PILPG Update: Five Pro Bono Fellows Join PILPG

March 22, 2012

Five fellows have joined PILPG’s Fellowship program in the Washington, D.C. and overseas offices.  Through this program, law fellows provide pro bono assistance to PILPG clients around the globe on peace negotiations, the development of post-conflict constitutions, transitional justice, and combating maritime piracy.

PILPG’s 2012 Law Fellows are:

Jasper Kaikai, PILPG Kosovo Fellow. Mr. Kaikai is a graduate of the Tillburg University in the Netherlands. He previously worked with the Netherlands Institute of Human Rights. Mr. Kaikai works in PILPG’s Kosovo office on increasing citizens’ access to justice and supporting reform in the justice sector.

Max Margulies, PILPG Policy Fellow. Mr. Margulies is a graduate of Columbia University, with a Master of Arts in Political Science. He previously worked for the Institute for Social and Economic Research and Policy. Mr. Margulies works in PILPG’s Washington, DC office providing assistance on PILPG’s various strategic policy planning projects.

Lauren Rogal, PILPG Law Fellow. Ms. Rogal is a graduate of University of Michigan Law School and the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.  She has worked with the Rule of Law, Justice and Security Team at the United Nations Development Program. Ms. Rogal works with PILPG’s Bosnia project, to provide assistance on constitutional development.

Trevor Ulbrick, PILPG Law Fellow. Mr. Ulbrick is a graduate of Northwestern University Law School. His previous experience includes working as a Foreign Law Clerk for the Supreme Court of Israel and as an associate with Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe. Mr. Ulbrick works on peace negotiations and transitional justice matters in PILPG’s Washington, DC office.

Jonathan Worboys, PILPG Law Fellow. Mr. Worboys is a graduate of University of Oxford. He previously worked atThe AIRE Centre. Mr. Worboys works in PILPG’s Washington, DC office on issues of maritime piracy.

Information about PILPG’s Fellowship Program can be found here.


PILPG Update: PILPG Opens New York Office with Anna Triponel

September 13, 2011

This month PILPG opened a New York office, directed by Anna Triponel.

Anna Triponel is Senior Counsel and Director of the New York office.  Ms. Triponel’s portfolio includes providing legal assistance to Kenyan government officials and policymakers on constitutional reform, transitional justice, and international criminal law, and truth and reconciliation processes.

Ms. Triponel comes to PILPG from Jones Day where she was a Senior Associate responsible for structuring international mergers and acquisitions between American and European companies.  At Jones Day, she also created the International Law Pro Bono Group which provides counsel on international law to a wide range of clients.

PILPG’s New York office will deepen PILPG’s relationship with UN agencies and other organizations working in post-conflict states and international law and also work closely with PILPG’s law firm partners contributing pro bono assistance.

Ms. Triponel also serves as a consultant to the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations.  Previously, Ms. Triponel served as legal advisor to the Education for All – Fast Track Initiative at the World Bank where she worked on implementing the Millennium Development Goals.  Prior experience includes positions at the U.S. Institute of Peace, the War Crimes Research Office, and the Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law.

Ms. Triponel is a New York attorney, a solicitor of England and Wales, and a French jurist.  She holds an LL.M. in International Legal Studies (summa cum laude) from American University Washington College of Law, a masters in International and European law (magistère with high honors) and a Juris Doctor equivalent (maîtrise with high honors) from the University of Paris-X Nanterre.  Ms. Triponel regularly publishes in the areas of international law and development aid and is a member of the Carnegie New Leaders Program, a New York State Bar Association honoree, and a recipient of the Seymour J. Rubin Award in International Studies. .


About the Public International Law & Policy Group

The Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG) is a global, pro bono law firm providing legal assistance to governments involved in conflicts.  To facilitate use of this legal assistance, PILPG also provides policy formation advice and training on matters related to conflict resolution.  PILPG was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005.

PILPG’s primary practice areas are Peace Negotiations, Post-Conflict Constitutions, and War Crimes Prosecution.  To provide pro bono legal advice and policy formulation expertise, PILPG relies almost exclusively on volunteer legal assistance from more than sixty former international lawyers, diplomats, and foreign relations experts, as well as pro bono assistance from major international law firms.  Annually, PILPG is able to provide over $15 million worth of pro bono international legal services.

In July 1999, the United Nations granted official Non-Governmental Organization status to PILPG.

The Managing Board of PILPG includes:

 Paul Williams – Executive Director

Michael Scharf – Managing Director

James Hooper – Managing Director


PILPG Update: Ambassador Morton Abramowitz’s” Advantages to a Syrian War” Published in The National Interest

March 21, 2012

PILPG Advisory Board Member Ambassador Morton Abramowitz’s commentary regarding Syria appeared in The National Interest.  The article provides an analysis of the strategic considerations of the Syrian civil war.  Ambassador Abramowitz is a Senior Fellow at the Century Foundation.

The full article is included below and is available here.

Advantages of a Syrian War

By Morton Abramowitz
March 16, 2012

The Syrian civil war is not just a humanitarian crisis. There are also important strategic considerations—including Iran and other regional players like Turkey—that must be considered.

