Seeking a Path to Durable Peace: How a Multinational Force for the Donbas Region Could Forge Stability in Ukraine

Seeking a Path to Durable Peace: How a Multinational Force for the Donbas Region Could Forge Stability in Ukraine

By: Professor David M. Crane

The ongoing Russian war in Ukraine poses significant challenges to stability in Europe and beyond. With the full-scale war entering its fourth year, finding a path to durable peace has proven nearly impossible. Government officials and foreign policy experts have laid out numerous ideas and proposals for peace, including the option of establishing a demilitarized zone, stationing European peacekeepers in Ukraine, or freezing the war on current battlefield lines. Despite the numerous ideas put forward, none have emerged as a clear solution.

This blog post explores a ceasefire model based on the successful Multinational Force and Observers (“MFO”) established for the Sinai Peninsula, examining how such a framework could be adapted for the Donbas region of Ukraine. The MFO, agreed upon in the 1981 Protocol to the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, functioned as a peacekeeping force to observe and verify compliance with the provisions of the peace treaty. By drawing inspiration from this model, a Multinational Force and Observers for the Donbas Region (“MFO-DR”) could offer a potential avenue for fostering security, dialogue, and cooperation among the affected parties in Ukraine.

While not proposing it as a definitive solution to the conflict, the MFO-DR model represents a framework through which neutral international forces could help ensure compliance with any ceasefire and facilitate further dialogue. The MFO-DR model is intended to only apply to the Donbas region as Crimea would likely require an alternative arrangement. Likewise, this model is not intended to replace security guarantees for Ukraine as a whole. This approach aims to contribute to the broader conversation on peacekeeping strategies without positioning itself as the sole path to resolution.

The Concept of the Multinational Force and Observers for the Donbas Region (MFO-DR)

The MFO-DR would divide the conflict zone into three distinct zones, each serving a specific purpose in maintaining peace and ensuring compliance with any ceasefire agreement. This division would allow for better monitoring, reduce the chances of escalation, and enable trust-building measures between Ukraine and Russia.

Zone A would cover an area directly adjacent to the Russian-Ukrainian border, where Russia would maintain control and stability. Military presence in this zone would be limited, with only non-offensive personnel, such as border police, allowed. Surveillance equipment could be employed to monitor activities in the region.

Zone B, the largest and most critical area, would be managed by the neutral Multinational Force. Composed of selected countries willing to contribute to peacekeeping efforts, the Multinational Force would serve as a buffer between the warring parties. This area would be where most of the monitoring, inspections, and negotiations would take place. The force would be equipped with basic defensive tools for self-protection but would refrain from deploying any offensive weapons.

Lastly, Zone C would be the Ukrainian-controlled area, where Ukrainian governance and security forces would operate. This zone would also prohibit heavy military equipment and offensive weapons, with the presence of Ukrainian border police limited to non-aggressive personnel. Surveillance would be used here as well to ensure compliance and prevent any violations of the ceasefire.

The command structure of the MFO-DR would be headed by a neutral general officer, someone with vast experience in international peacekeeping and diplomacy. The Director General, an equally impartial individual, would oversee the strategic and diplomatic aspects of the mission, working to maintain relationships between all stakeholders and keep the peace process moving forward.

The Importance of Neutrality in the MFO-DR

One of the key aspects of the MFO-DR would have to be its neutrality. Drawing from the success of the MFO in the Sinai, which had troops from various states with no affiliation to either party in the conflict, the MFO-DR would similarly need to maintain strict impartiality. This would allow the multinational force to be seen as a legitimate and trusted entity by both Ukraine and Russia, increasing the likelihood of cooperation.

States involved in the MFO-DR would not be part of NATO, ensuring that the initiative is not perceived as an extension of Western influence. The inclusion of states from diverse regions of the world, such as China, India, Kenya, Jordan, Brazil, Argentina, and Australia, could help mitigate concerns from all parties about bias or interference in the war. These states have historically held neutral stances in international conflicts, and their involvement could signal an effort to balance international interests while respecting the sovereignty of both Russia and Ukraine.

By remaining neutral and independent, the MFO-DR could play a vital role in easing tensions and encouraging dialogue between the two sides. The participation of neutral nations from a variety of geopolitical backgrounds would enhance the legitimacy of the peace process, giving it a broader, more inclusive global appeal. This diversity also brings a wealth of experience in conflict resolution and peacekeeping, making the MFO-DR a potentially effective instrument for long-term stability.

