



DARFUR: A NEGOTIATION SIMULATION ON DISPLACED PERSONS, SECURITY, AND POWER SHARING

**International Mediators
Briefing Packet**

Prepared by the

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DARFUR: A NEGOTIATION SIMULATION ON DISPLACED PERSONS, SECURITY, AND POWER SHARING

Introduction

The purpose of this negotiation simulation is to surface key issues and potential solutions to points of impasse likely to arise during negotiations between the Government of Sudan and the Darfuri delegation on issues related to displaced persons, security, and power sharing. It is important to note that the objective of the simulation is not to reach consensus on the precise nature of the peace process or to agree upon specific conditions for negotiations. Rather, this negotiation simulation is designed to stimulate debate, address points of conflict, and identify potential solutions. The negotiation simulation has been developed using the methodology employed by the United States Department of State's National Foreign Affairs Training Institute, which runs similar negotiations to train US diplomats prior to negotiations.

This simulation exercise is not intended to be a comprehensive review of all the issues involved, nor is it intended to endorse one view over the other. The participants in the simulation naturally will have varying levels of substantive or area expertise, as well as professional commitment to the issue. Participants are therefore encouraged to draw upon their individual experience as they deem appropriate.

To provide the necessary information to conduct the simulation, this briefing packet contains an overview of the principal interests of the parties to the conflict, the relevant issues to be negotiated, and instructions for the delegations. Participants are divided into three delegations: the Government of Sudan, the Darfuri delegation, and the international mediators. Each delegation is provided only their own instructions. The simulation will proceed along a structured agenda provided in Annex I. Annex II provides links to additional sources of information and state practice examples for each of the three issues addressed in this simulation.

The negotiation simulation has been prepared by the Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG), in cooperation with the Washington College of Law. PILPG, a 2005 Nobel Peace Prize nominee, is a non-profit organization, which operates as a global pro bono law firm providing free legal assistance to states and governments involved in peace negotiations, drafting post-conflict constitutions, and prosecuting war criminals. To facilitate the utilization of this

legal assistance, PILPG also provides policy formulation advice and training on matters related to conflict resolution. To date, PILPG has advised over two-dozen countries on the legal aspects of peace negotiations and constitution drafting, and over thirty countries in Europe, Asia and Africa concerning the protection of human rights, self-determination, and the prosecution of war crimes.

Context

This negotiation simulation assumes the parties have agreed on a neutral location and the agenda for this negotiation simulation. Each delegation may negotiate strategies and secondary issues for discussion. Delegations may communicate with other delegations—or individuals from other delegations—in written messages or tactical meetings arranged by the delegations at any time during the simulation.

The Parties

For the purposes of this negotiation simulation, the primary parties to the negotiation are the Government of Sudan (including representatives from the National Congress Party and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement), the Darfuri delegation (including representatives from the Justice and Equality Movement, the Sudan Liberation Army, other Darfuri movements, and civil society), and the international mediators (including representatives from the United States and the African Union/ United Nations).¹

Government of Sudan

The main objectives of the Government of Sudan are to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity, maintain a unified Sudan, increase its stature within the international community, and avoid any action that creates the appearance of weakness or might have a destabilizing effect in Sudan. The Government of Sudan also intends to maintain sufficient control over Darfur, both in respect to security and development in the region.

Darfuri Delegation

The main objectives of the Darfuri delegation are to end the ongoing violence against civilians in Darfur, ensure peace and stability in both the short and

¹ The inclusion or exclusion of any group on a delegation is not intended to endorse a particular scenario.

long term, facilitate adequate and unhindered humanitarian aid, promote the long-term sustainable development of Darfur, and establish conditions for the safe and voluntary return of displaced persons to their homes. The Darfuri delegation is also interested in gaining fair and equitable representation in the central government while strengthening the autonomy of the region.

International Mediators

The main objective of the international mediators is to facilitate an agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Darfuri delegation on the issues of displaced persons, security, and power sharing. While the international mediators agree that international oversight is necessary to ensure the resolution of these three issues, each state or organization represented by the international mediators is hesitant to act as the primary group responsible for providing additional troops or funding.

