Security Council Meeting on the Situation in Darfur – Report Presentation by Fatou Bensouda

By Sophie Bones, PILPG Law Fellow & Victoria Ernst, PILPG Research Associate

Bensouda’s Remarks – paraphrased 

Effecting warrants of arrest is a big challenge and more collaboration is needed between Member States and the ICC. States Parties receiving as guests suspects the court wishes to arrest cannot become the usual practice. Over the years, reports have highlighted consistent failure of the Security Council to react on the movement of Bashir between states, and States Parties have failed to comply with the court’s request despite a clear treaty obligation to do so. A lack of legal clarity has been used to justify this, however the ICC’s position is that there is no legal lacuna or ambiguity concerning States Parties’ obligation to arrest persons with warrants issued against them. Such failures are flagrant violation of the Rome Statute, they equally undermine the Security Council’s reputation, and are an affront to Security Council resolutions. South Africa failed to arrest Bashir, and the pre-trial chamber found it had failed to comply with the arrest warrant – a direct contravention of the Rome Statute. This failure prevented the court from exercising its functions and powers under the Statute. This decision (not appealed) establishes that there is no legal or factual justification for South Africa’s failure to arrest and surrender Bashir to the court. In such circumstances, there can be no justification to not arrest based on their official status where a warrant has been issued. Despite the chamber’s finding of non-compliance, it did not refer South Africa to the ASP or the Security Council. This was for multiple reasons namely that South Africa was the first State Party to utilize art. 97 of the Rome Statute; the chamber took note of robust domestic proceedings in South Africa on the issue. 

A spotlight is cast on the repeated inaction of the Security Council. This is a matter of grave concern, in particular for Bashir’s victims. This costly inaction has potential to undermine the fight against impunity and lowers the bar of accountability that many have fought to raise. Due to this inaction, states are safe in the knowledge that the Security Council will not respond to breaches. This has a detrimental impact on victims who rely on the court. The EU’s call to Member States of the UN to abide by, and implement resolutions made by the Security Council under Chapter VII was welcomed. However, cooperation has been a significant challenge. The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) does have gratitude for the support received from other States Parties which has been crucial for obtaining information and evidence. Sudan continues to adopt an antagonistic posture to the ICC and refuses to cooperate, however the ICC is ready and willing to cooperate with them. It is necessary to remember that Bashir and other suspects are alleged to have committed serious crimes under the Rome Statute. As such, the office will continue to independently and impartially investigate these crimes, and notes that all suspects are innocent until proven guilty by the OTP. The OTP calls on the Council to remind parties to comply with International Humanitarian Law. The work of the ICC is essential for fighting impunity for world’s most serious and destabilizing crimes. The Court should be actively supported by the Security Council and community as a whole. The OTP is still receiving reports of killings and displacement of peoples. Moreover, there have also been reports of sexual violence, in particular against young girls. On this note, the OTP reminds the Council that it needs financial support to continue its investigations. Accountability for crimes under the Rome Statute is a necessary complement to sustainable peace in Darfur. Finally, the OTP calls on Member States to come to action on warrants for arrest issued by the court 

Sudan’s Remarks – paraphrased 

Their first comment was regarding the existence of small arms and light weapons in conflict zones. These weapons, the Sudanese representative claimed, contribute to insecurity and instability in the region, and therefore their presence in Darfur poses a challenge to the government. However, he argued that the Government of Sudan will not be part of the weapons collection, and UNAMID is to be responsible for this task. Sudan is not a party to the ICC, whose prosecutor and office, he says, have been blinded by political motives and cannot see the clear position of international law (referring to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations). The Sudanese representative further argued that Security Council Resolution 1593 specifically refers to the fact that ICC jurisdiction does not apply to non-parties. This focus on Sudan, he says, is the result of inconsistencies inherent in the Rome Statute, notably the wide and unlimited powers granted to the Prosecutor, going on to mention “shocking reports about corruption of the court and the prosecutor”. 