Operational Guidelines and Confidence-Building Measures

For the MFO-DR to function effectively, several operational guidelines would be required. Observers and peacekeepers within the force would need unrestricted access to all zones, allowing them to conduct regular inspections and engage with local populations to assess the situation on the ground. In addition, there would need to be a robust reporting mechanism to quickly address any incidents or breaches of peace, ensuring that any violations of ceasefire agreements are communicated and dealt with swiftly.

Perhaps one of the most crucial elements of the MFO-DR would have to be its role in building trust. Regular consultations between Russian, Ukrainian, and Multinational Force representatives could help maintain open lines of communication and address concerns as they arise. Additionally, cross-border cultural and economic initiatives could be implemented to foster collaboration among communities divided by the conflict.

Training programs for military and security forces from participating nations could further reinforce cooperative security principles and build trust. These programs could focus on cooperation, non-escalation tactics, and human rights, reinforcing a commitment to peaceful resolution rather than military confrontation.

Geopolitical and Diplomatic Considerations for the MFO-DR

As for any peace proposal for the Russian war in Ukraine, the evolving geopolitical landscape could present both challenges and opportunities for the MFO-DR. While NATO and the European Union would not formally participate, their influence as established power structures in Eastern Europe remains significant. For this model to work, Russia, Ukraine, and the international community, including NATO and the EU, would have to agree on the framework and support its implementation.

Furthermore, the MFO-DR may find itself navigating the complex tension between national sovereignty and collective international action. The MFO-DR, by involving nations outside traditional Western alliances, may reflect a new paradigm of cooperation. Nations like India and Brazil, with their histories of non-alignment, could facilitate dialogue between Russia and Ukraine and open doors for constructive engagement in negotiations.

The United Nations could serve as a critical facilitator for bringing together the core nations in establishing the MFO-DR. Leveraging its expertise in peacekeeping and conflict resolution, the UN could provide technical assistance and guidance to the MFO-DR, ensuring adherence to international norms and practices.

A potential General Assembly resolution supporting the MFO-DR could provide the initiative with the necessary legitimacy, especially if the UN Security Council remains paralyzed by political divisions. This would parallel the MFO in the Sinai Peninsula, which operated without direct UN involvement but received public support from the international community, including the UN.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Multinational Force and Observers for the Donbas Region could be another model to consider for peace in Ukraine. By involving nations from outside traditional Western alliances, the MFO-DR can provide a balanced, multi-polar approach to peacekeeping that avoids the pitfalls of geopolitical bias. The establishment of this framework would aim to reduce hostilities, encourage dialogue, and ultimately create a path towards long-term peace and stability in Ukraine.

Crimea and Donbas Are Ukrainian: A Historical and Cultural Perspective

Crimea and Donbas Are Ukrainian: A Historical and Cultural Perspective

Authors: Kateryna Kyrychenko and Dr. Paul R. Williams

The territories of Crimea and Donbas, currently under Russian occupation, have become central to the global discourse on Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Despite their distinct characteristics, Crimea and Donbas are inseparable parts of Ukraine, with centuries of shared cultural, historical, and political ties that firmly anchor them within the Ukrainian state. Both regions are also universally recognized as Ukrainian under international law. The 1991 Ukrainian Independence referendum and UN Resolution 68/262 on Ukraine's territorial integrity affirmed their status within Ukraine’s borders. Yet, the ongoing tensions over the status of these territories stem from the regions' complex histories. Understanding their shared histories offers a deeper perspective on Ukraine’s modern struggles to protect its territorial integrity.

Historical Perspective on Crimea

The illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 reignited an age-old debate about the peninsula’s rightful place. The diverse ethnic and cultural background of Crimea, including its Tatar heritage, shaped its complex relationship with both Russia and Ukraine. 

From ancient times, the Crimean peninsula was home to various indigenous peoples, including the Cimmerians, Scythians, Greeks, Armenians, and Crimean Tatars, who have long-standing ties to Ukraine. The development of the region was largely influenced by ancient Ukrainian and Greek settlements. In the 15-18th centuries, the Crimean Khanate, a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire, controlled the region. While having significant economic and political links with Ukraine, the Crimean Khanate was characterized by an aggressive policy and remained the primary rival of the Russian Empire for dominance in the Northern Black Sea region until its downfall. In 1783, the peninsula was annexed by the Russian Empire and became part of various Russian governorates for over two centuries. From the 1920s onward, Crimea formally became a part of the Soviet Union.

Prior to the 1783 annexation, Crimea was a truly culturally diverse region. However, following its incorporation into the Russian Empire, the region started experiencing a systematic process of russification aimed at diminishing local culture, which included the renaming of cities and the settlement of Russian-speaking populations. The aggressive assimilation policy peaked in 1944, when the Soviet Union organized mass forced deportations of the Crimean Tatars, along with other indigenous groups, accusing them of collaboration with the enemy during World War II. The deportations resulted in a profound demographic shift, undermining the multicultural fabric of the region and facilitating the dominance of Russian settlers.