The past year has seen the slow-motion slaughter of many Syrians. Assad has carefully avoided the destruction of large populations. The world’s response has been countless international gatherings asserting sympathy for the Syrian opposition, feeble efforts toprovide humanitarian assistance and the thunder of imprecations, mostly American, that skewer the Russians but pass little ammunition or other help to the besieged opposition. Once again, another UN resolution is under consideration to bring the Chinese and Russians around to a cease fire, while a tireless Kofi Annan is asked to produce his quiet magic as if Syria were Kenya.

The deepening humanitarian crisis is generating more militant proposals: significant supportto the opposition, including the establishment of humanitarian zones and the direct provision of more arms and training. While welcome to the opposition, these zones would require theprotection of outside military forces and do little to change the situation except by loweringthe intensity of some fighting. And these measures have little support. Policy makers are concerned that such efforts will generate mayhem and civil war in Syria—as if what they are witnessing were not a civil war, or perhaps just a minor one. We seem to console ourselves with the notion that Assad’s fall is inevitable, that his Russian and Chinese friends will grow tired of isolation and embarrassment, and we can stand back knowing that right will ultimately triumph. The Syrian people will just have to suffer a little more.

Perhaps Washington believes Assad’s end is indeed close, and therefore a serious American military effort is unnecessary. That does not look likely from the latest fighting—nor from theincreasing Congressional pressures to take aggressive military measures and theadministration’s request for military options from the Pentagon.

The Post-Assad Region

The notion of a more serious and concerted U.S.-led military option to end Assad’s rule understandably has received little attention so far. Many fear it would deepen the existing civil war and spread disorder to other countries. There would, of course, be significant costs tosuch an operation—probably more than Washington bargains for. This is not another Kosovowar with no casualties, which gave Americans misleading notions about American power. Syria has air defenses whose destruction would be costly at a time when the United States is trying to reduce defense expenditures. And it would involve U.S. forces in a war of uncertain duration that they do not want.

A Syrian intervention would not be Iraq redux. But it would require something Americans are not very good at—bringing the various Syrian parties together (no mean problem with their strong sectarian differences) to help create a post-Assad world. Nor is a new Syria likely to bea short-term burden; the law of unintended consequences inevitably prevails in war. It would also be a terrible political problem for the Obama administration.

A military attack on Syria would need the whole-hearted political and material support of Turkey and Arab states. That is by no means assured. Until a year ago, the Turkish government romanced Assad. Now, it is at the forefront of trying to get rid of him, but it has done little to make that happen other than promoting international support, accepting refugees and providing a haven for Syrian opposition leaders. In a potential toppling of Assad, Turkey would need to establish a protected zone in Syria for the opposition and those fleeing any fighting. The Turkish government, however, is not enthusiastic about a military effort inSyria; it would not have a UN imprimatur or support of the Turkish public. The politically besieged Turkish military is averse to invading an Arab country and concerned that a SyrianKurdish entity might emerge from Syria’s internal disorder.

Arab support, particularly the Saudis, who talk much about supplying arms to the opposition but apparently do little, is also politically indispensable. It is not clear that support would be available, and the Arabs could well split.

Containing Iran

Nevertheless, there are ample reasons for considering a dramatically different approach, and not only for humanitarian reasons. A Syrian intervention might help with a larger and pressing Iranian problem by removing its chief client and regional ally from the scene. Strategically, Washington would send a far tougher message to the Iranian leadership to halt their nuclear-weapon aspirations than any it has delivered to date.

To have this effect on Iran, President Obama must first send an unmistakable message toAssad: unless he is prepared to give up power, his government will be destroyed. Such amilitary effort cannot win UN approval and requires a coalition of the willing. Once again theU.S. military would be indispensable in doing the fighting—the destruction by air of many of Assad’s key facilities and his ability to manage a continuing war, rather than simply enabling and equipping the opposition to Assad.

Iran likely believes this kind of an American-led attack on Syria will not happen. An attack on Syria, however, could constitute a truly defining moment for the much bigger Iranian nuclear issue. Tehran would find it highly difficult to intervene directly in Syria and would face ahumiliating loss and greater isolation in the region. It would be a huge political shock with possibly vast internal repercussions.

How Iran would respond is obviously uncertain. But the United States should consider theopportunity to change the regional dynamics in a way that might end or put off the nuclear issue and create domestic upheaval in Iran. One cannot preclude that an U.S. attack on Syria would harden Iran’s dedication to developing nuclear weapons. But though it would be hardto propose and defend, the United States would be starting a war in Syria in part to prevent afar bigger war with uncertain but immense consequences. There seems little doubt that it would result in two desirable outcomes for U.S. strategy: hastening the end of the Syrianconflict and creating a new climate for negotiating the stalemate with Iran.

Realistically, all these considerations may need to be put on the back burner for now. It’s likely that it will take a lot more violence in Syria to generate a military effort. No matter that an intervention would sever Iran’s Syria connection—and end a growing humanitarian nightmare.


PILPG Update: “Planning for Syria’s ‘Day After’ – Security, Rule of Law & Democracy,” a strategic planning paper

March 16, 2012

PILPG Managing Director Jim Hooper, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe Associate and Advisory Council member Betsy Popken, and Law Fellow Tyler Thompson recently participated in a workshop in Copenhagen on the situation in Syria. The workshop was sponsored by the Foreign Ministry of Denmark, and hosted in partnership by the University of Copenhagen, PILPG, and the Tharwa Foundation.

