed.
These attacks are timed not to coincide with military offensives but with the onset of winter. The foreseeable effect — and arguably the intent — is to plunge civilians into darkness and deprivation, using winter as a weapon. The resulting humanitarian crisis, with hospitals and water systems paralyzed, has little to do with military necessity and everything to do with breaking the morale of the Ukrainian people.
Such conduct fails every major test of legality under IHL. Power grids and district-heating plants, designed to provide warmth and light to the civilian population, are not military objectives. The scale of civilian suffering caused by these strikes far exceeds any conceivable military advantage, violating the rule of proportionality. And the deliberate use of cold and darkness to break morale indicates an intent to terrorize, which is explicitly prohibited under the laws of war.
The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has documented these attacks as likely violations of international humanitarian law. As the Atlantic Council warned, Russia’s campaign has implications that extend beyond Ukraine’s borders, threatening regional stability and Europe’s energy security as well.
In fact, the International Criminal Court has already issued two arrest warrants against Russian military officials for alleged war crimes against civilian objects, primarily focusing on Russia’s attacks on civilian energy infrastructure.
Ukraine’s campaign against Russian refineries
In contrast to Russia’s unlawful attacks on civilian energy infrastructure, Ukraine has focused its military campaign on legitimate targets under international humanitarian law. Since early 2025, Ukraine has expanded its campaign against the Russian Federation’s oil refining and chemical industries — sectors that directly fuel the Russian military. Over the summer and autumn of 2025, Kyiv’s precision attacks damaged multiple refineries, cutting Russian refining capacity by an estimated 10 to 17 percent. In October, Ukrainian drones struck the Rosneft-owned Ryazan refinery, one of Russia’s largest.
Ukrainian attacks have targeted Russian export terminals in the Black and Baltic seas using air and sea-borne drones. They have aimed to disrupt the Kremlin’s revenue streams and military logistics. Ukraine has also targeted Russia’s oil refineries, fuel depots, and energy export infrastructure in various Russian regions. The Tyumen refinery, nearly 2,000 km from the border, marks the deepest strike recorded. Ukraine has also struck at least 18 pumping stations, including Unecha and Nikolskoye on the Druzhba pipeline. Notably, Ukraine has not targeted civilian power plants, residential heating infrastructure, nuclear facilities, or gas pipelines supplying Europe, thereby underscoring a deliberate effort to avoid humanitarian fallout and broader energy destabilization.
While some evidence may point to the existence of a certain civilian impact resulting from these strikes, it is overall limited. The effect of the Ukrainian attacks is indeed more of a military nature, raising the cost of Russia’s war of aggression by reducing Russia’s export capacity. Ukrainian officials and experts still acknowledge that Russia’s energy industry is not under a critical threat but that it does have an impact on Russia’s ability to finance the continuation of its war.
Against this background, the legal analysis of these attacks is fairly straightforward. Do Ukraine’s attacks satisfy Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions’ requirement of producing a military advantage and limiting the damage to objects that create an effective military contribution? There is a strong case for saying that they do. Likewise, the Ukrainian strikes are targeted at facilities contributing to Russia’s war effort and, while it is difficult to verify precise numbers of possible civilian casualties, there is little to no evidence suggesting that they have caused disproportionate civilian suffering.
Overall, Ukraine’s targeting of infrastructure with direct military relevance, coupled with its efforts to avoid indiscriminate effects, supports the conclusion that these strikes are consistent with the law of armed conflict. Unlike Russia’s campaign of terror against civilian energy systems, Ukraine’s actions reflect a disciplined application of IHL principles in defense of its sovereignty.
Escalation without equivalence
It is undeniable that the strikes on energy infrastructure have fueled a cycle of escalation. Russia’s renewed bombardment of Ukraine’s power grid has come largely in response to Ukraine’s successful attacks on refineries that sustain the Kremlin’s war economy. Yet this escalation is not driven by Ukraine, but by Russia’s pattern of retaliating against civilians whenever its military and economic assets are struck. And so, the spiral continues.