In 1954, the Soviet Union transferred control of the Crimean Peninsula to Ukraine, which was described as a gesture of goodwill between the two populations. The decree with which this transfer was executed itself characterized the move as advisable due to the “territorial inclination of the Crimean Oblast' toward the Ukrainian SSR, the commonality of the economy, and close economic and cultural ties between the Crimean Oblast' and the Ukrainian SSR”. This decision was in fact a pragmatic move by the Soviet Union to address the peninsula’s post-war economic decline and logistical challenges, as Ukraine’s geographic proximity and resources made it better suited to manage Crimea’s recovery and development.  

The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, followed by Ukraine’s declaration of independence, which was supported by a majority of the population in Crimea, further solidified the understanding that Crimea was part of Ukraine—despite later Russian claims and the illegal annexation of the peninsula in 2014.

Undoubtedly, Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians are tied with enduring connections rooted in mutual respect and shared struggles. During the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917, Ukrainians recognized Crimean Tatars as the primary agents of self-determination in the region, fostering cooperation. Crimean Tatars, in turn, aligned with the Ukrainian People’s Republic, united by aspirations to resist imperial domination. This history of collaboration contrasts sharply with Russian imperial and Soviet policies of repression and cultural erasure, which undermined Crimean Tatar autonomy and left a legacy of mistrust. 

Acknowledging the Crimean Tatars’ unique role and historical grievances is crucial in the context of any future peace agreement that might end the current war. Ensuring their political and cultural autonomy within Ukrainian Crimea would restore justice and reinforce Ukraine’s commitment to human rights and inclusive governance.

Donbas: Ukraine’s Melting Pot

While Crimea’s historical ties to Ukraine are often discussed through cultural and administrative lenses, Donbas region is more deeply intertwined with the country’s industrial legacy and its long-standing resistance against Russian imperialism. 

Donbas region (an abbreviation of "Donetsk Coal Basin") is a major industrial and coal-mining hub, located in the eastern part of Ukraine (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts). The region was heavily influenced by Russian and Soviet policies from the late 19th century onward. It became a melting pot of various ethnic groups, including Ukrainians, Russians, and others, due to its booming industry and labor demands. However, the region’s industrialization was not purely economic; it was deeply shaped by Russia’s russification policies. The expansion of Russian-speaking communities in Donbas, initiated by tsarist Russia and intensifying during Soviet times, fundamentally altered the region’s cultural landscape. From the late 19th century, Russian-speaking workers were brought to the area to work in coal mines and factories, gradually diluting the Ukrainian presence. By the mid-20th century, Russian became the dominant language of communication in both public and private spheres.

Nonetheless, the Donbas region has always been an integral part of Ukrainian lands. Before industrialization, Donbas had a rich history tied to Ukraine. In the 17th century, the region was home to the Ukrainian Cossacks, who played a pivotal role in shaping Ukrainian identity and protecting Ukrainian lands from external threats. Archaeological evidence also shows that Donbas was historically linked to the Wild Fields, a frontier zone sparsely inhabited by various Ukrainian-speaking communities. The foundation of towns such as Bakhmut and Sloviansk in the 16th and 17th centuries as salt-mining centers further tied Donbas to early Ukrainian economic development.

The region’s inclusion in the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union did not sever its ties with Ukraine. During the Ukrainian War of Independence (1917–1921), Donbas was a site of resistance against Russian imperial forces, demonstrating its strong connection to the Ukrainian national struggle. Later, the Soviet industrialization program brought more Russian speakers into the region, further complicating its identity. Nonetheless, Donbas remained a critical component of the Ukrainian SSR’s economy, society, and culture.

 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Donbas became a part of the newly independent Ukraine. Despite significant pro-Russian sentiment in the region among some parts of the population, rooted in decades of russification, the 1991 referendum showed overwhelming support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, even among the Russian-speaking Ukrainians.

Conclusion

Despite their distinct histories, both Crimea and Donbas share a common Ukrainian experience through culture, language, and shared national consciousness. The histories of Crimea and Donbas are inextricably linked to Ukraine’s national identity. The regions’ crucial roles in Ukraine’s independence movement reveal that they have always been part of Ukraine’s historical, social, and cultural fabric. Though Russia has attempted to assert its claims over these territories, the historical narratives of Crimea and Donbas demonstrate that their connection to Ukraine is deep and unbroken.

