Defending Justice

Defending before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda - An Interview with Philippe Larochelle

Defending before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

An Interview with Philippe Larochelle

Edited by Cailan Cumming, Kate Gibson & Paul R. Williams

A Note on Defending Justice

This blog is part of the Defending Justice series, an initiative of the Public International Law and Policy Group (PILPG) to promote an eclectic array of  voices within the field of international criminal law. 

As part of our broader efforts to strengthen institutions of justice, this series seeks to create space for dialogue around the varied perspectives and concerns that shape these institutions. With that aim in mind, we interviewed a series of defense practitioners working in international criminal law and distilled their experiences and insights into a series of first-person blogs, preserving the spirit and voice of those interviews.

Editor’s Note

Philippe Larochelle, widely regarded as one of the leading lawyers in international criminal defense, has built his career representing clients in some of the most complex and high-profile international cases. The ability to navigate political and procedural challenges of international law quickly positioned him as a key figure in the international defense field. His commitment to due process, fairness, and the protection of fundamental legal rights, even in cases where public sentiment strongly favored conviction, has built his reputation across multiple international tribunals, including the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), International Criminal Court (ICC), and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. This blog explores the challenges and lessons that emerged from his particular set of cases before the ICTR. Through Larochelle’s setbacks and triumphs within the world’s second international tribunal, readers get a glimpse into the case preparation and trial process for these complex cases, and better understand the way in which these tribunals shape the legacies of conflict. Through Larochelle’s stories one thing becomes clear: uncovering the truth can only be accomplished through objective institutions, counsel, and judges; strong standards of evidence and procedure; expeditious trials; and stronger mechanisms to assess victims and witnesses. 

Introduction

I became involved with the ICTR at a time when international criminal defense required both common law training and fluency in French. As a native of Quebec, I found that this combination of abilities positioned several Canadian lawyers to take on key roles as defense counsel at the Tribunal. It was in this environment that I began working alongside a group of lawyers who would go on to shape the practice of international criminal defense.

One of my most formative cases was that of my first client, Jérôme Bicamumpaka, a Rwandan government official accused of genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, and crimes against humanity. The case was particularly challenging due to the difficulties in proving individual criminal responsibility within the broader context of mass atrocities. Prosecutors alleged that Bicamumpaka, as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the interim government during the 1994 genocide, played a role in facilitating the violence. However, after years of legal battles, he was acquitted in 2011 due to insufficient evidence, a verdict that showed a failure to establish individual culpability from broader systemic crimes.  This case profoundly influenced my understanding of international criminal defense and became a defining moment in my career, shaping my approach to defending individuals accused of mass atrocities for years to come.

I then defended Callixte Nzabonimana, a former Rwandan minister convicted of genocide in 2012. The ICTR found him personally responsible for inciting and organizing killings, particularly through public speeches encouraging violence, and his conviction was upheld on appeal in 2014, reinforcing the precedent of holding political figures accountable for speech that contributes to mass atrocities. In contrast, my work with client André Ntagerura, who was acquitted of genocide charges in 2004, focused on the significant challenge of assisting Ntagerura’s relocation, as acquitted defendants often face difficulties in resettlement after trials due to political and diplomatic blocks, or threats, to their relocation.

I also represented Jean De Dieu Ndagijimana, who was charged with contempt of court related to witness protection, following his role in facilitating the recantation of prosecution witnesses who had testified against Augustin Ngirabatware, but who years later wanted to give statements saying that their testimony had been false. More recently, I have representedf Fulgence Kayishema, a Rwandan genocide suspect who was recently detained in South Africa under an arrest warrant by the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals. His potential extradition remains uncertain and raises questions regarding jurisdiction and fair trial rights, issues the defense team is currently working through.

Other cases I have taken on underscore the continued and extensive work that defense lawyers undertake post-conviction. The case of Gérard Ntakirutimana, a Rwandan doctor convicted of genocide and crimes against humanity in 2003, remains under review and certain elements of his case are being reconsidered. I also continue to support Dominique Ntawukuriryayo’s request for a reduced sentence, who was convicted of genocide by the ICTR in 2009 and sentenced to 25 years in prison.

This blog will further explore these cases, and I hope readers will gain insight into the day-to-day realities of international criminal defense, the evolving nature of post-conflict justice, and the lasting impact these trials have on both individual defendants and the broader field of international law.

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

The Rwandan genocide of 1994 remains one of the most tragic periods in modern history, deeply affecting both Rwanda and the international community.  Over the course of approximately 100 days, an estimated one million people—primarily Tutsi, along with moderate Hutu and others who opposed the government—were killed in a wave of violence carried out by government forces, militia groups, and civilians. The genocide was the culmination of longstanding ethnic and political tensions, exacerbated by colonial history, economic disparities, and a period of civil war.

In the aftermath of the genocide, Rwanda faced the immense challenge of rebuilding its society while ensuring accountability for crimes committed. The scale of the violence, combined with the destruction of Rwanda’s judicial infrastructure, made it difficult to prosecute cases through domestic courts alone.  In response, the United Nations established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda on November 8, 1994, through Security Council Resolution 955.  Headquartered in Arusha, Tanzania, the ICTR was tasked with prosecuting individuals responsible for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, focusing on high-ranking officials, military leaders, and key organizers of the violence.

Beyond its prosecutions, the ICTR played a critical role in developing international legal precedent. In 1998, it issued the first-ever conviction for genocide in an international court with the Jean-Paul Akayesu case, which also set an important precedent by recognizing rape as an act of genocide. The tribunal also addressed the role of hate media in inciting violence, convicting individuals found to be responsible for the broadcasts of Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) and other propaganda outlets that played a role in encouraging mass killings. 

In 2015, the ICTR officially completed its work, having adjudicated dozens of cases. However, its remaining functions were transferred to the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (UN-IRMCT), which is currently concluding its work to oversee appeals, enforce sentences, and locate fugitives.  The UN-IRMCT continues to handle ongoing legal matters, including cases like that of my client Fulgence Kayishema, who was detained in South Africa and awaits potential extradition.

The ICTR’s legacy extends beyond Rwanda. It contributed to the establishment of legal principles that continue to guide international criminal law, influenced the development of the International Criminal Court, and reinforced the importance of accountability for mass atrocities in post-conflict states. At the same time, its flaws, highlighted throughout this blog, remind us that the creation and implementation of international criminal justice frameworks must continue to be reformed to fulfill the promises set out by the international justice project.

Case Preparation

I will never forget my first encounter with the case file of my first case, Jérôme Bicamumpaka. The allegations were gruesome and grave. Yet, when I met Bicamumpaka, I was presented with a polite, articulate man—well dressed and measured in speech. Reconciling this outward demeanor with the horrific accusations in the file proved difficult at first. But it was also an important first lesson regarding the nature of defense: to look beyond first impressions, confront personal preconceptions, and maintain objectivity. My role was not to react emotionally to the allegations, but to get to know the deeper truths of the client: understand his story and the conflict that led to my client’s arrest. With limited knowledge of the Rwandan genocide, I immersed myself in the complex historical, social, and legal context of the conflict, having to adapt quickly to the new context and new legal system of the ICTR.

As I began building a defense strategy, the early meetings with the client were pivotal. Working through the details of the case and walking through each charge was an important first step, and proved to be key to Bicamumpaka’s defense. Bicamumpaka claimed not to have been present at the times and places of the alleged crimes, and it became clear that he had an alibi to support these claims. In fact, Bicamumpaka maintained that he had been trying to help de-escalate the situation from abroad during key periods of the genocide. Amongst such serious allegations, I found myself drawn into the evidence, trying to understand what had really taken place. We were able to call a Belgian Minister as a witness, who testified that Bicamumpaka was in Belgium during one of the events he was accused of orchestrating and supported the fact that Bicamumpaka was actually working to garner international help for Rwanda during the genocide while he was abroad. 

Examining the extensive evidence with the client can also help to identify inconsistencies and expose weaknesses in the prosecution’s evidence. For example, during Bicamumpaka’s first interview with the prosecution, he provided an alibi for specific crimes he was accused of, which the prosecution failed to remember. During the trial, the prosecution continued to present arguments that overlooked this key information—information that was later presented by the defense—leading to obvious gaps in the credibility of the prosecution’s case. 

Throughout this process I benefited greatly from the support and camaraderie of the international legal community in Arusha, Tanzania, where the Tribunal was located. For a young lawyer, the weight of responsibility was immense, but the experience was transformative. I was deeply involved in the investigative aspects of the case and grew rapidly through direct engagement with witnesses, files of evidence, and defense strategy. It was in this demanding but collaborative environment that my commitment to defense work developed, and where I learned that effective defense begins not with certainty, but with humility, persistence, and the willingness to listen.

The Nature of Complex International Crimes Cases

The scope of the crimes dealt with in international tribunals is so vast that it can be difficult to comprehend. The crimes committed almost feel immaterial because of their magnitude. These cases are not isolated events but involve the horrors of genocides, mass atrocities, and the suffering of entire populations. Consequently, the evidence presented in such cases is often overwhelming, and it becomes increasingly difficult to apply the usual, rational standards of evidence typically seen in other legal proceedings.

A significant challenge in international criminal cases is the reliance on witness or victim testimony as a principal form of evidence. While these testimonies may be grounded in real, traumatic experiences, they often fail to meet the threshold of ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’ However, rather than the prosecution having to prove ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’, the burden often falls on defense counsel to actively prove their client’s innocence to secure an acquittal. This shift in burden of proof, in my experience, creates an inherently biased environment for the accused, with presumption of guilt often outweighing the presumption of innocence.

In several of my cases the defense was faced with testimonies where the victim’s suffering was undoubtedly real, but the evidence connecting the accused to the crimes was non-existent. The Bicamumpaka case, for example, relied heavily on witness testimonies that lacked the necessary corroboration or, at its worst, was manufactured in order to fit a false narrative of the accused. The judges, in some cases, did not adhere to rules of evidence, but rather assessed evidence as the trial progressed, making it hard for the defense to anticipate how evidence would be treated and making it more difficult to build a case.

The reliability of witnesses is another major challenge that defense counsel contend with. I recall the story of one witness who, after being informed he could not seek asylum after testifying in a case in Canada, recanted his previous testimony—revealing that he had lied to further his interest in gaining asylum. This example highlights the serious issue of witness manipulation, especially when victims and witnesses are offered benefits such as reduced sentences in their home countries or asylum in exchange for testifying. Some witnesses have admitted to fabricating stories to make themselves more credible to gain access to compensation and other benefits.

What is more, many of the witnesses are anonymous, which presents difficulties in verifying their testimonies, their credibility as a witness, and tracking their testimonies across multiple cases. There have been instances where witnesses recanted their statements, yet those recantations could not be used to reopen or reassess a case unless the other testimonies also changed. This dynamic can lead to wrongful convictions, especially when false testimony goes unchecked or is shielded by anonymity.

Beyond evidentiary challenges, there is also the issue of bias towards the prosecution. Many of the judges of international tribunals are not seasoned jurists but diplomats who may not have the requisite experience to assess evidence impartially. This lack of qualification, combined with a tendency to favor the prosecution, can result in judgements that do not reflect the reality of the evidence presented. I believe there are some cases in which judges have appeared to let their personal feelings about the victims’ suffering cloud their judgment, making it harder for them to maintain the required objectivity. Faced with a flood of testimony detailing unimaginable atrocities, it is understandably difficult to remain impartial, but impartiality is precisely what justice demands.

Additionally, the long duration of these trials, with some lasting over a decade, severely impacts the integrity of the cases. Memories fade, evidence becomes stale, and the accused are subjected to years of legal uncertainty. In my experience, protracted legal proceedings often infringe on the rights of the accused. In one such example, one of my clients spent several months in prison, only to have his charges dismissed after an argument that only lasted three hours, meaning that he had been unjustly detained without sufficient grounds.

To address these issues, an independent review of evidence before indictment should be conducted, as seen in the case of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, where ICC Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan convened a panel of external legal experts to review the evidence he ultimately used to support his application for arrest. This would ensure that charges are based on credible and verified evidence, reducing the likelihood of wrongful prosecutions. Additionally, there should be stronger standards for assessing victims and witnesses to avoid manipulation, ensure that testimonies are accurate, and verify that the testimony is linked to the client. Moreover, victim reparations should not be tied directly to the outcome of criminal trials, as this creates an inherent conflict of interest that may lead to fabricated testimonies. Lastly, I argue for the establishment of clear and fair rules of evidence, which should be consistently followed by all judges. Only by adhering to these principles can the integrity of the tribunal and the pursuit of justice be preserved. 

Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was established with the mandate to prosecute those most responsible for the 1994 genocide, to end impunity, and to help establish a historical record of the events. However, the legacy it leaves behind is one mired in contradiction—where the pursuit of justice became inseparable from the pursuit of political objectives.

Rwanda, under the leadership of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), quickly understood how to wield the ICTR as a tool of lawfare. It used the tribunal to legitimize its own narrative of the genocide while shielding its crimes from scrutiny. When international investigators attempted to look into acts like the downing of President Habyarimana’s plane—a critical trigger for the genocide—Rwanda impeded efforts to investigate. The Rwandan Patriotic Front continually refused to provide witnesses or evidence and instead turned over only political opponents. The tribunal, lacking enforcement power and dependent on Rwanda for access, effectively became complicit in this selective justice.

International tribunals have the capacity to shape domestic and global political landscapes for decades. Once an individual is indicted, regardless of guilt, their political and social life is effectively over. The Rwandan government has long exploited this reality, feeding narratives to the media, fueling continued arrests, and portraying all members of the pre-genocide Hutu political elite—ministers, préfets, military leaders—as inherently culpable, regardless of their actual role in the genocide. While some may indeed have played a role in the genocide, the concern lies in how the Rwandan Patriotic Front, led by Paul Kagame, has fabricated or distorted evidence against those not involved to attribute a blanket collective responsibility on the Hutu political elite from before the genocide. Ultimately implicating them based not on actions but on influence and perceived political threat, hence using the tribunal to eliminate the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s main threats to power.

This manipulation hollowed out the ICTR’s intended impartiality. Rather than establishing a comprehensive factual record of the genocide, the tribunal was instrumentalized to reinforce a singular, simplistic version: one in which Hutu extremists were the sole perpetrators, and the Rwandan Patriotic Front were the liberators. The reality, however, was far more complex and the genocide was perpetrated by a diverse group of people. Atrocities were committed by a range of actors, including the Rwandan Patriotic Front, yet none of its members were ever indicted. The tribunal’s promise to hold “those most responsible” to account was not fully realized. Instead, it has been seen by some as granting a degree of impunity to the Rwandan Patriotic Front and President Kagame’s regime,  effectively legitimizing their control, justifying their actions, and limiting the voices of its critics.