Yet understanding escalation dynamics does not mean accepting moral or legal equivalence. Ukraine’s strikes target facilities that materially sustain an ongoing war of aggression; Russia’s strikes target infrastructure essential for civilian survival. The difference is not semantic — it is the line between legitimate warfare and war crimes.
Similarly, calling on Ukraine to exercise restraint so as to avoid escalation fails to recognize the background to the war and pattern of Russia’s behavior. Russia unlawfully annexed Crimea and began its aggression against Eastern Ukraine in 2014. In 2022, it escalated its war with a full-scale invasion. It has continued to bomb all of Ukraine for almost four years without any restraint, despite continuous calls and efforts to negotiate an end to the war throughout 2025. Experts broadly agree on the necessity to make Russia’s war of aggression too costly for Russia to be able to continue and that only this scenario will allow there to be a meaningful peace process. Ukraine’s military campaigns thus are doing exactly that.
Why clarity matters
As the war enters another winter, clarity about the legality of energy strikes is essential. Analysts, journalists, and policymakers must describe what is happening accurately: the destruction of refineries used for military purposes is not equivalent to the targeting of power plants that heat civilian homes. Choosing the right words matters because it shapes the narrative that, in turn, influences political will and future accountability.
Ultimately, destroying a refinery that fuels an invasion may be lawful if done proportionately and with precautions. Destroying a heating plant to freeze civilians into submission is a war crime.
Ukraine’s precision strikes on Russian energy infrastructure fit within the legitimate exercise of self-defense. Russia’s systematic attacks on Ukraine’s energy systems, designed to terrorize and coerce, fall far outside that framework — and into the realm of war crimes. Recognizing and articulating that difference is not simply a legal necessity; it is a moral one.
Clarity, however, is not only a matter for lawyers and policymakers. Every paragraph of international law, if enforced, can help Ukrainian civilians survive.
For an ordinary Ukrainian living in Kyiv—hundreds of kilometers from the front line—or for a foreigner who often visits the city, such as the co-author of this post—the war remains brutally present. In recent days, as outdoor temperatures hover between 40 and 50 degrees Fahrenheit, most residents have no heating in their homes. The city’s vast network of combined heat and power plants lies partly crippled by Russian strikes, while the destruction of gas infrastructure has forced the government to delay the start of the heating season for as long as possible to conserve dwindling supplies. Nights bring little relief: usually several times a week, the capital is shaken by the hum of incoming drones, and sometimes by the roar of ballistic or cruise missiles. At least several days a month, there is no true night’s sleep in Kyiv anymore—only brief intervals of rest between air-raid sirens.
That same resident has no certainty that he or she will awaken whole and healthy after going to sleep. Recently, drones have struck residential buildings, killing people directly or indirectly—like the nineteen-year-old girl and her mother who suffocated in their bathroom after hiding there during an air alert. It happened when a drone set her apartment ablaze.
That Kyiv resident cannot be sure of keeping a job either, as economic activity slows under energy shortages and the threat of mobilization looms. Above all, there is no clarity on when the war will end, or whether justice will prevail.
Thus, many Ukrainians grow increasingly frustrated by what they perceive as the “symmetry” in some foreign analyses—an insistence on treating aggressor and victim as if their actions were morally or legally comparable. The muted tone of some Western commentary feels like cynicism disguised as balance. Ukrainians seek instead moral clarity and honest words from the democratic world to describe reality.
* Łukasz Adamski is the Deputy Director and Head of the Research and Projects Office at the Juliusz Mieroszewski Dialogue Centre
** Kateryna Kyrychenko is the Head of Ukraine Legal Affairs and Program Management at PILPG and a PhD candidate in International Law at the National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”
*** Sindija Beta is a Legal Officer and Program Manager at PILPG
**** Dr. Gregory P. Noone, CAPT, JAGC, USN (Ret.), is Executive Director at PILPG and a retired Captain in the United States Navy