The ongoing Russian aggression and occupation of Crimea and Donbas, fueled by the Federation's imperial ambitions, highlight the larger struggle for Ukrainian sovereignty and the right of its people to determine their own future. The histories of these two regions remind us that Ukraine’s territorial integrity is not just a matter of contemporary politics but is also rooted in centuries of shared culture, economic ties, and a collective desire for independence. Understanding this history is essential for acknowledging the legitimate claim of Ukraine to both Crimea and Donbas and reaffirming its rightful place on the world stage as a sovereign nation.

The Minsk Protocols: Flawed by Design

The Minsk Protocols: Flawed by Design

Authors: Sindija Beta, Katie Hetherington, and Paul R. Williams

The election of Donald Trump as the next President of the United States has reignited discussions about a potential peace agreement in Ukraine. Advisors close to the President-elect have floated the idea of revisiting the Minsk Protocols of 2014 and 2015—agreements initially crafted to address Russian aggression in Ukraine but fraught with significant design flaws.

At first glance, revisiting the Minsk Protocols might seem like a logical starting point. However, their design was fundamentally flawed, with three critical weaknesses undermining their effectiveness.

First, Russia acted in bad faith by asserting that it was not a party to the armed conflict, despite maintaining a military presence on Ukrainian territory. This claim allowed Russia to avoid any obligations under the protocols, undermining their credibility and enforceability.

Second, the “special status” provision in the Minsk Protocols created a pathway for eroding Ukrainian political unity. It fostered governance fragmentation and institutionalized a permanent Russian influence over Ukraine’s internal affairs.

Third, the sequencing of the Minsk Protocols required Ukraine to hold elections in Donetsk and Luhansk before regaining control over its territory. This made it impossible to ensure that the elections would be free, fair, and transparent.

This blog will explore these design flaws in greater detail and explain why reviving the Minsk Protocols in future peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia is unlikely to result in a durable peace.

What are the Minsk Protocols?

In response to Russia’s 2014 aggression against Ukraine, the Minsk Protocols were negotiated under the auspices of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), with France and Germany mediating the talks. These agreements, known as Minsk I (2014) and Minsk II (2015), sought to establish ceasefires and provide a roadmap for resolving the conflict. However, both agreements ultimately failed, largely due to their inherent weaknesses.

Minsk I outlined commitments in three key areas: cessation of hostilities, conflict resolution, and enhanced security measures. It called for a bilateral ceasefire, OSCE monitoring, and the exchange of detainees. Additionally, the agreement provided for "special status" autonomy for parts of Donetsk and Luhansk, encouraged a national dialogue, and required “early local elections” to be held under Ukrainian law.

Following the collapse of Minsk I, Minsk II attempted to address some of these shortcomings by specifying obligations more clearly. It introduced provisions for a demilitarized zone monitored by the OSCE, constitutional reforms, local elections, and the restoration of full control over Ukraine’s borders by its government.

The “special status” provision in Minsk II included an annex detailing the powers to be granted to Donetsk and Luhansk under the decentralization process. These included the ability to appoint judicial officials, form cross-border cooperation initiatives with Russia, create militia units, enjoy immunity from interference by Ukraine’s central government, and decide language rights in the regions.

It Is Not The Same Context 10 Years On

While the Minsk Protocols address some of the same issues that continue to persist during Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, their provisions were shaped by a very different geopolitical context. The war has evolved, rendering the assumptions underlying these agreements increasingly irrelevant.

Namely, when, after the protests that erupted in Kyiv’s Maidan Square and the ousting of pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych, Russia launched its aggression against Ukraine, it did not do so as overtly and blatantly as in 2022. The aggression started with “The Little Green Men”, Russian military personnel acting without identification marks taking control of the Crimean peninsula.  Over the course of the next 8 years, Russia continued to assert that the war in Ukraine was a civil war between “separatists” in Luhansk and Donetsk and the Ukrainian military. 

In this context, the Minsk Protocols included provisions stating that Ukraine would eventually regain control over all its territory. For example, Minsk I specified that “unlawful military formations, military hardware, militants, and mercenaries” would be removed from Ukraine. Minsk II reinforced this, promising Ukraine full control over its borders.

Fast forward to 2025–Russia has launched a full-scale invasion, sending hundreds of thousands of its soldiers into Ukraine and claiming to have annexed the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia. On October 4, 2022, the Russian State Duma and the Federation Council approved the Federal Constitutional Laws on the accession of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia regions to the Russian Federation, thereby putting the Russian Constitution in direct conflict with the Ukrainian Constitution. 