Identification of the Issues

Displaced Persons

While there is disagreement over the exact figures, reports estimate that, as a result of the conflict in Darfur, approximately 2.4 million Darfuris have been internally displaced and 250,000 Darfuri refugees are living in refugee camps in Chad. Reports also indicate that humanitarian agencies have encountered reduced access to displaced populations as a result of increased insecurity, targeted attacks, and bureaucratic impediments.

Right of Return: The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement recognizes the right to informed, voluntary return. Forced repatriation is inconsistent with this right as long as the conditions causing displacement still exist. State practice indicates that providing displaced persons with information about the conditions in the areas of their pre-conflict homes helps to encourage voluntary return. Post-conflict states have also cooperated with international humanitarian agencies to facilitate “go-and-see visits,” which allow displaced persons to assess the security situations in their former communities and make informed, voluntary decisions to return.

Property Restitution: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees the right to property and home. Property concerns are a significant obstacle to the return of displaced persons. To address property rights and

restitution, peace agreements usually provide for the right to property restitution, including the physical return of property or financial compensation in situations where physical return is not a viable option. Many post-conflict states have passed legislation or included provisions in peace agreements creating mechanisms to adjudicate property restitution claims. State practice indicates that one of the most difficult property restitution issues is the consideration of secondary occupants. Secondary occupants often have destroyed or stolen the property of displaced persons. Regardless of past actions, however, the Pinheiro Principles emphasize that secondary occupants should be afforded safeguards of due process, including an opportunity for genuine consultation, adequate and reasonable notice of eviction, and the provision of legal remedies.

Humanitarian Assistance: Parties to a peace agreement often facilitate the return and resettlement of displaced persons by explicitly invoking international laws governing refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in a peace agreement. To manage humanitarian assistance to displaced persons, states emerging from conflict situations often cooperate with the international community. The state agrees to ensure the security of international organizations, and in return these international organizations provide repatriation assistance, including aid and trans-border transportation to return displaced persons.

Resettlement: To successfully facilitate the return of displaced persons, resettlement plans generally encompass humanitarian, economic, and security concerns. Parties to a peace agreement often seek assistance from the international community to help fund and implement resettlement programs. The international community may be able to provide more funding and better oversight for repatriation programs than if states attempt to implement the programs on their own.

For additional information and state practice examples on the issue of displaced persons, please see Appendix II.

Security

While the figures are contested, reports estimate that between 300,000 and 400,000 people have died as a result of the conflict in Darfur. Nonetheless, the security situation in Darfur is unstable, and this volatile environment jeopardizes the lives of civilians and undermines the future success of peace negotiations. Some of the major security concerns include the continued proliferation of arms and the increasing number of banditry attacks.

Ceasefire: A ceasefire is an agreement for the temporary cessation of hostilities. While ceasefires generally do not resolve the larger conflict, they create a secure environment to initiate dialogue between the conflicting parties and pave the way for future negotiation. Common elements of a ceasefire agreement include: (1) identification and definition of prohibited acts; (2) separation of forces; and (3) verification, supervision, and monitoring of the agreement. Previous ceasefire agreements have also established ceasefire or joint military commissions consisting of an international peace keeping force, a domestic force to self-monitor the ceasefire, or a joint force consisting of both international and domestic organizations.

Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR): Demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration programs serve to (1) remove troops from offensive positions, (2) encourage non-governmental forces to place their weapons in storage and under the supervision of a neutral body, and (3) provide civil society transition programs. Many post-conflict states choose to integrate former combatants into provincial or national defense forces because of their experience using military equipment, working in military groups, and executing orders. The ultimate objective of DDR programs is to create a secure and stable environment conducive to lasting and sustainable peace.

Civilian Security: A lack of security and safety can prevent the return of displaced persons to their areas of origin. Displaced persons may be in danger both during the process of return and after resettlement. Peace agreements frequently address these concerns by establishing each party's affirmative obligation to ensure the safety and security of affected populations during times of return and reintegration. The international community may also be able to provide various services to ensure civilian security, including financial support, technical assistance, and neutral monitors.

For additional information and state practice examples on the issue of security, please see Appendix II.