He states that this Sudan report is the same as previous reports, which have gone beyond all international norms by attacking sovereign states and heads of state. He goes on to complain that the report does not highlight the real perpetrators of the violence – the armed groups. He argues that the ICC is hampering the peace process, and the Prosecutor is a tool for one single predetermined purpose- the intent to use the ICC as a political tool to achieve a specific political objective to extend the hostilities in Darfur. They argue that this intent is solidified by the Security Council Resolution 2363 which seeks to extend the mandate of UNAMID without care that further presence of UNAMID and ongoing ICC interest will continue the war. They believe that the ICC is an obstacle that needs to be removed in order to achieve peace in Sudan so it can turn to development and peace. He also argues that the Prosecutor has used fabricated information on Darfur regarding the numbers of people displaced and the atrocities committed all of which are outside the duties of the Prosecutor, and calls for an investigation into the sources used. He concludes by saying “we pay no attention to the contradiction, utterings, and phrases of a court that was born dead”, and “Sudan will pursue the course of lasting peace in Darfur, by doing so we will protect our people from falling victim to conflict, victims who are being exploited by the Prosecutor and her office”. 

Responses to the Prosecutor’s briefing from other Security Council Member States fell into two camps: those that supported the ICC and the apprehension of Bashir, and those that believed the continued investigation violated international law norms. Sentiments among states in each camp were largely consistent. The United Kingdom, France, Sweden, Senegal, Italy, the United States, Ukraine, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Japan supported the cases in Sudan. Sudan, China, Egypt, Russia, and Ethiopia did not. 

Among the representatives that voiced support for the ICC, the main issues concerned IDPs, continued sexual violence, and continued impunity. Representatives from the UK, France, Sweden, Italy, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Japan called on the Security Council to enforce the decisions of the ICC and take action against non-compliance, especially by State Parties to the Rome Statute. The UK representative stressed the importance of DDR, but said that the government’s ongoing disarmament campaign was undermining the security situation. She also addressed the continued volatility of the situation and the need for a ceasefire to refocus on the peace process. The French representative called for increased access for UNAMID so it could fulfill its mandate. She also reiterated a previous proposal to allow states that do not cooperate with ICC arrest warrants to come before the Council and have a dialogue. The Senegalese and Bolivian representatives called for support of the OTP as well as support of the AU’s high-level implementation group in achieving peace in the region. The Bolivian representative called on non-Parties to the Rome Statute to ratify and added that constructive dialogue was impossible while non-Party states advocated for the rule of law while ignoring their own international obligations. The Italian representative highlighted that the Council’s conversation about Darfur was not progressing and that continued talk without action was not advancing peace or security. He called for more open dialogue and creative solutions. 

The representatives that were not supportive of the ICC’s continued presence in Sudan reiterated sentiments that pursuing prosecution of Bashir violated customary norms relating to head of state immunity and national sovereignty. Representatives recognized achievements made by the Sudanese government in cooperating with UNAMID and others providing humanitarian assistance. Representatives advocated for an African driven peace process, which was being hampered by continued international intervention. Representatives also highlighted their position that states not Party to the Rome Statute have no obligations under it and cannot be held to violate its provisions or to abide by its orders. The Ethiopian representative went as far as to say that the case against al Bashir was weak and was “frankly becoming an embarrassment” to the Court. He said that continuing the case would only serve to damage the Court’s credibility. The Russian Federation representative said that the Prosecutor’s report was misleading and ignored real progress being made by the government of Sudan in pursing peace. He also defended Russia’s inaction in apprehending Bashir and said that Russia did not intend to report to anyone on its bilateral contact with Sudan.

Sudan made it clear today that it has no interest in cooperating with the court, and their complaints are indicative of the regional opinion on immunity for heads of state, and the court’s focus on African States. Sudan views the ICC’s involvement in the region as antagonistic to the peace process, while the OTP stood strong in its opinion that Bashir needs to answer for his alleged crimes in order to fight against impunity and bring a lasing resolution to the conflict. It appears, then, that the parties are at an impasse. Any future progress remains to be seen.