This drastic shift in Russia’s strategy and its illegal actions under international law have escalated the conflict far beyond the assumptions of 2014-2015. The Minsk Protocols, based on outdated frameworks, are no longer applicable to the realities of 2025. They fail to address the current scale of aggression, Russia’s abandonment of diplomatic subtleties, and overlapping constitutional claims over territory.

Granting Special Status: Entrenched Instability and Dysfunction

In addition to being unsuitable for the 2025 context, the Minsk Protocols were already flawed in their 2014-2015 design. Specifically, the “special status” provision for Donetsk and Luhansk was not about genuine decentralization of power but a mechanism to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty.

Decentralization can be a valid governance model, but the Minsk Protocols went far beyond empowering local governance. They effectively created states within Ukraine that would operate as Russian proxies, undermining Ukraine's sovereignty and unity.

By granting Donetsk and Luhansk control over policing, language policies, and cross-border cooperation with Russia, the protocols institutionalized dysfunction. This level of autonomy would paralyze Ukraine’s central government on critical issues, including foreign policy and security. For example, attempts by Kyiv to deepen ties with NATO or the European Union could be obstructed by these regions’ refusal to comply with national policies.

These provisions were not aimed at fostering self-governance but at giving Moscow leverage to control Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation. Russia’s broader strategic goal has always been to keep Ukraine within its sphere of influence and prevent its integration into Western institutions. Embedding such provisions into Ukraine’s political framework would ensure perpetual instability and make NATO or EU membership impossible.

The Sequencing That Was Never Realistic

The sequencing of obligations in Minsk I and Minsk II was among their most critical flaws. Both agreements required Ukraine to hold local elections in Donetsk and Luhansk and implement constitutional reforms before regaining control of its borders and ensuring security.

First, holding elections in regions controlled by Russian-backed forces made it impossible to guarantee free, fair, and transparent elections. Without territorial control or security guarantees, these elections would legitimize governments loyal to Moscow.

Second, this sequencing allowed Russia to maintain leverage over Ukraine throughout the process. By requiring elections before border control, the protocols gave Russia an opportunity to entrench its influence in the region. Moscow could strengthen its position on the ground during the pre-election period, ensuring that political developments aligned with its interests. This would make it even harder for Ukraine to reassert sovereignty, as Russia could manipulate the political environment to maintain control under the guise of peace.

Conclusion

The design and sequencing of the Minsk Protocols were flawed from the outset, and their application today would only entrench Russian influence in Ukraine. Any effort to revive these agreements would perpetuate instability and undermine Ukraine's sovereignty. A viable peace proposal must affirm Ukraine’s independence, safeguard its political unity, and support its aspirations for Euro-Atlantic integration. Ukraine’s future lies in strengthening its sovereignty, not in appeasing Russia through a flawed peace process.

The Istanbul Communique: A Blueprint for Ukraine's Capitulation

The Istanbul Communique: A Blueprint for Ukraine's Capitulation

Authors: Sindija Beta, Katie Hetherington, and Paul R. Williams

The Istanbul Communique, an early and ambitious attempt to negotiate peace between Ukraine and Russia, has often been portrayed as a promising step toward ending a devastating conflict. Drafted in Istanbul, Turkey, during March and April 2022, the treaty aimed to halt hostilities soon after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, a closer analysis reveals that the agreement would have been disastrous for Ukraine. It left the country vulnerable to future Russian aggression and offered no foundation for lasting peace. The Communique’s key provisions on neutrality, military constraints, and security guarantees amounted to little more than a blueprint for Ukraine’s capitulation.

Neutrality: A Dangerous Gamble

A cornerstone of the Istanbul Communique was the establishment of Ukraine as a permanently neutral state. This neutrality, enshrined in the constitution, would have barred Ukraine from joining military alliances, hosting foreign bases or weapons, or engaging in activities that might compromise its neutral status. At face value, neutrality might seem like a pathway to de-escalation, but in reality, it would have stripped Ukraine of the very means it needed to defend itself against further aggression.

Neutrality is an untenable proposition for a nation sharing a border with an aggressive and expansionist power like Russia. This provision would have stripped Ukraine of its ability to seek military assistance from international partners, severely limiting its defense options in the event of another invasion. In a world where territorial integrity is constantly at risk, neutrality would have only invited further Russian encroachment, leaving Ukraine without the support of allies for protection.

Given Russia's demonstrated disregard for international norms and its pattern of invading neighboring countries, a policy of neutrality would have left Ukraine exposed to continuous threats. It would have denied Ukraine the ability to bolster its defenses or seek support from NATO or other military alliances. Far from fostering peace, the notion of neutrality undermined Ukraine's security and signaled that aggression could be rewarded through diplomatic concessions. Rather than safeguarding Ukraine’s sovereignty, this provision would have left the country vulnerable to future exploitation by its far larger neighbor.