The workshop included participants from the exiled Syrian opposition, transition planning experts, and individuals integral to the Kosovar and Iraqi transition periods.

Together with the participants, PILPG drafted  a strategic planning paper on “Planning for Syria’s ‘Day After’ – Security, Rule of Law & Democracy”.  The purpose of this report is to provide recommendations for measures that an interim Syrian government could take in the days immediately following President Bashar al-Assad’s departure.  This report is intended to generate planning for practical responses and solutions to a range of transitional challenges that an interim government will face during the transition period.

A copy of Planning for Syria’s ‘Day After’ – Security, Rule of Law & Democracy” is available here.


PILPG Update: Eleven New Foreign Legal Specialists Join PILPG

January 19, 2012

Eleven practitioners from around the globe will be joining PILPG’s 2012 Foreign Legal Specialist Program.  PILPG’s Foreign Legal Specialists Program provides an opportunity for early career international lawyers to spend six months to one year working with PILPG’s Washington, DC office, providing in-depth research and analysis on issues of key importance to PILPG clients.

PILPG’s 2012 Foreign Legal Specialists are:

Agnese de Leo, from Latvia. Agnese previously worked for the European Central Bank Representation Office at the International Monetary Fund.

Christian De la Medina Soto, from Mexico. Christian previously clerked at a federal court in Veracruz, Mexico.

Julie Smith, from Argentina. Julie previously worked for the Argentine Ministry of Justice.

Maria Glenna, from Norway. Maria previously worked for the Norwegian Mission to the United Nations.

Maria Noel Leoni, from Uruguay. Maria previously worked for Ferrere Abogados, a law firm in Montevideo, Uruguay.

Mathuri Thamilmaran, from Sri Lanka. Mathuri previously worked for the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions in Sri Lanka.

Phattaraporn Phetphong, from Thailand. Phattaraporn previously worked for the Constitution Drafting Assembly for the Kingdom of Thailand.

Sabina Petersen, from Sweden. Sabrina previously worked for the Innocence Project.

Sofia Amozurrutia Pineda, from Mexico. Sofia previously worked for the International Affairs Office of the Government of the State of Yucatan.

Virab Khachatryan, from Armenia. Virab previously worked in the Defense Policy Department of the Armenian Ministry of Defense.

Zsofia Young, from Hungary. Zsofia previously worked for the International Criminal Court.
Information about PILPG’s Foreign Legal Specialist Program can be found here:



PILPG Update: Ambassador Morton Abramowitz and James Hooper’s “Serbia’s EU Ultimatum” Published in The National Interest

September 21, 2011

PILPG Advisory Board Member Ambassador Morton Abramowitz and PILPG Managing Director James Hooper’s commentary regarding Serbia-Kosovo relations was published in The National Interest.  “Serbia’s EU Ultimatum” discusses Serbian activity in northern Kosovo and potential ramifications for entrance in the EU.  Ambassador Abramowitz is a Senior Fellow at the Century Foundation and James Hooper is a Managing Director of the Public International Law & Policy Group.

The full article is included here and below:

Serbia’s EU Ultimatum 
By Morton Abramowitz and James Hooper
September 20, 2011

Last month the earth in the Balkans moved, but you would not have known about it from reading the mainstream media—not surprising, perhaps, because there was no mass violence nor financial eruption.

The mover was German leader Angela Merkel. She marched into the office of Serbian president Boris Tadic and in unlikely EU talk made clear to him the Serb political game in Kosovo was over. Kosovo would not be partitioned; the area inhabited by Serbs north of the Ibar River was Kosovo territory. Serbia has to stop running that area. The Kosovo issue had to be resolved before Serbia could enter the EU.

It was a shock to Tadic, a favorite of the West, who had been led by the EU commission and a few EU states to believe he could politically straddle the issue of Kosovo indefinitely: maintaining a tough line on the north and a rejectionist position on the existence of an independent state of Kosovo, while starting access negotiations and gaining ultimate accession even without settling the problem. Merkel’s voice is a major one, and her straightforward approach shook political circles in Belgrade and led to dismay and pessimism. She was impervious to the view that requiring Serbia to deliver on Kosovo would help elect more dyed-in-the wool nationalists. Her remarks have already changed Belgrade’s tone in dealing with the issue of northern Kosovo.

Politically significant progress on the issue was also recently made in Kosovo itself, causing Serbia to retreat a little on dealing with northern Kosovo and enhancing the Kosovo government’s position in the area. In July the government of Prime Minister Hashim Thaci unilaterally sent small police units into northern Kosovo to take over customs posts at two border-crossing stations with Serbia. Acting in accord with U.S. and EU principles regarding the inclusion of the north within Pristina’s sovereignty but moving mostly on its own, the Kosovo government began enforcing—however feebly—the existing border rather than accepting Serbia’s de facto changes. It was a small demonstration of sovereignty that was grudgingly but firmly accepted by the internationals in Kosovo. Moreover, despite Kosovo’s action the two parties finally reached an agreement that permits the wording of customs stamps to be accepted by Serbian customs officials facilitating trade between the two countries.

