President Zelenskyy's Three Pillars: Envisioning Security Guarantees for Ukraine
By: Sindija Beta, Paula C. Kates, and Dr. Paul R. Williams
As the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine rages on and talk of peace negotiations continue, the key issue is no longer territory—but rather, “security guarantees.” Since the full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukrainian, European, and US officials have struggled to define what this term means in practice. The Trump-Putin Summit in Alaska, the subsequent Ukraine–US–EU–NATO leaders’ meeting in Washington, D.C., and the high-level Coalition of the Willing meeting in Paris have only intensified the conversation. More recently, according to statements emerging from the latest Coalition of the Willing meeting, all or parts of the security guarantees Ukraine’s allies would provide to Ukraine have already been developed. These, however, are kept highly confidential for the time being.
Ideally, Ukraine would join NATO, gain full protection under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and Russia would never again threaten its security and territorial integrity. This is not an unreasonable aspiration. Article 5—the principle that an attack on one is an attack on all—combined with the deployment of the Alliance’s forces along NATO's eastern border, has deterred Russian imperialism for decades. No NATO member has suffered a kinetic attack from Moscow, despite the fact that several share borders with Russia and have long histories of being targeted by the Kremlin.
Practically, this scenario would entail pushing Russia’s forces out of Ukraine’s territory, obtaining the unanimous support of all existing NATO member states, and likely deploying NATO troops to Ukraine as part of the alliance’s eastern posture. For now, this remains out of reach.
The most recent discussions, particularly surrounding the meaning of “Article-5 like guarantees” and “security guarantees,” are discussed in another PILPG blog post. This current post builds on that discussion by focusing on the security guarantees framework outlined by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in August 2025 and the realities with which that framework will have to contend. President Zelenskyy outlined three pillars: funding for Ukraine’s military, mutual defense agreements with NATO member states, and sanctions against Russia.
The First Pillar: Developing and Funding Ukraine’s Military and Domestic Defense Industry
The first pillar is arguably already in advanced stages and, according to President Zelenskyy, will form the “central element of security guarantees”. President Zelenskyy defined this pillar as a three-track system: domestic production of drones and technology, European output of artillery and air defenses, and American supply of advanced weapons. Ukraine’s drone production and increasing development of robotic systems utilized in the war have been highly successful. Ukraine’s output of drones rose to several hundred thousand per year, including 15,000 ground robots, in 2025. Ukraine has also begun developing its own long-range missiles domestically and has successfully deployed drones in surveillance, attacks, and mine laying and demining. These advancements have been essential in counter-balancing Russia’s manpower advantage.
The goal is for Ukraine to obtain self-sufficiency in its weapons production. In 2023 and 2024, Ukraine concluded a series of bilateral security agreements with various partners, including the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and Germany. The agreements provide for a multiple-year commitment to provide military and financial aid to Ukraine and ongoing training support to ensure Ukraine’s military interoperability with NATO structures. Following a meeting of the Coalition of the Willing on September 4, 2025, to discuss security guarantees, President Emmanuel Macron of France affirmed the Coalition’s support for the development of a strong Ukrainian military.
However, weapons support from other states is often subject to domestic political pressures, as seen recently in the Trump Administration’s decision to end weapons donations to Ukraine. While currently NATO and European states are filling the gap by purchasing American weapons and passing those on to Ukraine, the most sustainable approach is for Ukraine to build up its own domestic defense industry—though whether or not Ukraine (and European states sponsoring this effort) have the financial resources to accomplish this remains unclear.
The Second Pillar: Mutual Defense Agreements with NATO Member States
The second pillar, mutual defense agreements with NATO member states, is still contentious, as discussed in the prior post. Current bilateral agreements merely require consultations within 24 hours of any new attack, but Ukraine seeks language that goes further, obligating partners to take concrete action in defense of Ukraine in the event of renewed aggression.
What is apparently currently on offer, however, is unlikely to form a NATO-style guarantee. Instead, the emerging model is best described as “collective response without automaticity.” Partners are pledging coordination and rapid assistance, but not a binding commitment to use military force in defense of Ukraine. This reflects deep political caution: neither Washington nor major European capitals are prepared to risk a direct confrontation with Russia by entering into a treaty with Ukraine that requires them to go to war with Russia in the event Russia attacks Ukraine again.
Related to this is the development of a proposal for a so-called “reassurance force” which would see European troops on the ground in Ukraine. This effort is part of the Coalition of the Willing’s efforts, led by the United Kingdom and France. Although the precise contours and size of such troop deployment are confidential, in early September, President Macron declared the plans complete.