Rwanda has also leveraged foreign domestic jurisdictions to target its opponents. In Canada, for instance, the government prosecuted Jacques Mungwarere, an alleged Rwandan genocide suspect, under universal jurisdiction, which was Canada’s last criminal trial of this kind. Since then, Canada has largely moved away from complex criminal prosecutions, favoring administrative laws instead. By relying on lower-threshold immigration standards such as a “reasonable belief” of involvement in atrocities, authorities have deported alleged perpetrators, a shift Rwanda has capitalized on by using these mechanisms to pursue political dissidents living abroad.

These failures have lasting consequences. The selective justice, and selective narrative, perpetrated by the ICTR undermines confidence in the legitimacy of both convictions and acquittals. The ICTR’s findings are now cited to justify Rwanda’s current foreign policy, including its support for the M23 rebel group and its military presence and crimes committed in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Western states, still constrained by guilt over their inaction during the genocide, continue to give Rwanda a wide berth. The power of the narrative produced by the tribunal has outlived the tribunal itself, shaping international politics decades later.

Justice Richard Goldstone, the first Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY and ICTR, articulated five goals of the tribunals, often referred to as the ‘Goldstone Five’: deterrence, establishing a historical record, victim catharsis and justice, ending impunity, and contributing to peace and reconciliation. Overall, the ICTR has fallen short of the goals laid out by the Chief Prosecutor; however, there is hope that future tribunals can deliver on these goals if key questions are addressed and substantial reforms are implemented.

The Future of International Criminal Tribunals

Looking forward, the international justice system must confront these uncomfortable realities. The manipulation of evidence, reliance on questionable witnesses, and failure to prosecute powerful actors are not problems unique to the ICTR—they are recurring flaws that continue to plague tribunals, including the ICC. The Timor-Leste tribunal provides a compelling precedent. A special expert committee was established to assess the justice delivered, eventually reopening some cases in which they believed that justice had not been served. A similar approach should be applied to the ICTR and future international tribunals. Allowing for independent review of the work of the tribunal would be a meaningful step toward restoring legitimacy and true justice to the victims. However, international tribunals are unwilling to admit fault in order to protect their legacy, and residual mechanisms are interested in closing the work and the history books. 

Today, the UN-IRMCT, the successor to the ICTR, is winding down. But the same ethical and legal questions remain unresolved. Take the case of Fulgence Kayishema. Although the UN-IRMCT has pushed for his extradition from South Africa, it has no intention of trying him itself. Instead, it seeks to send him to Rwanda, despite well-documented risks that he may not receive a fair trial. South Africa is hesitant knowing that he may be sent to Rwanda given the country’s history of assassinating political opponents on South African soil and refusing to turn those responsible over.

These dilemmas raise urgent questions about the long-term design of international justice mechanisms. I find it legally and ethically incompatible with the UN-IRMCT’s mandate and jurisdiction to arrest individuals only to transfer them over to the referral state, especially when due process cannot be guaranteed in the state. I am also concerned with the prospect of handing over the court’s archives, an essential repository of history and evidence, to a government that has shown a willingness to manipulate history and suppress dissent. As the UN-IRMCT prepares to close its doors, these unprecedented challenges have exposed the overall lack of foresight and long-term planning when first establishing the ICTR.

Looking at the long-term future of international criminal justice, I hold the same opinion as many defense lawyers, that at the ICC arrest warrants should be issued and publicized with great care, not symbolically or for political effect. Issuing warrants without realistic prospects for enforcement, such as the ICC’s warrant for Vladimir Putin, weakens the legitimacy of the entire system. Worse, the legacy of selective justice in many situation countries has eroded public trust in international tribunals, prompting some to view such warrants as politicized instruments rather than impartial legal measures, thereby reframing individuals like Putin as targets of geopolitical bias rather than perpetrators of international crimes.

Finally, and critically, we must continually reassess the very model of international criminal justice. Is a traditional courtroom—where a single suspect stands trial for atrocities affecting thousands of victims—the best structure for addressing such massive and complex crimes? So far, efforts to centralize victim suffering into one symbolic trial have not achieved the goals of victim catharsis and justice. These shortcomings should be a central consideration in the design of future international tribunals. 

Justice must not operate in isolation from the societies it seeks to serve; it must work in tandem with domestic efforts and remain rooted in the lived experiences of affected communities. The international justice project is far from perfect, but its deep flaws are precisely why it must be preserved and reformed—not abandoned. Moving forward requires the humility to learn, the courage to evolve, and the resolve to repair what is broken.

Conclusion

International criminal tribunals are among the most complex and challenging legal environments in the world. The crimes they address are extraordinary in scale and scope, requiring legal practitioners to operate in equally extraordinary ways. Defense counsel, in particular, must navigate a system where traditional legal frameworks are stretched, where the political context shapes the courtroom, and where the weight of history looms over every decision.

This chapter has traced the unique legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, highlighting how international tribunals do not merely adjudicate facts—they also shape historical memory, political narratives, and international relations. In doing so, they carry immense responsibility. Yet, as we have seen, this responsibility can be compromised when justice is politicized, when the rights of the accused are overshadowed by prosecutorial bias, or when credibility in evidence and witness testimony is sacrificed for expediency.

These challenges demand not only legal expertise, but also resilience, creativity, and ethical fortitude. They demand defense teams that can operate with extreme adaptability—developing unique strategies, cultivating deep knowledge of both law and the local context, and holding their ground in a professional landscape that is often politically charged and emotionally fraught.

Tribunals can play a vital role in building peace, establishing historical truth, and promoting reconciliation. But as the ICTR has demonstrated, they can also be weaponized for political gain, producing partial narratives and reinforcing impunity when justice is selectively applied. The cost of these failures is not merely legal—it is human. It is borne by victims denied the full truth, by accused persons denied a fair trial, and by entire societies burdened with unresolved histories.

Looking ahead, the international legal community must critically reflect on the shortcomings of the ICTR and implement reforms to improve the international justice system. Specific reforms include:

  • Establishing independent expert committees to assess evidence and review problematic cases.

  • Applying stronger and clearer standards for evaluating the credibility and testimonies of witnesses and victims.

  • Selecting judges with proven qualifications, legal rigor, objectivity, and sensitivity to the broader social and political dynamics at play.

  • Strengthening due process protections and upholding the fundamental rights of the accused.

  • Reducing excessive delays in trials and delivering timely judgments.

  • Carefully reviewing evidence before issuing indictments, rather than relying on quantity or political pressure.

  • Ensuring that, after release, acquitted or freed individuals can access safe relocation options, including family reunification, work, and residency rights in safe third countries.

Defense counsel will remain at the heart of this effort, not only as advocates but as guardians of justice in a system that too often struggles to balance law with politics and truth with power.

Defining the Practice of International Criminal Defense - An Interview with Peter Haynes KC

Defining the Practice of International Criminal Defense

An Interview with Peter Haynes KC

Edited by Emma Bakkum & Paul Williams

A Note on Defending Justice

This blog is part of the Defending Justice series, an initiative of the Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG) to promote an eclectic array of voices within the field of international criminal law. 

As part of our broader efforts to strengthen institutions of justice, this series seeks to create space for dialogue around the varied perspectives and concerns that shape these institutions. With that aim in mind, we interviewed a series of defense practitioners working in international criminal law and distilled their experiences and insights into a series of first-person monographs, preserving the spirit and voice of those interviews.

Editor’s Note

This blog introduces the topic of defense of the accused before international criminal courts and tribunals. By drawing upon Peter Haynes KC’s extensive experience at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), and the International Criminal Court (ICC), it introduces several key themes to defense, including the structure of international defense teams, how to effectively defend the accused before international criminal tribunals, differences between domestic and international defense practices, and the future outlook for international criminal defense lawyers. Through the striking first-hand achievements of Peter Haynes in defending accused and managing defense teams at international criminal courts, this blog realistically positions international defense work within the international criminal law project and articulates standards that need to be met in order to effectively defend accused before international criminal courts and tribunals. 

Introduction

A strong defense is not just a procedural safeguard. It is the foundation of a fair trial and a vital part of the international justice process. Over the years, I have come to see the defense as the quiet force that holds the system accountable. It is the defense that ensures the rights of the accused are not only recognized but actively upheld.

I have spent most of the last 17 years appearing before various courts and tribunals in The Hague, The Netherlands, including the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). The first time I worked in defense in The Hague was at the turn of the century. I was ready for a change from my domestic career in the United Kingdom, so I took the step to move to The Hague and work at the ICTY. My primary motivations to work in the difficult field of defense back then were the disenchantment I felt with domestic criminal practice, especially the inability to concentrate on my own cases because of the volume of work and the “returns” system (I was known for my ability to be able to pick things up at short notice),* as well as the desire to do something new and cutting-edge. 

I returned to the Hague and the ICTY in 2006, where I appeared for the defense of General Vinko Pandurević in relation to the Srebrenica massacre.** From then on, I worked continuously as an international defense lawyer, appearing in cases involving charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and international terrorism. At the STL, from 2012 to 2023, I represented the victims of the terrorist bombing in Beirut which resulted in the assassination of then Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri. At the ICC, I appeared for Jean-Pierre Bemba, the former Minister of Defense and Senator of the Democratic Republic of Congo, starting in 2013 and securing his acquittal of all charges on appeal in 2018. In June 2024, I was assigned to represent the interests of Lord Resistance Army’s leader Joseph Kony before the ICC. Between 2019 and 2021, I furthermore held the office of President of the International Criminal Court Bar Association, becoming the first and only person to be re-elected to the post.

Domestically in the United Kingdom, I have appeared for both the prosecution and the defense inter alia in cases of murder, serious fraud, sexual offenses, human trafficking, and complex conspiracies. Away from crime, I have acted as lead counsel in a class action against the British government concerning the torture of prisoners in Cyprus; initiated proceedings against the ICC seeking $75 million in damages for the losses arising from the freezing of Bemba’s assets; and represented the Tamil community in an appeal to the UK Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission relating to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eeelam.

These experiences, across different courts and contexts, have shaped how I understand the role of the defense within international criminal justice. What began as a professional challenge evolved into a deeper understanding of what it means to defend accused in a system built to prosecute those responsible for the gravest crimes. 

Defense as the Measure of International Justice

At the ICC, the Rome Statute provides a detailed framework for the rights of the accused. Article 67 guarantees the right of the accused, including to be informed of the charges, to have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense, to be tried without undue delay, and to choose legal counsel freely. It also affirms the right to examine witnesses, present evidence, remain silent, and receive any material from the Prosecutor that may suggest innocence or mitigate guilt. 

But rights on paper are not enough. In practice, defending someone before an international tribunal requires a well-resourced and experienced team. I have worked with investigators, case managers, and legal assistants who bring deep expertise and commitment to the work. The volume of disclosure, the complexity of legal issues, and the cross-border nature of our investigations demand a level of coordination and strategic planning that goes far beyond what is typically required in domestic criminal practice. My experience at the ICC, and earlier at the ICTY and STL, has taught me that institutional knowledge and adaptability are just as important as legal skill.

International defense work is fundamentally different from domestic criminal litigation. We operate in multilingual courtrooms, across diverse legal traditions, and often in politically sensitive environments. The crimes under scrutiny are not only serious but also deeply embedded in historical and social contexts. As defense counsel, I have had to navigate bureaucratic obstacles, limited access to witnesses, and political resistance that can make even the most basic investigative steps a challenge. Unlike domestic systems, where lawyers may benefit from established norms and local familiarity, international defense requires flexibility, cultural sensitivity, and a willingness to challenge dominant narratives.

In this blog, I reflect on what it takes to effectively defend an accused before international criminal tribunals. I focus primarily on the law and practice of the ICC, but I also draw on my experience at the ICTY and STL to highlight broader institutional dynamics. I explore how international defense teams are structured, what they require, how international defense differs from domestic criminal practice, and how I see the future of international defense. Ultimately, I argue that the strength of the defense is a litmus test for the legitimacy of international criminal justice.


International Criminal Defense Lawyers and Teams

Defense at international criminal courts and tribunals differs in many ways from defense at the domestic level, as described in further detail later in this blog. Years of experience as an international criminal defense lawyer and leading defense teams have led me to identify several key requirements for lawyers seeking to defend accused before international courts, as well as best practices for the structure and management of a defense team. 

Defense Qualifications for International Criminal Courts

Defense counsel appearing before international criminal courts, including the ICC, are independent legal professionals. Unlike prosecutors, who are employed by the Court, defense counsel are not staff members. However, to appear before the ICC, counsel and their assistants must meet specific eligibility criteria and be admitted to the Court’s official lists.

To qualify as defense counsel, applicants must satisfy the baseline requirements set out in Rule 22 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and Regulation 67 of the Regulations of the Court. These include demonstrating established competence in international or criminal law and procedure, and having at least ten years of relevant experience in criminal proceedings. Candidates must also be fluent in one of the Court’s working languages, English or French, and have no convictions for serious criminal or disciplinary offenses. Associate counsel and assistants to counsel must meet similar standards, though with a minimum of eight years’ and five years’ experience respectively. All applicants must submit documentation verifying their qualifications, including proof of legal training, professional references, and evidence of language proficiency. Once admitted, those on the List of Counsel may practice before the Court as defense counsel, legal representatives for victims, duty counsel, or ad hoc counsel. 

Professional investigators are another critical component of defense teams. The ICC maintains a separate List of Professional Investigators, governed by Regulation 137 of the Regulations of the Registry. Investigators must have at least ten years of experience in criminal investigations, either at the national or international level. They must demonstrate competence in international or criminal law and procedure, and be fluent in one of the Court’s working languages. In most cases, investigators are also expected to speak at least one language relevant to the country or region under investigation. Defense and prosecution teams propose their own case-specific investigators for inclusion on the list, subject to approval by the Registry. 

Beyond counsel and investigators, defense teams typically include assistants, case managers, and administrative staff. Legal assistants are expected to hold advanced degrees in law, with specialization in international criminal law, human rights law, or related fields. They assist with legal research, drafting, and analysis, and often play a key role in preparing filings and coordinating with the Court. Case managers oversee logistical aspects of the case, including disclosure, scheduling, and document management. Administrative staff support the day-to-day functioning of the team, ensuring that records are maintained, deadlines are met, and internal communication is efficient. Hiring practices for support staff vary depending on the complexity of the case and available resources. However, professionalism, adaptability, and familiarity with international criminal procedure are essential across all roles. 

Structure of Defense Teams

The composition of a defense team at the ICC depends on whether the accused is indigent, receiving legal aid, or is paying for his own representation. The latter of which means far more flexibility in choosing a defense team. Where the accused is indigent, the structure and funding of the team are governed by the ICC’s Legal Aid Policy. This policy outlines the permissible size and composition of defense teams, calibrated to the phase and complexity of the case. In general, a defense team includes two counsel, two assistants to counsel or legal officers, two case managers, and, where necessary, a language assistant. The Policy also provides an investigative budget, which may be used to assign either a professional investigator or a resource person to the team.