Power Sharing

Under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the Interim National Constitution (INC) of 2005, Sudan has a federal system of government consisting of the central government, the Government of Southern Sudan, provincial governments, and local governments. The CPA and INC allocate 52% of Executive positions and seats in the National Assembly to the National Congress

Party (NCP) and 28% to the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Other Northern political organizations receive 14% of these seats while other Southern political organizations receive 6%. The perception that NCP political and economic policies marginalize populations within Darfur, and the attendant desire for greater political autonomy and share in national wealth contribute to the crisis in Darfur.

Central Government: Provincial governments often have a formal role in the executive or legislative branch of the central government. In the executive, this frequently takes the form of a representative from the provincial executive serving in the national executive. In the legislature, this often takes the form of representatives elected by the provincial citizens or appointed by legislative authorities to sit in the national legislature. Representation in the central government is typically based on precedent and/or population size.

Devolution of Powers: In post-conflict states, state practice indicates that a clear division of powers helps prevent future disputes over political authority. Common elements that states consider when devolving power include: (1) the structure and organization of the allocation of power; (2) the fiscal relationship between the central and provincial governments; (3) judicial review and dispute resolution relating to the allocation of powers; (4) mechanisms for coordination between the central and provincial governments, among provincial governments themselves, and between provinces and other entities; and (5) methods for the modification of structures once they have been established. Powers devolved to provinces frequently include taxation, transportation, police powers, and matters related to education, family life, health, and social welfare. Generally, expenditure authority follows the devolution of political authority between state and provincial governments.

For additional information and state practice examples on the issue of power sharing, please see Appendix II.

DELEGATION INSTRUCTIONS**For the International Mediators Only**

The main objective of the international mediators is to facilitate an agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Darfuri delegation on the issues of power sharing, security, and displaced persons. The role of your delegation is to push for consensus between the Government of Sudan and the Darfuri delegation without taking on the primary responsibility of funding or supplying additional troops for any agreed operations.

Issue One: Displaced Persons

Your delegation supports the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons in accordance with international law. Furthermore, your delegation recognizes the need for immediate and directed humanitarian assistance for displaced persons. Members of your delegation are hesitant to act as the primary source of funding for any efforts relating to displaced persons. However, your delegation may be willing to leverage international funding in order to facilitate an agreement among the parties.

The positions of the parties listed below are intended to help the mediating parties to develop a strategy to foster mutually beneficial points of consensus between the parties:

*Darfuri Delegation*Right of Return

- The Darfuri delegation's position is that, following the initial reconstruction of homes and infrastructure, displaced persons should be allowed to return to Darfur, if they so choose. The Darfuri delegation seeks to ensure that this initial reconstruction happens in a timely manner without undue delay by the Government of Sudan.
- The Darfuri delegation demands the use of international monitors to oversee the return process, as they believe that the Government of Sudan's actions have perpetuated the violence and directly caused the displacement of Darfuris.

- The Darfuri delegation is concerned that, without international monitors, displaced persons will face violence, harassment, intimidation, coercion, informal ‘taxation,’ confiscation of property, or forced resettlement upon their return.

Property Restitution

- The Darfuri delegation’s position that all displaced persons have the right to have their housing, land, and/or property returned to them. In the event that a displaced person’s property cannot be returned in its original condition, the Darfuri delegation’s position is that the displaced person should be equitably compensated.
- The Darfuri delegation supports international involvement in the property restitution procedure, but is willing to negotiate the Government of Sudan’s role in property restitution. However, the Darfuri delegation requires assurances from the Government of Sudan that secondary occupants of Darfuri property are peacefully removed in the interest of preventing renewed conflict between the original and secondary occupants.

Humanitarian Assistance

- Without immediate and directed humanitarian assistance, the influx of displaced persons into Darfur has the potential to create a large-scale humanitarian crisis. To facilitate return, the Darfuri delegation seeks assurances that displaced persons will have the right to immediate humanitarian assistance, including access to basic amenities such as food, water, and shelter upon their return.
- The Darfuri delegation has little evidence to demonstrate that the Government of Sudan has the capacity to provide the necessary aid to displaced persons as they return. Therefore, the Darfuri delegation insists that the Government of Sudan allow international humanitarian aid agencies immediate access to civilians in Darfur.
- The Darfuri delegation requests that the Government of Sudan, in cooperation with the international community, protect aid workers and secure humanitarian supply routes wherever necessary.