Security Guarantees: Promises Without Guarantees

The Communique’s proposed security framework revolved around guarantees from a group of Guarantor States, including the United Kingdom, China, the United States, France, and Russia. Additional guarantors were suggested, such as Belarus (proposed by Russia) and Turkey (proposed by Ukraine). At its core, the framework aimed to provide a safety net should Ukraine face renewed aggression, yet these guarantees were riddled with flaws.

The draft treaty required the Guarantor States to engage in consultations if Ukraine were attacked. While military assistance was a possible outcome, it was neither automatic nor guaranteed. Unlike NATO’s Article 5, which obligates member states to collective defense, the Istanbul Communique provided no binding mechanisms to ensure a swift and unified response. This reliance on consultations left Ukraine’s security dependent on the alignment of interests among the Guarantor States.

The draft treaty also failed to resolve whether unanimous consensus among all Guarantor States, including Russia, would be required to activate any assistance. If adopted in a final peace agreement, this provision would replicate the dysfunctional decision-making model of the United Nations Security Council’s veto system. It is unthinkable to design security guarantees that give veto power to the very aggressor responsible for initiating the war.

Military Constraints: Ukraine on a Silver Platter

Russia’s demand that Ukraine drastically reduce its military would have amounted to a catastrophic surrender of Ukraine’s ability to defend itself. Without solid, unconditional security guarantees, these constraints would have left Ukraine defenseless against future Russian aggression, effectively handing the country over to an emboldened Russia.

Stripping Ukraine of its military capabilities in a region marked by fragile security and constant threats to territorial integrity would have invited further invasions. Ukraine’s recent resilience against Russian aggression has demonstrated that a strong, modernized military is indispensable for its survival.

Unresolved Issues: Just Peace?

Beyond its provisions on neutrality, military reductions, and security guarantees, the Istanbul Communique left numerous critical issues unresolved. Chief among these was the lack of a clear mechanism for the return of prisoners of war and civilians, including children. While the treaty called for their return, it provided no specific details on how this would be accomplished—an alarming omission given the global outcry over the abduction of thousands of Ukrainian children. This failure would only prolong the suffering of families, perpetuate grave human rights violations, and undermine any hopes for a genuine and just peace.

Moreover, Russia’s demands—such as lifting sanctions, terminating legal cases against Russia, and recognizing Russian as an official language in Ukraine—constituted a blatant infringement on Ukraine’s sovereignty. Accepting these terms would have been tantamount to capitulation, undermining Ukraine’s independence and its international legal rights.

Few Wins for Ukraine

It is worth noting that the treaty did contain a few positive aspects. One notable success was the acceptance of Ukraine’s EU membership. Additionally, Russia did not object to Ukraine’s participation in peacekeeping missions under international frameworks such as the UN, OSCE, or EU. This provision preserved Ukraine’s connection to European institutions and represented a small but meaningful concession from Russia.

The Communique also proposed a procedure for a ceasefire and a monitored troop withdrawal. Russia agreed to withdraw its forces to their permanent deployment positions, with implementation supervised by a joint commission comprising Russian, Ukrainian, and potentially UN representatives. Although the exact timeline for withdrawal was left to future consultations, the inclusion of this framework suggested a step toward de-escalating the conflict and pursuing a peaceful resolution.

Conclusion

The Istanbul Communique was a dangerously flawed attempt to force Ukraine into submission. By stripping the country of its ability to defend itself and offering no solid protection against future Russian aggression, the treaty would have exposed Ukraine to further exploitation and vulnerability. Even the few concessions, such as the prospect of EU membership, barely masked the overwhelming flaws of the agreement. Ukraine deserves a peace that guarantees its future—not a treaty that sets the stage for further subjugation. The Istanbul Communique was a dangerous fantasy, and Ukraine must continue to fight for peace that truly ensures its survival and sovereignty.

Zelenskyy’s 10-Points vs. the Potemkin Peace Plans: A Comparative Analysis of Peace Proposals for Ukraine

Zelenskyy’s 10-Points vs. the Potemkin Peace Plans: A Comparative Analysis of Peace Proposals for Ukraine

Authors: Katie Hetherington, Sindija Beta, and Dr. Paul R. Williams

Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has sparked a range of proposals aimed at achieving a durable and comprehensive end to the war. These proposals vary widely in merit and legitimacy. Among them, Ukraine's Peace Formula, publicly introduced in 2022, stands out as a framework firmly rooted in international law and designed to address the interests of both Ukraine and the broader international community.