Efforts in Kosovo to change the situation in the north and to take over the administration of customs stations, not surprisingly, led to some altercations—Kosovo Serbs blocked roads, NATO intervened to keep some roads clear—but so far very little violence. Tensions are far from over. On September 16 the European mission in Kosovo airlifted small Kosovo police and customs teams to the two crossing points to avoid confrontations at the roadblocks set up by Kosovo Serbs to protest the new border arrangements and the symbolic presence of Kosovar officials there. The violence that many predicted has yet to materialize, and demonstrators have yet to appear on Serbian streets. Belgrade apparently doesn’t want violence in north Kosovo for fear it would be counterproductive to the EU candidacy decision on Serbia later this year.

Kosovo has again altered the international agenda by aligning its actions with European and U.S. principles. The problem in the north, of course, is still dangerous and far from resolved; violence can indeed break out at any moment. The Serbs in the north are strongly opposed to rule from Pristina, and in the end arrangements must be made for the security and management of their affairs by the Serb community.

The message Merkel delivered in Serbia also has implications for Bosnia with its continuing sharp ethnic divisions. Bosnian Serb separatists in Serb-dominated Republika Srspka have flouted the Dayton peace agreement, tied the central government in knots and laid the foundation for eventual secession. Its leader Milorad Dodik has alternated in his rhetoric between complete autonomy and independence for his ethnic entity. There are nationalists in Serbia who see the Bosnian Serb entity as a real part of Serbia. Playing it politically careful in Serbia, President Tadic always reaffirms his dedication to the Dayton accords but does nothing to constrain Dodik. Merkel shrewdly sidestepped this messy situation by remaining silent on any Bosnian partition, conveying Berlin’s view that Bosnian borders are settled by the Dayton accords and require no public restatement of principle.

Recent Kosovo developments have helped make clear that most of the West has exhausted its patience with talk of ever more border changes in the Balkans and that further partitions are unwelcome. As the price for joining modern Europe, Serbia is expected to ultimately renounce territorial claims and ambitions on its neighbors, as other European states have done since 1945. That has not politically sunk in with Belgrade, but there has been an important step forward. The German chancellor has led the West out of the weeds.


PILPG Update: PILPG Announces Launch of @PILPG Twitter

September 12, 2011

The Public International Law & Policy Group has launched @PILPG on Twitter as part of a larger initiative to communicate with the international law community through social media.Follow @PILPG to receive information from PILPG including policy planning reports, news updates, information relating to client developments, job announcements, and breaking news in client regional areas.


PILPG Update: PILPG Releases Report on “Libya: The Day After – Immediate Steps for a Post-Qadhafi Libya”

August 24, 2011

PILPG releases a roundtable report, “Libya: The Day After – Immediate Steps for a Post-Qadhafi Libya,” with seven recommended actions the Transitional National Council may take in the hours and days immediately following the fall of Qadhafi.  This report is based upon a roundtable that was hosted by PILPG on July 29 at the offices of Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP.  The roundtable brought together thirty experts in the areas of post-conflict reconstruction, constitutional law, economic development, human rights, and transitional justice.


The roundtable participants debated the steps that would need to be taken immediately by the leadership of a post-Qadhafi Libya.  The attached report sets forth the major issues identified by the roundtable participants for the Transitional National Council to prioritize once the Qadhafi regime falls.


Access the “Libya: The Day After – Immediate Steps for a Post-Qadhafi Libya” report here.


PILPG Update: Ambassador Morton Abramowitz and James Hooper’s “Balkan War Redux” Published in the National Interest

August 3, 2011

PILPG Advisory Board Member Ambassador Morton Abramowitz and PILPG Managing Director James Hooper’s commentary regarding the recent violence in Kosovo was published in the National Interest. Ambassador Abramowitz is a Senior Fellow at the Century Foundation.  James Hooper is a Managing Director of the Public International Law & Policy Group.

The full article is included below and is available here.

Balkan War Redux
By James Hooper and Morton Abramowitz
August 3, 2011

Ethnic violence is back in the Balkans.  And once again, it has taken the West by surprise.

This time the focal point is northern Kosovo, the region north of the Ibar River.  Formally under Kosovar sovereignty, the area is claimed by Serbia and treated by the West as a de facto part of Serbia, where Serb paramilitaries profit from smuggling to the Albanian mafia while enforcing obedience among the area’s overwhelmingly Serb population.

NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) units—which include some U.S. troops—and the EU’s rule of law mission (EULEX) tread gingerly around this reality.  Belgrade exploits the paramilitaries to reinforce Serbia’s territorial claims.  Officials from Pristina rarely step into this international shadowland.  The United States, European Union and Belgrade all regard Pristina as a distant and inconvenient landlord, a silent partner in their tripartite understandings.  Kosovo is expected to abide by the status quo and not fuss over the disjunction between Western professions of Kosovar sovereignty (albeit with close ties to Belgrade) and the reality of dominating Serb paramilitaries on the ground.