Resettlement

- Resettlement expenses are likely to stretch beyond the capacity of Darfuris. The Darfuri delegation feels strongly that the damage to Darfuri buildings and infrastructure is largely the direct result of the Government of Sudan's actions. The Darfuri delegation, therefore, opposes requiring Darfuris to fund reconstruction efforts and seeks funding from both the Government of Sudan and the international community for resettlement and reconstruction.
- The Darfuri delegation's position is that international contractors should manage and conduct the reconstruction of Darfur. Reconstruction is likely to last for a substantial period of time and create many jobs within Darfur. The Darfuri delegation intends to secure jobs for Darfuris and returning displaced persons.

Government of Sudan

Right of Return

- The Government of Sudan agrees that displaced persons should have the opportunity to return to their places of origin. However, the Government of Sudan's position is that they should be allowed to return until the necessary reconstruction efforts are complete in Darfur.
- Though the Government of Sudan does not oppose the return of displaced persons, it does not want to lose any authority to international monitors in the return effort. Therefore, the Government of Sudan seeks absolute oversight of the return of displaced persons without international monitors.
- The Government of Sudan requests funding from the international community for the return effort. Furthermore, the Government of Sudan believes that the Darfuri rebels were the root cause of the conflict, and do not feel obligated to fund the return of the displaced Darfuris.

Property Restitution

- Although the Government of Sudan does not necessarily support the establishment of a system for addressing property restitution claims, it recognizes that this will likely be inevitable given the large number of

displaced persons. Accordingly, because the Government of Sudan seeks to control and process all Darfuri restitution claims to houses, land, and/or property and determine the validity of these claims.

- The Government of Sudan seeks the authority to remove any secondary occupants and opposes international monitors in this process.
- The Government of Sudan seeks the sole authority to determine when it is necessary to rebuild or provide compensation for any housing, land, and/or property that cannot be returned or restored to its original condition. In such instances, the Government of Sudan plans to seek funding from the international community.

Humanitarian Assistance

- The Government of Sudan's position is that humanitarian aid groups registered with the Government should have access to civilians in Darfur. The Government of Sudan's position is that other international organizations and NGOs should have to negotiate with the Government for the right to operate within Sudan.
- The Government of Sudan seeks to maintain control over the protection and monitoring of supply routes for humanitarian aid at the exclusion of international monitors.

Resettlement

- The Government of Sudan's position is that funding for resettlement efforts should come from the international community, and that reconstruction should take place under the supervision of the Government of Sudan.
- The reconstruction efforts present an opportunity to create many jobs for Sudanese workers. Therefore, the Government of Sudan supports the use of Sudanese government contractors and Sudanese workers to manage and conduct the reconstruction efforts in Darfur.

Issue Two: Security

While your delegation emphasizes adherence to international treaties and guaranteed access to humanitarian assistance, the international community does

not want to be primarily responsible for funding or providing troops for security operations. Your delegation supports a Darfuri police force for purposes of creating jobs for citizens of Darfur. Additionally, the U.S. is concerned with maintaining its intelligence relationship with those on the ground in Sudan.

The positions of the parties listed below are intended to help the mediating parties to develop a strategy to foster mutually beneficial points of consensus between the parties:

Darfuri Delegation

Ceasefire

- The Darfuri delegation calls for an immediate cessation of all hostilities and military action.
- The Darfuri delegation opposes involvement of the Government of Sudan in monitoring a ceasefire and seeks international personnel to create a compliance mechanism for ensuring that the cessation of military hostilities is enforced, both immediately and in the long term.

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)

- The Darfuri delegation requires that disarmament programs be created to aid and advance the disarmament of the Sudan Armed Forces and of the Janjaweed militia groups in Darfur.
- The Darfuri delegation strongly opposes any presence of the Sudan Armed Forces and Janjaweed Militia in Darfur. Few Darfuris will recognize the legitimacy of a ceasefire unless these opposing forces are demobilized and have completely left Darfur.
- The Darfuri delegation recognizes that Darfuri Movements' forces also require demobilization. The Darfuri delegation seeks to reintegrate Darfuri movements' forces into national, regional, and local security, police, and military forces. The Darfuri delegation is willing to provide assurances that a regional effort toward this demobilization and reintegration will begin once an acceptable ceasefire has been agreed upon.