Each role within the defense team carries distinct responsibilities. Lead counsel, supported by co-counsel, sets the strategic direction of the case, represents the accused in court, and oversees all legal decisions. Assistants to counsel support this work through legal research, drafting, and analysis, often taking the lead on specific motions or evidentiary issues. Case managers handle procedural logistics, including disclosure, filings, and coordination with the Court. Investigators are responsible for identifying and interviewing witnesses, gathering evidence, and verifying factual claims. If required, language assistants facilitate communication between the accused and the team and ensure that all materials are accurately translated. Resource persons may provide contextual expertise, such as knowledge of local customs, political dynamics, or historical events relevant to the case.

Defense teams also often rely on interns and visiting professionals. They contribute to research, drafting, and administrative tasks, and their involvement can be key to the success of the team when properly integrated. 

Forming a Successful Defense Team

In practice, defense teams are often assembled through professional networks and prior working relationships. However, there is increasing recognition of the need to ensure diversity and representation, particularly of individuals from the situation country. This enhances cultural competence and facilitates engagement with local witnesses and communities.

Essential to the effectiveness of a defense team are the structure, synergy, and internal dynamics. A team that is divided, dysfunctional, or unclear in its strategic direction will struggle to prepare a credible defense. It is critical that all members share the Lead Counsel’s strategic vision and understand their roles within that framework. Clear communication, mutual respect, and a shared commitment to the case are indispensable. It is important to give all team members, including interns, ownership over their work and opportunities for professional development. This fosters a collaborative environment and strengthens the overall quality of the defense.

Challenges within defense teams are not uncommon. In the Bemba case, for instance, two Congolese defense lawyers were later investigated themselves, and found guilty of various offenses against the administration of justice related to the false testimonies of defense witnesses. This situation brought to light key issues regarding team cohesion, professional conduct, and the pressures faced by defense teams operating in politically sensitive contexts.

Ultimately, the defense team is not simply a collection of professionals. It is a strategic unit tasked with upholding the rights of the accused and the fairness of international proceedings. Its composition, management, and internal cohesion can shape not only the outcome of a case but also the broader perception of justice at the international level.

Essential Skills and Attributes

Effective international defense requires more than legal expertise. It demands a distinct set of personal and professional qualities that are often not fostered in domestic practice. The transition from national to international defense work involves adapting to different legal cultures, institutional expectations, and team dynamics. Over time, I have found that several attributes have proven essential to navigating this shift successfully.

Confidence is particularly important. Defense counsel must be prepared to assert the rights of the accused in environments where they are often viewed with suspicion. Public opinion may be hostile, and the presumption of guilt can be strong. In such settings, counsel must advocate with clarity and conviction, maintain composure under pressure, and defend strategic decisions even when they are unpopular. Confidence also plays a role in courtroom advocacy, where counsel must challenge assumptions, cross-examine witnesses, and engage with judges who may be unfamiliar with common law techniques or adversarial reasoning.

Adaptability and flexibility are equally critical. International defense work varies not only from domestic practice but also from one tribunal to another. Differences in judicial background, procedural culture, and legal tradition can shape the tone and substance of proceedings. In the Popović case, for example, the Presiding Judge was Maltese and came from a common law background. In Bemba, the Presiding Judge was Brazilian, with a civil law orientation. This shift required an adjustment of strategy. The civil law judge was less receptive to common law practices, and the defense had to adjust its approach to align with the expectations of the bench. The ability to read the courtroom, anticipate procedural preferences, and tailor advocacy accordingly is essential.

A useful analogy comes from football. David Beckham, known for his success across multiple European teams, was able to perform consistently because he adapted to different playing styles, coaching philosophies, and team cultures. International defense lawyers must do the same. Each tribunal has its own particularities, and success depends on the ability to integrate, adjust, and perform under varying conditions.

Diplomacy and interpersonal skills also matter. Defense lawyers are rarely the most popular figures in international criminal proceedings. They represent individuals accused of serious crimes, and their role is often misunderstood. Building relationships with Registry staff, opposing counsel, and even judges requires tact, professionalism, and a willingness to engage constructively. Being friendly and respectful, even in adversarial settings, can help defuse tension and facilitate cooperation. It is important to make allies where possible, even among those who may not be inclined to support the defense.

Leadership is another key attribute, especially as Lead Counsel. Unlike domestic practice, where defense counsel may work alone or with minimal support, international defense teams are often composed of six to seven individuals from diverse backgrounds. As lead counsel, managing this team requires clarity of vision, delegation of tasks, and the ability to foster cohesion. Everyone must understand the strategic direction of the case and their role within it.

Other, additional, qualities of a lawyer that contribute to effective international defense include sound judgment, strong writing skills, and courtroom presence. Counsel must obviously be able to communicate arguments persuasively, both in writing and in the courtroom. Good IT skills are also increasingly essential, given the use of electronic case management systems, the volume of digital disclosure, and the need for secure communication.

These attributes, in my view, are foundational to the practice of international defense. The most effective lawyers in this field combine technical knowledge with strategic insight, interpersonal skills, and a commitment to fairness in the face of complexity and resistance.

Resource Constraints

Resource constraints are a defining reality in international defense practice. While the ICC provides some institutional support to defense teams, including access to the Office of Public Counsel for the Defense, logistical support to investigative activities, and basic IT infrastructure, the disparity between defense and prosecution is significant. The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) routinely operates with far greater resources. In most cases, their teams outnumber ours by a ratio of eight to one. Prosecutorial staff benefit from permanent contracts, stable working conditions, and access to advanced document management systems. At the ICTY, for example, the OTP’s internal platform was far more sophisticated than anything available to defense teams.

Defense teams, by contrast, are composed of external contractors. We do not receive sick leave, vacation days, or parental leave. Our cybersecurity and travel security are minimal compared to the protections afforded to OTP staff. The imbalance is structural and persistent. But fairness in resources is not the measure of success, you do what you can with the resources you have, and what matters is the quality of the work: what is filed and how it is argued in court. Despite the limitations my defense teams have faced, I have never felt prouder of the written submissions produced by my teams. The appeal brief in Bemba remains one of the clearest examples of what can be achieved with a focused strategy, despite limited resources. 

A successful written brief is defined by clarity, consistency, and presentation. It must be readable, well-indexed, and free of unnecessary repetition. Style matters in a brief: font choices should be coherent, text should be justified, and a logical, indexed, structure should help guide the reader through complex legal arguments. A good brief does not just require an excellent understanding of the law and persuasive arguments; it also requires clarity and a strong presentation. This takes time and careful review.  

Courtroom advocacy requires the same level of preparation. A strong appearance in court is built on calm delivery, mastery of the evidence, and proficiency with the technology used. It is important to remain composed, even when challenged by the bench or provoked by opposing counsel. If an objection is necessary, it must be strategic and grounded in fairness, particularly fairness to the witness. These moments are rare, and they must be used wisely.

Working within resource constraints demands dedication, resilience, and teamwork. The defense may not have the same institutional backing as the prosecution, but it has the capacity to produce work of equal quality, both in written briefs and courtroom appearance.

International vs. Domestic Criminal Law Practice

Key differences between international and domestic criminal trials are not limited to legal frameworks or procedural rules. They extend to the length and scale of the cases, structure, and type of work throughout the proceedings. These differences shape the role of defense counsel and the demands placed on the defense team throughout the life of a case.

Key Differences in the Trial Process

One of the most significant distinctions is the length of proceedings. International trials often span several years, if not a decade. The Bemba case at the ICC lasted ten years from pre-trial to appeal. In Popović at the ICTY, which extended over nine years, the Presiding Judge remarked early in the proceedings that counsel should prepare for the long haul, noting that many changes in our private lives would likely occur before the case concluded. This observation reflects a broader truth: international defense work requires sustained commitment over long periods, often becoming the central focus of a lawyer’s professional and personal life.

The intensity of client contact is another defining feature of international criminal cases. Unlike many domestic systems, where communication with clients may be limited to court appearances or scheduled meetings, international defense work involves regular, often daily, interaction with the accused. Visits to detention facilities are frequent, and the relationship between counsel and client becomes deeply personal. Clients and their families may become part of the lawyer’s daily life, creating a dynamic that is both humanizing and pressurized. In The Hague, where the court building(s), detention center, and legal offices are located within a small geographic area, the proximity reinforces this intensity and can blur the boundaries between professional and personal space.

The scale of international cases also sets them apart from domestic criminal cases. The crimes under investigation typically involve multiple incidents, geographic regions, and hundreds of witnesses. Defense teams must manage vast quantities of evidence and coordinate complex legal strategies. Unlike domestic practice, where a lawyer may work independently or with minimal support, international defense requires the management of a multidisciplinary team. These teams are often composed of individuals from diverse legal traditions and cultural backgrounds. Effective leadership in this context demands intercultural sensitivity and inclusive team management.

The nature of the legal work itself in international crimes cases is also distinct from domestic cases. In domestic systems, legal arguments are often raised in court. In international criminal law, however, most procedural and substantive issues must be submitted in writing through the filing of a motion. In addition, international defense teams are responsible for conducting their own investigations. This includes identifying and interviewing witnesses, collecting evidence, and verifying facts, tasks that are typically handled by police or investigative authorities in domestic systems.

Key Differences in the Defense Strategy and Procedure

These structural and procedural differences between domestic and international criminal cases require a shift in the approach to defense work. International defense counsel must be prepared for long-term engagement, sustained client interaction, and the management of legally complex cases and multilingual teams.

This also means a shift in defense strategy and procedure, as proceedings differ markedly from domestic practice, particularly in common law jurisdictions. International defense teams must be prepared to litigate complex legal issues, respond to evolving jurisprudence, and advocate effectively within a system that blends multiple legal traditions. 

First, international trials tend to be more legalistic, with a greater emphasis on the interpretation of law and precedent. In domestic proceedings, the focus is often on the presentation and review of evidence. By contrast, international trials frequently center on the scope and application of legal provisions, many of which remain open to interpretation due to the relatively limited number of cases involving international crimes. 

This legal focus is especially pronounced in relation to the concept of modes of liability. Concepts such as command responsibility, joint criminal enterprise, and indirect co-perpetration are still evolving. Defense teams must engage in detailed litigation to challenge the scope, elements, and evidentiary thresholds of these doctrines. The strategic emphasis shifts from factual rebuttal to legal interpretation, requiring sustained engagement with jurisprudence from multiple tribunals and careful framing of arguments that may influence future case law.

Second, the process of judicial decision-making at international tribunals differs. In international tribunals, judges deliberate on whether the prosecution has proven each element of the crimes charged beyond reasonable doubt. They draft the judgment based on these deliberations and determine the sentence. There is no jury. This model places significant weight on the written record, particularly the trial transcript. Judges and legal officers often rely on transcripts when drafting judgments, which means that non-verbal cues of witness examination, such as tone, hesitation, or facial expression, are excluded. Defense counsel must therefore ensure that key points are clearly articulated and captured in the transcript. This requires deliberate planning for and during witness examination and a strategy to direct your defense in a much more purposeful way into law and precedent.

Third, procedural particularities at international courts shape defense strategy. International criminal law reflects a combination of common and civil law traditions. Pre-trial litigation is extensive, with prolonged debates over the admissibility and relevance of evidence. Hearsay is more readily admitted than in many domestic systems, and the prosecution may call rebuttal witnesses after the defense case has concluded. The procedural framework is also highly codified, with detailed regulations governing filings, disclosure, and courtroom conduct. Defense teams must navigate these rules and regulations with precision and adapt their strategies to the procedural realities of each tribunal.

Another distinctive feature in international criminal proceedings is the participation of victims in proceedings. At the ICC, STL, and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), victims may be represented by counsel and may submit observations on legal and factual matters. This introduces an additional layer of complexity, as defense teams must respond not only to the prosecution but also to victim representatives. In the Bemba case at the ICC, for example, victim participation influenced the structure and content of the proceedings, requiring the defense to engage with multiple parties simultaneously.

Effectiveness of Modern International Criminal Tribunals 

Despite its foundational commitment to accountability and fairness, the ICC has faced persistent challenges in delivering on its mandate. Two structural issues in particular have in my view undermined its effectiveness and raised concerns about the integrity of its proceedings.

The first relates to enforcement. Unlike the ICTY, which operated based on a UN Security Council Resolution grounded in Chapter VII of the UN Charter and benefited from the cooperation of all UN member states, the ICC lacks a comparable enforcement mechanism. The ICTY was able to secure the arrest and surrender of suspects with relative consistency, contributing to its reputation as a successful international tribunal. In contrast, the ICC has struggled to bring high-level suspects into custody. While the Kenya cases and the Bemba case involved prominent figures, many of the individuals who have faced trial before the ICC have been relatively low-level actors. This has led to criticism that the Court is failing to pursue the most responsible perpetrators and is instead focusing on those who are politically or logistically easier to apprehend.

This dynamic has prompted me to call for a more strategic use of the complementarity principle. Under Article 17 of the Rome Statute, states bear the primary responsibility for investigating and prosecuting crimes within their jurisdiction. The ICC should consider referring cases involving lower-level perpetrators to domestic systems, where feasible, and focus its resources on those most responsible for serious international crimes. Such an approach would not only reinforce the principle of complementarity but also help the Court concentrate its efforts on cases with the greatest potential impact.

The second issue concerns the process by which suspects are brought into custody at the ICC. I have witnessed a tendency to issue arrest warrants based on preliminary suspicion, with limited scrutiny of the strength of the underlying case. This practice places the accused at a disadvantage and undermines the fairness of the proceedings. Although the Rome Statute provides for a confirmation of charges hearing within a reasonable time, this timetable is frequently extended. There is no provision for custody limits, and the evidentiary threshold for confirmation is not consistently applied. The result is prolonged pre-trial detention and uncertainty for the accused. I believe there should be a more structural and thorough review of arrest warrants before they are issued, as well as a structural review of whether people in custody should remain in custody or should be released. 

These two systemic shortcomings have implications for the overall fairness of trials at the ICC. While the Court has demonstrated its commitment to due process, evidenced by the acquittal of several defendants, the pre-trial phase remains a point of concern. A more rigorous review of arrest warrants, clearer standards for confirmation, and greater respect for procedural timelines would strengthen the Court’s credibility.

The Future Outlook for Defense Counsel 

The role of defense counsel in international criminal law remains underappreciated, despite its centrality to fair trial guarantees and the legitimacy of international justice. A functioning criminal system requires not only effective prosecution but also robust and independent defense. Acquittals, when they occur, should not be viewed as institutional failures, instead they are indicators that the system is capable of applying legal standards impartially. The rhetoric surrounding acquittals must shift to reflect this reality.