Side Events: 16th Assembly of States Parties | Minding the Gap: Progress in Drafting a Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity

By Victoria Ernst, PILPG Research Associate

This afternoon’s panel discussion was moderated by Professor Sean Murphy, Special Rapporteur on Crimes Against Humanity and member of the International Law Commission (ILC). Panelists included: Professor Charles Jalloh, also a member of the ILC; Professor Claus Kress, Director of the Institute for International Peace and Security Law at the University of Cologne; Judge O-Gon Kwon, President of the ICC; Professor Leila Sadat, Director of the Whitney R. Harris Law Institute and Special Advisor on Crimes Against Humanity to the ICC Prosecutor; and Solomon Sacco, senior legal advisor for Amnesty International. 

Sean Murphy began the discussion with an overview of the process that led to the first draft of the convention. The ILC launched the project in 2014 and the first reading was completed and opened for comment this past summer. The draft convention consists of a preamble, 15 draft articles, and an annex. Comments will be accepted from states and NGOs through December 2018, and the Commission will submit a new report in early 2019, taking comments into account. The Commission plans to have a second and final completed draft by summer 2019, and shortly after to recommend adoption of the convention by the general assembly. The first draft of the convention can be found on the ILC website in the Commission’s 2017 report. Both members of the ILC on the panel, as well as the Amnesty International representative, called on audience members and the entire international community to submit comments. 

Mr. Murphy also reiterated the need for a convention on crimes against humanity. He stressed that such a convention is not redundant. The ICC focuses on investigating and prosecuting crimes in The Hague, but there is still a need for national level prosecution and increased international cooperation in areas such as extradition. He mentioned that 50% of UN states have no national statute on crimes against humanity, including a third of State Parties to the Rome Statute. The Rome Statute does not require national legislation but incentivizes doing so. Mr. Murphy further noted that even states that do have national legislation on crimes against humanity, do not have legislation in line with the Rome Statute. He cited the fact that many national statutes on crimes against humanity were adopted in the 50’s, 60’s, and 70’s, long before the Rome Statute. One major gap in national legislation across states is that states typically only have jurisdiction if the crime is committed in their own territory or by one of their nationals. Few states have jurisdiction to prosecute individuals present in their territory that do not meet those jurisdictional elements. Addressing this gap is one of the major goals of the convention. 

Next, the discussion was opened to the other panelists, starting with Professor Jalloh. Mr. Jalloh recognized the achievement of the Commission in completing the first draft in only three years. He also stressed the need for a convention on crimes against humanity to fill the gap in international and national prosecution for atrocity crimes. He noted the existence of conventions on genocide and war crimes and the lack of something similar to guide states in prosecuting crimes against humanity. In his opinion, the most significant developments in the convention related to extradition, mutual legal assistance, and the rights of victims. He recognized the difference in transnational prosecution of economic versus atrocity crimes. He hopes the provisions on mutual legal assistance will help address these gaps. He noted that three elements were not included in the first draft: a monetary mechanism, a prohibition on immunity for state officials, and a prohibition on amnesties. He admitted that he wanted all three included, but ultimately the Commission chose not to include them. The monetary mechanism was left out because the Commission perceived this as a political rather than legal issue. Immunities and amnesties were excluded because the Commission determined there was insufficient state practice to address them. 

Professor Kress spoke next. Mr. Kress highlighted the significance of the dispute resolution mechanism in the draft convention. He sees this as a positive development that will allow broader review of legal issues. He used the Bosnian cases as an example. He noted that the crime of genocide was both too limited and too confining to fully adjudicate the crimes at issue. Specifically, the intent requirement in the genocide article constrained the Court. Mr. Kress concluded with areas of improvement he sees for the second draft. He hopes the convention will use some of its elements to further prosecution of war crimes and genocide. He hopes to see guidance on transitional justice and more legal space to prosecute war crimes in non-international armed conflict. 

Judge Kwon spoke next. He reiterated Mr. Murphy’s opinion that the convention was not redundant. He believes the draft convention and the ICC are compatible and mutually beneficial. He sees the new convention as an opportunity for non-State Parties of the Rome Statute to fight against crimes against humanity. He also stressed concern about the lack of a prohibition on amnesties in the draft. 