Other proposals, such as the African Peace Mission’s Proposal, China’s 12-Point Plan, and the Brazil-China Peace Proposal, have also been put forward. However, these efforts are largely fragmented and driven by self-interested diplomacy. While claiming neutrality, they often avoid key legal and geopolitical issues and instead reflect the strategic priorities and interests of their authors.

Peace in Ukraine must be pursued within the framework of a rules-based international order. This requires adherence to fundamental and non-negotiable principles such as territorial integrity, justice, and accountability. Genuine peace cannot be achieved through potemkin peace plans: superficial or self-serving proposals that sidestep these core values. Instead, the path forward demands a steadfast commitment to sovereignty, the rule of law, and a vision of justice that serves not only Ukraine but the global community.

Ukraine's Peace Formula

Ukraine’s Peace Formula was first introduced by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in October 2022 to the Group of Seven (G7) leaders and later published on official Ukrainian government platforms. Of the available proposals, the peace formula is most consistent with international law. It addresses critical issues required for any genuine negotiation to end Russia's aggression, including the non-negotiable principle of territorial integrity, security concerns such as food and energy security, compensation for war damages, and accountability for crimes committed during the conflict. The formula takes into account the broader interests of the international community, particularly those of Global South nations heavily impacted by disruptions to global supply chains. As a result, it is a solid blueprint for a durable, legitimate, and legally sound peace. 

The restoration of territorial integrity and the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukrainian territory are central to the Peace Formula. It also calls for the withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukrainian nuclear plants, the transfer of control to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and strongly condemns Russian nuclear blackmail. The formula emphasizes the need for robust security guarantees to prevent both immediate and future aggression.  While the formula has not been formally amended since its publication, Ukraine’s position on when the issue of territorial integrity must be resolved might be shifting: President Zelensky has made recent remarks regarding the possibility of negotiating outstanding territorial issues with Russia at a later date, in return for NATO membership and security guarantees now. These remarks do not, however, negate Ukraine’s demands for the return of the Occupied Territories, nor the fact that Russia’s aggression is strictly prohibited under international law, including Article 2 of the UN Charter.

The Peace Formula also tackles the humanitarian impacts of Russia’s war, focusing on Russian attacks on civilian infrastructure, environmental protection, and the return of prisoners of war. It highlights the need for accountability for the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children and adults, emphasizing their immediate return, and advocates for an “all for all” exchange of prisoners of war. Additionally, the formula addresses the global repercussions of food and energy insecurity by proposing price restrictions on Russian energy exports and restoring grain exports to stabilize global markets and mitigate the adverse effects of global food shortages.

On justice and accountability, the formula demands the prosecution of those responsible for war crimes. Although it does not extensively discuss post-conflict reconstruction, it highlights the need for an international mechanism by which Russia will compensate Ukraine for war damages.

As affirmed by legal analyses, including PILPG’s, the peace formula is deeply rooted in international law. It is premised on fostering international cooperation to implement a vision of peace that extends beyond Ukraine to benefit the global community.

The African Peace Mission’s Proposal

The African Peace Mission’s Proposal, introduced in the summer of 2023 by a delegation from Comoros, Congo-Brazzaville, Egypt, Senegal, Uganda, Zambia, and South Africa, offered a broad framework for resolving the conflict. While the specifics were never formally disclosed, South Africa’s President Ramaphosa outlined a 10-step peace plan addressing issues such as state sovereignty, security, the protection of global supply chains, humanitarian concerns, and reconstruction. However, the proposal lacked concrete details on how these measures would be implemented.

The proposal highlights African states’ commitment to diplomacy and their desire to play a significant role in maintaining international peace and stability. However, it falls short as a viable blueprint for peace. It avoids explicitly acknowledging the illegality of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and remains silent on critical issues such as territorial integrity and accountability for war crimes. Ultimately, the proposal reflects a cautious foreign policy stance and, in some cases, the Russia-leaning positions of certain states aiming to influence the resolution of the conflict.

China’s “Political Settlement”

China’s 12-point plan, released in February 2023, aims to portray China as a neutral mediator. However, it is less a comprehensive proposal to end the war and more a self-serving framework for facilitating dialogue and advancing a political settlement aligned with China’s strategic interests.

The plan calls for moving away from “Cold-War mentality” military blocs and bloc confrontation, echoing language often found in Russian narratives about the perceived threats of military alliances. It opposes unilateral sanctions and their perceived misuse while advocating for the protection of global supply chains. Notably, the plan reflects China’s strategic concerns, particularly its stance on Taiwan and territorial integrity. It outlines a normative and legal framework that China could potentially invoke if it were to take action against Taiwan, revealing its apprehension about potential international military and economic responses to such a scenario. 