These arrangements were upended recently when Kosovo’s prime minister—finally, in the view of his countrymen—sent police units to two northern border posts to enforce a trade-policy decision by the Kosovo government.  As Kosovar officials have frequently complained to the EU and the United States (to no avail), Serbia freely exports its goods into Kosovo but blockades Kosovar goods headed north.  Kosovo’s deputy prime minister publicly warned Belgrade that unless it lifted the blockade within thirty days, Pristina would block Serbian goods entering through the north.  On July 25—after informing EULEX of its intentions, according to the prime minister—he sent Kosovar police units to take charge of two northern crossing points along the Serbian border.  The action led to a confrontation with armed Serbs, and one Kosovar police officer was killed in the shooting.

What followed were scenes reminiscent of Croatia and Bosnia in the early 1990s: Barricades went up throughout the north and began restraining KFOR movements; Two leading officials from Belgrade responsible for relations with Kosovo crossed into the north to show solidarity with fellow Serbs manning the barricades, underscore Belgrade’s claim over the territory and try to restore the status quo ante by negotiating with the KFOR commander; Serbs threw Molotov cocktails into a KFOR camp and set the two border posts ablaze. KFOR, as part of a compromise solution to tamp down the violence, took over control of the two destroyed border gates.

By Thursday a deceptive calm had returned to the area and the Kosovar forces had withdrawn.  But the violence may have created a new reality.  With emotions running strong on both sides, positions seem to be hardening.  The Kosovars have united behind their prime minister, who condemned an already-unpopular EULEX for doing nothing to aid the police unit.

Another casualty may be the EU-sponsored Serbia-Kosovo bilateral talks on small but practical technical problems.  Just weeks ago, the EU proudly announced agreement on three such issues and hoped to build momentum for further limited dialogue.  But pictures of the Serbian leader of those talks meeting with paramilitaries at the barricades cast the negotiating process into a new and less benign light.  The events also stirred nationalists in Belgrade.  In Pristina, Kosovars now see the talks as a sideshow in which their negotiators are used as props by Brussels to help make Serbia more presentable to governments deciding soon on the country’s EU-candidacy status.

The greater damage may be to a fundamental US policy assumption: that it is better to delay grappling with the undiscussed core issue of the status of northern Kosovo—the claim in Belgrade that Kosovo be partitioned along the Ibar River and the equally firm insistence by the Kosovars that the north belongs to Kosovo.

It may well be that the West’s preference of restoring the status quo ante in the north will not be possible, though diplomats in Pristina, Belgrade and Brussels are working assiduously to achieve that.  If so, Washington will have to decide whether to reexamine long-held assumptions about keeping final-status negotiations over the north in a diplomatic deep freeze and consider whether events are now forcing its hand.  If this were to happen, it would require the United States to play a major role in the present negotiations and the overall Serbia-Kosovo divide.

Clearly Washington would prefer not to take on this set of headaches—far easier to kick the can down the road.  Once violence, however, enters an issue, it can outrace the efforts of diplomats to contain it, as we learned in the Balkans in the 1990s.

Washington now faces two broad policy choices: follow the EU in attempting to restore the old situation by coaxing Pristina to accept the status quo ante in the north and convincing both parties return to their limited talks.  Or it could try to shape a new reality, either by changing the nature of the talks and focusing on the fundamental question of the future of the north; or by leading the EU in establishing Western control over northern Kosovo and the border with Serbia.  Almost certainly, if history is any guide, short-term considerations will prevail over long-term ones.


UN Security Council Documents

UN Security Council Resolutions on piracy off the coast of Somalia:

UN Security Council Resolutions on situation in Somalia:

UN Security Council Presidential Statements on the situation in Somalia:

UN Secretary-General Reports on the situation in Somalia:

Reports of Monitoring Group on Somalia appointed pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992), 1519(2003), 1558(2004), 1587(2005), 1630(2005), 1676(2006), 1724(2006) and 1766(2007):

  • S/2004/604
  • S/2005/153; S/2005/625
  • S/2006/229; S/2006/913
  • S/2007/436
  • S/2008/274; S/2008/769 Annex
  • S/2010/91, 10 March 2010
  • S/2011/433, 18 July 2011

Reports of Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to resolutions 1425(2002) and 1474(2003):

  • S/2003/223; S/2003/1035

Report of the Security Council mission

  • to Somalia, 26-27 October 1994, S/1994/1245
  • to Djibouti (Somalia), 31 May–3 June 2009, S/2008/460, pages 1-8, 42-43, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/missionreports.html

Security Council Meetings on the situation in Somalia

  • S/PV.6596, 29 July 2011, on S/2011/433
  • S/PV.6564, 24 June 2011
  • S/PV.6560, 21 June 2011, on S/2011/360
  • S/PV.6532, 11 May 2011, on S/2011/277
  • S/PV.6386, 16 September 2010, on S/2010/447
  • S/PV.6374, 25 August 2010, on S/2010/394 per S/RES/1918
  • S/PV.6313, 12 May 2010, on S/2010/234
  • S/PV.6226, 30 November 2009, on S/RES/1897
  • S/PV.6221, 18 November 2009, on S/2009/590
  • S/PV.6197, 8 October 2009, on S/2009/503
  • S/PV.6173, 29 July 2009, on S/2009/373
  • S/PV.6050, 19 December 2008, on S/RES/1853
  • S/PV.6046, 16 December 2008, on S/RES/1851
  • S/PV.6026, 2 December 2008, on S/RES/1846
  • S/PV.6019, 20 November 2008, on S/RES/1844
  • S/PV.5987, 7 October 2008, on S/RES/1838
  • S/PV.5957, 19 August 2008, on S/RES/1831
  • S/PV.5902, 2 June 2008, on S/RES/1816