Mr. Sacco with Amnesty International spoke next. Overall, he said Amnesty is supportive of the convention. He highlighted the provisions on superior orders and the non-applicability of statute of limitations as especially positive. However, he was very transparent on Amnesty’s belief that the convention was not nearly progressive enough. He called on progressive states and civil society to submit comments to push the next draft in a more progressive direction. He specifically hopes for more progressive development on victims’ and witnesses’ rights and a ban on military courts. He was also very concerned about the lack of a prohibition on amnesties and immunities. He mentioned that Amnesty was also concerned with the incorporation in the convention of the Rome Statute’s definitions for gender and sexuality. Amnesty strongly believes that customary international law and global society has moved past those definitions and that the definitions used in the convention should reflect that progression. 

The final panelist to speak was Professor Sadat. She reiterated the other panelists views that the convention was necessary in filling the gap in prosecution of atrocity crimes. She highlighted ethnic cleansing that might not meet the definition of genocide and sexual violence during peace time as particular areas of concern addressed by the convention. She said that the convention was a necessary step in ending impunity and the increased complementarity will create more international criminal law capacity at the national level. She noted that she hoped the preamble would include a Martin’s clause, as there will always be new ways to commit atrocity crimes and she believes it is important to make space for those developments in the convention. She concluded with recognizing that today was the 71st anniversary of the adoption of the Nuremberg principles and the development on this convention was an important step in continuing that legacy. 

Next the discussion was extended to the audience for questions. One audience member asked why incitement was not included in the draft. He was especially concerned about the lack of an explicit mentioning of incitement in the articles relating to prevention. Mr. Murphy replied that the Commission discussed inclusion of incitement but ultimately decided to mirror the Rome Statute as closely as possible. He also added that the drafters believed that incitement was covered in the draft, even if not done so explicitly, through criminalizing attempt and aiding and abetting. Professor Sadat also replied that incitement is supported by the Rome Statute, even though it is not included. She pointed to the fact that incitement is included under genocide and that the likely reason for its exclusion under the article on crimes against humanity is because there was no convention to look to. Mr. Sacco, speaking in his personal capacity, agreed with the audience member that incitement was not adequately covered by the draft convention. 

Another question posed to panel asked whether there were concerns that reducing crimes against humanity to a convention was in itself a step backwards. He was concerned about a dilution in the customary law that had developed around crimes against humanity. The panelists stressed that a dilution in law was not the intent of the convention and that adoption of the convention would further international law relating to the prosecution of crimes against humanity. 

Personal observations: 
It was obvious that all the panelists strongly supported the development of the convention. However, it was also obvious that most, if not all of them, hoped the convention would become more progressive. The ILC members, especially Mr. Murphy, who has been intimately involved in the drafting, were more cautious about the convention becoming too progressive. Both members alluded to push-back from other commission members on certain progressive aspects. The exclusion of amnesties and immunities from the draft also suggests that the Commission’s membership overall is concerned with the acceptance of less progressive states of those elements. Mr. Sacco was very transparent on Amnesty’s concerns over areas where the convention fell short. Civil society will be crucial in helping to move more conservative ILC members towards accepting progressive additions to the convention.

ASP Background Briefings | ICC Investigation of US in Afghanistan

The Prosecutor’s Report on the Preliminary Examination of Activities explained that in 2001, the US invaded Afghanistan in response to the terrorist attacks that Al Qaeda operatives conducted in Washington, D.C., and New York City. The US entered Afghanistan and attacked the Taliban-led Government because it accused the Taliban of harboring Al Qaeda, who claimed responsibility for the attacks. UNSC Resolution 1386 established the International Security Assistant Force (ISAF), which brought NATO forces into Afghanistan. While NATO and the US ousted the Taliban by December 2001, the conflict spread from southeast Afghanistan to the capital, Kabul.

In 2007, the Office of the Prosecutor made the preliminary examination of the Afghanistan situation public. The Prosecutor determined that the Afghanistan conflict is a non-international armed conflict between pro-Government forces comprised of the Afghan Government, supported by the US and ISAF forces, and the anti-Government forces, including the Taliban and the Haqqani Network. In 2016, the Prosecutor found that there was a reasonable basis that: 1. the anti-Government forces committed crimes against humanity and war crimes, 2. Afghanistan’s intelligence agency and National Police committed war crimes of torture and ill treatment, and 3. the US’s Central Intelligence Agency committed war crimes of torture and ill treatment.