There is a persistent failure within the broader international community to recognize the value of the defense function. Legal aid decisions are often framed in terms of cost rather than necessity. Defense budgets are scrutinized more heavily than prosecutorial ones, and support for defense teams is frequently treated as discretionary. This approach undermines the principle of equality of arms and risks reducing the defense to a procedural formality rather than a substantive counterweight to the prosecution.

Looking ahead, I believe defense counsel face a number of challenges that extend beyond legal argumentation. Physical safety is a growing concern for me and my colleagues. In high-profile cases, such as the Bemba case, defense lawyers have encountered perilous situations due to public visibility and political sensitivities. The association with controversial figures or contested narratives can expose counsel to threats, surveillance, and personal security risks. These risks are compounded by the increasing vulnerability of legal professionals to cybercrime. Online exposure, data breaches, and targeted digital harassment pose serious threats to the confidentiality and integrity of defense work.

Resource constraints are also likely to intensify. The ICC and other international tribunals face mounting financial pressures, and defense teams are often the first to experience reductions in support. Cuts to legal aid, investigative budgets, and staffing levels compromise the ability of counsel to prepare and present a full defense. Without adequate resources to the defense, the fairness of proceedings is placed at risk.

To address these challenges, a cultural shift is needed. States, institutions, and civil society actors must recognize that defense is not an auxiliary component of justice but a foundational one. Adequate resources for defense, protection for legal professionals, and respect for the role of counsel are essential to the future of international criminal law.

Conclusion 

The practice of international criminal defense is shaped by a unique set of legal, procedural, and institutional frameworks. A successful defense case requires counsel with a specific set of core qualifications and attributes, including confidence, adaptability, diplomacy, leadership, sound judgment, courtroom presence, strong writing skills, and technological proficiency. Together, these attributes enable defense counsel to navigate the complexities of international proceedings and uphold the rights of the accused in some of the most challenging legal environments. Additionally, essential to the effectiveness of a defense team is a shared strategic vision and a clear division of roles within that framework. 

International trials are generally longer, more procedurally complex, and more heavily reliant on written litigation. Furthermore, the relationship between counsel and client is more intensive, and the scale of the cases requires the management of diverse, multidisciplinary teams. Defense teams must be able to operate within a hybrid legal system that blends common and civil law traditions. The defense team’s legal strategy is shaped by the evolving nature of international jurisprudence, with a strong emphasis on precedent and legal interpretation. The participation of victims adds another layer of complexity, requiring defense teams to engage with multiple parties throughout the proceedings.

Looking ahead, I think that several areas require attention. Much has changed since the early days of international criminal tribunals. The ICC has established the Office of Public Counsel for the Defense and developed legal aid frameworks that support our work. But the defense function remains under-resourced and under-recognized. Investigative support remains uneven and cooperation from states is still frequently limited. These structural imbalances undermine the principle of equality of arms and thus threaten the credibility of the proceedings.

The wider international community must acknowledge that an effective defense is not a procedural formality but a cornerstone of a fair and credible justice system. Acquittals should be understood as evidence that the system is functioning as it should, not as institutional failure. The rhetoric around defense outcomes must change accordingly.

The ICC faces its own set of challenges, including the need for stronger state cooperation, a more coherent and equitable legal aid policy, and improved security protocols for defense teams. The Court must also take seriously its obligation under the complementarity principle to focus on prosecuting those most responsible for international crimes, while encouraging domestic systems to address lower-level perpetrators. Finally, arrest warrants should be issued only after careful review, and the rights of the accused must be protected through timely confirmation proceedings and meaningful custody safeguards.

The future of international defense counsel will depend on the system’s ability to address these structural issues. Acquittals demonstrate that fair trials are possible, but the path to that outcome is often fraught with procedural delays, resource constraints, and personal risk. The security and protection of defense counsel must be prioritized, alongside sustained investment in the institutional capacity of the defense function with a view to strengthening the role of the defense in international criminal justice and ensuring that the principles of fairness, equality, and due process remain at the heart of the international criminal justice system.


* In the UK criminal bar, the “returns system” refers to the practice of reassigning cases at short notice to another barrister when the original advocate is unavailable, often due to scheduling conflicts. The barrister taking the “return” must prepare and appear in court with minimal time to review the case.

** The Srebrenica massacre refers to the July 1995 killing of more than 7,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys by Bosnian Serb forces in and around the town of Srebrenica during the Bosnian War. It has been recognized by international courts, including the ICTY and the ICJ, as an act of genocide.

The Inception of International Defense - An Interview with Dr. Mark S. Ellis

The Inception of International Defense

An Interview with Dr. Mark S. Ellis

Edited by Emma Bakkum & Paul Williams

A Note on Defending Justice

This blog is part of the Defending Justice series, an initiative of the Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG) to promote an eclectic array of voices within the field of international criminal law. 

As part of our broader efforts to strengthen institutions of justice, this series seeks to create space for dialogue around the varied perspectives and concerns that shape these institutions. With that aim in mind, we interviewed a series of defense practitioners working in international criminal law and distilled their experiences and insights into a series of first-person blogs, preserving the spirit and voice of those interviews.

Editor’s Note

This blog delves into the origins and evolution of the work of defense counsel before international criminal tribunals. It presents the reflections of Dr. Mark Ellis, based on his extensive experience providing assistance to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), his active involvement in the Saddam Hussein trial in Iraq, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), and the International Criminal Court (ICC), and his service as Executive Director of the International Bar Association (IBA). Through the examination of key defense developments, including the financial remuneration of defense counsel, assigning and selecting defense counsel, defense counsel ethics, and the role of bar associations, this blog traces the evolution of the defense counsel’s role in international criminal law, showcasing how defense contributions have shaped the fabric of international justice. Starting at the formative days of defense at the ICTY, including in the landmark Tadić case, the blog presents first-hand accounts of the key challenges and milestones faced by defense counsel appearing before the ICTY and beyond, illuminating key developments of the defense at international criminal tribunals, and laying the foundation for understanding the broader international justice system.

Introduction

While the idea of international criminal justice institutions dates back to the aftermath of the First World War, it was only after the Second World War that the first international criminal courts, the Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military Tribunals, were established, aimed to address war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity committed during the war. These tribunals laid the groundwork for future international criminal justice mechanisms. Large-scale atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda in the 1990s led to the establishment of two ad hoc international tribunals (the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; ICTR), set up by the United Nations in 1993 and 1994, respectively. Following the ad hoc international tribunals, the international community experimented with other formats: hybrid courts, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone (2000) and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (2007); and special or extraordinary chambers embedded within national systems, like the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts in Cambodia (2003) and the Special Panel for Serious Crimes in East Timor (2002).

Meanwhile, discussions of an independent international criminal tribunal emerged after both world wars, but became more realistic with the end of the Cold War, when the easing of geopolitical tensions fostered renewed multilateralism and revived the international community’s concern with impunity. Several rounds of negotiations culminated in the adoption of the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court (ICC), in July 1998. The Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002, after 60 countries ratified it. The ICC became the first treaty-based, permanent international criminal court to help fight impunity by investigating and, where warranted, prosecuting individuals charged with the gravest crimes of concern to the international community: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression.

I have been involved in the field of international criminal justice since 1995. My journey into defense work started at the ICTY and in the Tadić case. Thirty-six years ago, Justice Richard J. Goldstone, the founding Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY, set out the importance of Tadić receiving a fair trial and a proper defense. That principle has been the north star throughout my career in international law, including ensuring that fair trial rights, through adequate and effective defense, remain central in international and domestic criminal trials. 

Following the Tadić case, I have served in several positions advising on high-profile international criminal processes. I served as Legal Advisor to the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, chaired by Justice Goldstone. I was appointed by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to advise on the creation of Serbia’s War Crimes Tribunal. I was involved with the Iraqi High Tribunal and acted as legal consultant to the defense team of Nuon Chea at the ECCC. In 2000, I was appointed Chair of the Advisory Panel of the ICTY. In 2013, I was admitted to the List of Assistants to Counsel of the ICC. In 2015, I also served as Chair of the UN-created Advisory Panel on Matters Relating to Defense Counsel of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (previously the ICTY and ICTR).

I currently serve as the Executive Director of the International Bar Association (IBA), leading the foremost international organization of bar associations, law firms, and individual lawyers. My current focus is specifically on the IBA’s assistance to Ukraine, which includes legal support for war crimes accountability, technical assistance and capacity-building for judicial institutions, and support for justice reform and reconstruction efforts. In addition, I serve as an advisor to the ICC on sanctions issues. Prior to joining the IBA, I served for ten years as the Executive Director of the Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative (CEELI), a project of the American Bar Association (ABA). As part of this initiative, I provided technical legal assistance to twenty-eight countries in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, as well as to the ICTY in The Hague. To this day, CEELI remains one of the most extensive international pro bono legal assistance projects ever undertaken by the US legal community. 

Throughout these experiences, I witnessed the role of defense counsel grow in importance over time. As international criminal cases became more complex, the overall organizational structure for international defense improved significantly and financial support increased. Challenges invariably remain. Nevertheless, the evolution of international defense since the early years of the ICTY is remarkable and yields critical lessons for the way forward. 

Early Years at the ICTY: The Tadić Case

The International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

The ICTY was established in 1993 in response to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, specifically the mass atrocities taking place in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. I lived in the former Yugoslavia from 1985 to 1988, having been awarded a Fulbright Scholarship.

Reports of horrendous crimes, including the killing and wounding of thousands of civilians, torture, sexual abuse, and forced displacement, led to global outrage and prompted the UN Security Council to act. In accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council established the ICTY in May 1993. The ICTY was the first ever international criminal tribunal established by the UN, and the first international war crimes tribunal since the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. 

Based in The Hague, The Netherlands, the ICTY’s mandate was to prosecute those individuals most responsible for serious international crimes such as murder, torture, rape, enslavement, destruction of property, and other crimes listed in the Tribunal’s Statute, committed in the former Yugoslavia since 1991. By bringing perpetrators to trial, the ICTY aimed to deter future crimes and render justice to thousands of victims and their families, thus contributing to a lasting peace in the former Yugoslavia.

Throughout its operation, the ICTY indicted 161 persons; all cases were completed by the time the Tribunal closed in 2017. The ICTY indicted heads of state, prime ministers, army chiefs of staff, interior ministers, and many other high- and mid-level political, military, and police leaders from various parties to the Yugoslav conflicts. The ICTY transformed the landscape of international humanitarian and criminal law by establishing groundbreaking legal precedents, expanding the scope of international criminal accountability, and reinforcing the principle that no one is above the law.

The ICTY officially closed its offices on December 31, 2017. The International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT), created by the UN Security Council in December 2010, assumed responsibility for a number of essential functions previously carried out by the ICTY and ICTR (which had closed in 2015). In doing so, the IRMCT maintains the legacies of the pioneering ad hoc international criminal tribunals and aims to reflect best practices in international criminal justice. In 2024, the IRMCT reported on a historic turning point for the Mechanism with the conclusion of all core crimes cases and fugitive tracking.

The closing of the ICTY as a standalone institution and the recent reduced activity of the IRMCT mark the end of a period in international criminal justice shaped by the ad hoc tribunals, which also transformed the landscape of international defense work. The end of the ICTY experiment calls for a reflection on the formative days of the role of defense counsel.

The Start of Defense Counsel at the ICTY

The ICTY website highlights the crucial role of defense counsel: “a competent defense upholds equality of arms between the Prosecution and the Defense, thereby ensuring the fairness of the proceedings.” Interestingly, defense lawyers were not directly involved in the creation of the ICTY. Their role only became integral during the development of the ICTY’s Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence. From that moment, it became clear that defense attorneys would be critical to the Tribunal’s success. 
However, defense counsel faced several challenges in the early years of the ICTY. When the ICTY became operational, it had no defendants. The true catalysts for defense came from the first case at the Tribunal: the Tadić case. Duško Tadić, a Bosnian Serb and President of the Local Board of the Serb Democratic Party in Kozarac, was accused of participating in crimes committed against Bosnian Muslims and Croats in the Prijedor region of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war in the early 1990s. He was accused of crimes involving the abuse and torture of detainees in concentration camps. Tadić faced multiple charges, including crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and violations of the laws and customs of war. In 1997, after a total of 79 trial days, Tadić was convicted of wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, and murder. The Trial Chamber found, among others, that Tadić participated in the collection and forced transfer of civilians to detention camps, the killing of two Muslim policemen, and the participation in the killings of five men. He was sentenced to 20 years in prison.

The Tadić case was remarkable in numerous ways. Not since the international military tribunals established in Nuremberg and Tokyo after World War II had perpetrators been held accountable for international crimes before an international tribunal. The case set important legal precedent in international criminal law, including by providing definitions of war crimes and crimes against humanity, by expanding the scope of war crimes that could be prosecuted at the international level, and by contributing to the principle of command responsibility, which says individuals in positions of authority can be held accountable for actions of subordinates if certain elements are proven.

Once Tadić was transferred to The Hague, a crucial yet unclear question was the engagement of defense lawyers. As the first indigent defendant in a modern international criminal law trial, Tadić’s attorneys were assigned, which was the first time the Registry had to do so.

A year before the start of Tadić’s trial, I traveled to The Hague for a meeting with Justice Richard J. Goldstone. Justice Goldstone was a prominent South African judge and the first Chief Prosecutor for the ICTY and ICTR. At this point, he was setting up the prosecution offices for these pioneering tribunals, in which he played an instrumental role. During the meeting, I offered CEELI’s full support to the new Prosecutor in his first trial. Justice Goldstone, however, wanted me to assist with training the defense teams. Justice Goldstone recognized the importance of the fairness of the proceedings and was concerned that the defense did not have sufficient resources. He once noted during an address: “There is no question that history will judge the Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda on the fairness or unfairness of their proceedings. Whether there are convictions or whether there are acquittals will not be the yardstick. The measure is going to be the fairness of the proceedings.” 

I agreed to assist with training the defense teams. It is a credit to Justice Goldstone that, as the Prosecutor, he sought to ensure the defense had sufficient support and resources. I fully leaned into ensuring that defense had the resources to provide effective representation for suspects and the accused.

Tadić’s Defense Team and Initial Challenges

Defense Team Structure

I became convinced that the best approach to the defense was to assemble a diverse team of international and local (co-)counsel. This naturally creates the strongest team. When the Tadić trial started, the selection process for counsel at the ICTY was included in the original 1994 Directive on Assignment of Defense Counsel and was relatively straightforward. An attorney had to meet several requirements, including being admitted to a state bar or being a law professor, and having fluency in one of the Court’s working languages (French or English).

The initial counsel of Tadić were not schooled in the common law system. Partly because the ICTY was based in The Hague, some of the early defense counsel were, in fact, Dutch. Professor Michail Wladimiroff, one of the Netherlands’ most respected criminal lawyers, was assigned as lead counsel for Mr. Tadić. Mr. Wladimiroff had impeccable credentials. He selected Alphons Orie, another superb lawyer, as his co-counsel, who later became a respected judge with the ICTY. 