According to President Macron, 26 states will take part in the reassurance force and the force will serve on land, in the sea, and in the air. President Zelenskyy further clarified that these states will participate in different forms depending on their capabilities, which will include cyber and air defense. A number of states had already prior expressed readiness to contribute troops to help provide security for Ukraine.
While few specifics are currently public, commentators have noted that these plans could include the deployment of troops from mainly European states in strategic locations, such as in Odessa and Kyiv and patrolling the Black Sea, as well as the provision of air defense, air patrolling, surveillance, intelligence, logistics, and training units. The US is expected to provide logistics, intelligence, and possibly air defense support, with its assets based outside of Ukraine, to defend against Russian drones and missiles. Talks with the US about its role within the Coalition of the Willing are continuing. As such a deployment would require a joint control and command structure, NATO's existing infrastructure could be utilized, along with its joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. Nevertheless, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has said that, although being part of the Coalition of the Willing talks, NATO will not have a role in these security guarantees.
An overarching issue is that the US and European states are deeply reluctant to provide the type of guarantees that might actually lead to a military conflict with Russia. For this reason, some emphasize that any deployment of troops can only happen once there is a ceasefire or a peace agreement in place. This may, however, incentivize Russia to continue fighting to ensure that no foreign troops can be deployed in Ukraine.
Alongside the need for a ceasefire or peace agreement for any reassurance force to deploy, commentators continue to discuss the extent to which Russia would “allow” these security guarantees. In theory, security guarantees mean binding commitments from Western states to act should Russia attack Ukraine again, or mechanisms to support Ukraine in deterring Russia from further attacks, such as a tripwire force. These are measures that are exclusively the competence of Ukraine and its allies. Russia should have no say in these. When it comes to peacekeeping or monitoring forces deployed on the line of contact between Russian and Ukrainian forces, some degree of Russian buy-in is required as Russia would have to agree to respect, and not attack, those peacekeeping forces. In practice, the discussion around security guarantees seems to blend both of these measures together, thereby inadvertently giving Russia a veto over any security guarantees that could be implemented.
The Third Pillar: Further Economic Sanctions Against Russia
The third pillar shifts the focus from military force to economic leverage. Deterrence is not only about tanks and missiles; it is also about signaling to Moscow that renewed aggression will trigger immediate and severe financial consequences.
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the US, the UK, the EU, and other countries have imposed multiple rounds of sanctions on Russia. Targets have included Russian foreign reserves, Russian banks, the Russian defense industry, as well as individual oligarchs. The Trump Administration has frequently dangled the threat of further sanctions if Russia does not enter negotiations to end the war. Thus far, however, President Trump has allowed every supposed-deadline to pass by without imposing the threatened punishment. The efficacy of imposed sanctions is also often debated; President Putin claims that the Russian economy has not suffered from them, and Russia has been able to skirt some of them, particularly in its ongoing sales of oil and gas to China, India, and European Union states, as well as sales via its shadow fleet. It remains to be seen how the effect of sanctions will play out in the long run, and whether further sanctions would succeed in applying a decisive amount of pressure.
As part of the existing sanctions regime, there are a significant number of frozen Russian assets. Ukraine is seeking the full confiscation of Russia’s assets to be used for Ukraine’s reconstruction. While European states have to date been reluctant to confiscate all of Russia's frozen assets, they have begun using the interest generated from investing the assets to provide Ukraine with aid. The European Union’s foreign affairs chief Kaja Kallas has also recently stated that frozen assets will only be returned to Russia if it pays reparations to Ukraine. The confiscation, and potential repatriation of those assets to Ukraine, plays an important role in Ukraine’s future security framework. As noted above, financial constraints are a key limiting factor in Ukraine’s ability to develop its own domestic defense production and continue procuring weapons systems from Europe and the US. An influx of additional financial resources, such as the significant amount currently frozen around the globe, would assist with Ukraine’s efforts to become self-sufficient.
Conclusion
As leaders around the world debate what role their states will play in any reassurance force and security guarantees for Ukraine more broadly, an outline of what those security guarantees may look like has begun to emerge. President Zelenskyy’s three pillar framework identifies a Ukraine-first approach, bolstered by commitments from Ukraine’s allies to come to Ukraine’s aid militarily and financially to prevent further Russian expansionism. By putting Ukraine’s own capacities as the first and main pillar, Ukraine’s security guarantees account for the constraints of its allies while ensuring that it is able to defend itself should Russia again threaten its sovereignty and territorial integrity.