On November 20, 2017, the Prosecutor requested the Pre-Trial Chamber’s authorization to begin an investigation into crimes against humanity and war crimes in Afghanistan. Based on the preliminary investigation, the Prosecutor believes that there is sufficient evidence that the fighting parties committed grave war crimes and crimes against humanity, and no national jurisdiction is undertaking an investigation.

The Prosecutor determined that the investigation’s scope includes war crimes and crimes against humanity since May 1, 2003 in Afghanistan, and war crimes that are closely linked to the Afghan armed conflict in the territory of other State Parties since July 1, 2002. In the Preliminary Investigation, the Prosecutor reported alleged war crimes when pro-Government forces captured and transferred Taliban and Al Qaeda members from Afghanistan to territories, such as Poland, Lithuania, and Romania. Additionally, the Prosecutor explained that she is considering complementarity and acknowledging national courts’ efforts to address crimes she may recommend to the Pre-Trial Chamber.

Although the US is not a State Party to the Rome Statute, the ICC may have jurisdiction due to Afghanistan, Poland, Lithuania, and Romania being State Parties. This is because the crimes alleged against the US, specifically torture and ill treatment, occurred in the territory of these states. The Prosecutor has not submitted her official request yet, but said she would file her request “in due course.”

Sources

Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities para. 195 (Nov. 14, 2016), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/161114-otp-rep-PE_ENG.pdf.

Office of the Prosecutor, The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, Requests Judicial Authorisation to Commence an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Nov. 20, 2017), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=171120-otp-stat-afgh.

Alex Whiting, An ICC Investigation of the U.S. in Afghanistan: What does it Mean?, Just Security (Nov. 3, 2017), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/46687/icc-investigation-u-s-afghanistan-mean/.

Paul Seils, Handbook on Complementarity: An Introduction to the Role of National Courts and the ICC in Prosecuting International Crimes 29, International Center of Transitional Justice (2016), available at https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ_Handbook_ICC_Complementarity_2016.pdf.

ASP Background Briefings | Development of the Crime of Aggression at the ICC

Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter sets out a prohibition on the use of force “against the territorial integrity or political independence” of other States. After World War II, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg expanded upon this concept, creating the “crime of aggression.” This was the first time individuals were held responsible for conduct which previously had only been enforced against States under the Charter.

Thirty State Parties to the Rome Statute have ratified the Kampala Amendments from 2010. This means that the crime of aggression should be activated in December 2017, provided that the State Parties to the Rome Statue decide by a 2/3 majority vote to activate the Court’s jurisdiction for the crime.

If the activation process succeeds, the ICC may investigate and prosecute crimes of aggression. The Court may exercise jurisdiction either through State referral (Article 15bis), or by Security Council referral (Article 15ter). Alternatively, the Prosecutor for the Court could start an investigation. Jurisdiction will apply only for acts of aggression after the amendments come into force, and the “aggressor” State Party must not have opted out of the Court’s jurisdiction for aggression.

Article 8bis of the Rome Statute defines the crime of aggression as “planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.”

Paragraph 2 designates an act of aggression as “the use of armed force by a state” against another State, which is not consistent with the UN Charter, most specifically Chapter 7. The acts designated as acts of aggression (even without a declaration of war) were codified from the UNGA Resolution 3314, and include:

(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation […] by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof;

(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State;

(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State;

(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State;

(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement;

(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State;

(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.

It is unclear at this time how many State Parties will potentially enact domestic legislation providing for the Crime of Aggression. The biggest concern for most states is complementarity, and enacting domestic legislation could allow State Parties to potentially avoid ICC prosecution due to their domestic measures and possible domestic investigations into the crime. Furthermore, in line with the principle of only being tried once for one’s conduct, “ne bis in idem” will apply to the Crime of Aggression.

Sources

UN Charter, Art. 2(4), available at http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html.

International Crimes Database, Crime of Aggression, available at http://www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/Crimes/CrimeOfAggression.

The Global Campaign for Ratification and Implementation of the Kampala Amendments on the Crime of Aggression, Conditions for Action by the ICC, available at https://crimeofaggression.info/role-of-the-icc/conditions-for-action-by-the-icc/.

Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Handbook: Ratification and Implementation of the Kampala Amendment to the Rome Statute of the ICC, available at https://crimeofaggression.info/documents/1/handbook.pdf.

UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), (Jul. 17 1998), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADD16852-AEE9-4757-ABE7-9CDC7CF02886/283503/RomeStatutEng1.pdf.

Side Events: 16th Assembly of States Parties | Victims of Hissène Habré: the struggle for reparations continues

By Kirsten Lavery, PILPG Program Manager

On December 7, 2017, the government of Switzerland, Human Rights Watch, and REDRESS convened an event entitled “Victims of Hissène Habré: the struggle for reparations continues” in the sidelines of the ASP Meetings of the ICC. In 2016, Hissène Habré, the former dictator of Chad, was convicted by the Extraordinary African Chambers (CAE) in Senegal for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture. The Habré trial has rightly been hailed as a victory for all those that fought for justice, particularly the victims that called for justice for over 20 years. The Habré trial was also a victory for the African continent as an example of complimentary jurisdiction and the demonstration of the ability of Africa to deliver justice for Africans on the continent. The trial included the active participation of victims, including many women who broke taboos in Chad to testify openly regarding their experiences as sex slaves during the Habré regime. In 2017, the CAE confirmed Habré’s verdict and ordered Habré to pay roughly $150 million in compensation to his victims. The CAE located and froze less than $1 million in assets and mandated that the African Union establish an AU Trust Fund to locate and seize additional assets. This Trust Fund has yet to be established and victims have not yet received reparations.

The event focused on considering whether equitable justice can be achieved without the effective implementation of reparations. Following introductory remarks and a screening of a video by Human Rights Watch that showed footage of the trial, a civil party representative in the proceedings spoke regarding his experience. He was a victim of prolonged torture by the regime and inquired why victims of such heinous crimes were required to fight for justice for so long.

He noted that while the Habré verdict was an important step, reparations are still critical. He explained that reparations address several dimensions of the harm suffered by the victims, but its psychological impact is the most important. In this sense, reparations offer the victims of torture the opportunity to restore their dignity. He stated that reparations are often a matter of life or death for victims of gross human rights violations, who many times have lost everything as a result of the crimes suffered. He further stressed that Chad and the African Union have the obligation to ensure reparations are provided for the victims, as required by the Court’s judgment. However, in recognition of the financial weakness of Chad, he stressed that external funding is needed. He stated that victims believe that foreign states that encouraged the dictatorship of Habré should be required to provide compensation.

In addition, a lawyer involved in the Habré trial and a reparations specialist gave their views on best practices to establish a Trust Fund to effectively implement reparations. These experts noted the concerning delay in establishing the Trust Fund by the AU. Currently, a draft statute is circulating that will be considered at the next AU Summit this January. The necessity of establishing the Trust Fund with urgency was stressed, so that victims can achieve full justice within their lifetimes. As there will still be a lack of available assets once the Trust Fund is established, technical expertise and financial tools are needed to locate and seize assets that can contribute to the Trust Fund. It was noted that given the lack of expertise in this area by human rights lawyers, corporate law firms that conduct investigations should consider providing pro bono assistance. In addition, support is needed to perform victim outreach and to ensure that the implementation of reparations is a victim-centered process that avoids re-traumatization. The speakers further highlighted options for structuring and funding reparations, concluding that a hybrid approach where donors support the fund to build its capacity to reparations together with the seizure of assets will likely be needed. In addition to continued efforts to identify assets of the former Habré regime that can be seized, the responsibility of Chad to provide funds was stressed. The speakers noted that relaying on donors to fund reparations can be problematic, as it blurs the lines between reparations and broader development assistance, thus undermining the purpose of reparations. Given this, the role of donors in building capacity instead of providing compensation was stressed. The speakers further suggested that the option of a staggered payment plan would help facilitate payments in the Trust Fund by the government of Chad.

The event concluded with further emphasize on the necessity of reparations to achieve equitable justice for the victims of the Habré regime. The establishment and implementation of the Trust Fund for Habré victims has the potential to acknowledge victim suffering and should remain a priority on the international agenda.