I spoke to John Heffernan, director of the Coalition for International Justice, and we decided to initiate a training program for both Wladimiroff and Orie. I reached out to a good friend in the US, Joe Jones, who was a well known criminal lawyer. In turn, he suggested another American criminal lawyer, Carol Bruce, and a UK barrister, Steven Kay KC, a leading English barrister, to join the training team. With the assistance of another great American lawyer, Alain Norman, we created an extensive week-long training seminar focused on adversarial techniques, recognizing that the ICTY’s procedures and practices would lean heavily on common law traditions. The training seminar took place at the Peace Palace – a stunning building in the heart of The Hague and the home of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Because Wladimiroff was recovering from a back injury, we trained Orie in the Palace and Wladimiroff at his home while he was in bed! Both of them quickly picked up cross-examination techniques. However, they also recognized their own lack of experience in an adversarial trial. Thus, it was felt that it was essential to add a common law barrister to the defense team.
At the end of the training week, I visited the ICTY’s Registrar, Dorothée de Sampayo, and asked that a common law barrister be added to the team. I had earlier sought Justice Goldstone’s approval. One of the arguments I made was that at the time, the prosecution trial team had a mix of five Australian/US counsel, and there was a need for “equality of arms” (see below on equality of arms). To her credit, the Registrar agreed, and Stephen Kay was added to the defense team. Mr. Kay even agreed to take a substantial reduction in his fee. Another talented UK barrister, Sylvia de Bertodano, had recently completed her pupillage at the English bar and joined earlier as an assistant to the Dutch lawyers. Immediately, Mr. Kay took responsibility for cross-examining witnesses, while Mr. Wladimiroff and Mr. Orie continued to direct the overall case and advance arguments. 

Additionally, since the start of the ICTY, a transformation occurred in which lawyers from conflict situations joined the defense team. This has generally been a positive development. However, for the Tadić trial, the Serbian lawyers that Tadić had added to his team on his own were not working out. Consequently, Mr. Wladimiroff and Mr. Kay worked to have all of them removed from the team, which Tadić agreed to. While the skills used in a domestic criminal case are obviously relevant, they do not necessarily include the legal background required for a complex international war crimes case. Back then, the average attorney simply was not schooled in this practice. 

Because of the ICTY’s elaborate Rules of Procedure and Evidence, as well as its numerous directives, these attorneys found themselves unfamiliar with the ICTY and its procedures. However, the team did utilize local investigators, including Tadić’s brother and another local – Dragan Petrovoc, who had worked with a documentary crew and “fixer” in the local Yugoslav region.

The overall solution in the Tadić case was to blend co-counsel familiar with common law and civil law, with both having experience in international criminal law. Each brought his or her own unique expertise and experience. Had a common law lawyer not been added to the Tadić defense team, the trial would have been viewed entirely differently. The Wladimiroff/Orie/Kay defense team approach became the paradigm for international war crime tribunals.

Equality of Arms

Ensuring the basic tenets of a fair trial remain crucial at international criminal tribunals. The principle of equality of arms between the prosecution and the accused goes to the heart of the right to a fair trial. The importance of defense rights is premised on the equality of arms principle. This was a pivotal issue during the Tadić trial, and the trial influenced the interpretation and application of the principle of equality of arms in international criminal proceedings.

Equality of arms is not just achieved through the assignment of defense counsel. The defense teams at the ICTY faced serious challenges due to insufficient resources. The resources available to defendants, both in preparation for and during a trial, are fundamental to justice through due process. 

For instance, low remuneration for defense lawyers and limited support for their travel and witness interviews are relevant examples. In fact, the defense counsel for Mr. Tadić argued that there was no equality of arms between the prosecution and the defense at trial, which seriously affected the preparation of the case and therefore frustrated the right to a fair trial. The inability to gain access to evidence and enter key villages and towns in hostile states necessary to build the defense’s case had weakened counsel’s ability to represent their client effectively. 

The ICTY Appeals Chamber referenced jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), affirming that equality of arms encompasses the right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defense, as outlined in Article 21(4)(b) of the ICTY Statute.

In my research and through interviews with defense counsel and the Registrar, I learned that defense counsel’s access to the region of the former Yugoslavia greatly diminished over the years following the first case. Yet, the Tadić case and the decisions made reinforced the importance of procedural balance.

I have said many times that the ICTY would be judged by the fairness of its proceedings and by the certainty that the accused received a fair trial and proper defense. Ultimately, no one has questioned the outcome or legitimacy of the Tadić trial, precisely because equality of arms was ensured through the assignment of defense counsel. Justice Goldstone has reiterated this view on several occasions, stating that without the support given to the Tadić defense team, the trial would not have been fair.


The Evolution of Defense Counsel before the ICTY and ICTR

Key lessons learned from defense in the Tadić case continued to guide my work with defense teams and to influence defense work at the ICTY and ICTR. As the number of cases before the ICTY grew following the Tadić case, the role of defense counsel evolved. The evolution of defense counsel can be witnessed through developments in several areas, including remuneration, assignment and selection, ethics, and the role of civil society.

The Financial Position of Defense Counsel 

Remuneration for defense counsel is one area that drastically changed over the years. Thankfully, defense counsel salaries at the ICTY and ICTR substantially improved following the first ICTY case against Duško Tadić.

The original 1994 Directive on the Assignment of Defense Counsel (amended several times since) provided for limited remuneration for defense counsel. Counsel in the Tadić case was paid a fixed rate of $800 for the entire trial ($400 for each stage of the trial) and a daily rate of only $200 per day. As I have written in “The Evolution of Defense Counsel Appearing Before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia”, the remuneration in the Tadić case was hardly commensurate with the amount of time devoted to the case. Assigned Counsel spent 12 to 14 hours a day, six days a week, completing pre-trial and trial work. Counsel prepared for more than 85 cross-examinations and over 35 direct examinations of defense witnesses. When calculated based on a seven-and-a-half-hour workday, the lead defense counsel was paid $26 per hour, which also covered general administrative costs for the counsel’s office. Tadić’s counsel, Mr. Wladimiroff, waived his usual fees to meet the ICTY’s payment schedule.

After Tadić, compensation for counsel at the ICTY and ICTR generally improved. The Directive, amended in 2000, raised the fixed rate from $400 per trial stage to $2,000. The fixed daily rate was also raised considerably. In the early 2000s, depending on years of experience, lead counsel at the ICTY were remunerated at rates between $80 and $110 per hour, up to a maximum of 175 hours per month. An experienced counsel could earn more than $230,000 per year. Expenditures such as phones, mailing, office equipment, rent, fax services, and secretarial support were included in the payment to counsel of fees and costs. 

The Legal Aid Policies for the pre-trial, trial, and appeal stages later provided a more detailed payment scheme. They outlined the fixed rates for each phase of the proceeding, grouped into three levels of complexity (difficult, very difficult, and extremely difficult). The pre-trial stage policy provided for fixed rates, while the trial and appeal stage policies provided for a fixed rate per month depending on the difficulty of the case.

The Assignment and Selection of Counsel

The assignment and selection of defense counsel were established in the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, which referred to a right of the accused to communicate with “counsel of his or her own choosing” in Article 21(4)(b) and Article 20(4)(b) respectively. However, the right to counsel of an accused’s choosing was not without limits. The ICTY and ICTR generally left the administrative task of selecting counsel to the Registrar’s discretion, particularly to ensure that the counsel chosen met the criteria for assignment. However, in reality, the accused had great latitude in selecting his own counsel. In fact, there had rarely been a refusal of a request for assignment of counsel of choice during the ICTY’s history.

The Directive on the Assignment of Defense Counsel further governed the procedures for the assignment of defense counsel. The original Directive from 1994, in Article 16(A), entitled the suspect or accused to one attorney as assigned counsel only. The word “one” was interpreted literally. However, due to the enormous amount of work involved and the complexity of the Tadić case, as mentioned earlier, I successfully petitioned the ICTY for an additional defense attorney. The then ICTY Registrar reasoned that the Directive, while limiting counsel to one counsel, nevertheless allowed discretionary use of funds to secure the services of a defense counsel consultant.

In 1996, following the Tadić trial, the Directive was amended to allow the assignment of a second counsel to the accused under exceptional circumstances. By 2000, the ICTY further relaxed its co-counsel rules, allowing co-counsel more routinely, along with support staff such as investigators, translators, and language assistants, to manage the vast documentation involved. Article 16(C) of the Directive provided that the Registrar may, in the interests of justice and at the request of the lead counsel, “assign a second counsel to assist with the defense [...].” The Directive clarified the distinction between lead counsel and co-counsel too: acting under the authority of the lead counsel, the co-counsel may deal with all stages of the proceedings and all matters arising out of the defense. Article 16(D) further allowed the Registrar to “assign a co-counsel who does not speak either of the two working languages of the Tribunal but who speaks the native language of the suspect or accused.” Finally, Article 16(E) provided for the assigning of “other persons such as legal assistants, consultants, investigators and interpreters, as required, to provide support to counsel.” The article clarified that the lead counsel and the persons assisting him shall be referred to as the defense team.

Defense Counsel Ethics

The ICTY faced serious challenges in regulating ethics and discipline among defense counsel, given the diverse legal backgrounds of defense counsel from various countries. For instance, a system of “fee-splitting” emerged, in which the defendant appointed lawyers from the former Yugoslavia, with a portion of the lawyers’ fees paid to the defendant’s family. Unlike domestic systems with bar associations, the ICTY lacked a unified regulatory body. To address this, it introduced a Code of Professional Conduct in 1997, based on Rules 44–46 of its procedural framework, and subsequently amended it a few times. 

The Code was drafted by judges (not lawyers) and heavily influenced by national models, especially the ABA’s Model Rules. The Code, substantially revised in 2002, aimed to clarify defense counsel’s rights and obligations, restrictions and responsibilities, govern aspects of counsel’s work, such as confidentiality and conflicts, and to impose a disciplinary regime, including a Disciplinary Panel. A similar Code was introduced at the ICTR, and the ICTY code influenced the development of the ICC’s Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel.

Role of Civil Society 

The Tadić case was not only a legal milestone but also a starting point for civil society engagement in international justice. During the Tadić trial, a number of platforms and networks of civil society collaboration (e.g., CEELI) were heavily involved and played a crucial role by promoting transparency, advocating for victims’ rights, and shaping public discourse.

Civil society also recognized the importance of an effective defense as a component of a fair trial, which was crucial to the development of the defense. Several NGOs provided research or offered legal expertise and training to defense teams, recognizing the need for competent defense lawyers. Some NGOs advocated for procedural fairness and equality of arms, indirectly supporting defense teams by urging the ICTY to improve resources, transparency, and access to evidence.

Regarding the ICC Code of Professional Conduct, the IBA undertook a rigorous drafting process through an international Advisory Panel of legal experts.

Association for Defense Counsel 

Finally, a milestone development for the defense counsel was the establishment of the Association of Defense Counsel for the ICTY (ADC-ICTY). With the conclusion of the first trial, during which support for the early defense team was provided through a training program developed by CEELI, it became evident that it would be helpful for defense to consolidate formally, and in a way that would allow them to advocate for their interests. The ICTY judges saw a need for an association for the defense for several reasons. First, such an association could ensure a higher quality of defense counsel. Second, it could make collective representations to the ICTY on behalf of all defense counsel involved in cases. Third, it could deal with ethical and disciplinary issues. After more than a year of work by a special ad hoc working group, the ICTY established the Association of Defense Counsel of the ICTY in September 2002.

The judges amended the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, making membership of a recognised association of counsel a necessary requirement for inclusion on the so-called Rule 45 List (list of qualified counsel). This requirement can be found in Rule 44 of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

In December 2016, the General Assembly of the ADC-ICTY voted to adopt an amended Constitution which renamed the Association as the “Association of Defense Counsel practicing before the International Courts and Tribunals” (ADC-ICT). The ADC-ICT’s objectives include supporting the functioning, efficiency, and independence of defense counsel, promoting and ensuring the proficiency and competence of defense counsel, and overseeing their performance and professional conduct. It is the only official association of defense counsel that has practiced before the IRMCT. Lawyers admitted to the ICC List of Counsel are represented by ICCBA.

The Arc of International Defense and Way Forward

Following the armistice that ended World War I, the Treaty of Versailles committed the signatories to try Kaiser Wilhelm II for his crimes. Although he was never brought to justice, it would be the first time in history that nations imagined the possibility of an international tribunal. The ICTY, ICTR, and the ICC are a testament to that early vision.

In the 30 years since the UN Security Council created the ICTY, the international community has seen the field of international criminal law and the institutions within it steadily solidify, ultimately leading to the establishment of the ICC. The role of the ICTY and the ICTR in this evolution of legal thought cannot be underestimated. The ICTY’s achievements, in both substantive and procedural law, have established legal standards, and its perceived success is undoubtedly a major reason for the creation of the ICC.

ICTY and ICTR

Reflecting on my experiences, those early years at the ICTY showed a propensity to adapt to changing circumstances and needs. Representing those accused of some of the most heinous crimes of the past century was one of the most crucial aspects of the Tribunal. Yet, at the formation of the ICTY, issues addressing the needs of the defense counsel were not a priority for the newborn tribunal. However, because of the foresight of the ICTY’s first prosecutor, Richard Goldstone, and the Registrar, Dorothy de Sampayo, issues related to the defense counsel slowly gained greater importance. 

Although the years that followed have not been a panacea for all of these issues, the overall structure of the defense counsel significantly improved at the ICTY and ICTR. For instance, as described in this blog, the financial support for defense counsel at the ICTY improved. The number of assigned counsel and support staff provided to indigent defendants also increased. And, although not required, the ICTY adopted a liberal policy permitting the accused to select any available counsel qualified to appear before it. 

The ICTY also made progress in strengthening the integrity of the defense structure: the adoption of a code of professional conduct for defense counsel represented a milestone in countering allegations of ethical misconduct by assigned counsel. Finally, one of the hallmark developments was the formation of the Association of Defense Counsel of the ICTY.

International Criminal Court

These ICTY-specific defense developments significantly influenced the ICC’s defense framework. The ICC’s framework reflects several lessons learned from the ICTY and ICTR regarding defense issues, including the selection and assignment of defense counsel, defense counsel fees, and counsel ethics.

First, the ICC implemented a similar system of selecting defense counsel. The ICC’s Registrar oversees a list of approved counsel who meet the criteria set out in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Rule 20-22). Consistent with the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC makes clear that the indigent defendant does not have the absolute right to choose counsel. The Court reserves the right to select counsel for the defendant where the interest of justice so requires.