Seychelles Piracy Court Cases



National Counter-Piracy Websites


Excerpts from Reports of IMO Meetings

  • MSC 86/26, paras. 18.1-18.83
  • MSC 86/WP.7 & Add.1
  • C 102/D, paras. 14.1-14.3
  • MSC 88/WP.8

Maritime Industry Guidance

Best Management Practices, Feb. 2009, signed by Bahamas, Liberia, Marshall Islands, Panama, Cyprus, Japan, Singapore, United Kingdom and USA, http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/New_York_Declaration.PDF; IMO doc. MSC 86/18/2, Annex; http://homeport.uscg.milhttp://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Best_Management_Practices_to_Deter_Piracy.pdf;


Best Management Practices 3: Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and Arabian Sea Area, June 2010  http://shipping.nato.int/BESTPRACTI/file/_WFS/Piracy/BMP3.pdf

Best Management Practices 4: Protection Against Somali Based Piracy, August 2011, http://www.shipping.nato.int/Pages/BMP.aspx


International Counter-Piracy Websites


National Policy Documents

USA: Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action Plan, http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Countering_Piracy_Off_The_Horn_of_Africa_-_Partnership__Action_Plan.pdf

USCG Anti-Piracy Policy: http://homeport.uscg.mil, click on “anti-piracy”

USCG Port Security Advisories, http://homeport.uscg.mil/mycg/portal/ep/contentView.do?contentTypeId=2&channelId=-18346&contentId=184765&programId=13046&programPage=%252Fep%252Fprogram%252Feditorial.jsp&pageTypeId=13489:

2-09(Rev 3), Guidance for Vessels Operating in High Risk Waters, Jan. 7, 2011, http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Port_Security_Advisory_2-09.pdf

3-09, Guidance on Self-defense or Defense of Others by U.S. Flagged Commercial Vessels Operating in High Risk Areas, http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Port_Security_Advisory_3-09_Self_Defense.pdf

4-09(Rev 4), International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Port_Security_Advisory_4-09_%28Rev_4%29.pdf

5-09(Rev 1), Minimum Guidelines for Contracted Security Services in High Risk Areas

6-09(Rev 1), Procedures for Obtaining a Name-Based Terrorism Check for Security Personnel Operating in High Risk Waters (HRW) In Accordance With Port Security Advisory (PSA) 05-09 (Rev. 1)

8-09, Port State Response to Request for Information regarding carriage and transport of self-defense weapons aboard U.S. commercial vessels, http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Port_Security_Advisory_Weapons_08-09.pdf

9-09, Expected Courses of Action following attacks by pirates in the Horn of Africa Region, http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Port_Security_Advisory_09-09.pdf

11-09 (Rev 1), U.S. Coast Guard Counter-Piracy Information, http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Port_Security_Advisory_%2811-09%29%28Rev_1%29_2.pdf

MARAD Advisories, http://www.marad.dot.gov/news_room_landing_page/maritime_advisories/advisory_summary.htm:

Marad Advisories

  • 2011-05     Risk to Vessels Transiting High Risk Waters (cancels 2011-01)
  • 2011-01     Risk to Vessels Transiting High Risk Waters (cancels 2010-09)
  • 2010-10     Vessels Transiting in the Strait of Hormuz, Southern Arabian Gulf, and Western Gulf of Oman (cancels 2010-08 and 2010-04)
  • 2010-09     Risk to Vessels Transiting High Risk Waters (cancels 2010-05)
  • 2010-06     Guidance to Vessels Transiting High Risk Waters
  • 2010-05     Risk to Vessels Transiting High Risk Waters (cancels 2009-07)
  • 2009-07     Gulf of Aden, Red Sea and Indian Ocean Transit (cancels 2009-02, 2009-04, 2009-05, and 2009-06)
  • 2009-06     Gulf of Aden, Red Sea and Indian Ocean Transit
  • 2009-05     East Coast of Somalia and Gulf of Aden Transit (cancels 2008-06 and 2009-03)
  • 2009-04     Gulf of Aden and Somalia Basin Transit (cancels 2009-01)
  • 2009-02     Gulf of Aden/East Coast of Somalia Anti-Piracy Distress Calling Procedures

Kenya Maritime Authority

Australian Maritime Safety Authority

Liberia Bureau of Maritime Affairs Maritime Security Advisories, http://www.liscr.com/liscr/Maritime/Documents/tabid/87/Default.aspx#164