The plan shares some common ground with Ukraine’s Peace Formula. It calls for measures to de-escalate hostilities, protect civilians and prisoners of war, and ensure the stability of global supply chains. It explicitly advocates for international support for post-conflict reconstruction and offers China’s assistance. Furthermore, it emphasizes the importance of safeguarding nuclear facilities, supporting the role of the IAEA, and opposing the use or threat of nuclear weapons.

However, the proposal notably fails to address critical issues such as territorial integrity, the withdrawal of Russian troops, security guarantees for Ukraine, or accountability for war crimes. Its language carefully avoids acknowledging Russia’s illegal occupation of Ukrainian territory, simply stating that the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all states must be respected. Additionally, it refrains from labeling Russia’s actions as a war, instead referring to the conflict as the “Ukraine crisis.”

Indeed, in September 2024, a paper drafted by the Ukrainian government and circulated amongst diplomats at the September UNGA meeting in New York claimed that China was also pursuing international backing for an end-the-war strategy which would freeze current territorial demarcations. This only underscores China’s reluctance to support a just resolution based on Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Given China’s close ties with Russia, the proposal is best characterized as Russian-leaning.

The Brazil-China “Common Understandings” 

The Brazil-China Peace Proposal, introduced in May 2024, offers little progress beyond the framework of China’s 2023 plan. It focuses on a set of “common understandings” and calls for direct dialogue but fails to address several critical issues essential for achieving a durable resolution to Russia’s war.

The proposal echoes familiar themes, including opposition to bloc dynamics and nuclear escalation, advocacy for stable global supply chains, and calls for humanitarian assistance. However, it strays even further from the principle of territorial integrity, omitting any reference to Russia’s illegal occupation of Ukrainian territory, its broader aggression, or the fundamental obligation to uphold state sovereignty under international law.

Brazil’s stance in this proposal is clearly influenced by its membership in BRICS, which includes Russia. The economic and geopolitical interests of both Brazil and China are evident, suggesting that their approach is driven more by self-interest than by a genuine commitment to justice or international law.

Russia’s Position

Unlike the formal written proposals outlined above, Russia has not published an official peace plan of its own. Instead, its position on peace is conveyed through public statements by Russian officials and its actions on the ground in Ukraine. Russia’s prerequisites for peace remain centered on Ukrainian neutrality and the recognition of its territorial claims over Crimea and Donbas.

President Putin has insisted that meaningful negotiations with Ukraine cannot commence while—according to his narrative—Ukraine indiscriminately attacks civilian populations and infrastructure. While Russia has expressed openness to a ceasefire, this is contingent on terms that overwhelmingly serve its interests, including Ukraine’s withdrawal from the territories illegally occupied by Russia, and the abandonment of efforts to join NATO. Russia’s position centers on maintaining control over significant portions of Ukraine, including the strategically significant Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. 

While Russia has participated in several exchanges of prisoners of war, it frames these actions as part of its broader narrative of protecting ethnic Russians in Ukraine. Its approach to humanitarian issues remains starkly contradictory: Russia continues to target civilian infrastructure, including Ukraine’s energy systems, with the intent of disrupting daily life and undermining Ukraine’s resilience, particularly during the winter months.

Regarding global energy security, Russia wields its energy exports as a geopolitical weapon, manipulating supplies to exert pressure on European and global markets. While it initially engaged in grain export negotiations as part of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, it withdrew from the agreement in 2023, escalating attacks on Ukrainian ports and civilian shipping vessels.

Russia categorically rejects accountability for war crimes, dismissing such accusations as politically motivated. It also refuses to consider reparations for damages caused by the war.  Moreover, Russia has consistently opposed the use of frozen assets for reconstruction and, in May 2024, authorized compensation for its seized frozen assets by targeting U.S. assets within Russia.

Finally, while Russia has expressed nominal support for multilateral peace talks, it vehemently opposes any dominant role for Western-led blocs in such negotiations. Russia frames the conflict as part of a broader struggle against Western hegemony.

Conclusion

In the search for peace in Ukraine, not all proposals are created equal. Ukraine’s Peace Formula provides a robust framework for future peace that is grounded in international law and principles of justice. In contrast, many other proposals amount to little more than diplomatic posturing, shaped by the priorities and alliances of their authors.

Any path to lasting peace must prioritize territorial integrity, accountability for aggression and war crimes, and comprehensive security guarantees to prevent future conflict. Smoke-and-mirrors proposals may claim neutrality, but true peace demands an unwavering commitment to justice, sovereignty, and the rule of law—principles that Ukraine’s Peace Formula upholds as a blueprint not only for the region but for a more secure and just international order.