Likely in response to equality issues faced at the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC adopted a different approach to assigning counsel, allowing for the creation of a defense team. At the initial arrest, a defendant is assigned a “duty counsel” selected by the ICC from a list of attorneys in the accused’s country. The lead counsel is then allowed to assemble a defense team that, at various stages of the trial process, includes a professional investigator, two legal advisors, and one assistant. To facilitate this and other defense issues, the ICC has created an Office of Public Counsel for the Defense, an independent office within the registry whose purpose is to represent and research the rights of the defense and of persons entitled to legal assistance. Its functions include representing and protecting the rights of the defense during the initial stages of proceedings, providing general legal support to defense teams, and acting as an amicus curiae on defense issues.

Second, when embarking on creating the ICC’s legal defense system, the Registry conducted an impressive review of international and domestic legal aid systems. To avoid the early financial problems of the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC decided to reinforce the ICTY lump-sum payment system for assigned counsel, establishing an overall payment scheme for assigned defense counsel. 

The ICC Legal Aid Policy outlines the remuneration system in section G and Annex II, including remuneration for services provided and a monthly living cost lump sum. Unfortunately, there has been criticism about the ICC’s pay for defense counsel. Compared with other international tribunals, the ICC provides relatively low remuneration.

Third, following the ICTY’s practice, the ICC likewise recognised the need for a uniform code of conduct; Rules 8 and 22(3) of the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence authorized its creation. The Rules permitted the Registrar to develop a code of professional conduct in consultation with appropriate legal associations. As mentioned earlier, the IBA led a lengthy, consultative drafting process from 2002–2003 to build consensus across jurisdictions, and the Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel was adopted by the ICC’s Assembly of States Parties in 2005.

Finally, a considerable achievement at the ICC, building on the vital work of the ADC at the ICTY, is the creation of the International Criminal Court Bar Association (ICCBA) to advocate and lobby for defense interests similarly.

The struggles the ICTY encountered in dealing with issues affecting the defense offer current and future international tribunals ample opportunities to avoid similar mistakes. The significant achievements in the field of international criminal law and issues of accountability over the last 30 years have solidified the common understanding that, to ensure fair trials, adequate support for defense and the accused is a necessity. To maintain respect in the international community and to adhere to the principles of justice and the rule of law, international tribunals cannot be created merely to convict. I have witnessed that defense is no longer merely an afterthought as it was in the early years. 

Way Forward

Despite achievements, issues affecting the defense must remain a priority. Challenges inevitably remain (as other blogs in this series outline). As the field continues to develop and adapt, new challenges will arise. Over the past few years, we have seen a growing focus on the defense as it continues to play a critical role in shaping international criminal law at both the global and domestic levels. To meet international standards of international criminal law, this development requires an active role of the international community in capacity-building support. 

For instance, it has been very encouraging to see that Ukraine is receiving additional legal training in international criminal law from the IBA. Presently in Ukraine, over 97% of all war crimes committed by Russia since its full-scale invasion against the country will be tried by national courts. It is an arduous task with currently over 190,000 incidents of war crimes registered in the non-occupied territories alone. Ukraine’s legacy for these domestic trials will largely depend on whether the trials are seen to have met international standards of fairness and impartiality. The role of defense attorneys will be critical to meeting these standards.

The growth in domestic accountability processes, as we have also seen in universal jurisdiction cases, reinforces the idea that some crimes are so heinous that the world cannot turn a blind eye and that it has a duty to hold those responsible accountable. While this is inevitably not an easy duty, more acknowledge that a duty exists to combat impunity. We should be at a point where it is assumed that, to achieve accountability and ensure justice, a robust defense is a component of both processes. 

Conclusion

Protecting the rights of the accused appearing before international war crimes courts is not an easy task. Particularly where the most egregious crimes have been committed, social pressure to convict can be overwhelming. Coupled with the budgetary constraints associated with internationally supported courts, the focus on fair trials and the rights of the defense is often lost in the mayhem.

The rights of a defendant are fundamental to fair and impartial trial proceedings. Too often, defense issues fell to the bottom of the priority list. While there was a strong focus on the role of judges and prosecutors, little attention was given to legal assistance for the defense. Defense teams tended to be underfunded and short-staffed. Even the presumption of innocence was often absent in court statutes, particularly at the domestic level.

Although there are still many challenges for the defense, the ICTY changed the landscape of international defense remarkably. Initial challenges were overcome thanks to the foresight and resolve of some of those involved in the early defense work. The Tadić defense team’s approach, combining common and civil law experience and balancing regional expertise and procedural competence, became the paradigm for international war crime tribunals. And in the years that followed the Tadić case, crucial achievements were made at the ICTY and ICTR, some in response to the realities of defense work during that first case. 

At the ICTY and ICTR, the number of assigned counsel and support staff provided to indigent defendants increased. The ICTY adopted a liberal policy, allowing the accused to select any available counsel who is qualified to appear before the ICTY. Beyond acknowledging the importance of assigning defense counsel, the Tadić case made clear that equality of arms encompassed the right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defense. Financial support for defense counsel at the ICTY and ICTR improved in comparison to the first case. 

The ICTY and ICTR also made progress in improving the defense framework with the adoption of a code of professional conduct for defense counsel. These, and other developments, greatly influenced the broader international criminal justice field, including the ICC’s framework. A landmark development is the establishment of the International Criminal Court Bar Association (ICCBA) to represent the interest of counsel and support staff at the ICC.

The Tadić trial made evident that, in ensuring fair trials, support for the defense was necessary. Today, defense is no longer an afterthought for international criminal trials. That is a tremendous achievement in itself. Nevertheless, as the focus of international accountability increasingly shifts to domestic trials, these trials require greater specialized knowledge, awareness, engagement, and support from lawyers and the public generally. 

Defending Before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia - An Interview with Colleen Rohan

Defending Before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

An Interview with Colleen Rohan

Edited by Cailan Cumming, Kate Gibson & Paul R. R. Williams

A Note on Defending Justice

This blog is part of the Defending Justice series, an initiative of the Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG) to promote an eclectic array of voices within the field of international criminal law. 

As part of our broader efforts to strengthen institutions of justice, this series seeks to create space for dialogue around the varied perspectives and concerns that shape these institutions. With that aim in mind, we interviewed a series of defense practitioners working in international criminal law and distilled their experiences and insights into a series of first-person blogsblogs, preserving the spirit and voice of those interviews.

Editor’s Note

This blog presents the experiences and perspectives of Colleen Rohan, a prominent defense lawyer whose decades of defense practice encompass some of the toughest cases in U.S. domestic criminal law as well as landmark cases before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Through her personal journey in international criminal law, Rohan offers a singular perspective on the evolution of international defense, including the creation of the Association of Defence Counsel (ADC), the practical and ethical questions of representing persons accused of serious international crimes, and the procedural and institutional obstacles that shaped the early operations of the ICTY. Drawing upon Rohan’s experiences, readers gain insight into the daily realities of defense work, from navigating disclosure battles to fostering collegiality in a multicultural defense community, to the ways in which defense counsel must adapt to evolving legal systems. Her experiences illuminate both the successes and limitations of the ICTY, the development of substantive international criminal law, and the ongoing need for recognition, resources, and respect for defense practitioners in international tribunals.

Introduction

When the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established in 1993, it was in response to atrocities that shocked the world—mass killings, ethnic cleansing, systematic rape, and the genocide in Srebrenica. For the first time since Nuremberg, an international court was created to hold individuals accountable for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Over the years, the tribunal indicted political leaders, military commanders, and others in positions of authority, setting important precedents in international criminal law while also drawing criticism for its accessibility and procedures.

By the time I arrived in The Hague, the tribunal had already been operating for more than a decade, but my own journey there had begun much earlier. I never set out to become a lawyer, let alone an international criminal defense lawyer. As an undergraduate at UC Berkeley, in Berkeley, California U.S. I worked to support myself, taking a job as a typist at the Meiklejohn Civil Liberties Institute under Ann Fagan Ginger, a remarkable human rights lawyer. I thought I was headed toward a career in psychology, but Ann pushed me to consider law. I then worked as a typist for Patrick Hallinan, a celebrated criminal defense lawyer in San Francisco, where I was taken to court and given real work to do. Patrick also encouraged me to go to law school and told me he would give me a job if I did, which he followed through on. These two mentors, who convinced me that law would be a way to help people, were instrumental in my beginnings in law. 

My journey into law was a gradual process, but I was fortunate to be part of a generation that believed lawyers were not simply there to earn a fee, but to use the law as a tool for positive change in people’s lives. We genuinely felt we could help shape the law while helping individuals. We were not naïve, but we were optimistic, an optimism that waned as our legal careers progressed. Still, that early sense of altruism was essential in driving us forward as young lawyers.

My first introduction to ‘international’ law was when Patrick Hallinan was engaged to represent an American, William Joseph Quinn, who traveled to Ireland to join the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and was charged with a series of bombings in England and for the murder of a police officer in London. Watching that case unfold, with questions of extradition and about laws in other countries, opened my eyes to a field of law I had not considered before. Still, I spent the next 25 years in the U.S., first in private practice, later at the State Public Defender’s Office handling serious felonies and death penalty cases, and then back in private practice defending gang cases and post-conviction death penalty cases.

In the late 1990s, my partner Gregor Guy-Smith, also a defense lawyer, and I moved to Toulouse, France. While there, we followed the developments of the international tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Given our background in criminal defense, they struck us as interesting places to work and as a way to stay in Europe. Though we eventually returned to the United States, the seed had been planted.

At that time, there was a small but growing community of lawyers involved in international criminal law. Gregor attended a meeting of these lawyers in Montreal where he met Peter Murphy, who was working on the first Kosovo case at the ICTY against Fatmir Limaj, Isak Musliu, and Haradin Bala, members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) who were charged and later acquitted of war crimes. Peter invited Gregor to join the defense team for Haradin Bala, and eventually Gregor became lead counsel.

I spent time between California and The Hague, as our daughter was still in high school, but I met many people in the Hague community. Eventually the Registrar suggested that I take on cases myself, considering me qualified and recognizing the need for defense counsel at the time. After nearly 25 years in domestic criminal defence I formally entered the world of international criminal law.

Both Gregor and I were deeply interested in the development of international criminal law, the kind of law that was being practiced, which was very different from U.S. domestic law, and the future of these tribunals. Life in The Hague meant being part of a vibrant, dynamic community with constant intellectual discussion about the law. We quickly realized how much there was to learn and how trials operated in other countries. Many who left The Hague to return to domestic practice often came back due to just how compelling this field of law was. For us, the transition into international criminal law ultimately felt natural, meaningful, and engaging.

First Case

My first case at the ICTY was representing Milorad Trbic, a Serb implicated in the genocide in Srebrenica. I arrived in The Hague early that first morning, and by 11 a.m., I had my first meeting with the Prosecutor. He briefed me on the case and handed me three large boxes of disclosure, which was just the beginning of what would eventually amount to hundreds of thousands of documents. By the end of the case, even after I had moved on, over a million documents had been disclosed. 

After the meeting, I went to the ICTY’s ‘Defence room’. It was a shared space with a few computers and desks, but all the defense teams at the tribunal needed to use this space, which was about 30 to 40 people. With so few resources and no offices, there was constant jockeying for space and equipment. Most of the defense team members were from Serbia or other parts of the former Yugoslavia, and many different languages filled the room. At first, I felt completely overwhelmed. Setting up an office and figuring out how to begin going through the case was mostly up to me at this time. 

A woman introduced herself as co-counsel for one of the co-accused in the Srebrenica case. She told me there were many things I did not know because the case had progressed before my client was arrested and indicted and before I was brought in as counsel. She then proceeded to tell me that my client had confessed to 26 murders he did not commit and that his confession was false. This revelation completely shifted how I approached the case and evaluated the disclosure before even meeting my client. In my entire career as a defense lawyer I had never experienced anything like that—a false confession to 26 murders.

My co-counsel’s experience and local knowledge of the region and the war were invaluable. What could have been an intimidating first day instead became an important and welcoming introduction to the international defense community. I quickly realized that the collegiality among defense lawyers was strong and was a vital support system in navigating my first case.

My first day in court was equally eye-opening. I had to wear a robe, use headphones for translation, and navigate multiple computer screens for simultaneous interpretation. The proceedings involved three judges and no jury—a clear difference from my experience in the U.S. common law system. I had no time to thoroughly prepare so I relied on advice from colleagues who had gone through the same experience in order to understand exactly what to do in court. In other aspects it was easier for those coming from a common law system to learn the tribunal’s legal system. Many of the defense lawyers came from Serbia, a civil law system, without adversarial procedures like cross-examination, so even seasoned lawyers from these systems needed to learn courtroom techniques that were specific to the tribunal. That was a lot of pressure and challenge in such a high-stakes environment.

Other aspects of the system were not so comfortable to me as someone coming from a common law system. Hearsay evidence was admissible, certain witnesses were protected and inaccessible, and client access could also be difficult. Gradually, we adapted to the rules and procedures while working on our case and observing other cases, even if we did not like the rules and procedures we had to work with. One of the aspects of working at the tribunal that I never quite got used to was navigating the relationship with the prosecution. In the U.S., regardless of your relationship with the prosecutors, they will generally provide the required information, be reasonable, and generally be collegial. At the ICTY, some prosecutors seemed reluctant to share relevant or exculpatory evidence and at times could even be considered hostile towards the defense. The ICTY itself was structured around three pillars—Registry, Judges, and Prosecution—and as defense counsel, we were not formally part of this hierarchy. This meant the prosecution could sometimes view the defense as a necessary obstacle to be dealt with at trial. 

That first case taught me the realities of international criminal defense: navigating an unfamiliar legal system, managing massive disclosure with limited resources, and building relationships within a complex institutional structure, all while advocating for a client whose liberty and life were at stake.

Ethics of Defense Representation

In the United States, much of my early career was spent handling gang-related cases, including death penalty work. These cases could be quite demoralizing as they involved deeply damaged victims, deeply damaged clients, and often involved individuals who were emotionally and mentally unstable and had committed cruel and vicious crimes. The negativity was unrelenting. Over time, it took a toll.

Given the gravity of the crimes tried at international tribunals, many people assume that the ethical questions of defending clients at international tribunals must be even greater. In fact, I found the opposite to be true. My clients at the ICTY were not gang members or career criminals but rather those working in the military or members of the political structure. They were men who had once lived what we might call ordinary lives—people with an education, with families, with stable homes—until the war broke out. The only reason they became involved in criminal conduct was because the war literally arrived at their front doors. They were fighting for their communities, their families, and for what they believed in, in the context of a violent, ongoing war. If it was not for the war these people probably, with rare exception, would have never committed a crime. 