- The majority of the Darfuri delegation supports the use of a local Darfuri police force to patrol Darfur's borders, substantially comprised of former forces from Darfuri movements. The civil society members of the Darfuri delegation have reservations about a Darfur police force comprised of former Darfuri movement combatants.
- The Darfuri delegation supports the international community serving as the peacekeepers and working with the parties to monitor all DDR efforts.
- The Darfuri delegation's position is that the National Reserve Fund (NRF) should be used to fund all necessary financial support for DDR programs.
- The Darfuri delegation seeks further financial and logistical support for DDR programs from the international community.

Civilian Security

- The Darfuri delegation's position is that the Government of Sudan, with the assistance of international bodies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, should ensure that civilians in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps are protected and that humanitarian aid can reach civilians in Darfur who are in need.
- The Darfuri delegation seeks assurances that the Government of Sudan, in cooperation with the international community, will secure humanitarian supply routes wherever necessary.
- The Darfuri delegation strongly opposes allowing the Janjaweed militia or Sudan Armed Forces access to IDP camps, or control over security. In your delegation's view, allowing such access creates a strong potential of reigniting violence.
- The Darfuri delegation seeks the deployment of additional UNAMID peacekeeping troops to provide security at IDP camps.
- The Darfuri delegation's position is that international monitors should ensure that the Government of Sudan and Janjaweed Militia adhere to these measures.

*Government of Sudan*Ceasefire

- The Government of Sudan supports an immediate cessation of all hostilities and military action.
- Following a ceasefire agreement, the Government of Sudan seeks sole authority for the Sudan Armed Forces to ensure that the cessation of military hostilities is enforced, both immediately and in the long term. Therefore, the Government of Sudan strongly opposes international armed forces or monitors within Darfur and Sudan.

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)

- The Government of Sudan's position is that there is no right of Darfuris to carry weapons. The Government of Sudan supports the creation of disarmament programs for the Darfur Movements.
- The immediate demobilization of all combatants in Darfur is one of the Government of Sudan's main objectives. While the Government of Sudan seeks to reintegrate most of the Darfuri Movements' forces into society, the Government of Sudan may negotiate a limited number of forces joining the Sudan Armed Forces.
- However, the Government of Sudan does not support the demobilization of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). The Government of Sudan feels strongly that, as Sudan's national army, the SAF should provide security for Darfur.
- When the DDR programs begin, the Government of Sudan seeks assurances that the SAF will have the sole responsibility to oversee and carry out all the programs in Darfur, as international involvement would infringe on Sudan's sovereignty.
- In maintaining the internal DDR programs, the Government of Sudan seeks to provide all financial and logistical support for DDR programs through the National Reserve Fund (NRF), provided that the Sudan Armed Forces have the authority to carry out such programs.

- The Government of Sudan does not believe that it is responsible for the disarmament, demobilization, or reintegration of the Janjaweed Militia.

Civilian Security

- The Government of Sudan seeks to be the sole entity responsible for ensuring that civilians in IDP camps are protected. Furthermore, the Government of Sudan will only allow those humanitarian agencies registered with the Government access to civilians in Darfur who are in need.
- The Government of Sudan seeks to be the sole entity responsible for providing security along humanitarian supply routes. The Government of Sudan opposes the use of any supply routes that have not been designated and approved by the Government.
- The Government of Sudan also seeks the deployment of additional Sudan Armed Forces to provide security in and around the IDP camps.
- The Government of Sudan's position is that Darfur's borders should be patrolled only by the Sudan Armed Forces, and not by a regional security force for Darfur.
- The Government of Sudan seeks to ensure adherence to these measures without international oversight.

Issue Three: Power Sharing

Your delegation shares a common concern with the Government of Sudan that Darfur may gain enough momentum from a power-sharing agreement to encourage the possibility of secession from Sudan. As such, your delegation is concerned with regional stability and maintaining national borders.