  • 01/2011, 27 April 2011, Revised Registration, Reporting and Anti-Distress Calling, Emergency Contact Information for vessels transiting High Risk Areas of the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean (supercedes 09/2009)
  • 05/2009, 25 June 2009, Raising to Security Level II
  • 02/2009, 21 Jan. 2009, New UKMTO transit Corridor through the Gulf of Aden (superceded)
  • 13/2008, 15 Dec. 2008, Registration with MSCHOA
  • 11/2008, 17 Nov, 2008, Gulf of Aden Anti-Piracy Distress Calling Procedure and Emergency Contact Information
  • 10/2008, 10 Oct. 2008, Recommendations for Vessels Transiting the maritime Security Patrol Area

Marshall Islands Maritime Administrator, Maritime Safety Advisories, http://www.register-iri.com/content.cfm?catid=55

  • No. 2-011-31 (rev. 12/10), Piracy, Armed Attacks, Hijacking or Terrorism: Reporting Incidents, Ship Security Plans and Nest Management Practices
  • No. 52-09, 5 November 2009, Warning: Hijacking and Piracy in the Indian Ocean
  • No. 32-09, 9 July 2009, East Coast of Somalia – Weather Routing
  • No. 27-09, 11 June 2009, Update on Somalia Pirates
  • No. 26-09, 1 June 2009, Piracy Spreads to Red Sea
  • No. 25-09, 14 May 2009, Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean Transit Reminder
  • No. 17-09, 16 April 2009, Increased Pirate Attacks near the Seychelles
  • No. 12-09, 25 March 2009, UKMTO Public Meeting Held 23 March 2009
  • No. 2-09, 26 January 2009, Revised Gulf of Aden Transit Corridor–1 February 2009
  • No. 31-08, 3 Nov. 2009, Hijacking and Piracy in Somalia Waters (Northern Gulf of Aden)

Singapore Port Authority, Shipping Circulars, http://www.mpa.gov.sg/sites/port_and_shipping/circulars_and_notices/shipping_circulars.page

  • No. 11 of 2011, 10 June 2011, Guidance on the Use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on board Singapore-registered Ships in the High Risk Area
  • No. 10 of 2011, 9 May 2011, Changes to the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) Vessel Movement registration Instruction regarding Transits through the High Risk Area
  • No. 6 of 2011, 17 March 2011, Reminder to Adopt the Best Management Practices (version 3) to deter piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia (MSC.1/Circ.1337)
  • No. 2 of 2011, 17 Jan. 2011, Guidance for Company Security Officers – Preparation of a Company and Crew for the Contingency of Hiijack by Pirates in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden.
  • No. 14 of 2010, 24 Sept. 2010, Best Management Practices (version 3) to deter piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Coast of Somalia (MSC.1/Circ.1337)
  • No. 30 of 2009, 26 October 2009, Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and in the Indian Ocean near the coast of Somalia
  • No. 23 of 2009, 14 August 2009, New IMO Guidance for ship owners, managers, operators, agents, masters and crew members
  • No. 14 of 2009, 9 April 2009, Update on the Recent Developments in the Gulf of Aden and East Coast of Somalia
  • No. 9 of 2009, 23 Jan. 2009, Ships Operating in the Gulf of Aden – Update on the Revision of the Coordinates of the Maritime Security Patrol Area (MPSA) with effect from 1 Feb 2009
  • No. 31 of 2008, 30 Dec. 2008, Further Guidance for Ships Operating in the Gulf of Aden-Group Transits

United Kingdom, http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/global-issues/conflict-prevention/piracy/


PUC Disposition

U.S.-Kenya MOU, 16 January 2009

Implementing arrangements



International Maritime Organization Guidance

IMO Assembly Resolutions

  • A.1025(26) (2009), Code of practice for the investigation of the crimes of piracy and armed robbery against ships (revokes resolution A.922(22))
  • A.1026(26) (2009), Piracy and armed robbery against ships in waters off the coast of Somalia (revokes resolution A.1002(25))
  • A.1002(25) (2007), Piracy and armed robbery against ships in waters off the coast of Somalia (revokes resolution A.979(24))
  • A.979(24) (2005), Piracy and armed robbery against ships in waters off the coast of Somalia
  • A.738(18) (1993), Measures to prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships
  • A.683(17) (1991), Prevention and suppression of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships
  • A.545(13) (1983), Measures to prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships

IMO Legal Committee documents on piracy

  • LEG 98/8, Uniform and consistent application of the provisions of international conventions relating to piracy (Secretariat)
  • LEG 98/8/1, Piracy: elements of national legislation pursuant to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (UN-DOALOS)
  • LEG 98/8/2, Establishment of a legislative framework to allow for effective and efficient piracy prosecutions (UNODC)
  • LEG 98/8/3, Piracy: elements of national legislation pursuant to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (UN-DOALOS)
  • LEG 98/8/4, Establishment of a legislative framework to allow for effective and efficient piracy prosecutions (Ukraine)
  • LEG 98/14, Report of Legal Committee, section 8

Maritime Safety Committee Documents

MSC resolutions

  • MSC resolution MSC.305(87), 17 May 2010, Guidelines on Operational Procedures for the Promulgation of Maritime Safety Information Concerning Acts of Piracy and Piracy Counter-measure Operations
  • Montreux document on pertinent legal obligations and good practices for States related to operation of private military and security companies, 17 September 2008, MSC 89/INF.20 Annex
  • MSC resolution MSC.298(87), 21 May 2010, Establishment of a Distribution Facility for the Provision of LRIT Information to Security Forces Operating in Waters of the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean to aid their work in the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships (The Distribution Facility), and IMO Circular letter No. 3086, 22 July 2010, Availability of a distribution facility at IMO
  • MSC resolution MSC.32(89), 20 May 2011, Implementation of Best Management Practice Guidance