Take someone like Milorad Trbić, a low-ranking officer in the Bosnian Serb Army. He was trained, above all else, to follow orders. In military life, obedience is non-negotiable. Today, we have rules of law prohibiting soldiers from carrying out commands that are facially illegal or immoral, but in the reality of war, that was not the case for many of the officers on the ground. Many of the people who were told to shoot civilians in Srebrenica said no, and there was a whole regiment whose leader refused to shoot civilians, and they walked away. Some are able to withstand the pressure of those commands in a military environment. Others are not.

In the U.S., I represented people who often made destructive choices in their everyday lives. At The Hague, many of my clients were men who did not generate the situation that brought about the crime, but rather the situation was generated for them. These were men who would never have committed a crime had it not been for the war. For me, there was never an ethical conflict in defending someone who had been put in such a situation. Now, that is an entirely separate issue from whether they have a proper defense or not.

Other defendants came from the political leadership. I was on the standby team for Radovan Karadžić, who, as President of the Republika Srpska, was prosecuted for nearly every crime committed during the war. Karadžić was highly educated and highly intelligent. You may completely disagree with his worldview—and I certainly did—but like anyone involved in war, he took day to day decisions about the battlefield, and he did so with others who were in the political structure. Leaders on all sides were responding to very real political issues.

To understand that dynamic, you need to go back to the history. All wars, including the war in the former Yugoslavia, are in response to something. For instance, Bosnia’s former Muslim president, Alija Izetbegović, had published The Islamic Declaration in 1970, which Serb leaders interpreted as a call to transform Bosnia into a Muslim state. So, when Muslims moved into the area, they felt threatened, and tension and hatred began to build. When you combine this tension with the reality of war where people have lost their homes and family members; cannot work; and cannot walk anywhere without feeling unsafe, you begin to understand where the sense of existential threat comes from and how people are driven or feel driven to make decisions that we would not take under normal circumstances. Under those conditions, decisions were made that, in hindsight, absolutely constitute war crimes. How much of that is understood at the time is another complex issue.

This is why learning about your client’s history, culture, and lived reality is absolutely essential in international criminal defense. Whenever possible, I tried to travel to the region, meet people, and attempt to understand what it must have been like for my client during the war. Through this exercise, you can begin to understand why your client functioned the way that they did—not to excuse their behavior but to attempt to understand it. Defendants make poor choices and may be racist or Islamophobic, but these things never raised a single ethical barrier for me in representing them. My role was not to endorse their views, but to test whether they were guilty of the alleged crimes under the law, to ensure their rights as defendants were respected, and that they received a fair trial.

At the ICTY, we also had the Association of Defence Counsel (ADC), which I will discuss in greater detail below. The ADC was a professional association of defense counsel working at the tribunal and it included a disciplinary committee. This body was there to support lawyers who faced genuine ethical dilemmas in their cases and did not know how to resolve them. The committee could provide confidential advice and opinions, helping counsel navigate the complexities of international criminal practice. That structure itself was a recognition that, in this unique environment, ethical questions could arise in ways we might not encounter in domestic practice.

Shaping the Future of Defense

The Birth and Development of the ADC

When I first arrived at the ICTY, it quickly became clear that very little thought had been given to the defense during the tribunal’s creation—who we would be, how we would be supported, how we would fit into the institution, or how we would function. The tribunal paid us to handle our cases, but beyond that, we were largely on our own.

In the early years, defense counsel were highly restricted and, in many ways, ignored. For example, our badges allowed us to enter only a narrow corridor leading to the defense room in the tribunal building. We were barred from the cafeteria, the library, and certainly from entering the Prosecutors’ offices. Meanwhile, the prosecution had full offices, support staff, and access to a database of cases and case law that we could only consult from within the building. For those of us not living full-time in The Hague, legal research was incredibly difficult. We were permitted just three paid travel days to the Hague per month unless our case was in trial, which meant that the lawyers who did not live in the Hague full-time could not conduct legal research for their cases. 

At one point the Judges became concerned about the ethical practices among defense counsel. They proposed creating a structure to monitor ethical behavior and provide training. Many of us thought this was an excellent idea because at least, finally, we were being included in the institution in some way. Based on this original group, and working closely with the Registrar, we established what became the Association of Defence Counsel (the ADC or ADC-ICTY).

The ADC was a proper association, complete with a constitution, executive committee, president, training committees, and a disciplinary committee. It was the first step in providing the basic support that defense counsel needed to prepare and defend their cases effectively. By 2005, new defense counsel could walk into the tribunal building, knock on the door of the ADC, and receive the minimum guidance, information, and access necessary to do their work in this new environment.

Within a couple of years, the ADC began offering trainings with the basic information needed for defense counsel to do their jobs, such as how to conduct direct and cross-examinations, and substantive training on international criminal law. This was essential because the ICTY was the first modern international criminal tribunal, meaning many legal issues were being determined in real time and international law was constantly evolving. At the time you could not access this information on your home computer so the ADC’s trainings were critical.

The community support that grew from the ADC was invaluable. Defense counsel came from all over the world, including countries that had once been on opposite sides of conflicts, yet we shared a common language: going to court and representing the accused. Overcoming these early challenges together forged a strong bond among us. Working together to do our job effectively became more important than any of our differences.

Looking back, the birth and development of the ADC was one of the ICTY’s most enduring contributions to the international defence community. The ADC has now existed for over twenty years, and its legacy paved the way for the ICC’s Defence Association, the ICCBA, which gives defense counsel similar institutional support after many years without it.

Manual on International Criminal Defence

When the ICTY began planning to put out a manual to explain the basics of the tribunal and its three pillars of the Chambers, Prosecution, and Registry, the Office of the President suggested that someone write a chapter about the Defense. I wrote the chapter and included commentary on some of the challenges we faced as defense counsel, particularly regarding limited resources and difficulties in securing disclosure from the prosecution. Those who initially read the draft described it as reasonable and constructive. However, the Prosecution was not pleased. They wanted the sections on disclosure challenges removed. In the end, the ICTY President’s office did not allow us to edit the chapter and simply left it out of the final manual.

The primary funder of the manual, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), seeing that the defense chapter had been taken out, asked if the ADC would be willing to put together a defense manual for publication. We agreed. Lawyers from the ICTY, coming from all over the world, contributed to the manual, offering practical guidance on every aspect of defence work—from conducting direct and cross-examinations to writing and arguing motions, to interviewing witnesses effectively.

The publication of that manual marked a turning point. The perception of the ICTY judges towards the defense began to change. They started to recognize the defense’s role within the tribunal and the value of our inclusion in tribunal matters, rather than just limiting our relevance to basic due process rights. Defense representatives were now invited to important meetings and we felt that our role was more respected, our ideas listened to, and that we were treated with less hostility. 

In the early days of the ICTY, for example, the defense was rarely consulted or listened to by the Rules Committee, which decided on changes to rules and evidence procedures that directly affected our daily work. Often rules were passed without considering how they would function from a defence perspective, which meant wasted time and resources litigating adjustments that could have been avoided with proper consultation. The manual, and our advocacy in creating it, helped change that dynamic, giving defence counsel a stronger voice and greater accessibility within the tribunal.

Legacy of the ICTY

Fairness of Trials

When I reflect on the trials at the ICTY, I believe that, by and large, they were fair. Admittedly, at the beginning, I approached the proceedings with some skepticism, assuming that judges might be biased. But in practice, I found most of them were genuinely trying to reach reasonable conclusions based on the evidence before them. There were, of course, exceptions where judges made their bias absolutely clear. One well-known case involved Judge Frederik Harhoff, whose impartiality was called into serious question after he sent a private email to a large group in which he was critical of his judicial colleagues’ judgments acquitting certain commanders, and expressed his view the acquittals were political and did not follow the law. He was subsequently removed from the tribunal.

In my own cases, I found the judges made an effort to adhere to the rules of evidence and procedure. Appearing before a panel of Judges is a completely different experience from presenting your case to a jury. In an international tribunal like the ICTY, you are building a working relationship with three individuals who are deciding a case and it is very different from the relationship you have with a jury. It is not about appealing to the emotions of a jury but rather about establishing credibility with the judges, demonstrating the reliability of your evidence, and presenting yourself as a trustworthy advocate. You are trying to figure out who the judges are and how they think. Through that process you hope that they will listen to you and accept your view of the evidence.

Development of International Criminal Law

In terms of the broader development of international criminal law, I believe the ICTY had an enormously positive impact, provided people actually pay attention to it. I do not agree with every decision that came out of the tribunal, but the parties and the Judges worked through some extremely complex factual and legal questions. They produced opinions that can be relied upon in later courts and tribunals, creating a body of jurisprudence that continues to influence international criminal law. The challenge, of course, is that no one is formally required to follow ICTY decisions, but they are cited, studied, and increasingly used as a reference. Domestic courts and specialized tribunals in the region, such as the War Crimes Chamber of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), have drawn on ICTY jurisprudence to guide their own proceedings.

International criminal law is, and will always be, a dynamic and evolving field. In my view, the ICTY played a critical role in shaping this landscape, setting standards and offering a foundation upon which future tribunals and courts built upon and continue to build upon.

Continuing Challenges 
When I look at the landscape of international criminal law today, I see both progress and lingering challenges. Compared to the ICC, I believe the ICTY had a particularly strong defense association, and over time, we gained much better recognition of the defense’s role and function within the tribunal. That recognition, however, does not remove enduring issues, particularly when it comes to disclosure of exculpatory evidence, an issue that has major implications on the right to a fair trial.

Disclosure was a significant challenge at the ICTY, and it continues to be at the ICC. I recall one case at the ICTY where we actually filed a motion seeking sanctions against a Prosecutor for withholding exculpatory evidence. The Trial Chamber granted our motion and ordered sanctions, but on appeal, the decision was overturned. The Appeals Chamber was concerned about setting a precedent that would hold a Prosecutor personally accountable in this way. In another case, I remember a particularly sympathetic witness—an older gentleman who spoke about the brutal killing of his parents and how the war had devastated his life. He spoke about who he thought was responsible for the human cost of war and who he thought directed it, and he left the courtroom as a highly credible witness. A few days later, however, we received a late disclosure from the prosecution: this same witness was actually a wanted war criminal and had committed crimes against humanity himself. By the time this information came to light, he was no longer available for cross-examination. The late disclosure fundamentally affected the fairness of the proceedings, leaving us unable to properly examine or challenge his statements.

At the ICC, there are similar, and in some respects, more structural challenges for the defense. One example is the delayed admissibility of evidence. At the ICC, the admissibility of all evidence that the parties seek to admit and present during the trial is only formally ruled on by the judges at the end of the case. This means that if the Prosecutor seeks to admit an expert report and the defense objects, arguing that it is inadmissible on certain grounds, we will not know during the trial whether the evidence will ultimately be accepted. This makes it impossible for a Prosecutor to know if they have met their burden of proof. For the defense, this creates a major dilemma: we cannot determine whether we need to present affirmative evidence to rebut certain claims. Essentially, we are left guessing, which is unfair and undermines the defendant’s right to a fair trial. 

Conclusion 

Reflecting on my experience, I would emphasize the importance of cautious optimism for young lawyers entering the field. When I first began practicing at the ICTY, the dynamism of international criminal law, combined with the diverse and supportive community of defense counsel, was what drew many of us to The Hague and continues to bring lawyers back today. Learning from other defense counsel how to navigate a new court system, and learning as you go on each case, continues to be a vital part of practicing defense in international tribunals.

The existence of a Defence Association, first at the ICTY and now at the ICC, remains crucial for onboarding and basic training of defense lawyers, providing guidance and support in a complex and often overwhelming environment. Yet challenges remain: limitations in technology, inadequate facilities, and restricted funds for travel all continue to impact the effectiveness of the defense. 

Despite these challenges, the defense community at the ICTY overcame these obstacles together, forging strong bonds across cultures and legal traditions, a practice that continues today at the ICC and other international tribunals. As the first modern international criminal tribunal, the ICTY faced constant legal evolution, and both Counsel and Judges worked hard to address extraordinarily complex issues. From my perspective, the ICTY made a tremendously positive contribution to the development of substantive international criminal law, producing solid jurisprudence that continues to guide courts and tribunals around the world. The creation of the Association of Defence Counsel (ADC) was also a critical achievement, ensuring that defense voices began to be recognized and supported.

Looking forward, international tribunals must continue to build on these lessons. Proper funding and resources, clear communication, a strong defense association, and genuine recognition of the function of the defense are essential for maintaining the fairness and integrity of international justice. Counsel must be included in discussions regarding rules of procedure, and the prosecution must be held to high standards of timely and full disclosure of exculpatory evidence. Ultimately, even as decades pass and new tribunals are created, the needs of defense practitioners remain the same: for our role to be recognized, our ideas heard, to be treated with respect, and that our basic needs are met so that we can effectively represent our clients. The ICTY was one important step toward achieving this and advancing true justice before the eyes of the international community.

The Essential Contributions of Support Staff in International Defense - An Interview with Cécile Lecolle

The Essential Contributions of Support Staff in International Defense

An Interview with Cécile Lecolle

Edited by Cailan Cumming, Kate Gibson & Paul R. Williams

A Note on Defending Justice

This blog is part of the Defending Justice series, an initiative of the Public International Law and Policy Group (PILPG) to promote an eclectic array of voices within the field of international criminal law. 

As part of our broader efforts to strengthen institutions of justice, this series seeks to create space for dialogue around the varied perspectives and concerns that shape these institutions. With that aim in mind, we interviewed a series of defense practitioners working in international criminal law and distilled their experiences and insights into a series of first-person blogs, preserving the spirit and voice of those interviews.

Editor’s Note

Justice in international criminal law is not solely determined by the strength of arguments or the weight of evidence—it is also shaped by those working behind the scenes. Support staff, often unseen and underappreciated, play a decisive role in the defense of the accused. Through the work of Cécile Lecolle, an experienced case manager and legal assistant, this blog explores the reality of defense support work in some of the most high-profile international criminal cases. Lecolle’s career demonstrates not only the immense responsibilities carried by support staff but also the broader inequities in international justice, including resource imbalances between the prosecution and defense, failures in disclosing exculpatory evidence, and the persistent stigma surrounding defense work. 

Introduction

My journey spans from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to the International Criminal Court and beyond. With a background in international public law and a specialization in international humanitarian law, I began my career with an internship at the ICTY, assisting in the judgment writing, and participating in the work of the Presiding Judge on his separate opinion in the Šešelj case

In one of the most contentious trials in the ICTY’s history, the Serbian politician Vojislav Šešelj was charged with incitement to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity.  Prosecutors alleged that Mr. Šešelj’s inflammatory speeches and recruitment efforts fueled ethnic violence during the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s. His speeches called for the expulsion of Croats, Muslims, and other non-Serb populations, and he was accused of organizing paramilitary groups that committed atrocities. Ultimately, the trial sparked widespread debate about the limits of free speech and the burden of proof required to establish accountability for crimes of incitement.