The positions of the parties listed below are intended to help the mediating parties to develop a strategy to foster mutually beneficial points of consensus between the parties:

Darfuri Delegation

Establishment of Region

- Some in the Darfuri delegation believe that there should be established a region called Darfur that encompasses the provinces of North Darfur, South Darfur, and West Darfur.
- Sudan's independence in 1956 incorporated historical boundaries for the Darfur region. The Darfuri delegation supports the use of the boundaries of the Darfur region and its provinces as delineated in 1956.

Central Government

- The Darfuri delegation's position is that Darfur should receive a proportional representation based on population in the National Assembly of Sudan.
- The Darfuri delegation also seeks proportional representation based on population in the National Judiciary of Sudan.
- Cognizant of the power sharing structure outlined in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the Darfuri delegation intends for one Vice President of Sudan to be a Darfuri who will represent the interests of Darfur in the Presidency of Sudan.
- Equitable representation in all government ministries, including the National Council of Ministers is also a priority for Darfuris. The Darfuri delegation seeks such representation in order to participate in decision-making processes that directly affect Darfur.

Devolution of Power

- Some in the Darfuri delegation believe that a Darfur regional government should be established that provides Darfuris limited authority to administer the Darfur region.
- The Darfuri delegation supports the regional Darfuri government having authority to regulate expenditures in areas such as education, regional

law enforcement, transportation, communication, housing, and health care services, within its territorial boundaries.

- To support its authority to regulate government spending in Darfur, the Darfuri delegation seeks authority for the regional government over direct and indirect taxation and revenue generation within its territorial boundaries.
- Natural resources found within Darfur may provide opportunities for further revenue generation, as well as facilitate the creation of jobs for Darfuris. The Darfuri delegation wants the authority to control the extraction and exploitation of natural resources within the region and to use the wealth from these natural resources.

Government of Sudan

Establishment of Region

- The Government of Sudan opposes the creation of a distinct region called Darfur. The establishment of a Darfur region could empower Darfuris to seek greater autonomy, which would threaten the sovereignty of Sudan.
- Accordingly, the Government of Sudan would like to maintain the current division of Darfur into three distinct provinces – North Darfur, South Darfur, and West Darfur.

Central Government

- The Government of Sudan supports the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which does not provide for the involvement of Darfuris in the National Government of Sudan. The Government of Sudan sees the CPA as the backdrop over all future negotiations, including those with Darfur. The Government of Sudan may seek to raise the CPA in these negotiations and rely on its established provisions that do not include Darfuri representation.

Devolution of Power

- Darfur's abundant natural resources are an important part of Sudan's economy and the Government of Sudan strongly oppose granting Darfuris authority to independently control the wealth generated from these

resources. However, the Government of Sudan may use the authority to extract and produce natural resources as a negotiation tool.

Annex I: Agenda

DARFUR: A NEGOTIATION SIMULATION ON DISPLACED PERSONS, SECURITY AND POWER SHARING

- | | |
|----------------------|---|
| 9:00 – 9:30 | Registration and Coffee |
| 9:30 – 9:45 | Welcome and Introductory Remarks
<i>Sara K. Andrews, International Pro Bono Counsel, DLA Piper</i>
<i>Paul Williams, Executive Director, PILPG</i>
<i>Matthew T. Simpson, Darfur Project Director, PILPG</i> |
| 9:45 – 10:20 | Individual Delegation Meetings
<i>Discuss negotiation strategy on issues of displaced persons, security and power sharing</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government of Sudan • Darfuri Delegation • International Mediators |
| 10:20 – 10:55 | Bilateral Meetings <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government of Sudan / Mediators (A) • Darfuri Delegation / Mediators (B) |
| 10:55 – 11:10 | Coffee Break |
| 11:10 - 11:45 | Working Group Meetings
Mediated by Internationals <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Displaced Persons • Security • Power Sharing |
| 11:45 – 12:05 | Working Lunch
Individual Delegation Meetings
<i>Assess strategy and develop action plan</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government of Sudan • Darfuri Delegation • International Mediators |
| 12:05 – 12:40 | Working Group Meetings
Mediated by Internationals <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Displaced Persons • Security • Power Sharing |
| 12:40 – 1:15 | Final Plenary Session with all Parties |
| 1:15 – 1:45 | Lessons Learned and Concluding Remarks |