MSC circulars

  • MSC.1/Circ. 1408, Interim Recommendations for Port and Coastal States Regarding the Use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on Board Ships in the High Risk Area (18 Sept 2011); http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/HotTopics/piracy/Documents/1408.pdf
  • MSC.1/Circ. 1406, Revised Interim Recommendations for Flag States Regarding the Use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on Board Ships in the High Risk Area, (16 Sept 2011); http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/HotTopics/piracy/Documents/1406-rev-1.pdf
  • MSC.1/Circ. 1405, Revised Interim Guidance to Shipowners, Ship Operators, and Ship Masters on the Use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on Board Ships in the High Risk Area, (16 Sept 2011); http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/HotTopics/piracy/Documents/1405-rev-1.pdf
  • MSC.1/Circ. 1406, 23 May 2011, Interim Recommendations for Flag States regarding the use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on board Ships in the High Risk Area
  • MSC.1/Circ. 1405, 23 May 2011, Interim Guidance to Shipowners, Ship Operators, and Shipmasters on the Use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on board Ships in the High Risk Area
  • MSC.1/Circ. 1390, 9 Dec. 2010, Guidance for Company Security Officers (CSOs) – Preparation of a company and crew for the contingency of hijack by pirates in the western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden
  • MSC.1/Circ. 1337 (2010), Piracy and armed robbery against ships in waters off the coast of Somalia: Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Coast of Somalia developed by the industry [version 3] (revoking MSC.1/Circ. 1335(2009), Piracy and armed robbery against ships in waters off the coast of Somalia)
  • MSC.1/Circ. 1333 (2009), Recommendations to Governments for preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships (replaces MSC/Circ.622/Rev.1)
  • MSC.1/Circ. 1334 (2009), Guidance to shipowners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships (replaces MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3)
  • MSC/Circ.1073 (2003), Directives for Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centres (MRCCs) on Acts of Violence against Ships

Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, 2009, IMO docs. C 102/14, Annex; C 106/12/1, 3 May 2011, Implementation of the Djibouti Code of Conduct

SN.1/Circ.281, Information on Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) for Ships Transiting the Gulf of Aden, 32 August 2009

Seoul Statement on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, 10 June 2009, IMO doc. C 102/INF.3, Annex


Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia


Plenary Meetings

CGPCS Working Group 1 (coordination and information sharing) Chairman’s Conclusions

CGPCS Working Group 2 (judicial aspects of piracy) Chairman’s Conclusions

Working Group 2’s Legal Toolbox

Evidence Collection, IMO MSC 88/INF.10:

  • US Counter-Piracy Evidence Collection Guidance
  • Kenya Transfer Guidance for Piracy Suspects
  • Seychelles Transfer Guide

CGPCS Working Group 3 (industry) Chairman’s Conclusions

Working Group 3 Guidance:

  • Guidance to Company Security Officers (CSOs)—Preparation of a Company and Crew for the Contingency of Hijack by Pirates, IMO MSC 88/18/2 Annex
  • Post-Piracy Care for Seafarers, Guidance ver. 2.0, 16 Sept. 2010, IMO MSC 88/18/1 Annex

CGPCS Working Group 4 (diplomatic and public information) Chairman’s Conclusions

CGPCS Working Group 5 (disruption of pirate enterprise ashore) – Established by 9th meeting of CGPCS, 14 July 2011, Italy chair


Treaties and Implementing Legislation

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay Dec. 10, 1982, entered into force Nov. 10, 1994, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122, 1833 UNTS 397, 21 ILM 1621-1354 (1982), articles 100-107, 110 (piracy), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Rome March 10, 1988, entered into force March 1, 1992, 27 ILM 672 (1988), 1678 UNTS 221, available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/Conv8-english.pdf and http://treaties.un.org/Pages/UNTSOnline.aspx

International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, New York Dec. 17, 1979, entered into force June 3, 1983, 1316 UNTS 205, available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/english-18-5.pdf, and http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism/Conv5.pdf

International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, with annex, New York Dec. 9, 1999, entered into force April 10, 2002, 39 ILM 270 (2000), 2178 UNTS 197, available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/english-18-11.pdfhttp://www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htmhttp://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism/Conv12.pdf

UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (TOC), New York Nov. 15, 2000, entered into force Sept. 29, 2003, 40 ILM 353 (2001), 2225 UNTS 209, available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf and www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/index.html

  • United States: (pre-existing legislation)

UN Convention against Corruption, New York Dec, 11, 2003, entered into force Dec. 14, 2005, UN doc. A/58/422, 2349 UNTS 41, 43 ILM 37, available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%202349/v2349.pdf and http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf

Reviews of National Legislation:

  • IMO docs. LEG 98/14, sec. 8, LEG 97/15 sec. 9

United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, National Legislation on Piracy, available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/piracy/piracy_national_legislation.htm (updated January 2011)


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