Motivated to deepen my understanding of international criminal law, I pursued another internship with the defense team for Jean-Pierre Bemba at the ICC. The Bemba case, which involved allegations of crimes against humanity and war crimes in the Central African Republic, demonstrated to me the immense challenges defense teams face in managing extensive evidence. This work led to a paid position as a case manager, where I continued contributing to the Bemba case through the appeal stage. My career path then took me to the Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, where I worked as a case manager and legal assistant in Arusha. I later joined the Office of Public Counsel for the Defence at the ICC, conducting legal research for defense counsel on complicated and/or novel legal questions.  

My involvement as a legal assistant in the Al Hassan defense team at the ICC, which addressed war crimes and crimes against humanity in Mali, further shaped my career. Al Hassan ag Abdoul Aziz, a former member of Ansar Dine, an Islamist armed group, was charged with crimes committed during the occupation of Timbuktu. The case represented a significant step in addressing crimes that target cultural and historical identity as violations of international law.

In the Mokom case, I again acted as a legal assistant and supported the defense team through its pre-trial phase. Maxime Mokom, a leader in the Anti-Balaka militia in the Central African Republic, was accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including murder, extermination, deportation, and persecution. The ICC Prosecutor dropped all charges against Mr. Mokom after the hearing on the confirmation of charges, citing insufficient evidence. This case taught me the importance of exculpatory evidence in preserving the integrity of the judicial process.

I currently work as a legal assistant on the Kony defense team, focusing on the pre-trial phase of the case against Joseph Kony, alleged leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Central and East Africa. Mr. Kony faces charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including murder, enslavement, and forced enlistment of child soldiers. His case has drawn international attention as the first in absentia confirmation of charges hearing at the ICC, raising significant concerns regarding the rights of the accused and right to a fair trial. In addition to my role in the Kony case, I continue to offer pro bono support to other cases and work part time in France as an Associate Judge at the National Court of Asylum.

For me, defense work is both deeply rewarding and profoundly challenging. It is a formative and multifaceted pursuit, shaped by setbacks, stigma, administrative hurdles, and the ongoing struggle to uphold the rights of the accused. Despite these obstacles, my commitment to the field of defense continues, and I hope this blog provides meaningful insight into the contributions of those who work behind the scenes of the Defense in international criminal tribunals.   

The Role of Support Staff

In international criminal defense, support staff play a crucial and varied role, supporting counsel in every aspect of the case. From the initial stages of case preparation to the final stages of trial, support staff are integral in ensuring that defense teams are able to effectively represent the accused. There is a wide variety of roles within the support staff: interns, visiting professionals, case managers, legal assistants, assistants to counsel, and language assistants. Regardless of the title, most team members contribute broadly to many areas of the case. Whether researching legal precedent, analyzing evidence, discussing strategy with the client, managing case files, or preparing witnesses for testimony, support staff are deeply involved in the case’s progression.

Interns and visiting professionals are typically in the early stages of their careers looking to learn about the work of the ICC and in the case of visiting professionals, applying their specialized knowledge to an area of work. Language assistants are hired to help translate and analyze evidence and court documents in multiple languages, which is essential in ensuring that all evidence is correctly interpreted. Case managers, the first entry-level position within a defense team, are in charge of organizing and managing the case file. They are responsible for tracking deadlines, scheduling meetings, managing communications with the ICC Registry, and handling any administrative tasks. Most case managers are also involved in legal work, such as evidence review and legal research, contributing to the overall case strategy. 

Legal assistants typically have several years of experience in the field and are entrusted with more substantial legal responsibilities. They may assist with drafting legal documents, preparing witnesses, reviewing evidence, and even speaking in court, including questioning or cross-examining witnesses. Assistants to counsel have even more legal experience, and their work is often more strategic. They are trusted to take on the most complex legal tasks, contributing significantly to case strategy and court proceedings. 

One of the most significant responsibilities of support staff is managing evidence. This includes receiving documents from the prosecution, and then organizing, classifying, analyzing, and linking these documents together. This process is especially critical in the pre-trial phase, where understanding and becoming familiar with all the evidence is imperative before stepping into the courtroom. Organizing this mountain of information is no small task, and it requires immense attention to detail and a deep understanding of the case at hand. This is a central part of the work, and one that often requires long hours and a level of dedication that goes beyond the normal working day.

Support staff also often develop close relationships to the client, in some cases spending as much time with them as the rest of the defense team. Legal assistants, in particular, have privileged access to the client, which allows them to have confidential phone calls and visits, and means they are involved in many of the meetings between the support staff and the client. These interactions are at the heart of the defense team’s work, allowing support staff to gain insights into the client’s experiences, provide explanations of legal filings, discuss specific pieces of evidence or allegations, and ensure that they are well-informed and comfortable throughout the process.

Support staff can also play a role in shaping the defense strategy. As the team members who are often most intimately familiar with the case file, support staff serve as the “memory” of the case. By organizing filings, tracking correspondence, evaluating witness statements, and creating links between the evidence and charges, Counsel depend on the support staff to locate information, and be able to recall what has been decided or submitted throughout the case. Over time, as support staff remain involved in a case, they develop an understanding of the geographical, political, and contextual elements surrounding the case and gain fluency in the court’s rules, procedures, and functions. This combination of knowledge enables support staff to play an increasing role in shaping defense strategies. 

To succeed in the role, support staff must possess several key qualities. Time management, organization, and the ability to work well within a team are crucial for success in the fast-paced environment of international criminal defense. Communication skills, both in writing and verbally, are essential, as is the capacity for analytical thinking and attention to detail. Support staff must also understand the law and legal rules and be able to acquire new knowledge as needed. Finally, the support role requires patience, professionalism, and a strong ethical foundation, with individuals that trust themselves and others on the team.

These kinds of qualities enable support staff to successfully confront the challenges faced by defense teams. With little to no formal training available, they are often required to learn on the job—adapting quickly, acquiring new skills, and applying them daily under pressure. The fast pace of cases and the wide-ranging responsibilities leave no choice but to learn quickly and perform to a consistently high standard. Given that defense teams are typically much smaller than prosecution teams, support staff often carry a broader and more diverse workload. The exposure to all aspects of a case allows for significant professional growth, even if it is at the cost of long working hours and limited benefits.

Effective Case Management in Complex International Crimes Cases

In complex international criminal proceedings, effective case management is the backbone of a well-functioning defense team. At the helm of this process stands the case manager. The case manager is the architect of the case file—an extensive and living repository of everything related to the proceedings. The case file includes correspondence, filings, administrative decisions, meeting notes, client communications, witness folders, transcripts of hearings, evidentiary material, legal research, and more. Materials must be accessible, well-indexed, and tracked. Evidence is analyzed and categorized by type, geography, theme, event, or linkage to other evidence or witnesses. The evidence is also evaluated for chronology, provenance, legal weight, and relevance. The case file is not simply a folder of documents; it is the map of the case. Every team member relies on the case file to navigate the complex legal and factual terrain of their case. And when created with care and precision, it becomes the most important tool the team possesses.

Case managers also serve as the defense team’s timekeepers. They are responsible for maintaining a detailed calendar that reflects internal work plans, disclosure deadlines, filing submissions, scheduled hearings, and key procedural windows for legal actions. For example, when the defense team files a motion, the case manager tracks the deadline for the response, whether a reply is permitted, and if there is a right for the defense to appeal or request leave to appeal. 

While the ICC provides digital tools for case management, these platforms are complex and far from intuitive. The training available for these tools is limited and often unavailable, leaving case managers to become familiar with the technology on their own. The learning curve is steep, and yet the volume of material to be managed is immense. It is not uncommon for a case to involve tens or hundreds of thousands of documents, plus hours upon hours of audio and video footage.

These challenges are exacerbated by inadequate disclosure by the prosecution. Under Article 54 of the Rome Statute, the prosecution is obliged to investigate both incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally and disclose relevant material to the defense. However, no defense team at the ICC would argue that this is done thoroughly or consistently. The prosecution may miss key exculpatory evidence, either because of oversight, bias in their strategy, or a fundamental lack of understanding of defense theory. Consequently, defense teams must sift through everything themselves—doing the same work as the prosecution, but in much less time and with fewer people. 

During the pre-trial phase in the case against Maxime Mokom at the ICC, for example, the prosecution initially disclosed a set of documents it deemed exculpatory. Upon review, the defense identified numerous additional items that clearly fell within that category but had not been flagged. The Pre-Trial Chamber agreed and ordered the prosecution to repeat the disclosure process, ultimately leading to the identification of hundreds more exculpatory items. But by that time, only two months remained before the confirmation of charges hearing. The defense team then had to work under enormous time pressure to incorporate this evidence into its presentation. In the end, the charges against Mr. Mokom were dropped due to a lack of a reasonable prospect of conviction—a result owed in no small part to the work of the support staff in identifying and elevating exculpatory evidence.

The Mokom case illustrates that much of the critical work begins at the level of case management, and a strong case manager can make the difference between a case going forward or not. While Counsel focuses on shaping legal arguments and testing the prosecution’s evidence, they rely on the integrity and completeness of the information assembled and analyzed by their team. This trust means that the work of case managers carries immense responsibility. The volume of work is staggering and the stakes are high, but when carried with care, this role becomes one of the most impactful in the courtroom. 

Inequality of Arms

The structure and day-to-day work of the defense and prosecution teams in international criminal proceedings are markedly different. Prosecution teams are typically larger and far more specialized. Within a single prosecution team, there may be dedicated units for forensics, disclosure, information technology, mapping, and more. A team member in the prosecution might work full-time on one specific task, such as reviewing metadata or linking evidence to charges. In contrast, defense support staff are expected to juggle a wide array of responsibilities, often all on the same day. During the trial phase of a large case, a defense team may increase to 13–14 people, but more commonly consists of just 6–7 individuals. These include a Lead Counsel, one to three Co-Counsels (who may not be full-time), one Assistant to Counsel, a few Legal Assistants, one or two Case Managers, a Language Assistant, and a handful of interns or visiting professionals.

Though the different mandates of prosecution and defense may justify some variation in support, the disparity in resourcing and staffing can significantly impact the defense’s ability to do its job properly and efficiently. The prosecution often begins working on a case years before the defense is even assigned. They know their witnesses, their theory of the case, and how to proceed. Meanwhile, defense teams need to quickly acquire knowledge that the prosecution has had years of time to develop, such as the political and military context, the actors involved, the structure of the state, and the broader social and conflict history. There may already be thousands of pieces of evidence, hundreds of witness statements, and years of investigative work that must be gone through in a matter of months. For instance, when the defense team was appointed to represent the interests of Mr. Kony before the ICC, the case file already contained over 400 filings—representing years of litigation and procedural development that had occurred without any defense involvement. 

Prosecution teams also benefit from significantly greater funding for investigations, enabling greater fact-finding and evidence gathering than defense teams. In some cases, the sheer scale of the evidence even challenges the bench. In the case against former Côte d’Ivoire President Laurent Gbagbo, Trial Judge Geoffrey A. Henderson noted that he was unable to read the entirety of the prosecution’s case file within the timeframe given. He reflected that in his home jurisdiction of Trinidad and Tobago, he had never sat a trial without having reviewed all the evidence, and found this treatment of evidence deeply unsatisfactory. All of this affects the defense’s ability to respond fully and fairly—an imbalance that can have real consequences for the outcome of proceedings.

Beyond structural disadvantages, the defense also faces persistent stigma and unequal treatment within the international community. There remains a deep-rooted perception—among other legal professionals, NGOs, and even court officials—that the defense teams are merely an extension of the accused. In the Bemba case, for example, our experience in court was marked by clear hostility. Some members of the prosecution and legal representatives exhibited open disdain for Mr. Bemba, which extended to outright animosity toward the defense. 

This stigma persists even in academic and professional settings. At legal conferences, defense practitioners have faced accusations of dishonesty, procedural gamesmanship, or obstructionism—accusations that would never be made against the prosecution. Yet the defense simply does their jobs within the same legal framework and in the same pursuit of justice and due process. The defense is, quite literally, half of the courtroom and, as such, an indispensable pillar of the justice system.

However, there has been some progress regarding support to the defense in recent years. In 2022, defense support staff staged a strike and protested during the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) in The Hague, calling for better working conditions. The demonstration was a response to the lack of basic social protections for defense workers—protections that are afforded to ICC staff, including the prosecution. At that time, support staff had no rights to sick leave, holidays, parental leave, or retirement benefits. Defense personnel worked tirelessly, but without any institutional protection.

The protest aimed to pressure the ICC Registry and the ASP into revising the legal aid policy that was established in 2016. Those of us who were allowed to protest by their Counsel were banned from entering the Assembly, cutting off any opportunity to educate and advocate for our interests with state representatives. Nonetheless, the strike and protest proved to be an inflection point. For the first time, many people, even within the ICC, learned about the real working conditions of defense support staff and had greater sympathy for our cause.

Following the strike and demonstrations, there have been incremental improvements in the legal aid policy. As of 2024, defense support staff now enjoy certain employment rights, such as guaranteed holidays, parental leave, and slightly increased salaries. However, major imbalances persist. Support staff still lack pay parity with similarly positioned professionals in the prosecution, and it is unclear whether our salaries will be adjusted for inflation as theirs are. In 2022, there was a 35–40% pay gap between identical positions across the two teams—and this gap has not been closed.

Poor treatment can also extend to internal team dynamics. Junior support staff are especially vulnerable to harassment, overwork, and lack of protections. Many are expected to work excessive hours without sufficient leave and, due to their precarious status, are often unable to speak up. Their working conditions depend on the goodwill and management of their Counsel. Even excellent Counsel may have no training or background in team leadership, which can lead to mismanagement over the five to seven years that cases can last.

Although the Registry has acknowledged some of the concerns raised by support staff, it has rarely followed up with concrete action or demonstrated genuine concern—failing in its responsibility to protect defense professionals from institutional vulnerability. The 2022 protests brought greater visibility to the struggles of defense support staff, and some improvements followed, but defense teams remain institutionally disadvantaged, undervalued, and under-resourced. These imbalances not only affect the defense’s ability to do their jobs, but also have serious implications for the fairness and integrity of international justice.

Conclusion

Support staff play a vital yet often unappreciated role in international criminal defense. There is immense pressure placed on them: from the overwhelming volume of evidence and unworkable short timeframes, to the lack of resources, and for years, basic employment protections. These dynamics can lead to burnout and even mistreatment, with few avenues for recourse. And yet, it is within this high-pressure environment that many support staff experience rapid professional growth. Despite these challenges, support staff demonstrate exceptional adaptability and dedication, contributing meaningfully to major international cases from early on in their careers. Looking forward, it is essential to reframe how defense support staff are seen—not as junior assistants, but as essential professionals in the international justice system. Ensuring that they are treated with fairness, respect, trust, and professionalism is not only a matter of equitable treatment, but a prerequisite for the legitimacy and effectiveness of the defense.