Annex II: Resource Materials

General Documents

Darfur Peace Agreement (Government of Sudan, Sudan Liberation Movement/Army-Minnawi) (2006), available at <http://allafrica.com/peaceafrica/resources/view/00010926.pdf>

INTERIM NATIONAL CONST (2005), available at http://www.sudan-embassy.de/c_Sudan.pdf

Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Government of Sudan, Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army) (2005), available at <http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/Documents/General/cpa-en.pdf>

Displaced Persons

PILPG, *Displaced Persons* (chapter in Peace Agreement Drafting Guide: Darfur) (2007), available at <http://www.pilpg.org/sudan/docs/Displaced-Persons.pdf>

PILPG, *Refugee Return* (chapter in Peace Agreement Drafter's Handbook) (June 2005), available at <http://www.pilpg.org/areas/peacebuilding/peacehandbook/refugeereturn.pdf>

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 1998), available at http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/sriLanka_hpsl/docs/GPsEnglish.pdf

Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/17 (June 2005), available at <http://www.cohre.org/store/attachments/Pinheiro%20Principles.pdf>

Global Consultations on International Protection, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme (May 2002), available at <http://www.icva.ch/doc00000868.html>

Sean Brooks, *With or Without War*, Save Darfur (Aug. 27, 2009), available at <http://blogfordarfur.org/archives/1326>

Amnesty International, *Displaced in Darfur: A Generation of Anger* (Jan. 2008), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdf/idp_report.pdf

Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, *The Great Lakes Pact and the Rights of Displaced People: A Guide for Civil Society* (Sept. 2008), available at [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/JBRN-7NFKLT/\\$file/idmc_sep08.pdf?openelement](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/JBRN-7NFKLT/$file/idmc_sep08.pdf?openelement)

International Refugee Rights Initiative, *The Darfur Peace Agreement: What Hope for the Displaced?* (July 2006), available at <http://www.refugee-rights.org/Newsletters/Darfur/V3N2DPA.html>

Radio Dabanga, *Leaders of Darfur IDPs Arrested after Refusing Forced Return* (July 2009), available at <http://www.radiodabanga.org/?p=3094>

Amjad Atallah, *The Muslim World and Darfur*, 6 TURKISH POLITY QUARTERLY 19-25 (2007), available at http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpq_id_95.pdf

Security

PILPG, *Ceasefires* (chapter in Peace Agreement Drafter's Handbook) (June 2005), available at <http://www.pilpg.org/areas/peacebuilding/peacehandbook/ceasefiretemplate.pdf>

PILPG, *Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration* (chapter in Peace Agreement Drafting Guide: Darfur) (2007), available at <http://www.pilpg.org/sudan/docs/Demobilization-Disarmament-and-Reintegration.pdf>

PILPG, *Security and Demilitarization* (chapter in Peace Agreement Drafter's Handbook) (August 2005), available at <http://www.pilpg.org/areas/peacebuilding/peacehandbook/ddrtemplate.pdf>

Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on the Conflict in Darfur (N'djamena, Chad) (April 2004), available at <http://protection.unsudanig.org/data/darfur/DPA/DPA%20Annex%201%20-%20Humanitarian%20Ceasefire.pdf>

Protocol on the Establishment of Humanitarian Assistance in Darfur (N'dajema Chad) (April 2004), available at <http://www.issafrika.org/AF/profiles/sudan/humanprot.pdf>

Agreement of Goodwill and Confidence Building for the Settlement of the Problem in Darfur (Government of Sudan, Justice and Equality Movement) (Feb. 2009), available at <http://www.enoughproject.org/files/pdf/Problem-In-Darfur.pdf>

Agreement with the Sudanese Parties on the Modalities for the Establishment of the Ceasefire Commission and the Deployment of Observers in Darfur (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia) (May 2004), available at <http://www.issafrica.org/AF/profiles/sudan/darfur/cfc/agreement.pdf>

Protocol on the Improvement of the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia) (Nov. 2004), available at <http://www.reliefweb.int/rwarchive/rwb.nsf/db900sid/MHII-6ACCN2?OpenDocument>

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Map of Sudan



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